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Internationalisation is the buzzword in higher education, and indeed it would be a challenge 
to find a university that has no internationalisation strategies. However, very few studies have 
explored higher education internationalisation from a strategic management perspective. 
Thus, little is known about how universities formulate and implement internationalisation 
strategies and perhaps more importantly how such strategies are being executed or realised 
into concrete outcomes. The present study aims to address this gap by exploring how 
internationalisation strategies are made sense of and realised by three university 
stakeholders who are not conventionally strategy-makers but are instrumental in creating 
outcomes for internationalisation strategies: deans, lecturers and students.  
The theoretical grounding of this study is based on the Strategy-as-Practice approach in 
strategic management and sensemaking theory. Empirical evidence is gathered from two 
case studies in Vietnam using a combination of semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
document analysis, quasi-ethnographic campus visits and social media analysis.   
This study has found that the outcomes of internationalisation strategies and even the 
strategies themselves are shaped by how deans, lecturers and students make sense of them. 
This sensemaking is special in that most of the time (a) it happens without intent, due to the 
three stakeholders’ lack of interest in university-level strategic matters, and (b) it is indirect 
and implicit, because the stakeholders seldom have access to formal strategic information 
but rather become aware of internationalisation strategies by noticing internationalisation 
matters in the mundane, routine tasks of their respective roles. Briefly put, sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies occur through sensemaking of role-related tasks. Which and 
how the tasks, and thus internationalisation strategies, are made sense of then depend on 
the distinct role features and individual schemas of deans, lecturers and students, and can be 
constrained by institutional forces at the meso (organisational) and macro (extra-
organisational, field, societal) levels. In the end, the three stakeholders’ sensemaking lead 
them towards actions that create a spectrum of outcomes for internationalisation strategies, 
ranging from better-than-intended to complete failure. More importantly, some of the 
actions result in emergent ways of doing that replace formal strategies as the university’s de 
facto internationalisation strategies. In rare cases, non-leaders’ sensemaking may even 
stimulate strategy innovation or adjustment. 
The findings also respectively highlight the role of frontline engagement, micro-politics and 
social media in the sensemaking process of deans, lecturers and students. In addition, it has 
been found that deans, lecturers and students’ meaning-making can be leveraged to great 
effects by top management via empowerment. 
The insights generated in this study have provided contributions to three literatures, namely 
higher education internationalisation, Strategy-as-Practice and sensemaking. My study also 
carries practical implications for the strategic management of higher education 
internationalisation.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the internationalisation strategies of a university 
are realised (or executed) via the sensemaking of deans, lecturers and students, all of whom 
are not conventionally institutional strategy-makers and yet are instrumental to the success 
or failure of strategies. The study is positioned at the intersection of higher education 
internationalisation and strategic management, seeking to apply a strategic management 
perspective to studying higher education internationalisation. The theoretical scaffolding, 
therefore, is rooted in the strategic management and organisation studies literatures; more 
specifically, this study borrows heavily from the Strategy-as-Practice movement (see 
Golsorkhi et al., 2015a for an overview), which calls for exploration of strategy as people’s 
actions rather than organisations’ properties, and from Karl Weick’s sensemaking theory 
(Weick, 1995; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). The key feature of such theoretical scaffolding is 
its focus on the micro (individual and group) in order to generate insights for both the micro 
and meso (organisation) – the micro and meso in this case being people’s sensemaking and 
university strategies, respectively. Methodologically, the present study is a qualitative, 
comparative case study of two Vietnamese universities that have explicit internationalisation 
strategies and are actively internationalising, with the data collected from individual 
interviews, focus groups, documents, campus visits and social media. The Vietnamese 
context is chosen for its long history of higher education internationalisation (Tran, 
Marginson, & Nguyen, 2014), relative novelty (Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, 
2013; University of Oxford, 2015) and practicality – I myself am Vietnamese and was 
educated in Vietnam up to university level, and I have a personal network of lecturers, 
academic managers, highschool teachers and my own students, all of whom could help with 
case selection if not access. While based in Vietnam, the study is expected to generate 
theoretical contributions and practical implications that are transferrable (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) to other contexts.  
 
This introductory chapter provides the background for the study by explaining the 
motivation behind it (1.1), which is both personal to me and grounded in the literature on 
higher education internationalisation. Thereafter, I will present the research question and 
demonstrate how it has been refined thanks to the incorporation of the strategic 
management and organisation studies literatures, specifically sensemaking theory (1.2). The 
next section briefly addresses the terminology and theoretical assumptions of the term 
‘university non-leaders’, which I use as a collective for deans, lecturers and students (1.3). The 
last section of this chapter outlines the structure of thesis (1.4). 
 
1.1. Motivation for the study: Personal interest and gap in the literature 
The motivation for this study can be traced back to when I did my Master’s degree in English 
language teaching at the University of Bath in the UK. One of the first things I noticed about 
Bath upon arrival, or during induction week to be more precise was how much the university 
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promoted itself as being international. For example, there was the One World Week1, which 
was a series of events for students to showcase the culture of their home countries and for 
staff to present research done internationally. Another example was the induction session of 
my programme, where the programme director said Bath accommodated over 100 
nationalities2 in its staff and student body. Nonetheless, what struck me the most was the 
background of my lecturers, all of whom had not only worked but lived in at least two 
countries, and one of them had taught for many years in my home country of Vietnam.  
 
I was thus curious as to how Bath developed its international aspects – back then I was not 
aware of the term ‘internationalisation’. More specifically, I was less interested in the 
academic dimension of internationalisation, such as appropriate pedagogies for a multi-
cultural classroom, than its managerial one. To start with, it was a wonder to me how one 
university that was not world-renown, at least reputationally (unlike, say, Oxford, Stanford, 
National University of Singapore or Tokyo) managed to recruit and handle visas for over 100 
nationalities. While it was easy to attribute this highly diverse student and staff body to 
globalisation and the pull of the British economy, I also believed the university itself had to 
have internationalisation plans and was effective in executing them. For example, I first came 
into contact with Bath through its Asia Pacific representative, who visited Vietnam two times 
per year; in order for the university to maintain its nationality diversity track record, the 
representative must have fulfilled her responsibilites really well, and this begged the 
question of how. Nonetheless, it never occurred to me to pursue the management of 
internationalisation as a research topic, as it was irrelevant to my Master’s programme plus I 
had no intent on a career in academia, so the idea remained a little, fun thought exercise. 
 
I started to consider undertaking research into higher education internationalisation several 
months after the completion of my Master’s. By then I had returned to Vietnam and, 
alongside teaching English, started a researcher position at an international research agency 
specialising in lifelong learning. This provided me with opportunities to meet scholars from 
around the world and engage in various projects, which often commenced and ended with 
an international conference. In this way, the job re-ignited my interest in internationalisation, 
as I found myself wondering how these scholars were so mobile. In addition, I was also 
considering an academic career. Eventually, I felt there was merit in revisiting and pursuing 
the management of internationalisation as a research topic and therefore decided to 
develop it into a doctoral research project.  
 
The specific issues I wished to study were (a) the formulation of university 
internationalisation plans and (b) the reception and realisation (or execution) of these plans 
by people at lower levels of the decision-making hierarchy whom I termed ‘non-leaders’, like 





Bath’s representative in Asia Pacific, the lecturers of my Master’s programme (including the 
programme director) and the scholars I met in my job. It was quickly decided, however, that 
such a study would be too ambitious, so I narrowed my research interests to the reception 
and realisation of internationalisation plans by three specific non-leader groups: deans, 
lecturers and students (see 1.3 for my theoretical assumptions). Thus, this study was 
conceived. 
 
Given my research interests, this study would be positioned at the intersection of research 
into higher education internationalisation and strategic management (I found that a 
university’s plans were called strategies). Therefore, the first necessary step was to consult 
both literatures in order to gain a baseline understanding of internationalisation and 
strategic management. I paid particular attention to research on higher education 
internationalisation from a strategic management perspective to see if my idea had been 
explored and if so what were other potential gaps that I could examine for this study. My 
literature review was accomplished with two databases: Web of Science and Scopus, and the 
search engine Google Scholar; the keywords used included, to name a few, university 
internationalisation, university internationalisation strategy, university internationalisation 
strategy implementation, internationalisation strategy dean, strategic management of 
internationalisation lecturer. I found that, while there had been studies into 
internationalisation as university strategies (see 2.1.3 for a detailed review), none of them 
had addressed the reception and realisation of internationalisation strategies by deans, 
lecturers and students. In fact, most of these studies only utilise the theoretical resources of 
strategic management in a perfunctory manner (also see 2.1.3). Therefore, not only would 
my study be original, but there was a lot of scope to cross-fertilise higher education 
internationalisation and strategic management.  
 
In the end, the literature review affirmed my motivation to pursue the study and led to the 
framing of my research question:  
How are university internationalisation strategies received and realised by non-leaders? 
 
1.2. Research question: A short evolution 
While having an original and interdisciplinary question was undoubtedly motivating, it also 
presented a challenge given there was little guidance on which theoretical lens and 
methodology could be used. As I further examined the strategic management literature, I 
found one particular theoretical-methodological approach to strategy research that could 
provide a sound solution: Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) (see 2.2.2 for a detailed review). SAP is 
an approach that focuses on the ‘micro-level social activities, processes and practices’ 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2015b, p.1) involved in strategy making and implementation. This marks a 
movement away from conventional strategy research which places emphasis on strategies 
themselves and their impact on organisational performance (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). 
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SAP draws upon a lot of theories from sociology and organisation studies and is oriented 
toward qualitative methodology.  
 
Among the theories used by SAP scholars, Karl Weick’s sensemaking (Weick, 1995; Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014) appeared a strong fit with my research question (see 2.2.3 for a detailed 
review). Sensemaking is an organisation theory of how people make meaning of 
organisational ambiguities, and how organisations emerge from the exploratory and 
experimental actions that they take during meaning-making. In this way, the theory 
addresses both the notions of ‘reception’ (meaning making) and ‘realisation’ (action) in my 
research question. For this reason, when adopting sensemaking as the theoretical lens, I was 
inspired to refine my research question by combining reception and realisation into the 
concept of sensemaking: 
How are university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? 
This became my final research question, which I believe is definitely better than the initial 
one because it is more theoretically precise and therefore able to inform the readers of the 
theoretical grounding of my study. Moreover, it was hoped that answering the question 
would generate insights not only for higher education internationalisation, specifically the 
sensemaking (reception and realisation) of internationalisation strategies by deans, lecturers 
and students, but potentially also for SAP and sensemaking, since I found in the literature 
that little SAP or sensemaking research has dealt the context of university 
internationalisation. 
 
1.3. ‘University non-leaders’ 
Before proceeding to the body of the thesis, I wish to address the terminology and 
theoretical assumptions of this study, which revolve around the term ‘university non-leaders’. 
As stated above, I created the term to indicate a collective of people at the lower levels of a 
university’s decision-making hierarchy. More precisely, I consider non-leaders to be anyone 
outside of a university’s governance (e.g. board or council members, academic senates) and 
executive/top management (e.g. the Vice-Chancellor, Pro-Vice Chancellors). Therefore, the 
verb ‘lead’ here does not take on an intuitive, common sense definition of ‘to lead other 
people’; rather, it means ‘to govern or manage at a corporate level’. 
 
In this study, I assume that strategy-making is a distinct responsibility and right of university 
leaders. This does not mean, however, that non-leaders cannot contribute to strategy-
making or devise their own strategic initiatives, but this is only possible if leaders enable 
them to. This assumption makes an investigation into the strategic role of non-leaders 
interesting because they are the ones realising strategies despite little if any control over 





Another terminological note I wish to make concerns the term ‘university’. What constitutes 
a university varies across countries (see Forest & Altbach, 2007, pp. 159-206, 409-572) and in 
some cases the term ‘university’ is synonymous with higher education. In this study, I use 
university and higher education interchangeably to refer to postsecondary institutions that 
deliver academic undergraduate and postgraduate education and are allowed to grant 
degrees by the state. My understanding is based on the International Standard Classification 
of Education by UNESCO3.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis contains eight chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on higher education internationalisation in order to define the concept of 
internationalisation in higher education and demonstrate the strategic significance of 
internationalisation to universities. I will concentrate on any internationalisation research that 
has taken a strategic management perspective, based on which I will argue that there is a 
need for internationalisation research to engage more substantially with the strategic 
management literature. The second half of Chapter 2 establishes my theoretical framework 
to resolve the research question by examining and incorporating the SAP approach and 
sensemaking theory. 
 
Chapter 3 details the methodology used in this study. It begins with a disclosure of my 
paradigmatic stance of pragmatism, by which methodological choices have been made. My 
comparative case design is then introduced, along with the criteria for case selection and the 
expected empirical output from each case. The next section of Chapter 3 looks at the context 
of this study: Vietnam and the city of Saigon. With the design and context established, I 
describe how two Vietnamese universities (coded Blue and Red) were chosen as cases and 
how participants were recruited. This is followed by a historical report of the data collection 
and analysis procedures. At the end of Chapter 3, I talk about the maintenance of ethics and 
quality throughout the study. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5 respectively present the case studies of Blue and Red. Each chapter starts 
with the institutional profile of one university, including its history, organisational structure, 
corporate strategy and internationalisation strategies. This is followed by a report of how its 
internationalisation strategies were made sense of by deans, lecturers and students. Due to 
the space constraint of this thesis, only a few strategies are included; these strategies are 
chosen for yielding interview accounts that portray the university from multiple perspectives 
and that generate distinct themes. Chapter 4 and 5 will empirically show that the strategic 





management of university internationalisation depends considerably on non-leaders’ 
sensemaking.  
 
Chapter 6 further exhausts the data by comparing the two cases. It will focus on cross-case 
patterns in the sensemaking of internationalisation strategies by each non-leader group 
across Blue and Red, as well as the impact of institutional contexts on sensemaking. While 
Chapter 4 and 5 evidence the role of non-leaders’ sensemaking in internationalisation 
strategies, Chapter 6 serves to delineate the manner in which sensemaking of the strategies 
might be done by deans, lecturers and students. This will become the direct basis for 
discussion. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the sensemaking of university internationalisation strategies by non-
leaders, bringing together the findings of Chapter 4, 5 and especially 6. The discussion will 
examine key sensemaking issues that have emerged from the case studies, some of which 
apply to all non-leader groups while some are unique to one. From these intergroup and 
intragroup issues, I will then draw (a) the answer to my research question How are university 
internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? and in turn (b) knowledge 
contributions to the strategic management of university internationalisation, as well as to 
SAP and sensemaking theory. Ultimately, this study has found that there is more to the 
strategic management of university internationalisation than having and implementing the 
right strategy, in that the outcomes of internationalisation strategies and even the strategies 
themselves are shaped by the sensemaking of deans, lecturers and students. Moreover, the 
way these non-leader groups make sense of internationalisation strategies is special as it is 
often unintentional, implicit and embedded in the mundane, routine tasks of their roles. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the thesis and outlines its practical implications and limitations. 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: First, it reviews extant literature on 
internationalisation in higher education in order to define the subject-matter and examine 
any previous studies that have taken a strategic management perspective to investigate 
internationalisation. Second, from this review it demonstrates the scarcity and theoretical 
shortcomings of strategy-based research into higher education internationalisation, thus 
arguing for the necessity of deeper engagement with the strategic management literature by 
scholars in higher education internationalisation. In turn, the originality of the present study 
is proven. Third and finally, the chapter reviews the strategic management literature to 
establish a theoretical framework for this study. 
 
All literature in this study has been found with two databases: Web of Science and Scopus, 
supplemented by the search engine Google Scholar. The 10 core keywords are higher 
education internationalisation, university internationalisation, higher education 
internationalisation strategy, university internationalisation strategy, strategic management of 
higher education internationalisation, strategic management of university internationalisation, 
strategic management, strategy, middle managers, frontliners. All other keywords are derived 
from the 10 core keywords (e.g. university internationalisation deans) or result from the 
literature found using these 10 keywords (e.g. strategy as practice). Both British and American 
spelling have been used. 
 
The chapter is split into two main sections. Section 2.1 will provide an indepth look into what 
internationalisation is and why it is a strategic matter for universities. The section will also 
review existing studies into internationalisation as university strategies. Section 2.1 fulfils the 
first two goals of this chapter. In Section 2.2, I will examine the concept of strategy as defined 
by numerous authors from the 1940s to early 2000s. The Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) approach 
in strategy research is then presented, followed by sensemaking theory. Section 2.2 
constitutes the theoretical framework of this study, which is the third and final goal of this 
chapter. 
 
I wish to note that, as mentioned in the Introduction chapter, my research question 
underwent a short evolution from its initial, preliminary phrasing How are university 
internationalisation strategies received and realised by non-leaders?  into How are university 
internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? This refinement was inspired by 
and only came after my review of sensemaking theory, which as will be shown perfectly 
captures both notions of ‘reception’ and ‘realisation’. In order to reflect the evolution of the 
research question and its link with sensemaking theory, in this chapter I will refer to the 
preliminary phrasing whenever the research question is mentioned up until the introduction 
of sensemaking theory in 2.2.3, at which point I will demonstrate how the theory has helped 
refine the question into its final phrasing. 
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2.1. Higher education internationalisation  
This section reviews the literature on higher education internationalisation in order to define 
the subject-matter and examine any research into higher education internationalisation from 
a strategic management perspective, thereby generating insights for my (as of now 
preliminary) research question How are university internationalisation strategies received and 
realised by non-leaders? In so doing, I will also demonstrate the importance of 
internationalisation as a strategic area for universities and therefore the necessity of studying 
internationalisation as strategies. More importantly, the review identifies the strategic 
management of internationalisation as a gap in extant research, thereby substantiating the 
relevance of my study and more generally the cross-fertilisation of the higher education 
internationalisation and strategic management literatures, where my study is positioned.  
 
This section begins by synthesising the various definitions of internationalisation in higher 
education (2.1.1) into a working understanding for this study. The rationales for 
internationalisation are then outlined (2.1.2), demonstrating why it has become a ‘ubiquitous 
buzzword’ (Brandenburg, 2016, Times Higher Education blog) for universities and also a 
matter of strategic importance. Finally, any internationalisation research that has been 
conducted from a strategic management perspective is examined (2.1.3) to see if they offer 
theoretical insights for my study. 
 
2.1.1. Conceptualising internationalisation: A historical view 
Originally used in economics, internationalisation only gained popularity in education, 
particularly higher education, in the 1990s with Knight’s (1994) seminal publication 
Internationalization: Elements and Checkpoints. Historically, however, the notion of having an 
international dimension in higher education can be traced to the term ‘international 
education’, which was itself a popular research topic post-World War II. International 
education is an umbrella term that, according to Harari (1972), involves the international 
content of the curriculum, international movement of scholars and students, and 
international technical assistance and educational programmes. Harari’s ideas are reiterated 
by Arum and van de Water (1992), who build upon various definitions of international 
education and develop their own: ‘the multiple activities, programs and services that fall 
within international studies, international educational exchange and technical cooperation’ 
(p. 202). The common feature of these early definitions is that international education exists 
as a separate set of activities that are recognisable for their international dimension (e.g. 
student and staff exchange, international development studies). This clear-cut view, however, 
also creates a fragmented approach where people who participate in one activity of 
international education are often disconnected from those in another and moreover from 
the rest of the institution (de Wit, 2002; Green & Olson, 2003). Thus, there arose a need to 




‘Internationalisation’ emerged as an alternative term in the early 90s and was first defined by 
Knight (1993, cited in Knight, 1994, p. 7) as 
the process of integrating the international dimension into the teaching, 
research and service functions of an institution of higher education 
The definition marks a shift from an activity-focused to a process-focused perspective. Unlike 
international education, internationalisation proposes that the international dimension 
should not be contained within discreet activities but continually integrated into all aspects 
of the higher education institution (HEI). This reflects the increasing importance of being 
international in higher education (de Wit, 2013a) and shows that it is a much more complex 
matter than individual activities or programmes, which themselves have been growing in 
quantity and diversity (Green & Olson, 2003; de Haan, 2014). Internationalisation therefore 
became the term of choice from the 1990s, and Knight’s definition has greatly influenced 
subsequent works in the field.  
 
Knight’s definition, however, is not the only attempt to conceptualise internationalisation. On 
the contrary, numerous authors have taken the process perspective as starting point and 
arrived at their own understanding. Table 1 below presents the existing definitions of 
internationalisation, which span the 1990s and early 2000s with Knight herself updating her 
definition in 2004. 
Table 1. Definitions of internationalisation 
Scholar Year Definition Level of analysis 
Knight 1993 
the process of integrating the international dimension into the 
teaching, research and service functions of an institution of higher 
education (cited in Knight, 1994, p. 7) 
organisational 
Rudzki 1995 
a defining feature of all universities, encompassing organisational 
change, curriculum innovation, staff development and student 
mobility, for the purposes of achieving excellence in teaching and 




any systematic effort aimed at making higher education 
responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the 




the process of integrating an international perspective into a 





ongoing, counter hegemonic educational process that occurs in 
an international context of knowledge and practice where 
societies are viewed as subsystems of a larger, inclusive world. The 
process of internationalization at an educational institution entails 
a comprehensive, multifaceted program of action that is 





a change process from a national higher education institution to 
an international higher education institution leading to the 
inclusion of an international dimension in all aspects of its holistic 
management in order to enhance the quality of teaching and 
learning and to achieve the desired competencies (p. 29) 
organisational 
Knight 2004 
the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global 
dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of 




the totality of substantial changes in the context and inner life of 
higher education relative to an increasing frequency of border-





All the authors refer to internationalisation as a process either explicitly, using the word 
‘process’ itself, or implicitly, associating internationalisation with change (Rudzki, 1995; van 
der Wende, 1997; Teichler, 2004). Their definitions, nonetheless, clearly differ in some 
respects. First, while some frame internationalisation within the organisational settings of a 
HEI, others broaden this process to a whole higher education sector, thus involving agencies 
that draft or influence national internationalisation policies. The second difference is whether 
a rationale is mentioned. While Rudzki (1995) and Soderqvist (2002) highlight enhancing 
academic quality as the main purpose of internationalisation, most definitions do not include 
any rationales for internationalisation and in fact Knight (2004) argues that specific rationales 
should not be stated in a definition as they greatly vary across nations and institutions. Third, 
some authors (van der Wende, 1997; Schoorman, 1999; Teichler, 2004) posit 
internationalisation either as a response or counter to globalisation. This is because 
globalisation has significant impact on higher education in general, which includes inter alia 
massification, the creation of a global labour market for scholars and the rise of English as a 
lingua franca (Altbach, 2015).    
  
One definition that deserves special mention belongs to Rudzki (1995), who suggests that all 
universities are intrinsically international. The author argues that this ‘priori nature’ is 
necessary for a university to ‘claim legitimacy’ (p. 421) for their knowledge production, and 
thus it is contradictory for one to be provincial or national. This view is shared, although less 
strongly, by Maringe, Foskett and Woodfield (2013), who state that because all universities 
are international by nature, internationalisation is not about integrating but rather 
‘intensify[ing]’ (p. 11) their international dimension. I do not wholly agree with these 
arguments; rather, I would concur with de Wit (2011a) that such position is misconceived. I 
would argue instead that universities are intrinsically international only in the sense that the 
knowledge they teach and produce should not be restricted to any border. This does not 
mean they are not national or even provincial in purpose and operation. On the contrary, 
universities are embedded in their national context, some being created to address national 
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issues (Scott, 2000). As a result, they bear features that are characteristic of their country of 
origin, and the specific knowledge they choose to teach and produce may serve first and 
foremost local needs even when such knowledge itself is internationally applicable.   
 
There seems to have been no new definition from the late 2000s. Instead, the literature saw 
the emergence of alternative labels such as mainstreaming, comprehensive, holistic, 
integrated and deep internationalisation. These labels are in fact ‘tautologies’ (de Wit, 2013a, 
p. 26), using different words to refer to the same concept (e.g. internationalisation cannot be 
internationalisation without being comprehensive). This consequently causes a conceptual 
confusion without making much impact on practice (de Wit, 2013a). Therefore, this section 
will not discuss them in detail. 
 
Work on conceptualising internationalisation was revitalised in 2011, when the International 
Association of Universities (IAU) called for a rethinking of internationalisation following its 3rd 
Global Survey conducted in 2009. This request arose out of eight reasons among which were 
the misalignment between the discourse and practice of internationalisation, the under-
representation of non-western perspectives and the issues of values and ethics. Even though 
the initiative has not produced any new definition, it is an important reminder of the need to 
critically examine the internationalisation concept. 
 
There is, however, another and very recent exercise that did result in a new definition. In 
2014, the European Parliament commissioned a study to ‘scrutinise internationalisation 
strategies in higher education, with a particular focus on Europe’ (European Parliament, 2015, 
p. 2). The study drew data from 17 country reports both in and outside Europe, an analysis of 
digital learning and two major surveys (the IAU 4th Global Survey and the European Associate 
for International Education (EAIE) Barometer: Internationalisation in Europe). A Delphi Panel 
among experts in the field was also conducted to identify a future scenario for the 
internationalisation of higher education in Europe. The results were published in July 2015 
and, based on the outcome of the Delphi Panel, included a revision of Knight’s (2004) 
definition (revised parts are in bold): 
[internationalisation is] the intentional process of integrating an international, 
intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions and delivery of 
post-secondary education, in order to enhance the quality of education and 
research for all students and staff, and to make a meaningful 
contribution to society (European Parliament, 2015, p. 281) 
This expanded definition emphasises that internationalisation should be planned 
(‘intentional’) and that its main purpose is quality enhancement and social engagement. 
Internationalisation must also be inclusive rather than ‘elitist’ (European Parliament, 2015, p. 
29) by benefitting not just the mobile minority but all students and staff. Compared to the 
previous definitions, this one does not really add any new understanding to the concept, and 
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I would argue that its significance lies not in being a definition but a political commitment 
towards academic quality and the betterment of society via internationalisation. As a 
consequence, it neglects other rationales for internationalisation and the potential for 
internationalisation to be an unplanned, emergent process, especially at institutions where 
internationalisation is initiated from the bottom-up due to, for example, scholars establishing 
contact and collaborating with colleagues in other countries (see also Figure 2 in 2.1.3). 
 
All the presented definitions show that even as a nascent concept in higher education 
research, internationalisation has become a locus for debate and that there is no single 
shared view of what it really is. That said, from the above discussions a working 
understanding of internationalisation can be drawn for the present study:  
• First, internationalisation in higher education may occur at an organisational or 
national/sectoral level. This study locates internationalisation squarely at the 
organisational level.  
• Second, internationalisation is not the organisation of discreet international activities but 
a process that integrates an international dimension into all aspects of a HEI. This has 
implications for my study in that it has to cover all component strategies of a university 
(e.g. teaching, research) if not the whole corporate strategy because internationalisation 
strategies can be integrated in any of them (see footnote 4 on next page and Section 
2.2.1 for an explanation of component and corporate strategy).  
• Finally, internationalisation is embedded in globalisation and national, even local 
contexts. This suggests any analyses of internationalisation strategies should take into 
account macro influences like globalisation forces and national policies. I wish to 
emphasise here, however, that my study does not examine internationalisation strategies 
per se but rather their reception and realisation by university members outside top 
management, namely deans, lecturers and students. In this way, I take the 
internationalisation strategies of the Vietnamese universities I investigate (see Chapter 3 
for details of the research sites) as given and provide no analysis of them or the macro 
contexts in which they were conceived. That said, the empirical evidence of the strategies 
might still very well reveal influences by globalisation and the Vietnamese context.  
 
Now that a working understanding of internationalisation has been established, I will turn to 
the reasons internationalisation has become a compelling strategic matter for universities. 
  
2.1.2. Strategic significance 
Internationalisation has long been considered a strategic issue for universities (Rudzki, 1995; 
Kehm & Teichler, 2007; Warwick, 2014) and recently a ‘ubiquitous buzzword’ (Brandenburg, 
2016, Times Higher Education blog). Indeed, formally stated internationalisation strategies or 
the mention of internationalisation in corporate vision and mission can easily be found on 
the websites and promotion materials of many institutions, whether they are in the Northern 
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or Southern hemisphere, Eastern or Western, established education hubs (the US, UK and 
Australia) or not. Below are examples taken from six universities in these locations: 
Table 2. Sample strategic statements of internationalisation  
University Location Role of internationalisation 
Aarhus University Denmark  (Northern hemisphere)  
Part of corporate vision 
One of the five component strategies4 but apparently much 
more emphasised than the other four 









A strategic focus, especially in terms of rankings and 
cooperation 






Stuttgart Germany (the West) 
Part of corporate mission 
One of the six strategic goals (arguably equivalent to a 
component strategy) 
Also integrated into two other goals 
Source: 
https://www.uni-stuttgart.de/en/university/profile/mission/  
University of Malaya Malaysia (the East) 
Part of corporate vision 
One of the seven component strategies 









Part of corporate vision 




                                                 
4 Note on terminology: A component or functional strategy can be understood in two ways: It can be a strategic 
area, a collective of specific strategies that are similar in purpose (e.g. finance, human resources), or it can be one 
of those specific strategies. This study draws on the former sense. For example, Aarhus University has five 
component strategies: research, education, talent development, knowledge exchange, internationalisation. The 
component strategy of research consists of three specific strategies: Increase the number of research areas in the 
international elite, focus on societal challenges and strengthen cooperation, attract more external funding (see 









Part of corporate vision 
One of the five component strategies 






It would therefore be a challenge to find a university that does not strategically plan to 
become international or to expand its existing international dimension.  
 
The strategic emphasis on internationalisation stems from the various benefits it brings to 
the HEI. These benefits, which can also be considered rationales, can be grouped under three 
broad categories: economic, academic and sociocultural (Knight, 1997; de Wit, 2002). First, 
economic benefits are considered the dominant rationale behind internationalisation (de 
Wit, 2011b), especially considering the immediate financial incentives that export activities, 
as a form of internationalisation, generate (de Wit, 2002). The most widely used form of 
export is the recruitment of international students who inter alia pay a higher fee for tuition 
and services (Maringe, 2010). Many American and European universities also consider 
internationalisation the solution to pressures from increasingly tighter financial conditions 
that they operate in (Davies, 1992).  
 
Second, internationalisation can be used to enhance teaching and research and build 
capacity. It has been suggested that an international dimension can ward against 
parochialism (de Wit, 2002); that is, it helps the academic community avoid a narrow view of 
the world and think critically about the complex reality among nations and cultures. Where 
mobility is involved, internationalisation also allows students and faculty to broaden their 
learning and cultural experience in various contexts. Yet another major argument of the 
academic rationale is that internationalisation will enhance teaching and research quality, 
and lead to the achievement of international academic standards. This notion of standards, 
however, might be problematic because it raises the question of how and by whom 
standards are defined and, as pointed out by Knight (1999), the concern of a homogenising 
view on excellence in scholarship and research. Another reason for internationalisation is its 
contribution to the institution in the form of academic resources gained through 
international cooperation (de Wit, 2002). Institution development, however, may also relate 
to the competition for profile and status, the attainment of which (e.g., being top of an 
international ranking) is often controversially assumed to equate quality (Marginson & van 
der Wende, 2007).   
 
Finally, sociocultural diversity can be promoted and preserved via internationalisation. 
Universities can become hubs where different ethnicities, cultures and languages mingle, 
thus nurturing intercultural understanding both between and within communities at various 
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levels (Ryan, 2012). This also enables them to offer the local community ‘a forum for learning, 
research and social debate’ (The Liaison Committee, 1992, in Knight & de Wit, 1995, p. 12). 
Equally important are the benefits internationalisation brings to the individuals, namely 
academics, staff members, managers and most importantly graduates. Engagement in 
intercultural activities enables them to gain valuable skills, including but not limited to 
language, communication, cultural sensitivity, all of which help them to develop as global 
citizens (Jones, 2013). This in turn prepares them to function well in a global labour market 
where such intercultural competence is increasingly a requisite.  
 
While these three categories are not the only way internationalisation rationales can be 
conceptualised, they are chosen for providing clear framework for understanding why a 
certain HEI internationalises (Knight, 1997). The importance of answering the ‘why’ question 
for internationalisation cannot be understated, both in understanding and more importantly 
in putting the process into practice (Knight, 2008; de Wit, 2013b). At the very least, having 
clear rationales helps define the directions and final outcomes of internationalisation 
strategies as well as how they can be achieved, thus keeping them from being ad hoc and 
fragmented (de Wit, 2014). Additionally, the relative priority of these rationales may reveal 
what and whose values are attached to internationalisation (Knight, 2013). As a side note, 
internationalisation also carries a political rationale (ibid.), but this is more relevant to nations 
than HEIs (e.g. scholarships can be a foreign policy tool) and therefore excluded from this 
study.  
 
2.1.3. The strategic management of higher education internationalisation 
Given the strategic significance of internationalisation, it is no surprise that there has long 
been research into internationalisation as strategies and their management (Davies 1992; 
Taylor, 2004; Bremer, 2018). What is surprising, however, is that most of this body of works 
appears to engage little if at all with the vast literature on strategic management, and 
consequently the strategic dimension of internationalisation has been examined rather 
superficially. To begin with, there is a group of studies that invoke the word ‘strategy’ simply 
to advocate for and/or propose a planned approach to internationalisation, or to refer to 
empirical internationalisation strategies of particular HEIs (e.g. Knight, 2008a; Knight, 2008b; 
de Wit, 2011a; Ho, Lin, & Yang 2015). They do not utilise in any degree the theoretical 
resources of strategic management, thus lacking theoretical depth. For example, Taylor’s 
(2004) study on four universities’ internationalisation strategies refers to no strategy research 
and is very descriptive as it only presents and compares the content of these institutions’ 
internationalisation strategies. Moreover, studies in this group tend to use the word 
‘strategy’ ambiguously and confusingly. A clear example is Knight and de Wit’s (1995) paper 
(see also Knight, 2008a), in which the authors suggest that in order to internationalise, an 
institution should implement two sets of strategies: programme strategies and 
organisational strategies (see Table 3 below). Many of their strategies, like ‘articulated 
rationale’ or ‘academic support units’, hardly fit any established conceptualisations of 
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strategy (to be discussed in 2.2.1) because they refer to no goals, plans or actions. I would 
argue that it is more appropriate to consider these as factors or structures to support 
internationalisation strategies. As a consequence, few insights into the strategic management 
of internationalisation can be gained from the group of studies under question, except the 
necessity of internationalisation as strategies (Knight & de Wit, 1995), some suggested 
strategies and success factors (Knight, 2008a), and empirical evidence of internationalisation 
strategies (e.g. Ho, Lin, and Yang (2015) describes internationalisation in Japan and Taiwan). 





Student/staff mobility programmes, international student 
recruitment, foreign language study, area of thematic studies, 





Area and theme centres, international research agreements, joint 






Domestic: Community-based partnerships with public, private or 
non-government organisations, community service and 
intercultural project work 
Cross-border: International aid, cross-border delivery, international 
linkages, alumni-abroad programs 
Extra-curricular 
Student clubs and associations, international and intercultural 
campus events, liaison with community-based cultural and ethnic 
groups, peer support groups and programs 
ORGANISATIONAL 
STRATEGIES 
Governance Articulated rationale, recognition in strategic documents, expressed commitment by senior leaders, faculty and staff involvement 
Operations 
Integration into institution-wide and departmental planning, 
budgeting and quality review, appropriate organisational structures, 
systems (formal and informal) for communication, liaison and 
coordination, balance between centralized and decentralized 
promotion and management, financial support, resource allocation 
Services 
Integration into institution-wide service units (student housing, 
registrariat, fund-raising, alumni, information technology), academic 
support units  (library, teaching and learning, curriculum 
development, faculty and staff training) and student support 
services for incoming and outgoing students (orientation programs, 
counseling, cross-cultural training, visa advice) 
Human 
resources 
Recruitment and selection of international experts, reward and 
promotion policies, faculty and staff professional development, 
support for international assignments and sabbaticals 
 
A second group of studies do adopt a strategic management perspective but in a vague or 
auxiliary manner (e.g. Poole, 2001; Elkin, Farnsworth, & Templer, 2008; Jiang & Carpenter, 
2013; Warwick, 2014). One example is Jiang and Carpenter’s (2013) study of the issues in 
implementing internationalisation strategies at four British universities. The authors explicitly 
state ‘strategy implementation’ as a keyword and review several studies into facilitators and 
impeders of strategy implementation (pp. 5-6), but do not bring in these facilitators and 
impeders to discuss their own data. By comparison, Warwick’s (2014) appropriation of the 
strategic management scholarship is much clearer: He provides an outline of the ideas and 
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concepts to be used, shows how they form his theoretical lens and later on involves them in 
data analysis. However, strategic management is not the central perspective. This is because 
his study is not exactly about the strategic management of internationalisation, but more 
broadly about how universities may initiate and manage internationalisation, of which 
strategic management is a key factor (a similar case is Neave, 1992):  
This study […] employs a managerial lens to examine the internationalisation of 
UK universities. Three literatures are referred to: HE management, the 
internationalisation of HE and strategic management. Based on these 
literatures three major challenges to UK universities seeking to internationalise 
their activities are identified. (Warwick, 2014, p. 92) 
[One of the challenges is] a formal systematic approach to strategic 
management. (p. 95) 
Nonetheless, Warwick’s (2014) synthesis of multiple literatures and clear appropriation of the 
strategic management literature are laudable. Indeed, I would argue that within this second 
group of studies, his study provides the most well-grounded insights into the strategic 
management of internationalisation. With that said, the second group of studies on 
internationalisation as strategies provide a lot more insights into the strategic management 
of internationalisation than the first one: 
• The choice of internationalisation strategies tend to be highly opportunistic, but as 
strategies mature careful planning might be necessary. The management of these 
strategies is then an act of balancing between decentralisation, so that decisions are 
close to the action, and centralisation, so that oversight and coordination can be 
maintained. Internationalisation also requires managers to develop competencies in 
international business. (Poole, 2001) 
• There is a positive correlation between having a strategic focus on internationalisation 
and achievement of internationalisation. (Elkin, Farnsworth, & Templer, 2008) 
• There are eight impeders of internationalisation-strategy implementation: resource 
allocation, communication, operational process, cooperation and coordination, 
organizational culture, resistance of change, student support and external environment. 
(Jiang & Carpenter, 2013) 
• Internationalisation strategies should be well resourced (including incentives), 
communicated to and from staff, monitored and adaptive. Top management should 
show on-going commitment to the strategies and exercise leadership. (Warwick, 2014) 
 
Third and finally, in my survey of the higher education internationalisation literature I have 
been able to find only four studies that take strategic management as the central lens to 
examine internationalisation and do so in an indepth manner. The first two are conceptual 
papers by Davies (1992) and Rudzki (1995), both attempting to prescriptively model 
internationalisation strategies. Based on a very early study on academic strategy (Keller, 
1983), Davies (1992) discusses three internal and three external elements that are essential to 
internationalisation strategies and incorporates them into a model that guides strategy 
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making. The three internal elements include (a) university mission, traditions and self-image, 
(b) assessment of strengths and weaknesses, (c) leadership and structure. The three external 
elements are (a) external perceptions, (b) evaluation of trends and opportunities, (c) 
assessment of competition. It can be seen that key ideas of strategic management, like 
internal and external analysis, competition, corporate-level mission are clearly present. His 
model is shown in Figure 1 below. 




By comparison, Rudzki (1995) draws inspiration from strategy process thinking (Pettigrew, 
1992; Hutzchenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006; also see Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2008, 
pp. 49-84 and 301-316) and proposes two five-stage models of how internationalisation 
strategies come to be and mature. The first model is called pro-active, which posits 
internationalisation strategies as planned, while the other is called reactive, in which 
internationalisation strategies are developed opportunistically. Apart from the fact that they 
are based on a well-established school in strategic management, the models themselves 
contain popular strategic management ideas and tools like PEST5 and SWOT6 analysis, 
strategic choice, resource allocation. Rudzki (1995) further notes that a reactive strategy may 
transform into a pro-active one when noticed and formally adopted by university 
management, which was proven by Al-Youssef (2010). Figure 2 below illustrates both 
models. 
Figure 2. The pro-active (left) and reactive (right) models of internationalisation (reillustrated 
from Rudzki, 1995, pp. 437-438) 
                                                 
5 Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological 





The other two studies of the third group, only very recently conducted, are empirical 
investigations into the choice and implementation of internationalisation strategies (Adel, 
Zeinhom, & Mahrous, 2018) and impact factors for internationalisation outcomes (Bremer, 
2018). Adel, Zeinhom, and Mahrous (2018) report a case study of a partnership between an 
Egyptian and two British universities in order to examine how internationalisation strategies 
can be effectively managed. To this end, many strategic management ideas and tools are 
drawn upon, such as SWOT analysis, levels of strategy, Michael Porter’s generic competitive 
strategies, resources. However, the authors’ use of them is haphazard: No coherent outline of 
key concepts or explanation of their application is provided anywhere in the paper, especially 
at the start. Instead, the authors would report the case study and stop intermittently to 
analyse a certain block of data, where strategic management concepts are suddenly pulled 
in. Another, more serious limitation of Adel, Zeinhom, and Mahrous’ (2018) study is that it is 
extremely descriptive and generates no theoretical insights, since the authors seem occupied 
with practical implications for the partnership studied. This is an unfortunate missed 
opportunity considering it is one of the very few studies into internationalisation from a 
strategic management perspective.  
 
By contrast, Bremer’s two-stage study (2018) exhibits none of these shortcomings. In the first 
stage, the author quantitatively analysed the impact of eleven factors, grouped into five 
categories, on the outcomes of internationalisation, specifically growth in the ratio of 
international students and researchers. The factors all emerged from his extensive review of 
the internationalisation and strategic management literatures, including the aforementioned 
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papers by Davies (1992) and Rudzki (1995). Figure 3 below illustrates all the factors, 
categories and relations with internationalisation outcomes. 
Figure 3. Impact factors of internationalisation outcomes (Bremer, 2018, p. 18) 
 
The factors were tested on 78 German public universities via survey, and the data collected 
was supplemented by official statistics. Key insights from the first stage are: 
• Specialisation and university size facilitate internationalisation.  
• Interestingly, having a mission statement may increase growth in international 
researchers as it ‘signals’ (p. 137) to them the relevance of internationalisation in a 
university. 
• Internationality of environment (i.e. diversity in migrational background) does not 
necessarily support growth in international students. This happens when too many 
international students of the same nationality are enrolled.  
• Developing more exchange arrangements with partners may reduce growth in 
international students because they overstretch resources. 
• No significant correlation is found between the other factors and internationalisation 
outcomes. 
The second stage was a qualitative investigation into the role and approach of university 
leaders in internationalisation. Interview data with six senior managers from German 
universities (rectors or presidents) was analysed using Leipzig Leadership Model (HHL 
Academic Press, n.d., available online), which conceptualises leadership as navigating the 
organisation within the four dimensions of purpose, entrepreneurial spirit, responsibility and 
effectiveness. As a side note, the model had been developed by scholars at the Leipzig 
Graduate School of Management (HHL), in close dialogue with executives and owner-
managers from various companies; my literature search, however, has yielded no empirical 
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studies, at least in English, that are based on the model (apart from Bremer, 2018). That said, 
findings from the second stage show university leaders differ mainly in their purpose and 
degree of proactivity (entrepreneurship), which leads them to one of three approaches: 
• Aspire to become a global leader, particularly in terms of international rankings. 
University leaders following this approach emphasise performance from academic staff 
and the adoption of latest technologies (e.g. massive open online courses) to enhance 
international visibility. 
• Optimize the status-quo. University leaders of this type value scientific progress and 
believe that science is inherently international; therefore, a university does not need an 
‘imperative to internationalize’ (p. 180) since doing science is in its nature. 
• Aim at a niche. Leaders of smaller universities may pursue a niche that helps 
internationalisation, such as geographic location (e.g. being close to a border) or distance 
learning. 
dfc 
2.1.4. Looking beyond extant research and disciplinary boundaries 
Extant internationalisation research that takes a strategic management perspective offers 
little guidance for my research question How are university internationalisation strategies 
received and realised by non-leaders? As can be seen from the literature review, all prior 
studies have focused on internationalisation strategies themselves and their success factors, 
which also means that their analysis is of meso (organisational) level. My study, by contrast, 
focuses on micro-level (individual and group) interpretation and activity of three specific 
groups of university stakeholders, namely deans, lecturers and students, with regards to 
internationalisation strategies. Briefly put, the matter of interest and level of analysis of my 
study are completely different from those of extant research. This indicates the need for 
more relevant and robust theoretical grounding.  
 
Additionally, the mismatch between my study and extant research proves the study’s 
originality and value to the literature. Indeed, I would argue that the intersection between 
higher education internationalisation and strategic management is an open, fertile field for 
exploration, due to (a) the scarcity of research positioned there, (b) the strategic significance 
of internationalisation to universities and (c) the theoretical resources afforded by the vast 
strategic management scholarship. 
 
Given the reasons above, it is essential that I look beyond the confines of the higher 
education internationalisation literature and seek insights from the strategic management 
literature. This will be the mission of second half of the present chapter. 
 
2.1.5. Higher education internationalisation: A summary 
22 
 
I have so far synthesised the various definitions of internationalisation in higher education 
over the past 20 years into a working understanding of the concept. Internationalisation is 
essentially a process of integrating an international dimension into all aspects of a university 
and is bounded in globalisation and the national, local contexts. I have also discussed the 
three rationales for universities to become international, namely economic, academic and 
sociocultural, thus demonstrating the strategic significance of internationlisation. Lastly, a 
review has been conducted of extant research on the strategic management of higher 
education internationalisation, which clearly shows the scarcity of such research and the 
originality of this study; moreover, the insights from previous studies, though valuable, are 
not relevant to my research question. For these reasons, it is essential for me to venture into 
the strategic management literature to find a robust theoretical grounding for this study. 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework  
In this section, the strategic management literature will be reviewed in order to develop a 
theoretical framework to address my research question How are university 
internationalisation strategies received and realised by non-leaders? Due to the vast stretches 
of strategic management (see Durand, Grant, & Madsen, 2017 for a field review), only works 
that are most useful to this study are included. Specifically, I will examine (a) the strategy 
concept and (b) how one particular theoretical-methodological approach in strategy 
research, called Strategy-as-Practice (SAP), is remarkably suited to the present study and 
therefore followed. Furthermore, because SAP in itself is not a theoretical lens for research, I 
will also (c) select and describe the lens to be used: Karl Weick’s sensemaking theory. In fact, 
it is the appropriation of sensemaking theory that has helped refine my research question 
into How are university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders?, as 
mentioned in the Introduction chapter.  
 
This section is structured as follows: First, a working understanding of strategy is developed 
from the writings of key theorists (2.2.1). A clear conceptualisation of strategy, I would argue, 
is the very first stepping stone to cross-fertilise higher education internationalisation and 
strategic management. It is perhaps due to a weak grasp of the strategy concept that Knight 
and de Wit (1995; also Knight, 2008a) propose very strange ‘strategies’ (refer back to 2.1.3). 
Afterwards, the SAP approach will be introduced and its application to this study explained 
(2.2.2). Finally, I will describe sensemaking theory and demonstrate how it provides the 
theoretical building blocks that guide data collection, analysis and theorisation (2.2.3). The 
refined research question, inspired by sensemaking theory, will also be presented.  
 
2.2.1. Strategy: Plans, patterns and levels  
The word ‘strategy’ is derived from the Greek words strategos and strategia, which 
respectively mean army leader and art of army leader. This early, military use of strategy 
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subsumes the ideas of setting objectives and planning different courses of actions to achieve 
them, taking into account the available resources (e.g. troops, weapons) and the 
environment (e.g. enemy’s position, terrain). It was not until after World War II two millennia 
later that the strategy concept entered the field of management with the works of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Drucker (1954), who provide the very first 
management-related definitions of strategy (see Table 4 for all the definitions mentioned in 
this section). The decade from 1960 and 1970 saw the appearance of other pioneers in 
bringing strategy into an organisational context; notable names include Chandler (1962), 
Ansoff (1965) and Learned et al. (1969), whose ideas are now venerated in the strategic 
management literature. These early authors paved the way for great diversity in the 
conceptualisation of strategy as many more began to write about it, using different terms 
and highlighting different factors that they consider to be the essence of strategy. For 
instance, many associate strategy with goals, plans or actions (Glueck, 1976; Newman & 
Logan, 1971; Schendel & Hatten, 1972), while others describe it with words that denote a 
decision-making process (Steiner & Miner, 1977; Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, & Rosenblum, 
1973). The essential properties of strategy can be resources (McCarthy, Minichiello, & Curran, 
1975; Michel, 1976) or competitive advantage and performance (Barney, 1997; Porter, 1996) 
or organisation-environment fit (Schendel & Hatten, 1972). Strategy can be deliberate 
(Newman & Logan, 1971) or emergent (Hambrick, 1980; Mintzberg, 1987). 
Table 4. Definitions of strategy  
Scholar Year Definition 
von Neumann & 
Morgenstern 1947 
a series of actions undertaken by a company according to a particular situation 
(pp. 79-84) 
Drucker  1954 
analyzing the present situation and changing it whenever necessary. 
Incorporated within this is finding out what one’s resources are or what they 
should be. (p. 17) 
Chandler 1962 
the determination of the basic long-term goals of an enterprise, and the 
adoption of courses of actions and the allocation of resources necessary to 
carry out these goals (p. 13) 
Ansoff  1965 a rule for making decisions determined by product/market scope, growth vector, competitive advantage, and synergy (pp. 118-121) 
Learned et al. 1969 
the pattern of objectives, purposes, or goals and major policies and plans for 
achieving these goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the 
company is in or is to be in and the kind of company it is or is to be (p. 15) 
Newman & 
Logan 1971 
forward-looking plans that anticipate change and initiate action to take 
advantage of opportunities that are integrated into the concepts or mission of 
the company (p. 70) 
Schendel & 
Hatten 1972 
the basic goals and objectives of the organization, the major programs of action 
chosen to reach these goals and objectives, and the major pattern of resource 
allocation used to relate the organization to its environment (p. 4) 
Uyterhoeven et 
al. 1973 
[strategy provides] both direction and cohesion to the enterprise and is 
composed of several steps: strategic profile, strategic forecast, resource audit, 




McCarthy et al. 1975 
an analysis of the environment where the organization is located and the 
selection of alternatives that will direct the resources and objectives of the 
organization, taking into consideration the risk and potential profits, and the 
feasibility that each alternative offers (p.19) 
Glueck 1976 a unified, comprehensive, and integrated plan designed to assure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved (p. 3) 
Michel 1976 
deciding which resources should be acquired and used so they can take 
advantage of opportunities and minimize factors that threaten the achievement 
of desired results (p. 246) 
Steiner & Miner 1977 
the formulation of missions, purposes and basic organizational goals, policies 
and programs to meet them, and the methods needed to ensure that strategies 
are implemented to achieve organizational objectives (p. 19) 
Hambrick 1980 
the pattern of decisions that guides the organization in its relationship with the 
environment, affects the processes and internal structures, and centrally affects 
the organization’s performance (p. 567) 
Porter 1996 
creating a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities, 
making trade-offs in competing and creating fit among a company’s activities 
(pp. 68-75) 
Barney 1997 a pattern of resource allocation that enables firms to maintain or improve their performance (p. 27) 
 
Nevertheless, such diversity, as demonstrated in Table 4, makes strategy so broad that it 
paradoxically becomes a widely studied yet little understood concept (Ketchen, Boyd, & 
Bergh, 2008). The confusion surrounding strategy has been acknowledged in the literature 
(Ronda-Pupo & Guerras-Martin, 2012; Mainardes, Ferreira, & Raposo, 2014) and this 
motivated an extensive comparative analysis of 91 definitions originating from 1962 to 2008 
by Ronda-Pupo and Guerras-Martin (2012). Using a quantitative approach, the authors found 
that over the evolution of the strategy concept ‘firm’, ‘environment’, ‘actions’, ‘resources’, 
‘goals’ were its five core properties. Thus, despite the great number of definitions, 
organisational strategy remains relatively identical to its military roots. It should be noted 
that there are other comparative studies into the definitions of strategy (Bracker, 1980; Grant, 
2008), but because they only investigate a small sample, they may not provide an adequate 
picture of the concept and are therefore not discussed in this section.  
 
Among the five properties, ‘goals’ and ‘actions’ deserve further discussion because they 
relate to a long debate about the nature of strategy: Are (strategic) goals and actions 
deliberate? From a military standpoint, the answer is likely positive, and the notion that 
strategies result from human deliberation, in the form environment analysis followed by 
careful planning, is shared by a lot of strategic management scholars (e.g. Drucker, Chandler, 
Ansoff, Porter; see Table 4 above). A prime example is Porter’s (1985; see also Porter, 1996) 
seminal book into competitive strategy, one of the most influential works of the field. The 
author proposes a model for analysing the industry(ies) in which a firm competes, consisting 
of five forces: intensity of rivalry, threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining 
power of buyers and bargaining power of suppliers. He then suggests four generic 
competitive strategies, the choice of which is based on said analysis: cost leadership-broad 
25 
 
market, cost leadership-niche focus, differentiation-board market and differentiation-niche 
focus. The deliberate, prescriptive view of strategy by Porter and many others was 
questioned and challenged by another prominent strategic management scholar: Henry 
Mintzberg (see also Quinn, 1982). In his seminal 1987 paper Five Ps for strategy, Mintzberg 
argue that strategy is also emergent, coming into being out of ‘a pattern in a stream of 
actions’ (p. 12) by organisational members. One example provided by the author, though in a 
much later work (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2008), is how Honda entered the US 
market with no strategy but a desire ‘to sell something’ (p. 211) and then learned from their 
mistakes (the large motorbikes they wanted to market started to break down) while taking 
advantage of serendipities (the small motorbikes they did not want to market had to be 
pushed out and surprisingly became a huge success). Mintzberg concludes that an 
organisation possesses both deliberate strategies and emergent ones; simply put, it may 
develop plans for the future, but as it matures it also evolves patterns from the past. He also 
notes that no strategies are purely deliberate or emergent, because ‘one means no learning, 
the other means no control’ (p. 12). 
 
Another important distinction between strategies is their scope or levels (Berd & Dess, 1981; 
Johnson et al., 2017). In large and complex organisations, like universities, not all strategies 
cover the same areas of activity (e.g. teaching, research, estate, internationalisation) or are 
within the remit of the same section, branch or department, both vertically (e.g. a faculty’s 
strategies may be consistent but not same as the whole university’s) and horizontally (e.g. 
two faculties may have different strategies). Thus, it has been recommended in the literature 
(ibid.) that strategies be classified into three levels: 
• The corporate strategy lays out the vision, mission of the whole organisation and the 
businesses, in terms of product-markets, that it should be in. A whole university can be 
considered a corporate entity. 
• If organisations are large enough to have multiple independent strategic business units 
(SBUs), each SBU might have its own vision, mission and competitive approach with 
regards to a relevant product-market. This is the business strategy. If a faculty in a 
university is autonomous enough to be a SBU, it might develop its own business-level 
strategy.   
• Functional or component strategies7 are concerned with, as the name suggests, a 
functional area (e.g. finance, human resources) that is essential for the organisation to 
operate in its environment. Functional strategies may exist at both corporate and 
business levels. Popular component strategies for universities include teaching, research, 
estate, human resources, internationalisation.  
Regardless of levels, all strategies should be linked and well-integrated (Johnson et al., 2017). 
For example, the corporate strategy should address resource allocation and synergy between 
SBUs so that a whole corporate generates more value than the sum of its parts. At the same 
                                                 
7 As noted earlier, a component or functional strategy can be thought of as either a collective of specific 
strategies that are similar in purpose, or those specific strategies. In this study it is used in the former sense. 
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time, a SBU’s business-level strategy should contribute to the overall objectives of its 
corporate parent. 
 
The five core properties of strategy, its dual deliberate/emergent nature and three levels 
provide a good theoretical basis to synthesise a working understanding of strategy for this 
study: Strategies are both plans and patterns of actions to achieve organisational goals at 
multiple levels, based on the surrounding environment and resources. This definition has 
three implications for the present study: 
• First, my study focuses on internationalisation as a component strategy at the corporate-
level (i.e. whole university). Therefore, even though my study may cover different faculties 
with their own internationalisation strategies, I consider them as part of the corporate-
level internationalisation strategy. 
• Second, in order to find out the internationalisation strategies of a given university, I 
should not only peruse formal strategic documents but also ask university members, 
especially those well-familiar with the institution, to identify and describe what the 
institution does to internationalise. This is because internationalisation strategies can be 
both plans and patterns. 
• Lastly, although I acknowledge that the choice and implementation of 
internationalisation strategies are dependent on the environment and resources of a 
university, I will not examine this relation. As stated in 2.1.1, my study takes the 
internationalisation strategies of the Vietnamese universities I investigate (see Chapter 3) 
as given, because my concern is not the strategies themselves but how they are received 
and realised by deans, lecturers and students. What my study might nonetheless provide 
is empirical evidence of the environment and resources of said universities.  
 
Having derived a working understanding of strategy, I will now introduce an approach to 
strategy research that is highly suitable for this study.  
 
2.2.2. Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) 
There are many approaches to researching strategy (see Furrer, Thomos, & Goussevskaia, 
2008 and Gibbons, Scott, & Fhionnlaoich, 2015 for an overview), but the one taken in this 
study is SAP. SAP is a relatively recent theoretical-methodological approach in strategic 
management that focuses on the ‘micro-level social activities, processes and practices’ 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2015b, p.1) of strategy making and implementation. Its introduction could 
be attributed to Whittington’s 1996 seminal paper Strategy as practice, but it did not emerge 
as a distinct sub-field of strategic management until the mid to late 2000s. Since then, SAP 
has become a movement to change how strategy is studied and gained currency with a 
dedicated website at sap-in.org, three books (one being published recently – Golsorkhi et al., 
2015a), and numerous papers, workshops, conferences, all being backed by a fast-growing 
body of works, both theoretical (Fenton & Langley, 2011; Balogun et al., 2014; Seidl & 
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Whittington, 2014) and empirical (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002; Balogun & Johnson, 2005; 
Whittington et al., 2006). According to Jarzabkowski and Spee (2009), SAP develops partly 
out of the dissatisfaction with conventional strategy research which (a) predominantly 
focuses on the economic effects of strategy on organisational performance and (b) is 
methodologically preoccupied with multivariate statistical analyses (Golsorkhi et al., 2015b), 
consequently neglecting what actually takes place at the micro level of strategy work. SAP 
addresses this gap by drawing attention to the messy reality of strategy where people and 
their actions continuously shape and reshape strategy formulation and implementation; in so 
doing, SAP aims to generate new insights for strategic management while ‘humaniz[ing] 
management and organization research’ (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009, p. 70). In other words, 
SAP investigates what happens at the micro level of an organisation in order to understand 
the organisation itself. Accordingly, SAP draws upon a lot of theories in sociology and 
organisation studies that can explain micro-level activities and potentially link them with 
structures at the organisational or field, societal level (see Golsorkhi et al., 2015b for an 
overview); some examples are activity theory (Jarzabkowski, 2003), Bourdieu’s practice theory 
(Gomez & Bouty, 2011) and sensemaking (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). In parallel, SAP is 
methodologically oriented towards the qualitative paradigm, adopting designs that are 
ethnographic (Kaplan, 2008) or based on case studies (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). That said, to 
accurately understand the tenets of SAP, it is essential to look at its treatment of strategy (S) 
and practice (P). 
 
2.2.2.1. Strategy (S) and practice (P) 
SAP proposes that strategy is not something an organisation has, but what people do 
(Whittington, 1996). More specifically, strategy does not exist as an organisational ‘property’ 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2015b, p. 8); instead, it is constituted by the actions, interactions of 
organisational actors, the tools they use and the norms they follow, all of which can be 
condensed into the term strategising. A SAP researcher, for example, would investigate a 
strategy by observing how strategic meetings around it are conducted and analysing the 
impact of power dynamics between attendees on the content of said strategy. In this way, 
SAP differentiates itself from conventional strategy research on an ontological level as it 
reconsiders the nature of being of strategies. Given the SAP’s ontology of strategy, it is easy 
to see why, as described earlier, this approach focuses on micro-level activities and leans 
towards theories from sociology and organisation studies, as well as the qualitative 
paradigm.  
 
It is worth noting that SAP does not entail a redefinition of the strategy concept itself. The 
word strategy in SAP still refers to organisational goals and the plans and patterns of actions 
taken to achieve them. A critique I would have of the SAP literature is its tendency to discuss 
the strategy concept in such a way that the latter appears as if redefined. A clear example is a 
paper by Jarzabkowski, Balogun and Seidl (2007), in which the authors suggest strategy be 
redefined as ‘a situated, socially accomplished activity’ (p. 7). This is such a broad and vague 
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definition that strategy may refer to any and every activity in an organisation. The authors 
acknowledge this and, citing Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003), clarify that  
activity is considered strategic to the extent that it is consequential for the 
strategic outcomes, directions, survival and competitive advantage of the firm, 
even where these consequences are not part of an intended and formally 
articulated strategy (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007, p. 8) 
Their clarification ironically does not make the so-called redefinition clearer because it 
creates an almost tautological logic that ‘strategy is an activity that has strategic 
consequence’, thereby raising the question of what is strategic. The phrase ‘an intended and 
formally articulated strategy’ adds ambiguity since strategy here takes on the common 
meaning as plans and actions taken to achieve organisational goals. I would argue that the 
authors are not redefining the strategy concept as they claim to be, but merely trying to 
convey the SAP’s ontology of strategy. Several other papers suffer the same problem 
(Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Rouleau, 2013) in that their attempts to introduce the SAP’s 
ontology are presented as a redefinition of the strategy concept.  
 
I now turn to examining practice in SAP. While the strategy (S) in SAP denotes its broad 
ontological stance, the practice (P) refers to its various notions of practice, each associated 
with inter alia specific units of analysis (Rouleau, 2013). A cursory reading of the SAP 
literature might give the impression that practice simply means what empirically happens or, 
to a lesser degree, a way of doing something. Accordingly, SAP researchers would aim to 
study what actions organisational members perform in their strategy work or what 
procedures, routines and sociomaterial tools they draw on to accomplish what they do. 
These two notions of practice, however, do not represent the full extent to which SAP 
conceptualises practice (Orlikowski, 2015). In fact, when Rouleau (2013) conducted a review 
of the SAP literature (see also Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Spee, 
2009; Vaara & Whittington, 2012) with a particular focus on practice, she found at least five 
different notions, adopted by different SAP scholars. All five are summarised in Table 5 
below: 
Table 5. Five notions of practice in SAP research (adapted from Rouleau, 2013, p. 549) 
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First, SAP research is concerned with situated, concrete actions of managers when 
formulating and implementing strategy. For instance, Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002) 
conducted a study on the top management team at Warwick University, UK and found that 
the team’s nine members went to departments to communicate the institution’s strategy and 
met fortnightly to discuss strategic issues. Balogun and Johnson (2005) chose instead to 
study those in middle management at a utility firm and how they tried to make sense of a 
restructuring by sharing stories, rumours, jokes and discussing their experiences with their 
peers. By staying close to managers and their actions, these and similar studies provide vivid 
insights into different situated, lived realities of managerial strategising or even more 
generally into strategy work as a profession (Whittington, Cailluet, & Yakis-Douglas, 2011). 
Perhaps more importantly, they can examine issues that are directly relevant to managers 
and therefore have great practical value. However, I would contend that top and middle 
managers should not be the only population of interest for SAP research. If SAP’s ontology 
of strategy is to be wholly embraced, any organisational actors whose actions leave a 
strategic impact (e.g. by inducing immediate strategic change or creating long-term patterns 
of deviance) should be investigated, and this means moving beyond managerial ranks or 
even outside the organisation. The absence of such actors has been noted as a ‘theoretical 
and practical deficiency’ (Laine & Vaara, 2015, p. 624) and until now only few studies have 
investigated the strategising of non-managers, such as consultants (Nordqvist & Melin, 
2008) or frontliners (Balogun, Best, & Le, 2015). The inclusion of non-managers would 
therefore be a logical and valuable next step for SAP in the quest to understand strategising; 
it might even stipulate a rethinking of what it means to be a strategist.  
 
The second notion of practice, with practice usually in plural form, indicates the tools, 
procedures and routines employed to accomplish strategy. Whittington et al. (2006) studied 
three practices, namely management workshops, project management and symbolic 
artefacts and found that their use required practical, hands-on skills such as decorating the 
meeting room, positioning seats, making objects to communicate strategy. Johnson et al. 
(2010) also focused on strategy workshops, albeit from an anthropological perspective, and 
studied how their outcomes were influenced by ritualisation. Apart from strategy workshops 
(see also Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008), other explored practices include analytical tools (e.g., 
SWOT) (Jarratt & Stiles, 2010), visualisation (Eppler & Platts, 2009), presentation softwares 
(Kaplan, 2011) and discursive practices (Palli, Vaara, & Sorsa, 2009; Kornberger & Clegg, 
2011). The notion of practice as tools is of strong practical relevance since it helps better 





The third notion of practice shifts away from the empirical primacy advocated in the first two 
and applies sociological practice theories to studying strategy. Practice here is an array of 
activities, or routines, abiding by socially accepted rules and tacit practical know-hows, 
(Schatzki, 2001), and individual actions are shaped by and have the potential to shape 
practices (Giddens, 1984). Thus, the third notion of practice encompasses both the first one 
(actions) and part of the second (routines) but emphasises their social embeddedness. This 
understanding of practice arises from the practice turn in social science, ushered by the 
works of theorists like Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Theodore 
Schatzki, who use practice as the key concept to addressing a fundamental issue in social 
analysis: the relations between structure and agency. A detailed explanation of these authors’ 
ideas is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001), but 
in general a practice approach to strategy research means that researchers should not focus 
on strategising actions as mere products of organisational actors’ intent and capacity (i.e. 
their agency). Rather, it is essential these actions be placed and examined in relation to the 
prevailing practices of their social context because practices, serving as the realisation of 
social structures, influence actions and yet are produced, reproduced or transformed by 
them. The application of practice theories is one of the most notable features of SAP 
research. For example, Orlikowski (2000) used Giddens’ structuration to study how technical 
support staff in a consulting firm interacted with Notes, a database software that also 
functioned as an e-mail system. Taking advantage of the cooperative norms of their group 
and their knowledge of Notes, the staff used the software’s e-mail system to coordinate and 
schedule their activities; they also had discussions via databases, and some even created 
their own database design. Such use of Notes became recurrent and, in turn, reinforced the 
cooperative norms among technical staff and encouraged them to keep using the software. 
A Bourdieusian framework can be found in Gomez and Bouty’s (2011) study of a French 
haute-cuisine chef. The authors demonstrated how his vegetable-based cooking style was 
transformed into a prominent social practice through the overlapping between his agency 
and the structure of haute cuisine at the time, reflected in the coalescence of the renown 
chef’s actions, his habitus (personal dispositions developed via engagement in the field of 
haute cuisine), his understanding of, as well as position in this field. As a whole, studies that 
subscribe to the third notion of practice, though small in numbers, greatly help elucidate the 
hidden contextual, structural conditions that, through practices, mediate strategising 
(Rouleau, 2013).  
 
SAP research, however, is not theoretically scaffolded solely by sociological practice theories. 
On the contrary, the field is characterised by ‘a high degree of theoretical pluralism’ 
(Golsokhi et al., 2015b, p. 12). In recent years, management and organisation theories have 
moved from a somewhat fringe and obscure position in many theoretical discussions 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2010; Vaara & Whittington, 2012; Rouleau, 2013) to being highlighted in a 
dedicated chapter in the second edition of the Cambridge handbook of Strategy as Practice 
(see Golsorkhi et al., 2015a, pp. 283-430). As shall be seen shortly, the fourth notion of 
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practice ties in with one particular organisation theory: the resource-based view (RBV), which 
suggests that the competitiveness of a firm rests upon the application of its unique 
resources, both tangible (e.g. office layout) and intangible (e.g. employees’ skills) (Barney, 
1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). I wish to note that my study is also based on an organisation theory 
(sensemaking), but this will be discussed later on (see 2.1.4). 
 
The fourth and fifth notions of practice are not strictly representative of SAP because they 
primarily emphasise a meso (organisational) and macro (extra-organisational, field, societal) 
focus rather than a micro one. The fourth notion of practice marks the intersection of SAP 
and RBV by suggesting that organisational actors, their actions, the tools they use and the 
procedures, routines they follow constitute the resources that sustain an organisation’s 
competitive advantage (Regner, 2015). In this way, the fourth notion of practice also carries 
the first and second. Ambrosini, Bowman and Burton-Taylor (2007) compared two divisions 
in a financial service company and found that the wider presence of coordination practices in 
one division was part of its unique resource configuration that made it more competitive. 
Elsewhere, Salvato (2009) found that capabilities (a similar concept to resources, see Barney, 
1991) could be renewed or created by the ordinary, day-to-day actions of individuals within 
and around a design firm. The link with RBV brings SAP closer to the mainstream strategy 
literature, which has been mostly populated by RBV and capabilities research. However, this 
link might be problematic (Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2008; Regner, 2015) because of 
ontological and epistemological disparities between the two views: SAP studies micro-level 
actors and actions while the meso scope of RBV is centred on organisational resources, 
though there have been some calls in the RBV literature to look at the micro (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2008; Barney, 2001). SAP also differs from RBV in terms of research goal, in that SAP 
aims to explain the doing of strategy whereas RBV, building on economics, is concerned with 
strategic outcomes and performance. Nonetheless, it would be hard to deny the potential of 
a SAP-RBV combination since strategising can a play a role in shaping resources and vice 
versa (Regner, 2015). 
 
The fifth notion of practice purports that strategy itself becomes a socially accepted practice 
and idea (i.e. a discourse) that conditions how people think and act. This notion encourages 
a critical analysis of strategy to uncover its institutional influences on organisations and 
individuals. In a very early paper, Knights and Morgan (1991) argue that strategy is a 
pervasive mechanism of power that privileges certain individuals or groups who can 
participate in strategic practices. In the same vein, Dick and Collings (2014) conducted a 
study into an information and communications technology firm. Using discourse analysis, the 
researchers found that while one senior manager talked of strategy as the success factor of 
the organisation, his account actually undermined his high status as a strategist by 
portraying it as ‘mundane and straightforward’ (p. 1530). This finding demonstrates how 
strategy as a discourse, while bestowing authority upon managers, can also weaken it. Along 
with strategy, the field of strategic management, including SAP, has also become a locus for 
critique; for example, Carter, Clegg and Kornberger (2008) problematise the treatment of 
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strategy and practice in early SAP literature and call for more attention to the issues of power 
and identity, to which there have been several responses (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; 
Rouleau, 2013). 
 
It is worth noting that the five notions above are not mutually exclusive and in fact may be 
combined in a single study. For instance, a study into the strategic actions involved in 
opening a university’s branch campus abroad may also reveal the employed tools (e.g. SWOT 
analysis of the target country) and socially shared routines (e.g. laying down a red carpet in 
the grand opening ceremony).  
 
With the key tenets of SAP established, I will now look at how SAP can be operationalised 
through three empirical foci: praxis, practitioners and practices. 
 
2.2.2.2. Three foci for SAP research: praxis, practitioners and practices 
Prominent SAP scholars propose a simple, tripartite framework for studying strategising: 
praxis, practitioners and practices (Whittington, 2006; Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; 
Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). Its main purpose is to provide various empirical lenses through 
which researchers can select what data to collect, as well as a common terminology for 
presenting and discussing findings. By extension, it facilitates the synthesis and review of 
past SAP works (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Stander & Pretorius, 2016). Below is an 
illustration and description of the framework. 
Figure 4. Praxis, practitioners and practices 
 
 
According to the framework, there are three broad foci for SAP research: Praxis refers to the 
flow of actions involved in the formulation and implementation of strategy; simply put, praxis 
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is the actual doing of strategy. Although by definition praxis is very diffuse, existing in many 
forms (e.g. talking, presenting) and carried out in different temporal and spatial settings, it 
can mostly be seen in episodes or sequences of episodes (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) such as 
meetings, workshops or projects (Whittington, 2006).  
 
Practitioners are those who carry out praxis; they are the doers of strategy, the strategisers, 
or most commonly called, strategists. The position of practitioners has usually been limited 
to top managers in mainstream strategy research (Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007), and SAP 
has helped expand the scope by studying other groups of organisational actors, especially 
middle managers (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Fauré & Rouleau, 2011; Mantere, 2008). 
However, as I have previously argued, practitioners can come from outside managerial ranks 
or the organisation.    
 
Practices comprise the tools, procedures, routines that practitioners use in praxis. A key 
characteristic of practices is that they are socially embedded at various levels (Klein, Tosi, & 
Cannella, 1999, cited in Whittington, 2006): Practices can be organisation-specific; for 
instance, a company in Whittington et al. (2006) chose to use a special cardboard cube 
(Image 1) to communicate its strategy to employees. Practices can also exist on a field or 
societal level (e.g., SWOT analysis, presentation softwares).  
Image 1. RetailCo’s cubes (Whittington et al., 2006, p. 624) 
 
 
It is clear that the tripartite framework best corresponds to the first, second and third notions 
of practice in SAP described in the last section. This is understandable because, as stated 
previously, the fourth and fifth notions respectively place strategising at the meso and macro 
levels, which are relevant to but not representative of the primarily micro orientation of SAP. 
 
Even though the study of strategising would inevitably touch on all three foci in the 
framework, it has been suggested that a decision should be made on which focus or which 
overlapping area between two to be brought to the foreground for investigation 
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(Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Whittington, 2006). Such choice enables SAP 
researchers to generate precise explanations that are of value beyond the particular situation 
being studied (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007).  
 
2.2.2.3. Application of SAP in this study 
Judging by the tenets and empirical lenses of SAP, it can easily be seen why SAP is a fitting 
approach to solving my research question How are university internationalisation strategies 
received and realised by non-leaders? Both the question and SAP are concerned with people’s 
actions around strategies rather than strategies themselves. Moreover, SAP offers detailed 
guidance on how to study these the actions, including (a) the five notions of practice to 
narrow down the units and levels of analysis and (b) a tripartite empirical framework to 
narrow which aspect(s) of strategising for investigation.  
 
Among the five notions of practice in SAP, the present study specifically incorporates the first 
two (actions and tools) and partly the third (sociological practice theory). To elaborate, my 
key interests are micro-level strategising actions and the tools, procedures and routines 
involved rather than meso-level organisational resources and competitive advantage, the 
broad discourse of strategy. In addition, while a sociological theory has not been used as my 
lens (see 2.2.3), I do account for the presence and impact of social structures on strategising, 
both in my empirical and theoretical findings.  
 
My empirical lens revolves around praxis. That is, I seek to explore what different groups of 
university non-leaders think and do with regards to internationalisation strategies. Therefore, 
while data about the groups themselves as practitioners and their practices might be 
collected and woven into my findings, it only plays a supporting role to flesh out and 
illuminate data about their praxis. I will come back to which specific data was collected in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Nonetheless, because SAP in itself is not a theory or methodology, the consideration and 
choice of an appropriate theoretical lens and methodology are also necessary for any SAP 
studies, including the present one. These are precisely the missions of the next section and 
Chapter 3, where I will respectively address the theoretical lens and methodology of this 





2.2.3. Sensemaking theory 
This study draws on a very popular theory in organisation studies and management: Karl 
Weick’s sensemaking. As the name implies, sensemaking is a theory8 of how meaning (or 
sense) is made of ambiguities in organisations, and how organisations emerge and are 
shaped due to meaning making. Sensemaking is also, unsurprisingly, the name of the central 
concept of this theory and has been commonly defined as a process (Weick, 1995; Balogun 
& Johnson, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Cornelissen, 2012) or sequence (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstefeld, 
2005) through which people try to generate explanations for the ambiguity of organisational 
life. For the sake of clarity, the phrase sensemaking theory will henceforth be used to refer to 
the theory of sensemaking, in order to differentiate from sensemaking as a process. 
Sensemaking emerged as a matter of scholarly interest in the late 1960s via the works of 
Garfinkel (1967) and Weick (1969). Over the coming decades, sensemaking theory grew to 
become a dominant theory in organisation studies, and the theory itself has been developed 
in many ways. For example, sensemaking has been studied from both a cognitive perspective 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005) and a social one (Maitlis, 2005; 
Weick, 2005). Research has also explored the link between sensemaking and narrative 
(Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008), language (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995), embodiment 
and materiality (Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012), or the role of 
sensemaking in crises (Christianson et al., 2009) and strategic change (Balogun & Johnson, 
2005). It is worth noting that most authors use sensemaking theory in a descriptive manner, 
as a lens to understand and analyse organisations, while Weick’s version of the theory (1995, 
2001) is more akin to an explanatory account of organisations – he appears to suggest that 
organisations emerge when people retrospectively make meaning of and rationalise their 
past collective actions, especially those taken in response to unexpected ambiguities. For 
example, workers of a factory might first spontaneously react to a fire (e.g. some run for 
extinguishers while others the fire escape), and afterwards look back at how they organised 
themselves during the fire and make meaning of their actions. This retrospection gives form 
to whatever organisation the workers created, albeit only temporarily, to deal with the fire. 
 
Given the conceptual variation in sensemaking research, it is consequently a challenge to 
capture sensemaking theory. In fact, while the term ‘sensemaking theory’ has been invoked 
in the literature (Stein, 2004; Jensen, Kjaergaard, & Svejvig, 2009), some authors have 
avoided using the word ‘theory’ altogether. In his seminal 1995 book Sensemaking in 
Organizations, Weick describes sensemaking as a ‘set of ideas with explanatory possibilities’ 
that constitute a ‘perspective’ (p. xi, xii), which has been echoed in subsequent works 
(Sonenshein, 2009; Hsieh, Rai, & Xin Xu, 2011; Schultz & Hernes, 2013). Sensemaking has 
also been referred to as a ‘lens’ (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007) or ‘framework’ (Helms Mills, 
Weatherbee, & Colwell, 2006). Nonetheless, all variations of sensemaking theory practically 
share the same pool of theoretical ideas and vocabulary about organisational meaning 
making, albeit which ideas receive more attention vary among scholars. For example, some 
                                                 
8 In this study, theory is understood in a broad sense, including not only explanatory or causal accounts of the 
social world but also concepts and ideas that provide a lens for understanding it.  
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are interested in the discursive aspect of sensemaking while others look at sociomateriality or 
embodiment. It is not my intent, therefore, to debate how sensemaking theory should be 
called; instead, ‘theory’ is used as an umbrella term for the ideas and concepts that together 
constitute the body of knowledge around sensemaking. Moreover, the version of 
sensemaking theory used in this study is mostly descriptive and serves as an analytical lens 
rather than a causal explanation as is the case with Weick’s works (1995, 2001). 
 
With all that said, this section will review the ideas that have enduring influence in the 
sensemaking literature and are key to understanding the theory. Towards the end of the 
section, I will discuss the application of these ideas, in combination with my focus on praxis 
(refer back to 2.2.2.3), to data collection, analysis and theorisation. Additionally, a refinement 
of the initial research question, stimulated by sensemaking theory, will be presented. 
 
2.2.3.1. The nature and locus of sensemaking 
It is essential to first examine the two different views about the nature and locus of 
sensemaking: the cognitive view and social view, which have clear implications for research 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Some sensemaking scholars approach sensemaking from a 
cognitive perspective, in which sensemaking is posited as a process that takes place inside 
people’s minds (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000; Hahn et al., 2014). 
These scholars are interested in the development and use of schemas, cognitive frames or 
mental models (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995) in order to select and process cues, or information, 
gained from the surrounding environment (Elsbach, Barr, & Hargadon, 2005). Cornelissen 
(2012), for example, analysed 13 communication professionals’ accounts of critical incidents 
and found that they constructed their sensemaking frames by using metaphorical language, 
which helped them explain the details of these incidents and negotiate between their roles 
and social expectations. By comparison, another group of sensemaking scholars hold a social 
perspective of sensemaking and locate the sensemaking process as between people 
(Sonenshein, 2010; Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, 2012; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). These 
scholars are less concerned with schema-based meaning production within people’s mind 
and more with the dissemination, negotiation and contestation of meaning, conducted using 
narratives and discursive practices. For example, Sonenshein (2010) investigated a Fortune 
500 retailer undergoing strategic change and found that managers created mixed, at times 
contradicting narratives about the change to get employees to accept it. The employees, 
however, did not simply absorb these narratives but used them as materials to construct 
their own sense, which then led them to accept, resist or champion the change.  
 
It should be emphasised that the two ontological views of sensemaking above are not 
contradictory. Instead, they simply present different directions for sensemaking research that 
produce complementary insights into different aspects of sensemaking (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014; Cornelissen & Schildt, 2015). Moreover, there have been calls and 
37 
 
attempts to bridge the cognitive and social views (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Kaplan, 2008; 
Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). For example, Kaplan (2008) develops a model of framing 
contests to illustrate how managers politically promote their schemas, out of an 
ethnographic study of a manufacturer dealing in communication technologies.  
 
That said, it has strongly been recommended that sensemaking researchers articulate their 
ontology so that ‘conversations about sensemaking […] are made more intelligible’ (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014, p. 95); clear conceptualisation of sensemaking has also been argued for 
in the SAP literature (Cornelissen & Schildt, 2015) as it enables the formation of findings into 
‘a coherent whole’ (p. 359). In response to this, the view of sensemaking taken in this study is 
a cognitive one. By locating sensemaking within the mind, the cognitive view is more likely to 
reveal the differences between the sensemaking of different groups of organisational actors. 
This perk is of value to addressing my research question, which covers different groups of 
university non-leaders, namely deans, lecturers and students.  
 
On the matter of intergroup differences, it is interesting to see very little has been done to 
compare the sensemaking of various groups of organisational actors, as previous researchers 
have tended to investigate each group in isolation. For example, Prior, Keranen and Koskela 
(2018) study frontliners’ sensemaking in complex procurements, while Balogun and Johnson 
(2005) study middle managers during strategic change. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
synthesise extant studies to identify intergroup differences because they vary in the 
application of sensemaking theory, research contexts and the subject of sensemaking (e.g. 
complex procurements, organisational restructuring). Therefore, a cognitive and comparative 
view like one taken in this study might prove valuable by generating insights into intergroup 
differences. For example, my study might reveal how various hierarchical positions (e.g. 
managers versus non-managers) or dependencies (e.g. students have to pay the university 
but lecturers do not) lead to divergence in sensemaking between groups.  
 
My adoption of the cognitive view, nonetheless, does not mean a disregard for the social 
aspect or dimension of sensemaking. I would concur with Maitlis and Christianson’s (2014) 
argument that sensemaking still contains a social aspect even when individuals construct 
meanings on their own because they do it in a social context and are thus influenced by the 
‘actual, imagined, or implied presence of others’ (Allport, 1985, cited in Weick, 1995, p. 39). In 
my working ontology of sensemaking, I consider the social aspect as a set of factors (e.g. 
cordiality with colleague) that shape individual sensemaking.  
 
Now that my ontology of sensemaking is established, I will review the key ideas of 
sensemaking theory. In accordance with the cognitive view, an emphasis will be placed on 




2.2.3.2. The accomplishment of sensemaking: Trigger and episode 
The sensemaking process begins when organisational actors encounter a trigger, in the form 
of ambiguities or violations of expectations. In extant literature, triggers are often 
unexpected and disruptive events that occur amidst people’s flow of activity, like the collapse 
of a museum’s roof (Christianson et al., 2009) or quite the opposite, the non-occurrence of 
anticipated events, such as the failure of a merger (Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, 2012). Even 
planned and anticipated events, specifically in the context of strategic change, can be equally 
disruptive and trigger sensemaking because they likely involve dismantling the status quo 
and/or introducing new organisational structures and practices. In a study by Balogun and 
Johnson (2005), for instance, a strategic change intervention at a business division prompted 
sensemaking by breaking up the existing organisation into three new ones with expected 
new work culture and practices. Apart from disruptive events (unexpected or planned), 
triggers can also be gradual environmental shifts (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006) and social or 
professional movements (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003), both of which present great 
ambiguity. Ambiguities and violations of expectations, nonetheless, do not necessarily 
trigger sensemaking by themselves; instead, it is the experience of them that, when 
significant enough, makes people seek answers (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Yet, such 
experience still cannot warrant sensemaking if it is accommodated, explained away or 
normalised (ibid.). A notable example is the foam shedding during space shuttles’ flight at 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Vaughan, 1996; Dunbar & 
Garud, 2009). Over time this potentially dangerous phenomenon was normalised from an 
anomaly to an expected occurrence and therefore did not trigger sensemaking, which 
eventually led to the Columbia disaster. 
 
An interesting commonality among the types of triggers outlined above is that they emerge 
during relatively defined periods of time or episodes, whether immediate or protracted, 
where great ambiguity is found. Therefore, the trigger is tangible if not rousing, and the 
ensuing sensemaking is done with intent and attention. Indeed, most of the sensemaking 
literature, including Weick’s (1995) seminal and founding work, appears to postulate that 
sensemaking only happens during disruptive episodes and in a conscious manner (Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). This episodic and explicit nature of 
sensemaking has been called into question very early on by Gioia and Mehra (1996) and 
recently by Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015). These authors argue that sensemaking can be 
about the mundane, routine organisational reality around the sensemaker, where conscious 
efforts are not demanded:  
We argue that unconscious meaning-making should have a place in the 
sense-making formulation. Otherwise, we are left with the perverse sug- 
gestion that routine organizational life is somehow devoid of sense merely 
because it is marked by an absence of conscious information processing. 
(Gioia & Mehra, 1996, p. 1229) 
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We identify the main limitations of the sensemaking perspective […] the 
exclusive focus on disruptive episodes at the expense of more mundane 
forms of sensemaking. (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015, p. 86) 
Brown, Colville and Pye (2015) also briefly call for exploration of the mundane rather than 
‘crisis-led sensemaking’ (p. 272). Despite these calls, my review of the sensemaking literature 
has yielded scant empirical work into implicit sensemaking of the mundane. The clearest one 
is a recent by study by Balogun, Best and Le (2015) into how tour guides at two British 
museums made sense of daily situations at work. That said, I echo Gioia and Mehra (1996) 
and Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015) that it is necessary to account for implicit and mundane 
sensemaking, for the simple reason that the mundane, routine organisational reality already 
contains ambiguities that organisational members have to sort out in order to orient 
themselves, accomplish their roles and function with other members (see the literature on 
socialisation, e.g. Madlock & Chory, 2014; Ellis et al. 2015). I would also speculate that the 
trigger for implicit and mundane sensemaking is not as strong or tangible like that for 
explicit, episodic sensemaking. 
 
2.2.3.3. The accomplishment of sensemaking: Schema, cue  
From a cognitive view, once triggered sensemaking is accomplished by applying schemas to 
extract and interpret cues from the surrounding environment (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; 
Hahn et al., 2014). To begin with, schemas are ‘filters that admit certain bits of information 
into the strategizing process while excluding others’ (Porac & Thomas, 2002, p. 178) and 
‘template[s]’ to organise and give them ‘form and meaning’ (Walsh, 1995, p. 281; also Weick, 
2010). Ultimately, schemas can be considered ‘data reduction devices’ (Balogun, 2007, p. 83) 
that facilitate the sensemaking and navigation of complex organisational life. In the 
sensemaking literature, schemas have come in different names, including cognitive frames 
(Kaplan, 2008), mental models/frameworks (Malakis & Kontogiannis, 2013) or interpretative 
schemes (Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, 2012), all of which refer to practically the same concept 
as defined above. Schemas are the product of learning from past organisational events and 
experiences (Balogun, 2007), which are remembered as patterns of meaning and emotion 
(Strauss, 1992, in Morandin & Bergami, 2014). Consequently, schemas may cause 
‘confirmatory bias’ and ‘stereotypic thinking’ (Hahn et al., 2014; p. 465) because they select 
cues that fit existing knowledge; however, they can be updated with new cues, but this is 
difficult and might require intentional efforts from other people to provide cues that 
undermine or disconfirm one’s prior learning (Mantere, Schildt, & Sillince, 2012). The 
complexity-reducing function of schemas and their biased selectivity make them a key 
concept for sensemaking scholars who are interested in managerial decision-making 
(Sleegers et al., 2009; Winch & Maytorena, 2009; Hahn et al., 2014) and strategic change 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Mantere, Schildt, & Sillience, 2012). 
For example, Sleegers et al. (2009) explore the impact of professional background on school 
leaders’ framing of and solution to complex problems like decreasing enrolment and the 
possibility of merger. Elsewhere, Balogun and Johnson (2004) study the change in schemas 
of middle managers when they are faced with top-down restructuring. Outside managerial 
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decision making and strategic change, however, the role of schemas appears under-
researched, so little is know about, for example, how non-managers’ schemas shape their 
attitude and actions towards daily responsibilities. 
 
Cues are the ‘bits of information’ (Porac & Thomas, 2002, p. 178) that are filtered and 
interpreted with schemas. Cues and schemas are thus inseparable because one cannot be 
effective without the other; indeed, they are compounded in Weick’s (1995) discussion of 
how sensemaking is ‘focused on and by extracted cues’ (pp. 49-55), where he addresses 
‘[the] ways people notice, extract cues, and embellish [them]’ (p. 49). It is therefore surprising 
to see that while schemas have been the focus of many scholar (see the last paragraph), little 
research has been done into cues, and even schema studies seem to assume cues as a given 
element of sensemaking. When mentioned, the word ‘cues’ is usually substitute for ‘bits of 
information’ and thus the concept becomes reduced to an indistinct, singular label; on top of 
this, the source of cues is often only an indistinct, singular ‘environment’ (e.g. Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014, p. 67; Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015, p. 267). For example, many cue 
sources can be seen in Balogun and Johnson’s (2005; see also, Rouleau & Balogun, 2011) 
study of middle managers’ schema change during a restructuring: videos, vision workshops, 
daily work in new positions, interactions with other middle managers. However, the authors 
themselves offer no analysis of the sources or cues extracted from them, such as why vision 
workshops were organised or what the middle managers gained from them. Nonetheless, 
there is a group of studies that examine cues in terms of their physical nature, although only 
implicitly; these are studies about sensemaking devices, such as narratives (Sonenshein, 
2010), metaphors (Nicholson & Anderson, 2005; Cornelissen, 2012), artifacts (Stigliani & 
Ravasi, 2012), technology (Kaplan, 2011), bodily senses (Cunnliffe & Coupland, 2012), 
emotions (Liu & Maitlis, 2014). It can be inferred from them that cues may exist as language, 
sociomateriality or physio-psychological stimulation. Only very recently have cues become 
an explicit interest for sensemaking scholars: Gacasan, Wiggins and Searle (2016) conducted 
two studies on construction project managers in Australia and found they relied types of 
cues, namely feedback, context and tacit knowledge to make sense of critical incidents. 
Svensson and Hallgren (2018), on the other hand, found that Swedish emergency call 
operators paid more attention when noticing incongruence between verbal and non-verbal 
cues in a call.  
 
2.2.3.4. The accomplishment of sensemaking: Actions, enactment and 
retrospective future 
To really accomplish sensemaking, organisational actors rely on more than extracting and 
interpreting cues – they have to take actions. Indeed, actions are instrumental to 
sensemaking because they generate ‘raw ingredients’ (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 84) for 
the process and moreover, test previously made senses by providing feedback (Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Weick, 1988). Simply put, people can learn about something by taking certain 
actions (e.g. experimenting), interpreting the results and afterwards taking further actions to 
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test their understanding. It is also actions that separate sensemaking from mere 
interpretation (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Because of actions, the sensemaker alters the 
very situation that triggered sensemaking and thus the actions themselves in the first place; 
more broadly speaking, actions shape the environment that people make sense in. Such 
reciprocal influence between actions and the environment during sensemaking is captured in 
the concept of enactment, or ‘the process in which organization members create a stream of 
events that they pay attention to’ (Orton, 2000, p. 231). Walsh and Bartunek’s (2011) study 
provides a good example; it shows that employees’ early attempt to make sense of the 
impending closure of their firms led them to launch campaigns to save these organisations, 
and then when these failed to change the situation, they had to jointly contemplate other 
options and eventually opened their own ventures, which triggered yet another sensemaking 
process around the identity of these new organisations. Taken to an extreme, enactment 
becomes self-fulfilling prophecies when people’s arbitrary assumptions can make them enact 
a reality based on these assumptions (Cornelissen & Schildt, 2015). This was demonstrated 
by the Scottish knitwear community of Hawick in the late 80s (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-
Fuller, 1989) where the managers’ own beliefs about the competition guided the strategic 
decisions and behaviours that shaped the industry, and in turn, this enacted reality 
reinforced their original beliefs.    
 
Actions and enactment are related to a long-debated matter in sensemaking theory: 
sensemaking about the future. In his seminal work, Weick (1995) asserts that sensemaking is 
always retrospective because it can only be done of transpired events and the actions taken 
during those events. Therefore, actions precede interpretation, and there is no boundary 
between enactment and sensemaking, as famously said by Weick: ‘How can I know what I 
think until I see what I say? […] we are always a little behind [actions]’ (p.18, 26). The 
retrospective nature of sensemaking causes an interesting problem when the purpose of 
sensemaking is not to reflect on the past but to prepare for or predict the future: How can 
the future be made sense of? Weick’s own argument is that people do so in future perfect 
tense (1969; Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Gioia, 2006); that is, they envision a future state 
and ‘act as if [it] has already transpired’ (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002, p. 623). Many authors 
have critiqued this notion of retrospective future sensemaking (MacKay 2009; Gephart, Topal, 
& Zhang, 2010; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015) by questioning its 
feasibility under circumstances of great complexity and ambiguity or when the sensemaker is 
unclear about his/her aspirations. I would add to their critique that if future sensemaking is 
indeed retrospective, how can the hypothetical future state be created to begin with (in 
enough detail, to add) for retrospection, if not through some form of genuinely prospective 
sensemaking? Gephart, Topal and Zhang (2010), in particular, offer a nuanced solution to the 
retrospection/prospection debate about future sensemaking by proposing that future 
sensemaking can be prospective but is based on and contextualised by retrospective 
sensemaking of the past and present, where actions and enactment have occurred. On a 
more practical level, Smerek (2013) says that while retrospective sensemaking may be true in 
emergency situations (recall my earlier discussion about disruptive episodes), it is 
42 
 
‘unacceptable and unthinkable’ (p. 396) for those in decision-making and high-discretion 
roles, like a president or CEO, not to think prospectively before acting.     
 
2.2.3.5. The constraint of sensemaking: Politics and institutions 
A shortcoming of sensemaking theory, whether cognitive or social, is that despite its address 
of organisational meaning making, not enough attention is given to politics (and power) and 
institutions. Politics and especially institutions have been in fact a long-standing gap in the 
sensemaking literature (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Hope, 2010 Brown, Colville, & Pye, 
2015). This makes sensemaking appear a ‘subjectivistic’ (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015, p. 20) 
and ‘hyper-agentic’ process (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 98) where the sensemaker 
possesses full ownership of every meaning and is free to enact it. The past decade, however, 
has seen increasing endeavour to explore politics in sensemaking, both conceptually and 
empirically (Brown, Stacey, & Nandbakumar, 2008; Hope, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2011; 
Whittle et al., 2016). More specifically, sensemaking scholars have investigated the 
contestation of meaning and narratives (Brown, Stacey, & Nandbakumar, 2008; Vaara & 
Tienari, 2011), political actions taken to shape others’ meaning (Hope, 2010; Filstad, 2014), 
and the impact on power perception on one’s own sensemaking (Frieder, Ma, & Hochwarter, 
2016; Whittle et al., 2016). For example, Vaara and Tienari (2011) studied a cross-border 
merger of financial services and found three types of antenarratives, or ‘fragmented pieces of 
discourse’ (p. 372), being competitively mobilised to legitimise or resist the merger. Hope 
(2010) did a smaller-scale study into politics, in which the researcher looked at the various 
power tactics and power sources used by middle managers of an insurance company to 
influence sensemaking in multiple directions (upwards to senior managers, laterally to peers, 
downwards to subordinates).  
 
Compared to politics, institutions are a much less researched topic. My survey of the 
sensemaking literature has yielded very few studies into this matter, including a conceptual 
paper by Weber and Glynn (2006) and an empirical study by Schultz and Wehmeier (2010). 
That said, Weber and Glynn (2006) offer a very detailed framework for thinking about and 
studying the impact of institutions on sensemaking. According to the authors, institutions 
can prime, edit or trigger sensemaking: First, institutions direct or prime sensemaking by 
providing a limited and specific repertoire of meanings that serve as a schema for selecting 
and interpreting cues; these repertoire can be thought of as ‘ready-made clusters of actors, 
situations and actions’ (p. 1649). Second, institutions may indirectly edit the meaning of past 
actions. Due to its priming effect, institutions shape the expectations and thus judgement of 
other people towards one’s actions; as a result, should these actions violate their 
expectations, they might provide negative feedback that compels the perpetrator to reassess 
what he/she has done. Third, institutions themselves can trigger and become a subject of 
sensemaking. Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) study, by comparison, does not deal with 
institutions but rather institutionalisation. The author found that the institutionalisation of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in an energy company involved internally translating the 
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concept and legitimising the company’s implementation of CSR. The special feature of 
Schultz and Wehmeier’s (2010) study is that it posits a whole organisation as the sensemaker, 
rather than individuals as commonly found in the sensemaking literature. However, the 
appropriation of sensemaking theory in the study appears superficial: The authors often 
invoke the word ‘sensemaking’ without mention of its key concepts or explanation of its 
application except that meaning making and actions are intertwined.  
 
2.2.3.6. Application of sensemaking theory in this study: Compatibility with SAP 
and refinement of the research question  
Given the primary focus of sensemaking theory on the micro-level of organisational meaning 
making, it is not difficult to see its compatibility as a theoretical lens for SAP, and indeed 
sensemaking is one of the most frequently mentioned organisation theories in the SAP 
literature (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Rouleau, 2005; Kaplan, 2008; Rouleau & Balogun, 
2011; Balogun et al., 2014). However, the theory has not been employed to its full potential 
in SAP research. Cornelissen and Schildt (2015) did a review of sensemaking-informed SAP 
studies and observed that a striking feature among many was the use of sensemaking not as 
a theory but a ‘shorthand or label’ (p. 350) for empirical instances of thinking and talking 
where individuals or groups tried to understand a strategic issue (Rouleau, 2005; Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013; Kwon, Clarke, & Wodak, 2014). The authors further argue that SAP research 
should move beyond this empirical application of sensemaking to better utilise the ideas 
that this theory offers, which would enable SAP research to be more specific in its 
explanations of the subject matter, as well as its theoretical claims. It is of course this theory-
laden stance that I will take when using sensemaking theory in my study. 
 
Besides SAP, sensemaking theory fits perfectly with my research question How are university 
internationalisation strategies received and realised by non-leaders? because it addresses both 
meaning making (reception) and actions (realisation). In this way, the adoption of 
sensemaking theory as theoretical lens has also inspired a refinement of the research 
question, in which reception and realisation are combined into the single concept of 
sensemaking:  
How are university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? 
This refinement makes the phrasing of the research question more theoretically precise and 
also representative of the theoretical lens of my study. I would argue, therefore, that the 
refined research question is much more useful not only to myself but also potential readers, 
especially those interested in a SAP study of university internationalisation strategies or the 
application of sensemaking theory in a university context. With that said, I will now discuss 
the application of sensemaking theory, in combination with my praxis focus (refer back to 




2.2.3.7. Application of sensemaking theory in this study: Sensemaking praxis 
and theoretical building blocks  
The integration of SAP and sensemaking theory in this study is as follows. First, my focus on 
praxis in the SAP framework (see 2.2.2.3) means that most of the data collection, analysis and 
theorisation is centred on the flow of thinking and actions, or praxis, of university non-
leaders when they make sense of internationalisation strategies. The tools, procedures and 
routines they use for sensemaking (practices), as well as their own attributes (practitioners), 
play a supporting role to elucidate sensemaking praxis. Moreover, a SAP approach 
necessitates accounting for the presence and impact of social structures (e.g. politics and 
institutions) on sensemaking. 
 
Sensemaking theory itself, in turn, provides four key concepts for guiding data analysis and 
theorisation: trigger, schema, cue and enactment. To elaborate, the research question, as of 
now refined, is answered by looking at the triggers of university non-leaders’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies, the schemas and cues involved and the actions taken. 
Moreover, the associated issues of these four concepts, such as sensemaking of the 
mundane and prospective future sensemaking, and potential political and institutional 
constraints on sensemaking are bore in mind during analysis and theorisation.    
 
2.2.4. Theoretical framework: A summary  
In this section, I have established a theoretical grounding for the present study by moving 
beyond the higher education internationalisation literature and incorporating the strategic 
management literature. First, the strategy concept has been delineated using ideas from key 
theorists in strategic management: Strategy is both plans and patterns to achieve certain 
organisational goals and exists in multiple levels. Second, the SAP approach to strategy 
research, chosen for this study, has been described in terms of its tenets, three empirical foci 
(praxis, practitioners, practices) and application in my particular case. Finally, I have talked 
about sensemaking theory and its role as the theoretical lens guiding data collection, 
analysis and theorisation. I have also demonstrated its strong fit with both the SAP approach 
and my preliminary question, and how it has inspired the refinement of the research 
question.  
 
2.3 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literatures on higher education internationalisation and 
strategic management in order to position my research and establish the theoretical 
grounding for resolving the research question. The first half of the chapter has defined the 
concept of internationalisation in higher education and demonstrated its strategic 
significance to universities. More importantly, the paucity and theoretical shortcomings of 
extant research into higher education internationalisation as organisational strategies were 
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identified, thereby highlighting the value of this study and the need for higher education 
internationalisation research to engage more substantially with the strategic management 
literature. The second half of the chapter has defined the strategy concept and demonstrated 
how my research question can be addressed with the SAP approach in strategy research and 
sensemaking theory. In so doing, this chapter has also outlined several gaps and points of 
debate in SAP and sensemaking theory themselves, such as the obscurity of frontliners in 
SAP research (2.2.2.1) or the episodic nature of sensemaking (2.2.3.2). That said, I will now 
turn to how this study, as a piece of sensemaking-informed SAP research, is operationalised 




CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodology used to answer my research question How are 
university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? The question required 
a methodology that would lend itself to indepth scrutiny of organisational dynamics and 
thus an opporunity to investigate an integral aspect of organisational life that is sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstefeld, 2005). The need for such methodology was 
further affirmed by my adoption of the SAP approach and sensemaking theory, both 
focusing on fine-grained, micro-level activities. Additional to this was the exploratory nature 
of this study, since very little research had been undertaken into the topic or more generally 
had cross-fertilised higher education internationalisation and strategic management (refer 
back to 2.1.3, 2.1.4). For these reasons, my study leaned towards qualitative research, and a 
comparative case design was chosen (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2018). The fact that 
my choice of methodology, and theoretical framework for that matter, was entirely driven by 
the research question rather than certain ontological and epistemological beliefs also reflects 
my paradigmatic stance of pragmatism (Morgan, 2007; Creswell, 2013, 2014). 
 
My case study design involved two universities in Vietnam that had explicit 
internationalisation strategies, one being private and the other public. Within these HEIs, four 
types of data were gathered using five methods: individual interview, focus group, document 
analysis, campus visit and social media analysis. The data was then analysed through a four-
stage process of holistic exploration, single-case thick description and coding, cross-case 
comparative analysis and finally theorisation. This process was inspired by the tradition of 
first and second order analysis (Van Maanen, 1979; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2005) in combination with Eisenhardt’s (1989) theory building process for 
comparative case studies. Issues of ethics and trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Shenton, 2004) were also carefully observed throughout data collection and analysis.  
 
There were two unanticipated problems arising during fieldwork that could have very well 
put this study in jeopardy. The first was an ownership dispute at the private university that 
led to legal actions and the swift dismissal of all senior and middle management, many of 
whom were interview targets. The dispute occurred very shortly after the onset of my 
fieldwork there and presented me with a critical decision of whether to abandon the case. 
The second was a compound of access difficulty and operational timing at the public 
university. Securing access to this university took much longer than that to the private one, 
and immediately after my access, a series of student recruitment activities involving all 
faculties were organised, followed by semester exams and summer vacation. Fieldwork was 
consequently conducted in the unfavourable conditions of a sparsely populated summer 
campus. In the end, I decided to persevere with both, but participant recruitment and data 
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collection had to be dramatically changed. The methodology was therefore not executed as 
planned at all, which interestingly epitomises the idea of emergent strategy discussed in 
Chapter 2 and provides a vivid case of (research) strategy as practiced. The problems and my 
response will be elaborated in detail later on in this chapter. 
 
The methodology chapter contains seven sections. First, my paradigmatic stance will be 
made explicit to lay the background for the whole methodology (3.1). My comparative case 
design is then described (3.2), including the selection criteria for cases and the four types of 
data I sought from them. Afterwards, I will introduce and explain the choice of context: 
Vietnam and the city of Saigon (3.3). This is followed in Section 3.4 by a report of how two 
Vietnamese universities were chosen as cases, based on the criteria in 3.2, and how 
participants were then recruited from them. Section 3.4 will also recapture the problems I 
was faced with during fieldwork at both universities. In the next two sections, I will 
respectively detail how data was collected (3.5) and analysed (3.6). Finally the issues of ethics 
(3.7) and trustworthiness will be addressed (3.8). 
      
3.1. Paradigmatic stance  
The present study and, to a greater extent, my paradigmatic stance can be identified as 
belonging to the pragmatism paradigm, especially the ideas put forward by Morgan (2007). 
Here I refer to paradigm in the sense of ‘shared beliefs and practices’ within a community of 
researchers (p. 55) for thinking about and doing social research, rather than the more 
popular metaphysical sense of ontological and epistemological assumptions. In this way, 
paradigm subsumes the choice of questions and appropriate methodologies, which may or 
may not involve the examination of the researcher’s ontology and epistemology. With that 
said, my paradigmatic stance strongly resonates pragmatism, in that 
• My methodology and in fact the whole design of this study revolved around the research 
question, not metaphysical assumptions (Creswell, 2014). The greatest concern was to 
find and/or develop a theoretical lens, research design and data collection and analysis 
techniques that would address the question – in other words, to make the question 
‘workable’ (Morgan, 2007, p. 66).  
• In conjunction, I was and am not committed to any ontological or epistemological 
positions (Creswell, 2014), nor do I believe in the methodological prescription that such 
positions might present (see, e.g., Guba & Lincoln, 2005). This does not equate a 
complete disregard of metaphysics for me as a researcher, but rather I do not adhere to 
any traditions and thus limit my research to certain topics, perspectives of a topic or 
methodologies. 
Given the pragmatist attention to research outcomes (Cherryholmes, 1992), I would suggest 
that pragmatism offers an attractive response to two particular aims and challenges of SAP 
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research: (a) to provide informants, especially strategy practitioners, with insights that serve 
their organisational needs, and consequently (b) to elicit willingness and commitment from 
them to involve themselves as informants (Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003). Assuming the 
research question covers matters of interest to practitioners, pragmatist researchers would 
be well placed to benefit and engage them because they can choose a methodology that 
best addresses those matters without the potential constraints by metaphysical assumptions. 
This also means that the resulting findings can facilitate ‘human problem-solving’ (Powell, 
2001, p. 884) without the need to account for the nature of reality and truth, which is unlikely 
to be the concern of practitioners.  
 
Being a pragmatist, therefore, I exercised ‘freedom of choice’ (Creswell, 2013, p. 28) and a 
little eclecticism in this study, combining different methodological ideas from various 
methodologists in social science and management and organisation studies in a way that, to 
me, was best for the question. For example, the relation between theory and data was both 
top-down and bottom-up: I had a clear theoretical framework based on a specific 
conceptualisation of strategy and application of SAP and sensemaking theory (refer back to 
2.2) to guide data collection and analysis, and yet at the same time any collected data 
informed the collection of further data, and themes emerging from the data that did not 
quite fit my theoretical framework were not discarded or forced into the framework (to be 
elaborated in 3.6). I strongly believe that such a pragmatic approach has helped enriched this 
study both empirically and theoretically. With that said, while pragmatists have often opted 
for mixed-method designs (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007; Denscombe, 2008; Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2010) (this is not to imply pragmatism prescribes mixed methodology), I chose a 
qualitative design, specifically comparative case study for this study as it was better suited to 
the demands for empirical and analytical depth posed by the research question and 
theoretical framework. 
 
Freedom, nonetheless, did not cause my methodological choices to be permissive and 
arbitrary (Bryman, 2006). On the contrary, compatibility and coherence were always 
considered during the planning of my research design, data collection and analysis, and 
rigour within each element of the methodology was also taken into account. As a result, 
writings by the methodologists from whom I drew methodological choices (e.g. Morgan, 
2007; Creswell, 2013, 2014; Yin, 2018) were very often consulted and juxtaposed. 
Furthermore, the decisions I took in reaction to the serious problems during fieldwork, as 
mentioned earlier, were carefully weighed in terms of risks and rewards, although ultimately 





3.2. Research design: Comparative case study 
As stated above, my study followed a qualitative comparative case study design. This choice 
was made in consideration of the demands for depth and the exploratory nature of this 
study, and at the same time was motivated by the use of case study in extant SAP research 
(e.g. Jarzabkowski, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2005). My particular design was based on the 
writings of many prominent scholars in case study (e.g. Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2018), drawing on both divergent and commensurable ideas and weaving them 
into a coherent, workable solution to the research question. The key elements of the design 
included its multi-case orientation, case selection criteria and the necessary data to extract 
from the cases.  
 
This section will describe my research design, starting with the rationale for choosing the 
case study methodology and a comparative design (3.2.1). Then, the criteria for case 
selection will be presented (3.2.2). Towards the end, I will specify which data I sought from 
the cases (3.2.3).  
 
3.2.1. Rationale: Depth, breadth and SAP 
Case study as a whole has been noted as one of, if not the most popular qualitative 
methodology used by management scholars (Piekkari & Welch, 2018), and it holds ‘a long, 
distinguished history’ in many social sciences (Creswell, 2013, p. 97). Yet, it is highly 
contested in terms of its nature, purpose, characteristics and what constitutes a case (see, 
e.g., Yazan, 2015 for a comparison between three methodologists). A brief example is Stake 
(1995; 2005) versus Eisenhardt (1989): The former does not call case study a methodology 
but a choice of what to study and emphasises the intrinsic value of every single case; to the 
scholar, knowledge has to be gained naturalistically or ‘through direct experience’ with the 
case (Stake, 2010, p. 220). By comparison, Eisenhardt (1989) calls case study a ‘research 
strategy’ (p. 534), which is arguably close in meaning to ‘methodology’, and focuses on its 
theory-building capability (the author, however, does not state theory building as the 
purpose of case study). She promotes multi-case designs where cross-case analyses can help 
counteract false impressions caused by limited data, thereby improving the robustness of 
resulting theories. That said, it is not my intent to delve into the methodological debates 
around case study. In the spirit of pragmatism, I will describe a version of case study that was 
derived for this study and the reason why it was chosen against another strong contender: 





In this study, case study is understood as a methodology that investigates empirical 
instances, incidents or units of a social phenomenon (Yin, 1994; Schwandt & Gates, 2018) in 
order to generate knowledge about said phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2018). These 
instances, incidents or units can be placed under the umbrella term of cases. Cases are 
bounded in a spatial and temporal context (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2018) and therefore unique in 
their own rights, so the knowledge gained from them (about the phenomenon they reflect) 
might be transferable (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) but not wholly be applicable to other cases or 
contexts (see 3.8.2). A ‘hallmark’ of the case study methodology is its indepth treatment of 
the case via the use of multiple sources of qualitative data (Creswell, 2013, p. 98) and via the 
provision of a rich, nuanced report to readers (Yin, 2018). Case study also leaves the 
possibility for breadth should the researcher choose a multi-case design. 
 
The above characteristics of case study made it a logical choice for my research question and 
theoretical framework. Case study afforded the depth required by the micro-level focus of 
the question, the SAP approach and sensemaking theory, without neglecting the context and 
by extension the structural forces within, which are important in SAP research. However, case 
study was not the only methodological option considered, but was chosen over a strong 
contender: ethnography. Ethnography could have provided incredible empirical and 
analytical depth for this study by requiring me to immerse in the daily organisational routine 
at the research sites and conduct participant observation on the unfolding of sensemaking 
praxis among various groups (Cunliffe, 2010, 2015; Creswell, 2013). In the end, however, 
ethnography was not adopted for two reasons. First, the ethnography methodology 
presented serious feasibility problems, particularly logistics because my study covered three 
groups of organisational actors that would very likely have distinct routines and be found in 
distinct spaces in such a large type of organisation as universities; for example, it would have 
been hard to imagine deans and students doing similar tasks or being present in the same 
room, not to mention they might come from different faculties. Thorough participant 
observation was therefore almost unmanageable. Second, ethnography limited the empirical 
breadth I wished to achieve, as it was my desire to study at least two universities, which 
might better reveal the impact of structural forces, especially at the meso (organisational) 
level, on sensemaking. Although ethnography itself does not exclude a multi-site design 
(see, e.g. Ciuk, Koning & Kostera, 2018), in my situation such a design would only have been 
feasible if each site had been studied in turn, consequently not fitting the duration confines 
of a PhD programme (tying back to the feasibility problem). By contrast, a case study design 
was much more feasible as it did not require prolonged immersion, and it better allowed for 
empirical breadth via a multi-case design. Another reason, albeit minor, for my choice of case 
study was that it had been used commonly and to great success by SAP scholars (e.g. 
Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Jarzabkowski, Sillince, & Shaw, 2010; Johnson et al., 2010). All that 
being said, I did decide to integrate a quasi-ethnographic dimension into my case-based 




The aforementioned need for breadth (and with it the examination of meso-level structural 
influences) was also one reason a comparative, multi-case design was chosen over a single-
case design. In addition, the multi-case design would provide a more assured basis for 
theorising because it would generate more data to work with, and the findings from one 
case might challenge my impressions of those from another and vice versa, simultaneously 
making my analysis more critical and grounding the theoretical findings in more varied 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Last but not least, 
comparative multi-case study, while demanding more time and efforts than single case 
study, was deemed feasible within the resources I had. 
 
3.2.2. Case selection criteria 
Theoretical sampling was used for selecting cases (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
That is, I searched for universities that would illuminate the sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies by deans, lecturers and students; my concern was not 
representation of, for example, a certain higher education system or a class of universities. To 
this end, there were five criteria, based on insights from the literature review and feasibility 
concerns: 
• First, the universities chosen must have an explicit strategic focus on internationalisation, 
evident by the inclusion of internationalisation as a component strategy and/or as part of 
other component strategies and/or as part of the corporate vision and mission. 
Furthermore, the universities must be active in implementing its internationalisation 
strategies, evident by regular reports of international activities, either inhouse or by 
external media, for at least three years counting back from the start of my search for 
cases (2016). It was deemed that three years were enough to conclude a university was 
strategically committed to internationalisation. This criterion ensured that, within the 
chosen universities, there were internationalisation strategies for non-leaders to make 
sense of.  
• Second, no group of non-leaders was left out of internationalisation, so, for example, a 
university whose lecturers participated in no international activities would be eliminated. 
This would be evident in the content of the internationalisation strategies and reports of 
international activities. At the same time, it was extremely preferable that there were 
strategies involving at least two groups, which would greatly facilitate for intergroup 
comparisons during analysis (see 3.6). The second criterion ensured that all groups 
engaged in sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. 
• The third and fourth criteria were arguably two sides of the same coin: comparability and 
data variety. On the one hand, it would be very difficult to compare universities that were 
vastly different, especially if the differences affected micro-level sensemaking. On the 
other hand, if said differences were too small, the empirical evidence gathered would not 
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be varied enough to capitalise on the merits of a multi-case over single-case design. The 
balancing act between comparability and data variety was a major challenge for the 
research design. My solution, though crude, was to categorise possible differences 
according to levels of analysis: macro (e.g. national legislation, culture, education system), 
meso (e.g. organisational structure, disciplinary focus, financing), micro (e.g. individual 
background, personality traits9), and then choose the level or specific difference I wanted 
to control for. In the end, I decided to select universities from the same country (i.e. no 
macro differences) that did not target a specific demographic of students or staff (i.e. 
limited control over micro differences). Bounding the cases within one country was also 
motivated by the last case selection criterion: feasibility. 
• The number and location of cases should be feasible. Although international comparative 
research was an attractive prospect for this study and had been called for both in higher 
education (Forest & Altbach, 2007; Tight et al. 2009) and management (Werner, 2002; 
Pisani, 2009), it was beyond my resources, particularly time and travel expenses. 
Therefore, I located the cases in one country. Moreover, because data would be    
collected with multiple methods and from multiple faculties (see 3.4.3 and 3.5) in order to 
exploit the potential of each case, it was also decided to keep the sample size at two to 
maintain a reasonable workload for a lone researcher. 
 
I will come back in Section 3.4 to describe the actual procedure of finding suitable cases, to 
which the five above criteria were applied, and introduce the two universities chosen. The 
preceding Section 3.3. will describe and explain why Vietnam was chosen as the country 
context. 
 
3.2.3. Expected empirical output 
The role of each case was to provide four main types of data (henceforth coded A, B, C and 
D) that would help answer my research question:  
• Data A: the university’s internationalisation strategies, as both plans and patterns (see 
2.2.1) 
• Data B: background information about the university, including its history, corporate 
strategy, organisational structure, and governance 
• Data C: accounts of non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, with 
special focus on those involved as informants (see 3.4.3 for participant recruitment) 
• Data D: background information about the non-leaders involved as informants (e.g. 
reasons for applying into the university)  
                                                 
9 Universities may target a specific demographic of students and/or staff. 
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The four types of data each had a unique purpose. Data A established my baseline 
understanding of the university’s view of internationalisation and strategic approach to it, 
thus providing signposts for the collection of Data C (i.e. which strategies participants should 
be asked about). Data B was also gathered to contextualise the university’s 
internationalisation strategies and non-leaders’ sensemaking of those strategies, enabling 
the examination of structural influences at the meso level on micro-level sensemaking. Data 
C was the most important among the four as it gave direct insights into non-leaders’ 
sensemaking praxis and how their sensemaking shaped the outcomes of the university’s 
internationalisation strategies. Lastly, Data D enriched Data C by potentially shedding light 
on their ways of thinking or, in sensemaking terms, schemas. 
 
The data was collected using individual interviews, focus groups, document analysis, campus 
visits and social media analysis. Section 3.5 and 3.6 will respectively detail the collection and 
analysis of the data. 
 
3.3. Research context: Vietnam and the city of Saigon 
The present study was conducted in my home country of Vietnam, which was chosen for 
three reasons. First, internationalisation has actually played a major role in the country’s 
education for 2000 years (Tran, Marginson, & Nguyen, 2014). In ancient times, China invaded 
Vietnam and imposed their language and culture, most notably Confucianism, in an attempt 
to assimilate the latter. It also allowed some Vietnamese scholars to take part in 
examinations in China; this was the earliest form of student mobility that Vietnam had. 
French colonists also brought their language and culture and facilitated student mobility 
from Vietnam to France. Moreover, they built what could be considered the first international 
university in the country: Université Indochinoise in 1906 in Hanoi (later renamed to Vietnam 
National University), which recruited students from all French colonies in Southeast Asia. 
During the Vietnam War, Vietnamese higher education had two distinct areas of 
internationalisation. Academics in the socialist North participated in exchanges with the 
Soviets, while students in the American-backed South received scholarships to go to the US. 
Internationalisation has been revitalised in modern Vietnam. On the one hand, foreign 
initiatives have taken various forms, ranging from scholarships to study abroad (e.g. 
Chevening scholarship from the British government) to branch campuses (e.g. RMIT 
University from Australia). On the other hand, the country’s own universities are trying to 
internationalise themselves by, for example, establishing joint programmes (e.g. 
http://chuyentiep.khoaquocte.vn/), teaching in English (e.g. 
https://admission.tdtu.edu.vn/en), joining international university networks (e.g. 
http://www.aunsec.org/aunmemberuniversities.php). In the last two years alone, a few high-
profile events on higher education internationalisation were organised across the country. 
These included  
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• a conference on building excellence in higher education involving the Australian 
Embassy, held in January 2019 (https://vnu.edu.vn/ttsk/?C1654/N24477/day-manh-quoc-
te-hoa-giao-duc,-huong-den-xay-dung-dai-hoc-uu-tu.htm) 
• a symposium on rankings in Times Higher Education, co-organised by major public 
universities in Southern Vietnam in June 2019 (personal communication, the event was 
closed and not publicised) 
• most notably, a conference on reforming the Higher Education Law, held by the 
Parliament in August 2018. Internationalisation was an area of interest in the new law. 
(https://tapchigiaoduc.moet.gov.vn/vi/news/Tin-tuc-su-kien/hoi-thao-giao-duc-2018-
giao-duc-dai-hoc-chuan-hoa-va-hoi-nhap-quoc-te-350.html) 
Considering all of this, Vietnam offers a useful context from which to study higher education 
internationalisation. 
 
Second, Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia, an under-researched region for higher 
education that has more recently captured attention from both scholars and practitioners 
(Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, 2013; University of Oxford, 2015). Furthermore, 
research into higher education internationalisation in Vietnam is scarce and narrow, most 
being policy and situation analyses, and usually takes the form of desk studies (see, e.g., 
Welch, 2009; Tran, 2014). 
 
Third, the fact that I am a Vietnamese could be of advantage during data collection, due to 
shared language and cultural understanding with my participants.  
 
The research context was further narrowed down to the city of Saigon. Saigon was the city I 
was most familiar with in Vietnam, making travelling to and between my target universities 
easy. More important, I had a considerable personal network consisting of lecturers and 
academic managers in five large universities in the city, high school teachers and my own 
students10, all of whom could provide me with indepth knowledge about local universities 
and their internationalisation so that I could make a more well-founded case selection. If 
they worked at a university that I selected, they would be valuable key informants and may 
facilitate or grant me access. Lastly, Saigon was and is the most developed city in Vietnam 
economically and host to many international activities in education. As a result, universities in 
Saigon have more resources and opportunities for internationalisation. 
  
                                                 
10 I had been an English teacher in Saigon prior to my PhD. 
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3.4. The cases and participants 
With my research design and context established, the rest of this chapter will describe how 
my comparative design was realised in the Vietnamese context with the selection of cases 
and participants, collection and analysis of data and the address of major quality issues, 
including ethics and trustworthiness. 
 
This section begins by reporting the procedure with which two universities in Saigon were 
chosen as cases and accessed (3.4.1). I will then recapture the complications I had with each 
university before and after access (3.4.2), which had serious implications for participant 
recruitment and data collection. Next, I will outline the selection criteria for participants 
(3.4.3) and describe how the planned procedure for recruitment had to be significantly 
changed (3.4.4). 
  
3.4.1. Case selection procedure and access request 
Case selection began in August 2016 and was conducted in two stages. In the initial stage, I 
surveyed the websites and social media of the 53 universities in Saigon 
(https://tuyensinhso.vn/khu-vuc/dh-hv-khu-vuc-tphcm-c11806.html) to find whether they 
had internationalisation strategies or at least a strategic statement about internationalisation. 
Particular attention was paid to phrases such as tam nhin quoc te (international vision), chien 
luoc quoc te hoa (internationalisation strategy) or hoat dong quoc te (international activities). 
These universities were wholly Vietnamese and not foreign-owned (e.g. RMIT Saigon) or 
foreign-invested (e.g. Vietnam-Germany University) in order to maintain comparability. 
Information from the institutions was supplemented with news report about their 
international activities, if available. My initial search resulted in 14 qualifying universities, of 
which 10 were public and the others were private. 
 
In the later stage, I refined my search by examining the websites of these 14 universities 
more closely, this time perusing all available information on their teaching, research and 
extra-curricular for signs of internationalisation. I also contacted my network of highschool 
teachers, lecturers and academic managers to ask for their opinion on these HEIs and their 
internationalisation. Another source of opinion was my former students, some of whom were 
doing their undergraduate studies and presumably had looked up information about 
universities in Saigon when they were in the last year of highschool. At the end of this stage, 
I managed to narrow down to six public and three private universities. I then re-read all the 
information gathered about them and, for each sector, chose the one that I felt was most 




To protect their identity, the universities are henceforth called Blue (private) and Red (public). 
Blue was possibly the most reputable private university in Saigon and regarded by most in 
my personal network as ‘significantly better’ than other private universities (personal 
communication), and indeed it often appeared on the media for being progressive and 
innovative in teaching (e.g. offering modules in global citizenship, substantial placement). 
The university was founded in the 1990s as a vocational school for clerical work and digital 
media, then became a college in early to mid 2000s before attaining its university status in 
late 2000s, and throughout its history Blue had been non-profit. All the information collected 
about Blue showed a clear international outlook. It emphasised foreign language learning 
beyond English, had a joint venture with a French business school in Saigon that specialised 
in hospitality, offered joint programmes, offered exchange and internship opportunities 
outside Vietnam. Blue’s joint programmes deserve special mention because they were 
developed from the ground up with a foreign partner and highly customised to be delivered 
almost wholly in Vietnam. This stood in contrast with the 2:2 or 3:1 joint arrangements more 
commonly found in other Vietnamese universities11 where students would undertake, say, 
the first 2 years at home with a local curriculum, then transferred abroad for the latter 2 years 
to finish their degree, studying the curriculum of the university they transferred to.  
 
Red was a young public university established in the early 2000s. It had quickly gained in 
status to become one of the most attractive destinations, whether public or private, for 
students in Saigon and Southern Vietnam. This increasing appeal was reflected in the steady 
rise in entry requirements over the years. The university prided itself on being the first 
Vietnamese university to teach in English, its modern campus and an academic staff body 
who completed their doctorate in the West (Anglo-American and European countries). Like 
Blue, Red also showed a clear international outlook, including use of English as the medium 
of instruction, curricula and textbooks adapted from the West, recruitment of Vietnamese 
doctoral graduates from the West, research publication on Web of Science index, joint and 
exchange programmes. One of my former students, who graduated from an elite highschool 
in Saigon, applied to Red because of its ‘international feel and quality’ (personal 
communication).  
 
                                                 
11 See, for example (please use Chrome browser, once on the page, right click anywhere on the page and choose 







A more detailed profile of Blue and Red, including their history, structure, corporate strategy 
and internationalisation strategies, can be found in Chapter 4 and 5, where their case studies 
are respectively presented. 
 
I then wrote formal letters of interest to the Vice-Chancellors of Blue and Red, which in 
Vietnam is deemed more socially acceptable than emailing. In the letters, I introduced myself 
and expressed my wish to study their universities, the international prospects of which were 
highlighted. This was followed by an outline of my research aims and data collection 
methods; I kept all description of my study very brief and formatted into bullet points in 
order not to waste the Vice-Chancellors’ time. Also included was a dedicated paragraph on 
the practical benefits the study might bring to their organisations, and I promised to give 
them a debriefing on the practical implications of the findings once fieldwork was over. It 
was made clear, however, that the identity of the participants had to be kept anonymous, 
and the identity of the university would also be anonymised in the thesis and any ensuing 
publications unless the Vice-Chancellors preferred otherwise (which they did not). At the end 
of the latter, I reasserted my wish to study Blue and Red and politely asked for an audience 
with the Vice-Chancellors.  
 
The letters of interest were sent to Blue and Red in mid-September and mid-October, 
respectively. The one-month gap was to reduce the likelihood of being called and invited on 
campus at the same time. 
 
Notwithstanding, I soon discovered that securing access to Blue and Red was much more 
difficult than I had anticipated.  
 
3.4.2. Complications with access  
There were serious complications with access to both Blue and Red, dramatically altering 
participant recruitment and data collection. To start with, my letter of interest to Blue was 
responded within one month, and two weeks later in November 2016 I was granted an 
audience with the Vice-Chancellor, who welcomed my research and granted me access. By 
chance, there was a forthcoming conference on higher education and globalisation the same 
month, to which she invited me to present. She also informed me of a weekly series of 
workshops called Blue Research Seminar, where lecturers from many faculties came to learn 
about research methodology, and recommended that I present there at least once to 
socialise with lecturers. I took advantage of both opportunities and managed to establish 
contact with three lecturers, who turned out to be invaluable later on (see 3.4.4). 
Complications arose at the end of November, when I was informed by the Vice-Chancellor 
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that my participant recruitment and data collection should be postponed due to an 
ownership conflict among the board of directors. In brief, there were two opposing groups in 
the board who vied for ownership of the university: One side, led by the Vice-Chancellor, 
wanted to keep the university non-profit while the other, led by a private investor, wanted to 
turn it into for-profit. The secretary to the Vice-Chancellor explained to me that a private, 
non-profit university was not legally allowed to pay dividends as it saw fit but had to adhere 
to the government bond rate, which was very low and deemed unacceptable by a number of 
board members. This legislation was only introduced in 2014 and in response said members 
called to transform Blue into for-profit so that high dividends could be paid, leading a split in 
the board of directors. Neither side possessed a share majority to force a decision, and after 
three years of impasse internal negotiations had broken down, which triggered the for-profit 
board members to initiate a takeover. From November 2016 to February 2017, both sides of 
the board engaged in legal actions, with the city authorities also embroiled in the dispute. 
The internal situation quickly became chaotic with student protests, lecturer resignations and 
constant top management-faculty meetings. In February 2017 the for-profit side won and 
took ownership of Blue, and the first thing they did, apart from making Blue for-profit, was to 
dismiss not only top management but also middle management, who were supportive of the 
Vice-Chancellor and her side of the board. Dissenting, outspoken lecturers were also made 
redundant. A new top management team were quickly recruited and installed. 
 
When informed about the ownership conflict back in November 2016, I had to consider the 
risk of losing access and thus the necessity of finding another case. In the end, however, 
there were three reasons that I decided not to drop Blue and waited until the legal actions 
were over to push on with my research. First and most importantly, the Vice-Chancellor said 
she would sit for an interview and assist with my research regardless of court outcomes. She 
even encouraged me to persevere as she herself strongly believed that Blue would be a good 
case for Vietnamese higher education. As shall be seen in 3.4.4, the Vice-Chancellor did 
uphold her words. Secondly, gaining access to another university might have very well taken 
the same amount of time as waiting out the ownership conflict. During my case selection 
(see the last section), a senior academic manager of a major public university, whom I knew 
personally, warned me that a request like mine could take up to two or three months for a 
response or be ignored completely. His warning did happen with Red, in that I had to wait 
until January 2017 to receive a response to my letter (I will come back to this very shortly); 
the complications with Red partly motivated me not to abandon Blue. The third and final 
reason was that, from my audience with the Vice-Chancellor, it was apparent Blue had a clear 
conceptualisation of internationalisation and was serious in pursuing its internationalisation 
strategies; its case, therefore, would likely provide rich data for my study. Nevertheless, 
fieldwork at Blue was pushed back nearly five months until March 2017 and became an 




Complications with access were also encountered with Red, specifically with regards to 
communication and the university’s operational timing. After waiting a month with no 
response to my letter of interest, I called the university in mid-November 2016 to enquire if 
they had received it and was told to send the letter again to the External Relations Office. I 
suspected that going through all the bureaucracy would take a lot of time, and therefore in 
addition to sending another letter to External Relations as instructed, I leveraged all my 
personal connections and tried my best to find someone who could help me contact a 
middle or senior manager at Red. One month’s worth of networking led me to a quick 
meeting with a Pro-Vice Chancellor in a coffee shop in Saigon in December 2016, who gave 
me the Vice-Chancellor’s email; unfortunately, the Pro-Vice Chancellor did not have the 
authority to grant me access. Before emailing the Vice-Chancellor, I contacted the university 
again to see if my letter was processed and it was about to be, so I refrained from doing so. 
Two weeks later in mid-January 2017 I received a call from External Relations that I needed to 
wait until after the upcoming traditional Vietnamese New Year, which was in February, to 
have an audience with the Vice-Chancellor. In late February I finally met the Vice-Chancellor 
to explain my research and was granted access, and the head of External Relations was 
delegated as my point of contact; I was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement (to be 
elaborated shortly). The timing, however, was extremely inopportune. At that time the 
university was preparing for a two-month series of student recruitment activities, including 
three open days, and this involved a lot of academic staff and students. Therefore, the head 
of External Relations recommended I should postpone my fieldwork in order not to bother 
anyone until mid to late April. To make matters worse, by late April the university was 
entering the second semester exam, followed by summer vacation. Although I managed to 
interview the head of External Relations and the Pro-Vice Chancellor in internationalisation in 
April 2017 (see 3.5 for the full data collection procedure), it was not until mid to late May 
that the rest of my fieldwork started. 
 
As said above, I was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement. The agreement was rather 
simple, containing only three points: 
• The identity of Red should be kept anonymous in my publications. 
• I would not provide any data or information about Red to a third party. 
• No visual data would be used in my publications. 
It can be seen that the agreement did not prevent the publication of my research. In fact, the 
first two points were already part of my ethical measures (see 3.7), and the third point could 
easily be met. 
 
In brief, access into Red took much longer than I had anticipated and this was compounded 
by the university’s operational timing, consequently delaying my fieldwork. In fact, fieldwork 
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started approximately four months later than I anticipated. That said, the head of External 
Relations was greatly helpful in setting up my interview with her and the Pro-Vice Chancellor 
in internationalisation in April 2017, not to mention she also referred me to the deans of the 
faculties I wanted to investigate. 
 
In the very beginning in September 2016, I did consider sending letters of interest to other 
universities besides Blue and Red in case there were complications with them. However, that 
would have posed a risk for my personal reputation. Supposing I had been granted an 
audience with three Vice-Chancellors or more, I would have had to withdraw my request for 
access with at least one of them during our meeting (withdrawing after being granted access 
would have been worse). This could have permanently damaged my relations with them and 
thus prevented me from, for example, doing research into their universities in the future. 
Moreover, I could not have anticipated the serious complications with Blue and Red. Up until 
now, I have not been able to devise any solutions to circumvent such complications. 
 
3.4.3. Participant selection criteria  
For each case, I intended to interview a top manager, especially the one that granted me 
access, a high-ranking officer in charge of internationalisation (e.g. head of international 
relations), and most importantly deans, lecturers and students, whose accounts of their own 
sensemaking were the core type of data (refer back to 3.2.3). While the identification of said 
top manager and officer in internationalisation was rather straightforward, the recruitment of 
deans, lecturers and students, who were much more numerous, required a set of criteria. 
Once again theoretical sampling was used to choose the deans, lecturers and students to be 
interviewed about their sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. The composition of 
the non-leaders involved needed not to be representative of Blue or Red or any groups 
them, but rather it had to enhance data richness and variety. This guiding principle helped to 
narrow down the participant pool as follows: 
• First, deans, lecturers and students would be recruited from faculties and departments12 
that were active in internationalisation, identified by the aforementioned top manager 
and officer in internationalisation. The faculties and departments should differ in 
disciplinary focus in order to avoid potential disciplinary bias in terms of 
internationalisation. For example, business schools might be more receptive to 
international accreditations and rankings (see Gioia & Corley, 2002; Luca & Smith, 2015) 
than a history department. Nonetheless, it would have been interesting to see how non-
leaders in passive faculties and departments made sense of internationalisation 
strategies, but the inclusion of such faculties and departments would have increased my 
                                                 
12 A faculty represents a discipline (e.g. Faculty of Sciences) and contains smaller departments (e.g. Department of 
Physics), each representing an area of that discipline. 
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work load significantly as it demanded more data and complicated analysis (with the 
comparison between active and passive faculties and departments). 
• Second, a minimum of two years working/studying full-time was required of the 
participants to ensure their familiarity with the university and increase the likelihood of 
them having experienced internationalisation. This eliminated all part-time students and 
lecturers working on a fixed-term or indefinite contractual basis. In addition, recruitment 
preference would be given to those who had frequently engaged in international 
activities and were higher in seniority. 
• Third, only undergraduate students were recruited. This criterion was added after my 
entry interviews with the top management of both Blue and Red (see 3.5 for the full data 
collection procedure), who recommended recruiting only undergraduates. The reason 
was that at both universities, the undergraduate bodies accounted for more than 90% of 
the student population, making finding the appropriate postgraduates difficult. 
Furthermore, most of Blue and Red’s international activities were aimed at 
undergraduates. 
• Fourth, the number of faculties/departments and of lecturers and students within each 
had to be feasible (the number of deans was understandably always one). It was decided 
that two faculties per university and ten lecturers, ten students per faculty was desirable. 
However, as shall be seen very shortly below, the number of participants recruited was 
considerably smaller due to the complications with access described in the previous 
section.   
 
3.4.4. Participant recruitment procedure 
The procedure for recruiting participants at Blue and Red was dramatically changed by 
complications with access. Initially, a systematic, snowball procedure was planned. At each 
university, I would invite a top manager, especially the one that granted me access, and a 
high-ranking officer in charge of internationalisation to each participate in an entry interview 
(again see 3.5). During the interviews, I would ask them to identify two faculties that were 
active in internationalisation and provide me with the contact details of the deans so that I 
can could contact them, negotiate access into their faculties and recruit them for interview. 
Upon granted faculty access, I would recruit the rest of the participants by, with permission, 
putting up recruitment notices in shared spaces, mainly staffrooms, classrooms and 
stairways. Respondents to the recruitment notices would be asked to point me towards other 
potential participants. In addition, I would request the deans for permission to have the 
contact details of lecturers and to send out invitation emails to them; afterwards, I would ask 
the lecturers to refer me to student representatives in their classes and then ask those to 
relay my invitation to their friends. The ultimate goal was to find, as stated previously, ten 
lecturers and ten students from each faculty who qualified for the two-year, full-time 





The actual recruitment that I carried out was less systematic, more opportunistic and unique 
to each case. At Blue, although the Vice-Chancellor had agreed to sit for an interview and 
assist me in contacting deans regardless of the court outcomes, I decided to wait until the 
transition from the old board and top management team to the new one was completed 
before contacting her again in March 2017. This was to make sure that I would not be 
bothering her and that she had time to talk to me. With great appreciation to the Vice 
Chancellor, I was granted an interview. However, no entry interview was conducted with the 
officer in charge of internationalisation as he was unreachable. The Vice-Chancellor then 
recommended that I contact all Blue deans and not just those of the faculties active in 
internationalisation, in case the latter were unreachable after their dismissal or refused to 
participate. Fortunately, by late April I had managed to arrange a meeting with and recruit 
the deans of two, according to the Vice-Chancellor, internationalisation-active faculties: 
Economics and Commerce, and Language and Culture. The next, more difficult step was to 
recruit lecturers and students, which the deans could not help with because they had been 
dismissed. Neither was it any longer feasible (or advisable) to place recruitment notices 
around campus. My solution was to call the few lecturers that I had known from the 
conferences and seminars I had luckily attended (refer back to 3.4.2) and invite them out for 
coffee13. I would present my research and ask them to refer me to their colleagues and 
students; were they themselves to qualify my criteria, I also invited them to participate. One 
lecturer from Language and Culture, in particular, was immensely helpful in that she invited 
me to a dissertation defense of final-year students in her faculty, where I was able to recruit 
three students. I met and recruited all the participants online via Facebook or email, or face-
to-face on campus or at a coffee shop. A lot of efforts were also invested into building 
rapport with the lecturers and demonstrating to them that I was not a spy for the new board 
(see also 3.7 for ethics). Overall, participant recruitment at Blue was very slow, and three 
lecturers refused to participate for fear that their interview response might be leaked to the 
new board against their interests. After two months of recruitment, in June I was able to find 
five lecturers and five students from Economics and Commerce, and four lecturers and five 
students from Language and Culture. The details of all participants from Blue and Red are 
shown in Table 6 below; the number after gender signify the number of years 
working/studying full-time by the time of data collection. 
Table 6. Participant details 
Blue Red 




Economics and Commerce 
Pro-Vice Chancellor in 
internationalisation: male, 6 
Head of External Relations: female, 6 
 
Business School 
                                                 
13 It is a common social practice in Vietnam to do business over coffee. 
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Dean: male, 4 
Lecturer 1: female, over 10 
Lecturer 2: female, 3 
Lecturer 3: female, 4 
Lecturer 4: male, 2 
Lecturer 5: male, 3 
Student 1: female, 4 
Student 2: female, 4 
Student 3: female, 4 
Student 4: female, 4 
Student 5: male, 3 
 
Language and Culture 
Dean: male, 5 
Lecturer 1: female, 6 
Lecturer 2: female, 3 
Lecturer 3: male, 4 
Lecturer 4: male, 5 
Student 1: female, 3 
Student 2: female, 3 
Student 3: female, 3 
Student 4: male, 3 
Student 5: male, 2 
Deputy dean: male, 4 
Lecturer 1: male, 4 
Lecturer 2: male, 8 
Lecturer 3: male, 5 
Lecturer 4: female, 3 
Student 1: female, 3 
Student 2: female, 3 
Student 3: female, 3 
Student 4: male, 4 
Student 5: male, 4 
 
Computer Science 
Dean: male, 3 
Lecturer 1: female, 6 
Lecturer 2: male, 3 
Lecturer 3: male, 2 
Lecturer 4: male, 3 
Student 1: female, 3 
Student 2: male, 3 
Student 3: male, 3 
Student 4: male, 3 
 
Industrial Engineering 
Student 1: male, 3 
Student 2: male, 4 
Note: 4 for students means that they were either close to graduation or had 
recently graduated  
 
At Red, I had to wait until all the student recruitment activities had subsided to conduct the 
entry interview in April 2017, one with the Pro-Vice Chancellor of internationalisation and 
another with the head of External Relations, who identified Business School and Computer 
Science as the two faculties active in internationalisation. The head of External Relations then 
referred me to the deputy dean of Business School (the dean was unavailable for 
participation) and dean of Computer Science, both of whom agreed to participate and helped 
me contact the lecturers of their respective faculties. However, I had to wait until after the 
semester exam in May to begin recruitment and was not allowed to place recruitment 
notices around campus. By this time the university had entered summer vacation, but 
because I could not wait until the new academic year due to the timing of my doctoral 
programme, recruitment had to commence despite the sparsely populated summer campus. 
Most lecturers still worked during the summer, but they were not present on campus as 
frequently as during term time and responded to my invitation emails very slowly. That said, 
a few were willing to participate. Student recruitment, however, was a much greater concern 
because most had left on vacation. I decided against asking for references from deans or 
lecturers, which I felt would bother them too much. Instead, I would go on campus and 
conduct recruitment myself by meeting students in hallways and other shared spaces. The 
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head of External Relations also suggested I attend a pre-departure meeting for students of 
joint programmes between Red and a British university, who were preparing to transfer to 
the UK for the second-half of their degree; it was here that I managed to recruit two 
students. In addition, I discovered that one of my former students happened to be studying 
at Red; although he was from neither Business School nor Computer Science, he volunteered 
to participate and referred a friend of his. I kept contact with the recruited students via 
Facebook and invited them for a drink either on campus or in central Saigon to build rapport. 
By July, I had recruited four lecturers and five students from Business School, four lecturers 
and four students from Computer Science, and two students from Industrial Engineering. 
 
Participation was voluntary and based on informed consent, which was sought in two stages 
(see 3.7 for other ethical measures). During my first contact with any prospective participants, 
I introduced myself (introduction was not necessary with my former student) and the 
purpose for contacting them, which was to invite them for an interview. I also briefly 
described my research and assured them that, were they to participate, their identity and 
response would be kept anonymous. Finally, I emphasised that they were free to enquire 
about any issues and that if they no longer wanted to be in the study, they could opt out at 
any time without repercussion. The purpose of this stage was to ensure prospective 
participants were informed of their role and rights, and those who were willing to participate 
were then asked for their contact details (email, facebook or mobile phone), with which I 
could build rapport and arrange interviews later. I did not present the consent form 
(Appendix A) this early on as it was deemed too forward and pushing. 
 
Afterwards, I sent the participants a thank you message and asked to arrange our interviews. 
I also tried to engage in small chats with students and a few young lecturers to build rapport. 
More importantly, it was during this stage that I explained to the participants I needed them 
to sign a consent form as part of the ethical requirements of my PhD and more generally of 
doing research in the UK. The form repeated what I had informed them earlier about their 
role as interviewee and my guarantee of their anonymity and right to withdraw. Efforts were 
made to emphasise that signing the form would not place them under any obligations or 
risks. The form was then sent digitally to each participant for perusal, and he/she was given 
the option to sign it digitally then or physically when we later met for interview. Throughout 
this stage, I made a point of writing messages and not calling them on the phone or 
facebook14, which I felt would have been intrusive. 
 
                                                 




The consent form, nonetheless, was not signed by all participants. While most participants 
did, either digitally or physically, there were a few who refused to sign the form: 
• Lecturer 5 and Student 515 in Economics and Commerce at Blue 
• Student 5 in Language and Culture at Blue 
• Lecturer 4 in Business School at Red 
• The dean and Lecturer 4 in Computer Science at Red 
None of the above participants withdrew their agreement to be interviewed but said they 
were uncomfortable signing the consent form; one Red lecturer, in particular, found signing 
‘too formal and heavy’. All that being said, when I wrote to them to arrange an interview (via 
email, facebook or mobile phone), they did respond in writing with their consent. Therefore, 
informed consent was in fact provided by the participants, despite their subsequent 
unwillingness to sign the consent form. Two exceptions, however, were Lecturer 5 in 
Economics and Commerce at Blue and Lecturer 4 in Computer Science at Red. I arranged an 
interview with them via text message, to which they responded with a phone call and gave 
their consent. Because the calls were not recorded, there was no evidence of their consent. 
Even though I still interviewed all the participants who had not signed the form to show my 
sincerity and seriousness about their participation, any data gained from them was not used 
in this study.  
 
It was interesting to observe that the consent form, which I had learned was a normal 
component of research, caused discomfort in some of my participants. While luckily none of 
them decided to withdraw, their refusal to sign the form drew my attention to the cultural 
dimension of participant recruitment and informed consent. In retrospect, their refusal was 
explicable from a cultural perspective, at least from my own experience as a Vietnamese. 
First, signing papers was usually confined to the context of work, doing business or dealing 
with the authorities (e.g. registering one’s marriage); therefore, signing the consent form 
might have indeed been ‘too formal and heavy’ as said by one Red lecturer. Second, social 
science research in Vietnam was not as rigourous in terms of ethical procedures as that in 
the UK. I used to be involved as a participant in two research projects in Vietnam and was 
not asked to sign anything; moreover, I myself conducted one small project for my 
undergraduate degree, for which I was not required to present my participants with a 
consent form. Yet another potential reason, though perhaps not specific to the Vietnamese 
context, was that some participants might have been anxious about their response being 
leaked to superiors against their interests. Regardless of reason, I respected the wish of those 
who did not want to sign the consent form, neither nudging them to sign nor eliciting an 
explanation from them, which would have been unethical.  
                                                 




3.5. Data collection 
Data collection was conducted using individual interview, focus group, document analysis, 
campus visit and social media analysis. The combination of multiple methods satisfied the 
demands for depth of my research question, theoretical framework and the case-based 
design (Creswell, 2013). Moreover, it allowed for data triangulation between methods 
(Denzin, 1989), which helped counteract potential bias from any single methods. Ultimately, 
the combination was expected to produce nuanced accounts of sensemaking praxis that a 
lone method could not, because data from one method could contextualise, substantiate or 
problematise that from another. Such accounts then provided a robust basis for theorisation. 
 
The five methods were woven into a three-stage data collection procedure that was 
expected to span 9 months. Due to complications with access, the total duration was 12 
months, and the procedures at both Blue and Red had to be adapted with some 
compromises, but overall they were similar to what I had planned.  
 
This section describes my three-stage data collection procedures at Blue and Red and locates 
the data collection methods within each stage. Furthermore, I will explain the role of each 
method in contributing to the four types of data necessary to answer the research question 
(refer back to 3.2.3): 
• Data A: the university’s internationalisation strategies, as both plans and patterns  
• Data B: background information about the university, including its history, corporate 
strategy, organisational structure, and governance 
• Data C: accounts of non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, with 
special focus on those involved as informants  
• Data D: background information about the non-leaders involved as informants (e.g. 
reasons for applying into the university)  
The section begins with timelines of data collection at Blue and Red (3.5.1) in order to 
provide a historical overview of the three stages, the methods used and the data collected. 
The rest of this section, from 3.5.2 to 3.5.8, will focus on each stage and/or method. Finally, 
Section 3.5.9 will quantitatively account for the amount of data gathered. 
 
3.5.1. Historical overview of data collection 
My initial plan was to divide data collection at Blue and Red into three main stages. Stage 1 
was to establish a background understanding of the case, which then informed interviews in 
Stage 2, and to identify and provide contact of the faculties to focus on. This stage involved 
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analysis of strategic documents followed by two entry interviews, one with a top manager 
and the other with a high-ranking officer in charge of internationalisation (e.g. head of 
international relations).  
 
Stage 2 began once faculty access had been granted and was the central stage of data 
collection. Its purpose was to investigate the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of 
deans, lecturers and students; participant recruitment was also done in Stage 2. This stage 
was characterised by individual interviews with deans and then focus groups with lecturers 
and students – more specifically, in each faculty there would be two focus groups, one for 
lecturers and the other for students, so the total number of focus groups per case was four. 
Interview was chosen to investigate sensemaking because it allowed me to ‘explore in detail 
the experiences, motives, and opinions of others’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 3), and the 
method itself has often been drawn upon in sensemaking research (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004; Rouleau, 2005; Sonenshein, 2010; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  
 
The final stage was member-checking (Creswell, 2013), where I followed up with all 
participants in Stage 2 (deans, lecturers, students) so that they could feedback on the data 
and my impressions of what they had said.  
 
Throughout my fieldwork, campus visits would be conducted whenever there was a faculty-
wide international activity in the faculties I focused on; in addition, there would be one 
campus visit per case in the beginning (Stage 1) to familiarise myself with the layout and 
facilities of the campus. Campus visits would enrich my understanding of Blue and Red and 
supply materials for participants to comment on during the interviews. All interviews were to 
be on campus unless requested otherwise by the participants. 
 
Table 7 (next page) illustrates the intended timeline for data collection and the actual 
procedure that I undertook at Blue and Red. Target time for access is also included to put 





Table 7. Research timeline 
 Intended Blue Red 
Access November or December 2016 November 2016 February 2017 





December 2016 to January 2017 
• analysis of strategic documents 
• entry interviews with a top manager and an 
officer in internationalisation 
March 2017 
• entry interview with the Vice-Chancellor at her 
home 
• strategic documents were obtained later from an 
archival officer, who was also dismissed after the 
ownership dispute. 
April 2017 
• strategic documents were provided by the Head 
of External Relations 
• entry interview with the Pro-Vice Chancellor in 
internationalisation and the head of External 
Relations 





March to May 2017 
• individual interviews with deans 
• participant recruitment 
• one focus group per faculty for all lecturers of 
said faculty 
• one focus group per faculty for all students of 
said faculty 
 
April 2017  
interviews with deans of Economics and Commerce  
and Language and Culture at their homes 
April to June 2017 
participant recruitment 
June to August 2017 
• one focus group with two lecturers from 
Economics and Commerce (out of five) 
• individual interviews with all other lecturers 
• one focus group with four students from 
Economics and Commerce (out of five) 
• one focus group with two students from 
Language and Culture (out of five) 
• individual interviews with all other students 
May 2017 
interviews with deans of Business School and 
Computer Science  
May to July 2017 
participant recruitment 
July to September 2017 
• one focus group with all four lecturers from 
Business School  
• individual interviews with all other lecturers 
• one focus group with four students from Business 
School (out of five) 
• one focus group with all four students from 
Computer Science  




June to August 2017 
individual follow-up with all participants 
September to October 2017 
member-checking was only done with 
• the two deans 
• two lecturers from Economics and Commerce 
• one lecturers from Language and Culture  
• four students from Economics and Commerce 
October to November 2017 
member-checking was only done with 
• dean of Computer Science 
• two lecturers from Business School 
• one lecturers from Computer Science  
• two students from Business School 
69 
 
• two students from Language and Culture  
Other participants either were unreachable or 
refused to provide follow-up 
• two students from Computer Science  
• one student from Industrial Engineering 
Other participants either were unreachable or 
refused to provide follow-up 
Campus visits 
• One visit in the beginning for familiarisation with 
the campus 




• presentation at a conference on higher education 
and globalisation 
• presentation at a training workshop on research 
methodology 
December 2016 
• a tour around campus 
• attendance at strategic meetings between top 
management and the faculties  
 
No longer possible after the instalment of the new 
top management 
March 2017 
• attendance at an open day 
• a tour around campus 
April 2017 
attendance at pre-departure meeting for students 
of joint programmes between Red and a British 
university 
 
No events to attend during the summer  
Social media 
unplanned Used throughout to recruit participants and then 
build and maintain rapport with them. Part of the 
data was gathered from online conversations. 
 
Social media also provided supplementary data on 
students’ sensemaking. 
Used throughout to recruit participants and then 
build and maintain rapport with them. Part of the 
data was gathered from online conversations. 
 





Despite serious setbacks with access, data collection at both Blue and Red was mostly 
executed as intended, with a few necessary adjustments. First, data collection started a few 
months late at both universities. Second, the order of methods in Stage 1 was switched for 
Blue (to be elaborated in 3.5.2 below). Third, many interviews with participants from Blue 
were held off campus (in some cases in personal spaces) because they were either dismissed 
from the university or wished not to be seen talking at lengths to a stranger during the 
power transition from the old to the new board and top management. Fourth, campus visits 
were limited both at Blue, due to the departure of my gatekeeper (the Vice-Chancellor), and 
at Red, due to the lack of any activities during the summer. One issue that was not strictly 
related to the complications with access was the inability to involve all lecturers or students 
of a faculty into a focus group, and therefore individual interviews had to be held in 
supplementation. However, this had been anticipated during planning.  
 
Apart from adjustments, there was an addition to my data collection methods: social media. 
Initially social media was only used to recruit and maintain rapport with participants, but 
both Blue and Red students suggested that I pay more attention to the various social media 
communities created and run by students at the two universities, because what happened in 
the physical world would then be discussed in the digital world. As shall be seen in Chapter 5 
(the case study of Red), social media played a significant role not only as a data collection 
method but as a finding itself. 
 
With all that said, I will now describe each stage-method in the data collection procedure, 
starting with document analysis in Stage 1.  
 
3.5.2. Stage 1: Document analysis 
In the very beginning, the corporate strategy and, if available separate, the 
internationalisation component strategy would be collected and analysed to establish an 
institutional profile of Blue and Red (Data B) and more importantly to examine their 
internationalisation strategies (Data A). The information gained from the corporate strategy 
would partly inform my entry interview (3.5.3). 
 
I was provided with Red’s corporate strategy for the 2011-2015 strategic period by the head 
of External Relations within two weeks from my audience with the Vice-Chancellor. The 
strategy was quite substantial, being over 100 pages long, and included the vision and 
mission statement, SWOT analysis, all component strategies (11 in total). The coporate 
strategy was accompanied by a comprehensive action plan to implement the component 
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strategies with key performance indicators (KPIs) for monitoring and evaluation. The 
internationalisation strategies were integrated into said 11 component strategies. 
 
By contrast, I did not receive Blue’s corporate strategy until after the entry interview with the 
Vice-Chancellor. This was because the strategy, along with many important documents, was 
(secretly) kept by an archival officer who was dismissed when the new board and top 
management came to power. After the entry interview, the Vice-Chancellor referred to this 
person, who then gave me the strategy. Blue’s corporate strategy, made for 2011 to 2020, 
was much shorter than Red’s at only half the length, but the structure was largely similar with 
the vision and mission statement, SWOT analysis, all component strategies (five in total) and 
KPIs. The internationalisation strategies were integrated into the five component strategies. 
 
Apart from the corporate strategy, I wanted to access annual reports, which might shed 
lights into the degree of success of each internationalisation strategy. This would allow me to 
focus on certain strategies during subsequently interviews. However, I was denied access to 
annual reports at Red, and while the archival officer at Blue sent me a five-year report (2011-
2015), it was not detailed enough with regards to internationalisation strategies.  
 
3.5.3. Stage 1: Entry interview 
Interviews would then be individually held for a top manager and an internationalisation 
officer of Blue and Red. These interviews were labelled entry interviews to distinguish them 
from other interviews later on. The purpose of entry interview was threefold:  
• First, it identified the universities’ internationalisation strategies (Data A), but as emergent 
patterns of actions rather than deliberate plans (see 2.2.1 for my working understanding 
of strategy). Thus, my question for the interviewee would be: ‘What does the university 
do to internationalise?’ instead of, for example ‘Could your please outline your 
internationalisation strategies?’ (see Appendix B for all interview questions). In addition, I 
asked for elaboration of any internationalisation strategies that I found ambiguous in the 
corporate strategy. 
• Second, I sought to gain preliminary insights into the sensemaking of deans, lecturers 
and students when it comes to internationalisation (Data C). To this end, I enquired about 
the implementation of the internationalisation strategies that the interviewee seemed to 
mention often, and the reaction of deans, lecturers and students towards those 
strategies. For example, English as the medium of instruction (EMI) was emphasised as 
the core internationalisation strategy by both the Pro-Vice Chancellor in 
internationalisation and the head of External Relations. Therefore, I asked them such 
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questions as how EMI was implemented, what the challenges were, how was EMI 
received among lecturers and students.  
• Finally, I asked the interviewees to identify the faculties they thought were active in 
internationalisation and to provide me with the contact of respective deans, in 
preparation for Stage 2 of data collection.  
 
I wish to emphasise here that all interviews in this study, whether individual or in group, were 
semi-structured (Gillham, 2005). While I did have a clear agenda and certain topics I needed 
to cover (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), the interviews were more akin to an informal discussion 
where I asked open-ended questions and the interviewees had the freedom to talk about 
anything that came to mind. This might reveal issues that I could not have anticipated, thus 
providing an opportunity for further exploration of the topic at hand via probing questions 
(Gillham, 2005). Before concluding an interview, I made sure to ask the interviewees if there 
was anything unclear or that they wished to add. 
 
All interviews were audio recorded unless requested otherwise and conducted in Vietnamese 
to make it easier for my participants to express themselves. I also kept notes of key points. 
The recordings were transcribed verbatim and then translated into English by myself. I tried 
to limit all interviews within 90 minutes, but if the interviewee(s) kept talking I would check 
whether they wished to move on and if so, the interview would continue for half an hour. In 
focus groups, participants were free to leave at any time.   
 
With that said, I was only able to have one entry interview for Blue, which was with the Vice-
Chancellor because the officer in charge of internationalisation was unreachable. Moreover, 
this interview was conducted before I obtained Blue’s corporate strategy, so I could not ask 
anything from the document. Nonetheless, the Vice-Chancellor was extremely generous and 
gave me two sessions three days apart from one another, one lasting three hours and the 
other two hours. She told me that in order to understand Blue’s internationalisation I had to 
understand its 25-year history and international roots, and proceeded to recount the 
university’s growth from the 1990s. Her entry interview showed that Blue had a clear 
conceptualisation of internationalisation and a rather unconventional strategic approach to 
internationalisation (to be detailed in 4.2).  
 
By comparison, two entry interviews were conducted at Red, one with the Pro-Vice 
Chancellor of internationalisation and another with the head of External Relations. The 
former lasted 6016 minutes, while the latter lasted 90 minutes. The interviews helped me add 
                                                 
16 Durations of interviews are rounded for readability. 
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a few more internationalisation strategies to the ones I discovered from the corporate 
strategy (see 5.1) and revealed how strategies were made at the university. All entry 
interviews at Blue and Red were recorded.  
 
3.5.4. Stage 2: Dean interview 
During entry interviews, I asked the participants to help me identify which faculties to focus 
on. Once these faculties were identified, their deans would be contacted and invited for an 
interview. The goal of this interview was to examine deans’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies. At the start of each interview, I would ask about the deans’ 
academic and managerial background, including how they became dean of their respective 
faculties, and responsibilities as dean (Data D). I then asked them to describe the aspects and 
activities of their faculties that they deemed international, what they thought about them 
and how they managed them (Data C). Finally, the deans were asked whether and in what 
way they were aware of their universities’ internationalisation strategies (Data C, potentially 
Data D). Directly afterwards, they would be presented with a list of internationalisation 
strategies (Data A), compiled in Stage 1, and asked to comment on each (Data C). 
 
There were four dean interviews in this study, respectively with the deans of Blue’s Economics 
and Commerce (two hours at his home) and Language and Culture (90 minutes at his home), 
deputy dean of Red’s Business School (90 minutes on campus) and dean of Red’s Computer 
Science (two hours on campus). Like the entry interviews, dean interviews were semi-
structured, audio-recorded and conducted in Vietnamese.  
 
An interesting outcome of both dean interviews at Red was that they led me to have another 
interview with the head of External Relations. To elaborate, when asked about how they 
managed joint programmes (a key internationalisation strategy of Red), the deans told me 
that they simply carried out orders from the top and that Red’s governance was centralised. 
Thus, they suggested asking the head of External Relations as she was part of central 
management. I will account for this in more detail in Chapter 5. That said, the interview with 
the head of External Relations lasted 30 minutes, and this was in addition to an earlier entry 
interview with her as described in the last section. 
 
3.5.5. Stage 2: Lecturer and student focus group and interview 
For each faculty, there would be one focus group with lecturers and one with students. The 
aim was to uncover lecturers’ and students’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. 
The structure of each focus group paralleled that of dean interview: First, the participants 
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were asked about their background and how they became a lecturer/student of the 
university (Data D). The second part was a discussion where they would be asked to describe 
which aspects and activities of their faculties that they deemed international, and to give 
their opinions on them (Data C). Lastly, I would present them with a list of their university’s 
internationalisation strategies (Data A) and ask for their comment on each (Data C). The 
participants were also enquired whether and in what way they were aware of the strategies 
(Data C). 
 
There were two reasons the focus group method was chosen over individual interview for 
lecturers and students. On the one hand, focus group might provide richer data by drawing 
out the nuances and complexities of how a certain internationalisation strategy was made 
sense of (e.g. why EMI was well received by some students at Red but not others), as well as 
highlight issues that were important to lecturers or students as a group. On the other hand, 
focus group reduced if not eliminated the need to do multiple individual interviews and was 
therefore more convenient for me.  
 
However, focus group was also more challenging than individual interview in terms of 
logistics for the participants and the management of their response time during discussion. I 
set up each focus group by sending a group email or, if feasible, creating a chat group on 
Facebook and include all group members, and ask them to suggest an appropriate date and 
time. Once everyone had agreed on the venue, I would make all the necessary arrangements 
(e.g. booking, buying refreshments) and arrive early on the interview day to welcome them. 
During the focus group, I maintained a moderator role and ensured that each member has 
the opportunity to voice his/her opinion and that only one person spoke at a time 
(Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2013). Were a response to require clarification or elaboration, I 
would politely interrupt and probe into it. If the group strayed from the topic being 
discussed, I would try to steer them back by asking about said topic (e.g. ‘We were talking 
about the teaching quality of joint programmes. Could you elaborate more on it?’). 
 
With all that said, I was not able to conduct all the focus groups as desired. Apart from the 
focus groups with lecturers from Red’s Business School and students from Red’s Computer 
Science, the others were either missing some participants (e.g. only two out of five lecturers 
from Blue’s Economics and Commerce were available for group interview) or not conducted 
at all (e.g. lecturers from Blue’s Language and Culture). Therefore, individual interviews had to 
be held with those absent from focus groups. In the end, the interviews with lecturers and 




Table 8. Lecturer and student focus groups and interviews  
Blue Red 
Economics and Commerce 
Lecturer 1, 2: focus group (two hours) 
Lecturer 3: individual (three hours) 
Lecturer 4: individual (30 minutes) 
Lecturer 5: individual (40 minutes) 
Student 1, 2, 3, 4: focus group (two hours) 
Student 5: individual (60 minutes) 
 
Language and Culture 
Lecturer 1: individual (60 minutes) 
Lecturer 2: individual (90 minutes) 
Lecturer 3: individual (two hours) 
Lecturer 4: individual (90 minutes) 
Student 1, 2: focus group (two hours) 
Student 3: individual (two hours) 
Student 4: individual (30 minutes) 
Student 5: individual (20 minutes) 
Business School 
Lecturer 1, 2, 3, 4: focus group (two hours) 
Student 1, 2, 3, 4: focus group  
(two hours and a half) 
Student 5: individual (70 minutes) 
 
Computer Science 
Lecturer 1: individual (60 minutes) 
Lecturer 2: individual (90 minutes) 
Lecturer 3: individual (70 minutes) 
Lecturer 4: individual (10 minutes) 




Student 1: individual (90 minutes) 
Student 2: individual (70 minutes) 
 
The focus groups and interviews led me to request access to further documents that could 
contextualise what had been said. These were Blue’s teaching regulations and a description 
of two contractual schemes for lecturers, and Red’s syllabi and promotion materials (Data A, 
Data B). The documents will be featured in the case studies, presented in Chapter 4 and 5. 
 
3.5.6. Stage 3: Member-checking interview 
At the end of data collection, the participants in Stage 2 were invited for coffee as a token of 
my appreciation, and this meeting doubled as member-checking and follow-up. Those who 
took part in focus groups were invited as a group, and the rest were invited individually. The 
participants were provided with summaries and transcripts of their response, and I discussed 
with them my impressions of what they had said. Member-checking was both an opportunity 
for me to seek clarification and elaboration on Data C and Data D, and for the participants to 
feedback on my interpretation and request any modifications to the data if necessary. 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), member-checking is the ‘most critical technique for 
establishing credibility’ (p. 314). That said, the member-checking sessions were very casual 
(no audio recording) and the attendees were under no obligation to go through the 
transcripts on the spot. Those who were unavailable for the sessions were later sent an email 
with the summaries and transcripts. 
 
Member-checking was conducted with the following participants: 
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Table 9. Lecturer and student member-checking  
Blue Red 
Economics and Commerce 
Lecturer 1: individual (40 minutes) 
Lecturer 2: individual (60 minutes) 
Student 1, 2, 3, 4: group  
(two hours, coffee plus dinner) 
 
Language and Culture 
Lecturer 4: individual (30 minutes) 
Student 1: individual (40 minutes) 
Student 2: individual (30 minutes) 
 
Business School 
Lecturer 1: individual (20 minutes) 
Lecturer 3: individual (20 minutes) 
Student 1, 2: group (60 minutes) 
 
Computer Science 
Lecturer 3: individual (30 minutes) 
Student 1: individual (60 minutes) 
Student 2: individual  
(two hours, coffee plus dinner) 
 
Industrial Engineering 
Student 2: individual (60 minutes) 
 
In the end, there were no changes requested except one by a lecturer from Red’s Computer 
Science, who told me not to report some critical assessments of the university. 
 
3.5.7. Campus visits 
Campus visits were initially planned to be a substantial data collection method. There were 
two types of campus visits: 
• The first type consisted of one tour around campus (or more if necessary), either guided 
or unguided. The tour was taken in Stage 1, following document analysis and entry 
interview, so that I could familiarise myself with the campus layout and facilities, which 
would be useful for arranging interviews, and gather any visual evidence of the 
internationalisation strategies (Data A) that I had learned from documents and entry 
interviews. This visual evidence enriched my background understanding of the case and 
supplied materials for the participants to comment on during the interviews. 
• The second type consisted of attendance, with permission, at various events or activities 
related to internationalisation. If possible, I would take part in the events in order to 
observe from an insider, or emic point of view (Creswell, 2013). This made the second 
type of campus visits quasi-ethnographic in the sense that I would become immersed in 
the research setting, but not in a prolonged manner. The goal of such campus visits was 
to develop an indepth understanding of certain internationalisation strategies (Data A) 
and acquire glimpses into the innerworkings of the university (Data B). Visual evidence 
would also be collected, again with permission, for subsequent interviews.  
 
Due to the ownership dispute at Blue and summer vacation at Red, the campus visit method 
was not successfully implemented in this study. To begin with, campus tours at both Blue 
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and Red had to be conducted before document analysis and entry interview because at the 
time no other data collection activity was possible, and I was anxious that I was making no 
progress. Therefore, I did not have a basis of reference for focusing my attention, and 
consequently each tour took very long (four hours) and was tiring because I had to make 
sense of everything I saw. On the other hand, the second type of campus visits quickly 
became unfeasible as my gatekeeper at Blue (the Vice-Chancellor) was dismissed, and Red 
had entered summer vacation when my fieldwork at it started. Nonetheless, I managed to 
conduct a few second-type campus visits: 
• A presentation at a conference on higher education and globalisation at Blue, four hours 
• A presentation at a training workshop on research methodology at Blue, four hours 
• Attendance at strategic meetings between Blue’s top management and the faculties, 12 
hours in total 
• Attendance at one of Red’s open days, five hours 
• Attendance at a pre-departure meeting for students of joint programmes between Red 
and a British university, one hour 
 
3.5.8. Social media analysis 
Contrary to all the methods described above, social media was not planned as a data 
collection method at all and yet was added to good effects. During my interviews with 
students from both universities, I was recommended by them to read Blue Confession and 
Red Social, both being Facebook communities. To elaborate, Facebook is one of the largest 
social media platforms in the world at the moment. Facebook users each have their own 
personal page where they write what they think or post photos and videos. Other users can 
interact with them by commenting on what they have posted or chatting. Besides the default 
personal pages, Facebook users have the option create community pages (e.g. baking in 
England) and invite other users to join, and members of a community can contribute to it by 
writing and posting media on the shared page. Communities are either public (anyone can 
read, post and comment on posts) or closed (only members can read, post and comment on 
posts). Blue Confession and Red Social were public communities, but were set up in a way 
that all posts had to be vetted and anonymised by an anonymous group of administrators. 
Comments on posts, however, were not vetted or anonymised. 
 
I followed the students’ recommendations and perused both Blue Confession and Red Social. 
I was able to find a lot of discussions on internationalisation-related issues. For example, 
from late 2016 to 2017 there were multiple posts on Red Social complaining about the 
quality of a private language centre that the university contracted to provide English courses 
for students of joint programmes. From the posts, I could clearly see how the students 
framed the problem being discussed and how they shared information, thereby gaining 
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insights into their sensemaking. In this way, social media served as archival records (Yin, 
2018) and was a rich source of Data C and Data D. 
 
Moreover, I interacted with many participants via Facebook, especially students. Initially my 
goal was to keep in touch with them and develop rapport (e.g. two students from Red shared 
my hobby), and I had no intention of collecting data via social media. However, sometimes 
they asked me to help them with work or study (e.g. two students from Red asked me to 
teach them English writing) and proceeded to discuss a certain issue on campus (e.g. 
mispronunciation of English words by lecturers). In such cases I did help them but made it 
clear that I could not discuss their universities or offer advice on how they should act on 
campus. In other words, I tried my best to build trust and rapport without compromising my 
stance as a researcher or intervening in the research site. Nonetheless, our conversations 
provided me with additional insights into the participants’ sensemaking (Data C, Data D) and 
Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies (Data A). To ensure that I was not exploiting 
them by accident, I asked the participants if I could use our online conversations as data, to 
which they all agreed. 
 
3.5.9. Amount of data 
The total amount of data gathered from both cases is as follows: 
• Approximately 60 hours of interview, of which 7.5 hours were entry interview 
• Five documents: Blue’s corporate strategy, Red’s corporate strategy, Blue’s teaching 
regulations, description of two contractual schemes for Blue lecturers, Red’s syllabi, and 
numerous promotion materials by Red 
• Approximately 26 hours of campus visits 
• 10 pages of transcripts from social media conversations 
 
3.6. Data analysis 
Data analysis was thematic and followed a four-stage procedure, drawing on the tradition of 
first and second order analysis (Van Maanen, 1979; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2005) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) case-based theory building. The stages were: (1) 
holistic exploration, (2) single-case thick description and first-order coding, (3) cross-case 
comparison, and finally (4) theorisation (or second-order analysis). The multiple stages 
helped me to gradually develop a firm grasp of the data and exhaust it before theorising 
from it. 
 
The first stage was conducted simultaneously to data collection and involved a holistic, 
purely descriptive exploration of data. The aim was for me to familiarise myself with the data 
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and notice key issues for subsequent interviews. In Stage 2, familiarity with data then assisted 
in constructing thick descriptions of the sensemaking praxis around each of Blue and Red’s 
internationalisation strategies. From these descriptions, themes and patterns in the 
sensemaking of deans, lecturers and students at each university could emerge and be coded 
using the participants’ own words; the resulting codes comprised my first-order findings. In 
Stage 3, the codes from each case, along with the empirical evidence they represented, were 
compared so that cross-case patterns in the sensemaking of each non-leader group could be 
uncovered. In the last stage, sensemaking theory was applied to generate theoretical 
explanations for the comparative patterns in Stage 3; these explanations became my second-
order findings. The four sub-sections below will describe each stage in detail. 
 
3.6.1. Stage 1: Getting to know the data and preliminary impressions 
The first stage was conducted simultaneously to data collection. After collecting one data 
source (e.g. entry interview with a top manager), I made sure to finish transcribing it before 
collecting the next source, if possible. Next, I read through the whole transcript to develop a 
holistic impression of the data. In parallel, excerpts from the transcript were selected and 
sorted according to the four data types described in 3.2.3. Each excerpt was labelled to 
facilitate retrieval. Table 10 below provides an example:
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Table 10. Getting to know the data 
Source 
Data A:  
internationalisation strategies 
Data B:  
background information about 
the university  
Data C:  
non-leaders’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies 
Data D:  






1. Internationalisation as vision: 
Vietnam had to be part of the world; 
we must not make ourselves a stand-
alone exception. Likewise, Vietnamese 
higher education and Blue in particular 
had to be compatible with everyone 
else; we must respect the knowledge 
and values mankind has fought so 
hard for. Simply put, our vision was to 
become a normal university among 
normal universities. 
2. Research as internationalisation: 
Forming international research 
collaborations was my idea. Everyone 
said it was impossible, so I myself went 
and form one with a few colleagues in 
Canada and France to make a point. 
1. Establishment: 
In the 90s we started as a vocational 
school in clerical work and multimedia. 
It was purely an initiative of several 
lecturers from major universities in 
Saigon. 
 1. Deans’ role: 
I hire deans to develop the faculties, 
not operate them. Operation is the 
responsibility of deputy deans […] [The 
deans of Economics and Commerce, 
and Language and Culture] perfectly 




Thus, Stage 1 analysis was much more descriptive than analytical. Nonetheless, the holistic 
reading and categorised excerpts acquainted me with the data and helped identify issues 
that needed more attention when collecting further data. Moreover, Stage 1 prepared the 
building blocks for constructing thick descriptions in Stage 2.  
 
3.6.2. Stage 2: Single-case thick description and first-order analysis 
The second stage began after all data had been collected and member-checked. This stage 
drew upon the insights and building blocks from Stage 1 to construct thick descriptions of 
the sensemaking praxis around each internationalisation strategy in each university. The 
procedure for each strategy was as follows: 
• First, I looked for all excerpts about a certain internationalisation strategy from the Data 
A column (Table 10 above), and wrote a description of that strategy, including its 
content, rationale and implementation.  
• Second, I contextualised the strategy using relevant excerpts from the Data B column. 
• Third, excerpts of how the strategy was made sense of by deans, lecturers and students 
were extracted from Data C column and woven into a thick, narrative-like description of 
the sensemaking praxis around that strategy. Here my holistic understanding of the data 
guided the development of the narrative. 
• Finally, I fleshed out the description by adding Data D and any other relevant data. 
The aggregation of thick descriptions for one university constituted said university’s case 
study. Chapter 4 and 5 will report the case study of Blue and Red, respectively. 
 
Once a thick description was made for every internationalisation strategy of Blue and Red, it 
became apparent that the outcomes of their internationalisation strategies, sometimes even 
the strategies themselves, were shaped by the sensemaking of their respective non-leaders 
(see Chapter 4 and 5). However, the thick descriptions were not useful for examining the 
sensemaking features of each non-leader group, which were necessary to answer the 
research question. This was because, as mentioned above, the descriptions placed deans, 
lecturers and students together in a narrative of sensemaking praxis, consequently blurring 
the boundaries between their sensemaking. Even so, the descriptions strongly suggested 
there was distinction among the three groups, both within and across institutions (e.g. the 
sensemaking of Blue deans was different from that of Blue lecturers and Red deans). This 





Returning to the thick descriptions of the internationalisation strategies of each university, I 
started conducting single-case first-order analysis. First, the thick description of each 
strategy was analysed to find key sensemaking issues around it, which were noted and given 
a code using the participants’ own words. The codes were then sorted according to non-
leader groups (e.g. codes from lecturers will be placed together). This coding and sorting 
process was repeated until I had exhausted the thick description of every internationalisation 
strategy. Next, a comparison was performed between codes pertaining to one group but 
across strategies in order to uncover key themes and patterns in the sensemaking of said 
group. These themes and patterns were once again coded using verbatim phrases from the 
data. The resulting codes and their empirical evidence constituted my first-order findings. 
Table 11 below provides an example of first-order analysis for Blue. 
Table 11. Sample of first-order analysis for Blue  
Strategy Sensemaking issue 
Key theme (first-
order findings) 
Research You have no carrot you cannot tell people to do research even when it is a 
good thing. Lecturers always do what is in their best interests to maximise 
personal utility.  
(Lecturer 1 of Economics and Commerce) 
Code: carrot 
Personal utility: 









Again we have to remember what is the bread here: teaching. A lecturer 
maintains his bread with good students’ feedback. [Students] will always get 
caught by Turnitin however many times they revise. What are you supposed to 
do? Fail them and get terrible feedback? […] ‘Oh this lecturer is very difficult, 
do not ask him for supervision or enrol in his classes’. 
(Lecturer 3 of Economics and Commerce) 
Code: bread 
 
3.6.3. Stage 3: Cross-case comparative analysis 
In Stage 3, first-order findings from both cases were compared to generate larger, cross-case 
themes with regards to how sensemaking was done by each non-leader group. There were 
two types of comparisons, conducted in sequence. In the beginning, first-order findings of 
the same non-leader group across two cases (e.g. deans) were compared to examine how 
said group made sense of internationalisation strategies and how differences in 
organisational contexts affected its sensemaking. Themes and patterns of similarities and 
differences were coded; these were called intragroup codes. Once cross-case sensemaking 
patterns of all three non-leader groups were established, they were compared with one 
another. This second comparison revealed the ways in which one group’s sensemaking was 
similar or different from another’s. The resulting themes and patterns were represented with 




Table 12. Cross-case comparative analysis 
Note: Due to space constraints, I cannot include the empirical evidence for first-order codes, as 








Blue deans Documents and daily observation: 
Empirical data shows that Blue deans made sense 
of internationalisation strategies by reading 
strategic documents and observing their faculties 
through daily work. According to the Vice-
Chancellor, they were hired to develop the 
faculties, not operate them, and therefore it was 
necessary for them to be aware of Blue’s strategy. 
Role and 
information source: 
Deans with a more 
strategically 
important role were 
given strategic 
documents. Deans 
with a more 
administrative role 
were not and felt no 




role of each group 
affected their access 
to information, and 
motivation to gain 
access. 
Red deans Doing the job: 
Empirical data shows that Red deans made sense 
of internationalisation strategies by simply 
observing what was happening daily in the faculty. 
Their role at Red was to take care of daily 
administration and sometimes carry out a top-
down strategic initiative. They had no access to 
strategic documents nor found the necessity to. 
Blue students Simply studying: 
Interview response from Blue students shows they 
made sense of internationalisation strategies 
using their daily experiences as a student. They 
had no access to strategic information or found 




Almost all students 
had no access to 
strategic information 
and relied on daily 





matter irrelevant to 
their studies. 
Red students Simply studying: 
Interview response from Red students shows they 
made sense of internationalisation strategies 
using their daily experiences as a student. A few 
had access to strategic information due their 
special position within the university (e.g. studying 
a module taught by the Vice-Chancellor). 
However, all of them were uninterested in 
strategies, which were deemed irrelevant to their 
studies. 
 
The intragroup and intergroup findings provided the direct basis for theorisation in the final 
stage of analysis. 
 
3.6.4. Stage 4: Theorisation (second-order analysis) 
Theorisation, or second-order analysis, took place in the fourth stage. In this stage, 
sensemaking theory was applied to theoretically discuss both intragroup and intergroup 
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patterns of internationalisation-strategy sensemaking. All discussions resulted in my second-
order findings. At the same time, however, it was found that some findings could not be 
precisely discussed with sensemaking theory or even problematised it. In these cases, I tried 
to derive a theoretical expansion or counterpoint to sensemaking theory from such findings 
and integrate it into my second-order findings. For example, I found that most of the time 
non-leaders made sense of internationalisation strategies by resolving the ambiguities of 
their mundane organisational life. This finding stood in contrast to sensemaking theory, 
which posits sensemaking as an episodic, intensive activity during crises or disruptive events 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) (refer back to 2.2.3.2). Therefore, I inductively derived two 
counterpoints to sensemaking theory, namely implicit sensemaking and mundane 
sensemaking, and integrated them into my second-order findings. 
 
The second-order findings together provided the answer to my research question How are 
university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? In turn, they enabled 
me to draw theoretical contributions to not only higher education internationalisation but 
also SAP and sensemaking theory.  
  
3.7. Ethics  
The ethical principles of this study were based on guidelines by the British Educational 
Research Association (BERA, 2011). Ethical approval was first obtained from the University of 
Bath, to which this study is registered. Informed consent was then sought in two stages 
during participant recruitment, as detailed in 3.4.4. 
 
Ethics was also upheld throughout data collection. First, the participants were involved as 
interviewees only and no extra workload was made on them. Second, in order to preserve 
their anonymity I did not share or discuss my data with anyone, and I tried to be discreet 
when seeing them on campus, especially at Blue. Third, I respected the participants’ privacy 
outside of the interviews and did not disrupt their daily routine although I might ask after 
them from time to time via Facebook or text message. Fourth, I arranged the interviews to be 
as comfortable and convenient for them as possible by letting them decide the venue and, in 
the case of focus groups, preparing refreshments for them. The participants were given the 
freedom to refuse to answer questions they found inappropriate, withdraw from an interview 
or even the study. All interviews ended with my thanks and a friendly chat to build rapport. 
Fifth, their response and my impressions were member-checked before I analysed the data 
to ensure that I did not misrepresent them or report certain findings that they felt 
uncomfortable with. Finally upon departure, I will send an individualised thank you letter to 
each participant and maintain contact afterwards. If at any points the participants felt unclear 
about the purpose of my study and their role, I would answer their questions honestly and in 
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a straightforward manner, but I made it clear that certain information (e.g. the identity of 
other participants) could not be disclosed for ethical reasons. 
 
The integration of social media presented challenges in terms of privacy and my detached 
stance as a researcher, as it allowed the participants and I to interact on a personal basis 
without spatial or temporal constraints. To avoid complications, I refrained from contacting 
them about matters not related to the study, except occasional greetings and catch-ups to 
maintain relations. As stated in 3.5.8, however, sometimes I did help with their requests 
concerning work or study, and our online conversations eventually touched on matters on 
campus. I tried not to discuss those matters indepth, neither did I side with or against them 
when they were making complaints, or give them advice on they should act on campus. The 
furthest I would go was to listen sympathetically and reciprocate with my own stories when 
relevant. In addition, if I wanted to incorporate what they said into the data, I made a point 
of asking for permission.  
 
The acquisition of documents and conduct of campus visits were always preceded by 
permission. During my campus visits, I was careful not to disrupt anyone. 
 
All data was anonymised by assigning participants and universities with codes. That said, I 
acknowledge there is always a risk of identification arising from thickly described case 
studies. The data has been entirely kept for my own use. 
 
3.8. Trustworthiness 
Quality was observed by adopting Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) notion of trustworthiness, which 
consists of three criteria: credibility, transferability and dependability. These criteria provided 
a much needed quality framework dedicated to qualitative research (see also Stenbacka, 
2001; Flyvbjerg, 2011) and served as the counterpart to the more quantitative-focused 
criteria of internal validity, external validity and reliability, respectively.  
 
This section outlines the measures, based on Shenton’s (2004) suggestions, that were taken 
to enhance credibility (3.8.1), transferability (3.8.2) and dependability (3.8.3). 
 
3.8.1. Credibility  
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Credibility means that my findings had to be congruent with the micro-level organisational 
reality at Blue and Red (Merriam, 1998). In operational terms, credibility demanded that my 
data collection methods enable an indepth exploration of university non-leaders’ 
sensemaking praxis and that the final report, which would be this thesis, convey the richness 
and complexities of the data to readers. To start with, my comparative case design has 
incorporated multiple methods and varied data sources (e.g. students of different cohorts, 
faculties, universities) which together captured a rich and vivid account of micro-level 
sensemaking and, through triangulation, brought to the fore its nuances and complexities. 
The sequence in which the methods were deployed added to credibility by first helping me 
build up a firm background understanding of my target universities’ internationalisation 
strategies (document analysis, entry interview, campus visit), which then informed and 
enriched the direct investigation of deans, lecturers and students’ sensemaking (interview, 
focus group, social media). The way I approached my participants also enhanced data quality 
and by extension credibility as I tried my best to uphold ethical standards and establish trust 
and rapport without compromising my detachment as a researcher or intervening in the 
research sites. At the end of data collection, the participants had the opportunity to feedback 
on the data and my impressions of their response. Other credibility measures included  
• the use of semi-structured interview with open questions, probes and follow-up 
questions 
• frequent reflection on my impressions of the data to identify and reduce potential bias 
• keeping the data collection methods open to adjustments based on collected data. For 
example, thanks to the first few student interviews I was able to add social media as a 
method. 
 
To improve the credibility of the final report (see Chapter 4 and 5), a detailed institutional 
profile of Blue and Red was provided to contextualise empirical and theoretical findings 
about non-leaders’ sensemaking. Thick description of the case studies would then be 




In accordance with transferability, my goal is not to produce findings that are externally valid 
or generalisable, but to help readers draw their own conclusions as to the implications and 
application of the findings to their own contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To this end, I have 
provided a thick description of the cases in Chapter 4 and 5, followed by a thorough cross-
case analysis in Chapter 6 and, finally in Chapter 7, a discussion in which I tried to exhaust 
the data and relevant literature. The theoretical contributions and practical implications were 
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also clearly outlined towards the end of the thesis. In this way, what I did to improve the 
transferability of my study also contributes to its credibility. 
 
3.8.3. Dependability 
Dependability demands that my study enable future researchers to repeat it, but unlike 
reliability, this quality criterion acknowledges that results might not be replicated, due to the 
changing nature of social life (Shenton, 2004; Creswell, 2013). To warrant dependability, I 
made sure that all of my methodological choices were reasoned and consistent among 
themselves and with my research question, theoretical framework and pragmatic stance. The 
emergent decisions that I took during fieldwork, most importantly my perseverance with 
Blue and Red, were also carefully considered. Finally, all of these have been reported in this 
very chapter, which accounts for a substantial portion of the thesis. 
 
3.9. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has described and explained the methodology of my study, which has to satisfy 
the demands for depth of the research question as well as the SAP approach and 
sensemaking theory. There is no necessity, however, for the methodology to conform to any 
ontological or epistemological assumptions due to my paradigmatic stance of pragmatism. 
Thus, a qualitative, comparative case study design has been adopted, based on a synthesis of 
ideas from prominent case study scholars like Eisenhardt (1989), Stake (1995) and Yin (2018). 
The adoption of case study is also motivated by its popularity in prior SAP research (e.g. 
Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Jarzabkowski, Sillince, & Shaw, 2010). The major elements of my 
design can be summarised as follows: 
• The research context was the city of Saigon in Vietnam. 
• Two Vietnamese universities, coded Blue and Red, were chosen as cases for their explicit 
internationalisation strategies and active pursuit of the strategies. Each university was 
expected to provide data on its own internationalisation strategies and the sensemaking 
of these strategies by non-leaders (deans, lecturers and students). Background 
information about the university and any non-leaders involved as participants was also 
necessary. 
• Data was collected with semi-structured interview, focus group, document analysis, 
quasi-ethnographic campus visit and social media analysis. The data collection methods 
were arranged into a three-stage procedure for each university: The first stage 
established the profile of the university, including its internationalisation strategies. The 
second stage examined the sensemaking of internationalisation strategies by non-
leaders. The third stage was member-checking with participants.  
• Participants for interview included a top manager, an officer in internationalisation, and 
deans, lecturers and students from two faculties that were active in internationalisation. 
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• Data was analysed through four stages: (1) holistic exploration, (2) single-case thick 
description and first-order coding, (3) cross-case comparison, and finally (4) theorisation 
(second-order analysis). This procedure was inspired by the tradition of first and second 
order analysis (Van Maanen, 1979; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
case-based theory building. 
• Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) trustworthiness was employed as the quality framework. In 
addition, ethics was maintained throughout the study, with emphasis on honesty, 
anonymity, privacy and the participants’ interests. 
 
Despite careful planning, the conduct of this study was significantly adjusted due to 
complications with access to both Blue and Red. The number of participants at both 
universities was fewer than intended with recruitment being highly opportunistic. Moreover, 
specific steps in the data collection procedure had to be adapted in each case.  
 
Nonetheless, substantial data was collected, with 60 hours of interview, 26 hours of campus 
visits, 10 pages of transcripts from social media conversations and numerous documents 
(including Blue and Red’s corporate strategy). This data was used to construct the case 




CHAPTER 4: BLUE – UNCONVENTIONAL INTERNATIONALISATION 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 present the empirical findings of this study, each chapter having a unique 
and indispensable role in providing raw materials for answering my research question How 
are university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? Chapter 4 and 5 
will respectively present the case studies of the two Vietnamese universities studied: Blue and 
Red. Each chapter begins with the contextual information of one university, including its 
history, corporate strategy, internationalisation strategies and organisational structure. I will 
then report how the internationalisation strategies of said university were made sense of by 
its three non-leader groups (deans, lecturers, students). As shall be seen, the two case studies 
empirically show that the strategic management of internationalisation depends as much on 
having clear and appropriate strategies as on the sensemaking of non-leaders. I wish to note, 
however, that due to the space constraint of this thesis, only the strategies that yielded the 
most thematically diverse interview accounts from the most groups will be included. While 
such selectivity enhances the richness of my theoretical findings, the two downsides are that 
my study only paints a partial picture of Blue and Red’s internationalisation and places at the 
margins the participants whose response did not focus on the strategies being reported.  
 
Chapter 6 will then present cross-case comparative analyses of how each non-leader group 
from Blue and Red made sense of their HEIs’ internationalisation strategies. While Chapter 4 
and 5 provide evidence for the role of Blue and Red non-leaders’ sensemaking in the 
strategic management of internationalisation, Chapter 6 aims to delineate the manner in 
which sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was done by them. To this end, 
interview accounts from Blue (Chapter 4) and Red (Chapter 5) will be organised and 
compared on a group basis (e.g. all the interview data from deans is put together) so that 
group-specific themes and patterns may emerge. These intragroup themes will in turn reveal 
intergroup similarities and differences. Moreover, Chapter 6 will enrich the comparative 
analyses by pulling in background information about the groups being compared (e.g. Blue 
and Red students’ perception of their place in the universities). This data is not included in 
Chapter 4 and 5 because it would make the two chapters convoluted. That said, it is Chapter 
6 that provides the direct materials for theoretical discussion and answering my research 
question, which is in Chapter 7. 
 
I wish to state that my study provides no evaluation of the content of Blue and Red’s 
internationalisation strategies. The focus of this study is on the sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies by non-leaders, rather than the strategies themselves. 
Therefore, Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies are taken as given. 
 
With all that said, I will now report the empirical findings of this study, starting with the case 
study of Blue. This chapter includes five sections: Section 4.1 introduces the codes for 
participants and other data sources in order to facilitate reading of Chapter 4, 5 and 6. It will 
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also briefly talk about a major issue in my empirical findings: Most participants were neither 
interested nor aware of their HEIs’ internationalisation strategies. Section 4.2 provides 
contextual information of Blue, most importantly its corporate strategy and unconventional 
internationalisation strategies. The next three sections each report interview data 
surrounding one internationalisation strategy of Blue, namely research (4.3), anti-plagiarism 
(4.4) and language (4.5). 
 
4.1. Important notes for reading the data 
4.1.1. Data coding  
The participants are coded using acronyms that are put in the formula of 
institution_role_faculty. The acronyms are as follows: 
Table 13. Participant coding 
Institution Role Faculty 
B: Blue 
R: Red 
TM: top manager 
MM: middle manager  
(including dean, deputy dean and functional 
manager, all of which are present in this study) 
L: lecturer 
S: student 
acronyms will be 
explained in the text 
A number is also put after role, without underscore, to differentiate between different 
participants in the same role. As an example, R_L1_CS is lecturer number 1 in the faculty of 
Computer Science at Red.  
 
Apart from interviews, this study has three other sources of data, which are also woven in the 
case studies. They are documents (institution_D), campus visit (institution_CV), and social 
media (institution_SM).  
 
4.1.2. Major empirical issue: Sensemaking of internationalisation strategies as 
embedded in sensemaking of role 
There was one major empirical issue during the interviews that left far-reaching implications 
for the reporting and discussion of my data. That is, most of the deans, lecturers and 
students involved in this study were neither interested nor aware of their universities’ 
internationalisation strategies. This short section will briefly describe this issue in order to 




For most deans, lecturers and students at Blue and Red, internationalisation was never a 
subject to consciously think about. Instead, they made sense of what they had to do in their 
own roles (e.g. teaching) and through this process developed an implicit understanding of 
any internationalisation strategies that happened to be reflected by the tasks and 
experiences of their roles. One good example was a dean from Red: He had never thought 
about the university’s various accreditations (international accreditation was one of Red’s 
internationalisation strategies, see 5.1) until he was tasked with getting his faculty accredited 
by an American body – in other words, until accreditation became part of his role. Another 
example was lecturers from Blue, who made sense of its research strategy (academic 
research was an internationalisation strategy for Blue, though unconventional as it sounds, 
see 4.2.1 and 4.2.2) only by engaging in research and observing its impact on remuneration 
and promotion.  
 
As a result, the non-leaders from both Blue and Red rarely talked about internationalisation 
strategies by themselves. Rather, accounts of internationalisation strategies were part of 
those of role-related matters. These role matters were wide ranging, such as one’s own 
management style (for deans), teaching philosophy (for lecturers) and degree completion 
(for students). Indeed, role matters were brought up as a lead-in into or elaboration of issues 
to do with internationalisation. Hereunder are some interview quotes to illustrate this co-
presence: 
• One dean at Red described his own management style to elaborate on how he 
implemented an internationalisation strategic initiative: ‘You should not be detached 
from your staff. If you work and play with them closely you will know their morale, 
difficulties, or if there is problems with the computers […] You also see if they are with 
you.’ 
• When asked what she knew about Red’s internationalisation strategies, one lecturer 
referred to her own role to lead into her response: ‘Strategy is a concern for the top. They 
have to decide where everyone is heading. We cannot do that. We just teach. I don’t 
know anything about internationalisation strategy, but I can talk about, for example, 
some international research projects I did with colleagues abroad.’ 
• One student at Blue described her life on campus to explain her non-awareness of an 
internationalisation strategic initiative that dealt with academic integrity: ‘There are so 
many events and extra-curricular activities happening all year round. I cannot keep track 
of them all. I think I have seen events related to academic integrity, but I was not part of 
it, nor was I interested.’ 
As can be seen, these accounts placed internationalisation within the participants’ broader 
role experiences as deans, lecturers and students.  
 
All this meant that the participants’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was 
embedded within sensemaking of their respective roles. However, there were circumstances, 
albeit very few, where this embeddedness was problematised. One dean at Blue was 
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recruited in order to push any component strategies17 of his choice in his faculty. There were 
no pre-determined responsibilities for him, except reporting to top management (daily 
administration was taken care of by the deputy dean); thus, the dean was given total 
freedom as to what he could do at least in his first term. The dean started his position by 
examining Blue’s corporate strategy and the existing conditions of his faculty, which led him 
to choose one specific internationalisation strategy to push (4.3). In the end, he devised three 
initiatives for that strategy. It can be seen that the deans’ sensemaking of said 
internationalisation strategy was not embedded in his sensemaking of role responsibilities, 
because his role was not specified to begin with. On the contrary, this dean’s choice to push 
this particular internationalisation strategy defined his role.  
 
That non-leaders’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is embedded in role 
sensemaking has clear implications for how data will be reported and discussed. First, my 
empirical findings will often include accounts of role-related matters in parallel to accounts 
of internationalisation strategies, as shall be seen in this chapter and Chapter 5, 6. For 
instance, Section 4.3.3 will describe the impact of Blue lecturers’ concern about their 
livelihood and professional development on their sensemaking of several research initiatives. 
Second, any ensuing theoretical discussion must reflect the embeddedness; however, I will 
come back to this in the theoretical discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
With all that said, below is the case study of Blue. 
 
4.2. Institutional profile 
Blue was established in the early 90s as a private, not-for-profit vocational school. It 
was the initiative of several academics from different universities in Saigon, including 
B_TM, and was supported by a French-Vietnamese association and a French Chamber 
of Commerce. Blue offered two-year programmes in clerical work, managerial 
information system and multi-media, the structure of which was uniquely modelled 
after two types of technical education in France so that there would be one semester 
of placement either locally or overseas following one of study. Graduates would 
receive a degree co-signed with the aforementioned Chamber of Commerce. Blue 
additionally stood out for 
• being the first postsecondary institution in Saigon, if not in Vietnam to have a 1:1 
student-to-computer ratio during laboratory sessions 
                                                 
17 As noted in Chapter 2, a component or functional strategy can be thought of as either a collective of specific 
strategies that are similar in purpose, or those specific strategies. In this study it is used in the former sense. For 
example, Blue had five component strategies: Teaching and learning, Research, International relations, Human 
resources, Infrastructure (see 4.2.1). These component strategies also served as the internationalisation component 
strategy (see 4.2.2). 
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• its emphasis on students’ foreign language (English and French) competence. 
Blue established its own language centre. 
• having internationally educated and foreign staff. 90% of Blue’s students were 
employed upon graduation, some landing jobs in foreign companies or even 
outside Vietnam.  
 
At the end of the century, Blue applied and was granted college18 status by the then 
Prime Minister. It consequently gave up some freedom in programme design and 
degree awarding due to strict governmental regulations on these two areas. For 
instance, it must include Leninism in the curriculum while losing the alternating 
placement/study semesters. According to the Vice-Chancellor (B_TM), what the 
institution hoped to achieve by becoming college was official recognition of its 
programmes and in turn the ability to influence public colleges with its innovative 
practices. In 2000, B_TM, who was then an academic staff, was appointed Vice-
Chancellor (VC).  
 
This period was short-lived as only six years later Blue moved on to become a 
university. This was a necessary step for it to regain some of the lost freedom and 
enhance its standing in Vietnamese higher education. In 2009, a formal strategy was 
written, marking the first strategic period as a university from 2010 to 2020.  
 
4.2.1. Corporate strategy  
Blue’s vision was 
To become a Vietnamese university that asserts a leading position in 
education quality and community-oriented research that is recognised 
internationally. (B_D) 
This vision was the evolution of what Blue’s founder had in mind when establishing 
the institution, even though back then it was only a vocational school: 
He said Vietnam had to be part of the world; we must not make 
ourselves a stand-alone exception. Likewise, Vietnamese higher 
education and Blue in particular had to be compatible with everyone 
else; we must respect the knowledge and values mankind has fought so 
hard for. Simply put, our vision was to become a normal university 
among normal universities. (B_TM) 
It was this colloquial expression of ‘being normal’ that was propagated institution-
wide rather than the formal vision statement (B_MM_EC; B_MM_LC; B_L1_EC). 
                                                 
18 In Vietnam, colleges are higher education institutions that provide three-year programmes, while universities 
provide four-year programmes with substantially more academic content. 
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According to B_TM, ‘being normal’ meant Blue must possess the ‘universal values’ of 
academic freedom, integrity, accountability, transparency and social responsibility, 
while performing the ‘essential functions’ of education, research and community 
service. This emphasis on normality, as defined by Blue, was also key to its 
internationalisation (see 4.2.2).  
 
The vision was accompanied by the mission statement 
Create equal opportunities in education 
Produce graduates who can adapt, learn lifelong and possess the capability to 
compete in a changing global environment  
Contribute to fast, sustainable and humanistic development of the economy, 
society in Vietnam and the region 
(B_D) 
 
To realise its vision and mission, Blue developed five component strategies: Teaching 
and learning, Research, International relations, Human resources, and Infrastructure. 
Each component strategy included several specific strategies (stated in the form of an 
action plan), to which key performance indicators were assigned.  
 
All component strategies were underpinned by Blue’s seven core values, namely 
learning spirit, critical thinking, responsibility, integrity, respect for diversity, dynamism 
and creativity, commitment to quality. The university also had a slogan that 
represented its corporate strategy and most of the seven values: ‘Live ethically, Learn 
conscientiously, Connect with the world’. 
 
The corporate strategy was the outcome of retreats in late 2000s involving the board 
of directors, top management, middle management and consultants. The 
Administrative Office was in charge of putting everything into words.  
 
4.2.2. Internationalisation strategies: An unconventional perspective 
Paradoxically, internationalisation at Blue was a well conceptualised, and yet 
ambiguous strategic area. To begin with, internationalisation was conceptualised as 
‘recognition [by] and connection to’ universities around the world and ‘the ability to 
make international students and scholars feel no different than home’ (B_TM). 
However, the VC emphasised that Blue did not want to become an international 
university, which to her was ‘meaningless’ (ibid.), but rather a Vietnamese university 
95 
 
recognised internationally, which showed strong consideration for the local context. It 
can be seen that this conceptualisation was remarkably reminiscent of Blue’s 
corporate vision, stated in 4.2.1. As explained by the VC, the reason was that the 
corporate strategy itself was the internationalisation strategy. Simply put, Blue 
strongly believed that it could become international simply by ‘being normal’, which 
involved possessing the universal values and performing the essential functions of a 
university (also mentioned in 4.2.1). In fact, the VC said that a ‘normal’ university was 
intrinsically international (B_TM).  
 
In this way, because all five component strategies (4.2.1) were developed to help Blue 
realise its vision of ‘being normal’, they together constituted the component strategy 
of internationalisation, and indeed there was no explicit internationalisation strategy 
at all except for international relations. In other words, anything and everything could 
be internationalisation at Blue.  
 
As a result, strategies that are not conventionally called internationalisation were 
Blue’s internationalisation strategies. These included, for example, conducting and 
publishing academic research, preventing plagiarism, promoting academic freedom. 
The VC said that ‘what [was] taken for granted around the world [was] the things Blue 
strived for’, and achieving them meant Blue could stand among universities 
internationally.   
 
4.2.3. Organisational structure  
The structure of Blue was rather simple, as depicted below: 




A private organisation, Blue had shareholders comprising its own staff and private 
investors, a few of whom were actually other private universities in Saigon. 
Shareholders met every five years to vote on the board of directors who were to 
appoint a VC, participate in strategy making and oversee its execution by the 
executive or top management. At the time of data collection there were three people 
in the executive, B_TM as the VC and two PVCs, one in charge of teaching and the 
other of research and students’ activities. Daily administration was handled by the 11 
offices: Administrative, Infrastructure, Accounting, Communication and Recruitment, 
Information Technology, Internal Auditing, Human Resources, Academic, International 
Cooperations, Research, Quality Assurance. Teaching and research were done by four 
different parties: 
• four faculties: Economics and Commerce, Language and Culture, Science and 
Technology, Professional Training19 
• two research centres: Tourism, Gender 
• English Centre, which also provided commercial courses for the public  
• General Education, which was a department specialising in liberal education. It 
offered courses for all students in, for example, ethics, worldview, critical thinking. 
General Education was one of the unique features of the university (B_TM).  
 
Now that the institutional profile of Blue has been provided, I will report how three 
internationalisation strategies were made sense of by the university’s non-leaders, starting 
with research (4.3), followed by anti-plagiarism (4.4) and language (4.5). 
 
4.3. Research: An ideal strategy against existing patterns 
Academic research was a central piece in Blue’s vision to become a normal and thus 
international university. It was stated as a component strategy in the corporate strategy, with 
the overall goal being:  
Create a research culture and build transnational research groups around key 
issues that are imperative to the society and to the development of Blue. (B_D) 
Research was to be achieved via five specific strategies: 
Create appropriate policies and regulations for academic and applied research 
and technology transfer 
Promote research collaborations via joint projects and conferences with 
domestic and foreign individuals and organisations   
                                                 
19 Professional Training delivered Blue’s vocational programmes. 
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Develop the research capacity of academic staff via training programmes, 
enable them to access cutting edge research by inviting international scholars 
to work as visiting lecturers 
Encourage academic staff to publish domestically and internationally, create a 
research bulletin to showcase and disseminate staff’s works internally 
Provide seed funding for projects so that researchers could proceed to seek 
external funding from governmental and non-governmental organisations and 
businesses 
(ibid.) 
A committee, whose members were drawn from the faculties and offices, was established to 
implement Research. The component strategy, however, yielded little result for the first two 
years since its introduction in 2010, and in fact it was not well implemented (B_TM). Although 
encouraged, academic research was not written into staff regulations and policies (e.g. it did 
not account for any proportion of a lecturer’s performance evaluation), neither was there any 
training programmes nor collaborative projects. This was because the committee members 
were ‘swept away in daily operations’ (ibid.) and research was mostly ‘alien, fanciful’ 
(B_L1_EC) and beyond the ability of most staff (B_MM_EC). Consequently, research was 
isolated to a few capable and enthusiastic individuals such as B_L1_EC or the VC herself: 
Forming international research collaborations was my idea. Everyone said it 
was impossible, so I myself went and form one with a few colleagues in Canada 
and France to make a point. (B_TM) 
 
The situation changed dramatically in 2013, when B_MM_EC was recruited as dean of 
Economics and Commerce (EC). This section will present what he did to push research, 
especially in EC (4.3.1, 4.3.2), followed by the reception of EC lecturers (4.3.3, 4.3.4). Towards 
the end I will briefly mention the efforts of another dean to push research in Language and 
Culture (LC) (4.3.5). 
 
4.3.1. Going beyond the faculty 
Prior to Blue, B_MM_EC was a high ranking academic staff of a multi-nationally founded and 
governed higher education institution in Thailand, where he had also done his PhD. It was 
the VC herself who recruited him and made sure he was very well-informed of Blue and EC 
before he made a decision. To this end, the VC gave him Blue’s corporate strategy and 
charter, while the to-be dean looked up information about Blue on the internet and made 
enquiries to the VC. Furthermore, the VC introduced him to EC as a ‘candidate dean’ so that 
he could ‘work with full responsibilities of a dean while getting to know the faculty’ (B_TM). 
According to the VC, his biggest responsibility, as well as that of any Blue deans, was to drive 
the five component strategies forward: ‘I hire deans to develop the faculties, not operate 
them. Operation is the responsibility of deputy deans […] [EC dean] perfectly understood 
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this.’ Thus, B_MM_EC had to make sense of his future role if he were to accept the post, and 
for this purpose he took full advantage of the wealth of information he was given and the 
candidacy.  
 
What struck him was the lack of research activity and capacity among EC staff. The dean was 
a strong believer in research and considered it essential to the identity of any universities 
and thus lecturers; he said without it lecturers were mere ‘teaching mechanics [who] recite[d] 
the textbooks’ (B_MM_EC). Furthermore, he saw that research was a component strategy and 
understood its central role in Blue’s vision of becoming a ‘normal’ university. Thus, he wanted 
to build a research culture where lecturers made research as part of their identity.  
Eventually he decided to return to Vietnam and took up the post, and research was high on 
his priorities:  
Before he officially he started he came to me and said academic research was 
way beyond what the staff were capable of. He proposed to only focus on 
building research capacity for staff during his first term. (B_TM) 
Starting his position, the dean focused most of his effort on strategic initiatives that 
promoted research at Blue, while daily operations in EC were handled by the incumbent 
deputy dean. These initiatives include Blue Research Seminar and a new contractual scheme 
for researchers, accompanied by a new performance evaluation process:  
• Blue Research Seminar was a series of 15 weekly training workshops per academic 
year in research methodology. In each workshop, B_MM_EC himself taught research 
methodology for the first half, and the rest was a seminar on a paper or research 
project, the speaker for which was selected and invited by the dean and could be 
internal or external to Blue; for instance, one speaker was a friend of his working in 
France (B_CV). Attendance was free and open to all lecturers from Blue and even 
outsiders. All workshops were conducted in English.  
• A new contractual scheme (B_D) introduced the position of research-lecturer and 
changed the existing title of lecturer to teaching-lecturer. Previously all lecturers had 
had to teach approximately 350 hours per academic year with service duties on top, 
consequently putting a great constraint on those who wished to do research. The 
new position reduced this teaching quota by 40% to around 210 hours. In return, 
research lecturers had to (a) participate in at least one research project leading to 
publications and show evidence of progress throughout and (b) be an active 
contributor to Blue Research Seminar via attendance or presentation when possible. 
Any lecturers could apply for the new position in a given academic year or conversely 
opt out of it. 
• The new scheme also revamped how performance was evaluated. While teaching 
lecturers had 60% of their performance assessed based on teaching and 15% on 
research and professional development, which included research capacity building, 
the figures for research lecturers were 40% and 35% respectively. The remaining 25% 
for both was service to Blue. Equally important was the change in the performance 
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evaluation process. B_MM_EC found the existing one by the Human Resources Office 
ineffective and ‘boring’, so he designed a new three-step process ‘modelled after’ 
that used by his former institution in Thailand. Besides supporting the new 
contractual scheme, this process sought to improve evaluation accuracy, 
transparency and accountability. 
 
The three initiatives were special in two ways. First, they were never meant for EC alone. 
B_MM_EC emphasised during his interview that he always tried to get his initiatives 
implemented institution-wide: 
To be honest, although my title was dean, I never thought my responsibilities 
stayed within EC. Blue Research Seminar and everything else was for the 
institution. (B_MM_EC)  
This was because he held strong ownership of Blue’s strategic development, saying that ‘its 
vision is my vision’, and this was felt and appreciated by the VC (B_TM). EC to him was like 
the ‘seed and incubator’ that provided the necessary human resources and also became 
ground zero for his initiatives. At the time of data collection, the first was implemented 
institution-wide while the others were mostly confined to EC and the faculty of Language and 
Culture (LC). 
 
Second, the initiatives constituted dramatic change and even disruption. Blue Research 
Seminar and the research-lecturer title transformed research from a fringe, if not non-existent 
activity into a career consideration for many lecturers in EC. The accompanying revamped 
performance evaluation process pushed research even further, to such an extent that it was 
considered disruptive to Blue’s human resources operations: 
When I described it to the central administration, the Human Resources Office 
objected in no time. I remember it was a meeting for deans and heads of office. 
The HR people said everyone had been doing evaluation the same way, why 
would EC deviate. […] They invited me to stay on to defend the idea, but it was 
more like a quarrel. (B_MM_EC) 
 
Due to the scope and transformative nature of his initiatives, B_MM_EC had to communicate 
and convince a lot of stakeholders at multiple levels of hierarchy, including first of all EC 
lecturers and, as seen in the quote above, the Human Resources Office. The dean met this 
challenge with his own distinct way – via informal communication. This will be the focused 
on the next section. 
 
4.3.2. Formal results from informal communication 
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B_MM_EC’s initiatives were accompanied by a lot of informal communication to stakeholders 
at multiple levels of hierarchy. Within EC, the dean often shared with the academic staff how 
he had been acclimatised to academia back in Thailand and come to appreciate his 
responsibilities as a university lecturer. The crux of his stories was a period when the he was 
almost dismissed due to lack of publications: 
When I transferred from industrial engineering to the newly opened business 
school, I could not continue my research because nobody shared my 
specialisation in maths. After some time I was told my contract would be 
renewed for only a year, during which I must get some publications out or face 
dismissal. (B_MM_EC) 
The dean was able to keep his job, but this ‘crisis’ left such a lasting impact that it ‘made’ him 
who he was professionally (B_MM_EC). He wanted the academic staff at EC to understand as 
he had that if they wanted to be a university lecturer the pressure was on them to do 
research and publish, and he found the best way to achieve this was through story telling: 
I often told my lecturers I wanted to share with them my experiences. If you are 
to understand the responsibilities of a university lecturer, you have to go 
through the crises I have been through. If you can overcome them you will 
mature. If not all you do is recite the textbooks; you are teaching mechanics not 
lecturers. (B_MM_EC) 
He followed up his stories with reminders that EC lecturers should do research or they would 
eventually find themselves out of the academic job market. Reminders were also given to 
heads of department during performance evaluation in the hope that they would reinforce 
the notion of research being part of performance in their department. Most of the time these 
were made informally and opportunistically through personal, verbal communication; the 
dean emphasised that he ‘hate[d] formality’ (B_MM_EC), so he tended not to put messages 
down onto statements. 
 
Informality extended to how the dean communicated upwards with top management. A 
good example is how he discovered academic research was a strategic area, or component 
strategy. Even though the dean was given the corporate strategy at the start of his 
candidacy, he did not recognise the document when showed in the interview. However, he 
remembered the content and explained that he did not like reading documents and rarely 
paid attention to which said what: 
I am the kind of person who loves informal communication. I dislike it whenever 
I have to sit down and read something official. I read all the stuff you just 
mentioned, but I did not care whether this paragraph belonged to this 
document that document. (B_MM_EC) 
In fact, he said his grasp of the whole corporate strategy mainly came from his many 
conversations with the VC before and after the candidacy, while official documents stood in 




Lateral communication was perhaps where B_MM_EC’s preference for informality shined. 
Blue’s main campus, an urban tower in Saigon’s central district, was on the small size, so 
deans and heads of department from all faculties had to sit in the same office. Such shared 
working space was inconvenient because ‘everybody could hear everybody’ (B_MM_EC). At 
the same time, however, it enabled interfaculty interactions on a daily basis. It was during 
small talks that LC’s dean20 decided to adopt B_MM_EC’s research lecturer scheme: 
We discussed things in meetings, but we also discussed things everyday. […] She 
and I sat across each other, so we talked all the time and she knew what I did in 
EC. She ended up taking up the new scheme and evaluation process. 
(B_MM_EC) 
Later on Blue managed to arrange separate offices for the faculties, but ironically deans and 
heads of department wanted to stay put because it was ‘more fun’ being together and 
sometimes having the venue to easily share information could ‘get things done’ (B_MM_EC). 
That said, B_MM_EC understood some faculties could not adopt his ideas due to disciplinary 
features: 
Sometimes we faculties cannot have the same policies, for example Technology 
cannot evaluate lecturers the same way since their research has particularities, 
but I made sure to communicate the principles to them. In the end LC adopted 
what I was doing in EC. (B_MM_EC) 
 
Nonetheless, B_MM_EC could conduct formal communication when necessary. One example 
was when, recall in the last section, he had to defend his research-lecturer contract and the 
revamped performance evaluation in front of the Human Resources Office. He had to invoke 
his rights as a dean to do so and more importantly argued the process was perfectly ‘in line 
with Blue’s vision’ (B_MM_EC). Other formal communication included official announcements 
and guidelines of the new contractual scheme, or weekly invitation emails to Blue Research 
Seminar. 
 
While B_MM_EC’s communication played an extremely important role in realising his 
initiatives, the support from top management should not be understated. As a whole, deans 
at Blue were enabled and encouraged to be strategic drivers, and the VC was receptive and 
often decided to endorse their ideas after only a conversation. In the case of B_MM_EC, she 
was instrumental in getting his new contractual scheme and performance evaluation 
accepted by the Human Resources Office: ‘She also stayed on and participated in the heated 
discussion. She was totally for my idea and told them to let me implement the process.’ 
                                                 
20 B_MM_LC, who was a participant in this study, is the dean of LC from 2012-2015. The LC dean mentioned in this 
instance was B_MM_LC’s successor. 
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(B_MM_EC). The VC’s vocal support enabled B_MM_EC to proceed with the scheme in EC and 
later on introduce it to other faculties.  
 
Up to this point B_MM_EC’s initiatives appeared successful as he was able to communicate 
them both within and outside EC, gaining support from various stakeholders. However, 
interviews with EC lecturers revealed at the grassroots level, the initiatives and more 
generally research were problematic.  
 
4.3.3. Personal utility and resistance 
Outside EC, the dean exerted little influence on lecturers’ perception towards research apart 
from their awareness of Blue Research Seminar and of the research-lecturer contract being 
introduced in EC and LC. This is understandable since the span of his power was limited to 
EC, and he ‘respected faculty autonomy’ (B_MM_EC). For this reason, in this section and the 
next I will focus on EC lecturers given they were the most involved.  
 
One thing I wish to note is that EC lecturers had no awareness of the Research strategy, or 
Blue’s corporate strategy as a whole. Indeed, they were not involved in institutional decision 
making, so they never cared about strategic matters as it was not part of the job, neither did 
they have access to strategic information (B_L3_EC), and they trusted that top management 
would know best (B_L1_EC). Thus, what they said about research and B_MM_EC’s three 
initiatives came from the dean’s communication and their own engagement in the initiatives, 
mostly Blue Research Seminar. On top of this, it appeared research was not an outstanding 
area of activity that they were concerned about: ‘It is one thing among many things, some 
[being] more important like teaching’ (B_L3_EC). As shall be seen below, they laid research 
against teaching and other matters like livelihood, through which research was understood.  
 
With that said, B_MM_EC’s efforts to convey the necessity of research were effective with EC 
lecturers. To start with, the majority of EC lecturers were rather young at under 40 with 
strong industry background (B_TM), for instance B_L2_EC and B_L3_EC used to work as 
managers for a multi-national companies. All held a master’s degree, but only a few had 
done a doctoral study or had any research experience. Thus, the dean’s insistence on a 
lecturer having to do research came as a shock: 
He put forward great pressure: the survival of a lecturer without research. Even 
though we are not required to do research or publish yet, the vision that we will 
become redundant is daunting. It is like an axe hanging above your head, 




It seemed the dean’s messages achieved the intended impact of making lecturers 
understand and feel the pressure that research was part of their work, and in so doing 
invoked anxious reaction. Some, like B_L3_EC, responded by considering a PhD to safeguard 
their career. In one of the Blue Research Seminars I attended, one EC lecturer and another 
from LC shared that they were both looking for a research topic for a doctoral study (B_CV). 
B_L2_EC in particular also felt the pressure but reacted more lightly due to her personal 
connections outside Blue from whom she learned that a doctorate degree was increasingly a 
requirement in major public universities: 
I was told that the Ministry of Education will require all lecturers to have a 
doctorate degree. I have yet to verify this but I know that for a while the big 
names have been recruiting only people with PhDs […] I have to catch up sooner 
or later. (B_L2_EC) 
Nevertheless, EC lecturers faced a lot of ambiguity whether and how they went about 
research. First and foremost, they looked at research not as a separate matter but as an area 
of activity within their job at Blue and even more generally their livelihood. Thus, it was not 
research or B_MM_EC’s initiatives per se that they talked about in the interviews, but rather 
they discussed their own job and livelihood, of which research had suddenly become a part. 
This was evident in the accounts of all EC lecturers in this study: For one, B_L1_EC was the 
most active researcher of the faculty with a healthy track record of publications and grants 
within and outside Vietnam; she was one of the very few EC lecturers who held a PhD and 
opted for the new research-lecturer position, and had established a research group on 
foreign trade and investment in EC. When asked about research at Blue, the participant 
commented that despite efforts to write research into policies and regulations, most notably 
the new contractual scheme, there was nothing to enforce it: ‘This is a management issue. 
Carrot for research is extremely limited, not to mention there is no stick.’ (B_L1_EC). B_L2_EC 
elaborated on this: 
Research has been rarely mentioned during performance evaluation, and 
besides 60% teaching you have this 40% indistinct mix of research and service 
that you could wholly devote to the latter […] To be honest, the whole process 
has yet to provide motivation for any of us; we don’t know how or whether we 
get promoted or our benefits next year will be better if we perform well. 
(B_L2_EC) 
B_L2_EC’s accounts showed that in her department the new performance evaluation was not 
implemented as intended since research/professional development and service were mixed 
up instead of the respective 15% and 25% allocation (performance evaluation was described 
in 4.3.1). Unfortunately, her head of department was beyond reach to comment on why this 
was so, but the more important matter was B_L2_EC and other lecturers did not see concrete 
feedback from line managers for their research performance, leading to ambiguity.  
 




Cannot blame the lecturers you know. They are ordinary people with family and 
kids, and I’m no exception. But because my livelihood is fine, I can follow the 
academic calling [...] That’s why this is a management issue and not just of this 
university; you have no carrot you cannot tell people to do research even when 
it is a good thing. Lecturers always do what is in their best interests to maximise 
personal utility. (B_L1_EC) 
She made a strong link between the personal and academic sphere in that livelihood was the 
prerequisite for doing research. This also meant she made sense of research not only with 
experiences on campus but also those from her personal life. Moreover, her remarks 
suggested EC lecturers saw their own job and everything in it, including research, from a 
utilitarian stance; that is, the lecturers were driven by their own needs and interests rather 
than the inherent value of an activity (research in this case). Though not a research-lecturer, 
B_L2_EC was active in research and a member of B_L1_EC’s research group; she also referred 
to stable livelihood but said that unlike her colleague she could not ‘get the feel for 
research’. She observed that few lecturers at EC and Blue would ‘volunteer’ to do research 
because ‘there [was] little to gain personally’; as a result, most focused on teaching which 
‘brought clear financial benefits’ (B_L2_EC). Her response reinforced the notion that lecturers 
were utilitarian.  
 
B_L1_EC and B_L2_EC, however, were nowhere as candid as B_L3_EC with regards to 
livelihood and research. Doing no research, B_L3_EC devoted all her time to teaching and 
even registered for more classes than required in order to earn overtime wage, and despite 
her support for B_MM_EC and his initiatives, she felt that there was no place for research: 
The wage to begin with is just enough to go by. What if we have two or three 
kids? We cannot even comfortably raise them with it. Teaching is our bread; if 
we cannot fill the quota, come in class late, leave early, get complained by 
students, that’s the end. And there’s always so much to do. What about 
research? No clear support from the institution, and if you want in on the new 
scheme [to have teaching hours cut and get paid for research], you need to 
have good output as proof upfront, and how to get that output? Sacrifice 
teaching hours and starve. And what if we fail? Few can do research. Too risky, 
too adventurous!  
I sincerely wanted to support him, but we lecturers have to take care of 
ourselves first. We cannot just go and contribute to mankind; that is very 
unrealistic. Although the dean tried hard to promote research, we saw no 
motivation. (B_L3_EC) 
Not only did her comments emphasise livelihood and utility as the basis on which lecturers 
made career decisions, they illuminated why EC lecturers felt uncertain about research 
besides the lack of enforcement and incentives as mentioned by B_L1_EC and B_L2_EC. That 
is, despite the new contractual scheme Blue had no mechanism to help inexperienced 
researchers transition from teaching to research if they wanted to. Such transition was thus 
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perceived as too risky because it required EC lecturers to accept a substantial opportunity 
cost in the form of teaching wage when they gave up teaching hours to do research. The 
cost was made greater by the absence of upfront financial backing for the transition and by 
the possible failure to qualify for the new title. Simply put, lecturers were put in an 
ambiguous, all-or-nothing situation, to which their response was to prioritise own interests.  
 
Overall, interviews with EC lecturers showed that despite B_MM_EC’s efforts to implement his 
initiatives and to communicate the necessity of research, ultimately they failed to create a 
research culture owing to a lack of enforcement, incentives and support system. 
 
4.3.4. Adverse conditions and leadership 
The ambiguity described above was compounded by the low research capacity of EC 
lecturers. B_L3_EC thought that the transition to the research-lecturer contract would not 
have been such an issue if EC lecturers possessed the necessary knowledge and skills to do 
research. Employed at Blue for over 10 years, B_L1_EC provided a historical perspective on 
why so few lecturers possessed research capacity: 
We grew extremely fast; 25 years is extremely short to go from a vocational 
school to a college to a university. And we carried over many of our pre-
university staff. I do not want to point fingers but there is a considerable gap 
between those who are and are not capable of being a university lecturer. They 
should adapt of course, but we cannot just throw them out if they refuse to, 
because research is not in their contract in the first place. (B_L1_EC) 
B_L2_EC added that Blue still had ‘a teaching culture’ around which recruitment and 
promotion revolved, so lecturers cared more about ‘improving student feedback than 
learning how to do research’. Both responses showed how Blue’s existing strategic 
patterns, which was heavily teaching-oriented, became obstacles for its Research 
strategy. This issue was also raised by the VC (B_TM) and B_MM_EC during their 
interviews. As a consequence, the carried over staff from Blue’s past and even most of 
the new, younger staff had little research capacity. To further complicate matters, the 
few that wanted to try research ‘did not know where to start’ (B_L2_EC). Given she 
had no research experience, B_L3_EC was asked what she thought about B_MM_EC’s 
Blue Research Seminar, which she ‘used to attend’ (B_L3_EC), and its impact on her 
research capacity. The participant was ambivalent at first but quickly went into detail 
about the problems: 
The training gave a clear overview of research. Personally I could not learn that 
much but some did. Well, what can I say, there were a lot of problems with how 
it was organised. I was unable to take on Thursday classes for a whole semester. 
I would not mind if the time spent had been productive, but the first few 
workshops were a drag. Many lecturers knew nothing! He had to go over the 
basics – what a research question was, what was quantitative and qualitative 
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design, all of which I had learned from my Master’s. I found it annoying, 
imagine somebody forcing you to learn spelling again. When he moved on to 
the good stuff, another issue arose: English. The research lessons were difficult, 
too much new knowledge crammed in an hour and a half. […] Blue Research 
Seminar was beyond us. (B_L3_EC) 
Language and unfamiliarity with research apparently formed a significant barrier to 
EC lecturers’ engagement in Blue Research Seminar, thus hindering the development 
of their research capacity. B_L3_EC added that some presentations by guest speakers 
were ‘even worse’ because they required knowledge of not only research 
methodology but also discipline-specific topics: ‘How can an average business 
lecturer understand a mathematical study in econometrics?’ According to B_MM_EC, 
however, the presentations were not aimed at teaching research methodology but 
providing opportunities for attendees to widen their knowledge and network with 
seasoned researchers. Nonetheless, the sense of learning little led to B_L3_EC’s 
withdrawal behaviour: 
I took out my laptop and worked; a few others did too. I was lost what I was 
doing there. Suddenly realised I went because of him. Many of us went because 
of him, not to let him down, to make him happy, because he was a good dean 
and scholar. (B_L3_EC) 
 
It was interesting that while this lecturer had been very vocal about personal utility, she 
considered the dean a bigger motivation to keep attending Blue Research Seminar. Indeed, 
she ‘sincerely wanted to support [the dean]’ but could not (B_L3_EC). Therefore, there was a 
strong leadership dimension in her reception of the B_MM_EC’s strategic initiatives. That 
said, the participant eventually quit and decided if she were to do research she ‘would be 
better off staying home and self study’ (ibid.). 
 
I attended six workshops of the 16/17 academic year’s series (B_CV), two of which were held 
by EC research lecturers after B_MM_EC left Blue; I was also asked to present about 
qualitative methodology in one of them. When the dean was organising the seminars, there 
were 15 to 20 lecturers from EC and LC regularly attending, along with three from other 
universities. After his dismissal, however, fewer than 10 would turn up. This drop in 
attendance corroborated B_L3_EC’s accounts, in that lecturers attended Blue Research 
Seminar and more generally tried to do research only because of B_MM_EC, who provided 
instrumental yet singular leadership in driving Blue’s Research strategy against its ‘teaching 
culture’ (B_L2_EC). In a later interview, B_L2_EC said she no longer considered a PhD ‘in the 
foreseeable future’ and had retired from a collaborative project with B_L1_EC, leaving the 
latter with ‘all the writing’. In another instance, a regular attendee of Blue Research Seminar 
also decided to hold off pursuing a doctoral study after the dean left (B_CV). Both lecturers 
cited too much teaching, and B_L2_EC also referred to the uncertainty over the role of 
research and a doctoral degree in her job. Two weeks prior to writing this chapter, I had a 
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meeting with B_L1_EC, who lamented: ‘I miss Blue Research Seminar, but there was no way to 
keep research alive, not without him at the helm and not with the new management21 
reversing his efforts’. This showed that the absence of B_MM_EC, though possibly the most 
fundamental, was not the only organisational change that impaired Blue’s Research strategy 
– there was also the new executive.  
 
Personally B_L1_EC tried to ‘save the flame’ by gathering a few dedicated young researchers 
into an informal group: ‘I don’t know if anything comes out of it, but we can just meet 
sometimes to have an intellectual conversation.’ She was still working on the collaborative 
project that B_L2_EC left and despite the new executive’s heavily teaching-oriented corporate 
strategy, she was committed to research as it was her ‘passion and belief’, and she had ‘the 
means [to]’. It should be noted that, rather amazingly, B_L1_EC’s research had always been 
her personal work, funded externally and not by Blue in any manner even when B_MM_EC 
was dean, but due to her affiliation with the university her publications inadvertently 
contributed to its research output and therefore strategy. 
 
4.3.5. An alternative in another faculty 
Though not a priority, research was also a concern for the dean of Language and Culture 
(B_MM_LC), and like his counterpart in EC, he found that the focus should be capacity 
building for staff. His approach, however, was different and could be said to be more 
context-sensitive. Aware that few could do research, he decided to first expose lecturers to 
relevant scholarship in the hope that they could acquire the latest subject-matter knowledge 
and have an overview of research methodology. Therefore, he organised trips to conferences 
for LC lecturers which doubled as their vacation, and these conferences were in nearby 
Southeast Asian countries to cut down expenses so that as many staff as possible could 
benefit from them: 
To be a good researcher you must first be a good learner. The best way [for my 
lecturers] to learn was to send them to conferences. I myself travel all the time 
and have attended numerous conferences […] I have organised a lot of 
conference trips for the faculty, and these were also their vacation, and I went 
with them. We chose cheap Southeast and East Asian countries to get many 
people on board. (B_MM_LC) 
Additionally, he encouraged staff to seek out conferences themselves; he even accompanied 
them to some. LC lecturers were appreciative of conference opportunities and more 
generally of B_MM_LC’s management style, as expressed by one of them: 
I like him a lot. He is a caring and competent manager […] The trips were fun, 
first of all, but we also took away new knowledge and felt motivated to have 
                                                 




something to present at future conferences. (personal communication, this LC 
lecturer was not one of the participants) 
 
Nevertheless, there was little data on research in LC, partly because B_MM_LC only 
stayed in the post for two years (before moving to another) and his successor 
seemingly did not maintain his conference trips. This was not to mention the 
successor was dismissed a short time after starting the post due to the ownership 
dispute (see 3.4.2). With all that said, it could be seen that B_MM_LC and B_MM_EC’s 
approaches to pushing Blue’s Research strategy reflected them personally. B_MM_EC 
placed much more emphasis on research, hence the comprehensiveness and intensity 
of his initiatives; as an academic. By contrast, B_MM_LC took research more lightly 
and, as a traveller, combined research with vacation for his staff. 
 
4.4. Plagiarism and Turnitin: Changing mindset or counting numbers 
Apart from academic research, Blue’s vision of being a normal university included teaching 
and learning quality of ‘international standards’ (B_D), so that scholars and students from all 
around the world would feel ‘right at home’ (B_TM). A major strategic issue in this regard was 
academic integrity, which was explicitly stated in Blue’s core values and motto (refer back to 
4.2.1).  
 
Academic integrity was enforced with regulations on academic dishonesty and guidelines on 
handling of offences (B_D), plus an invigilation process that all participants described as very 
strict. It was further promoted by two strategic initiatives: One was a movement represented 
by a students’ club that advocated for education ethics. The other was the purchase and 
implementation of Turnitin22 to prevent plagiarism. I will focus on the latter in this section as 
it had much more impact, affecting all students and lecturers. More specifically, this section 
will first describe how the purchase of Turnitin came about and its loose relations with the 
students’ club (4.4.1). Then, I will report how Turnitin and the anti-plagiarism goal behind it 
was made sense of by students (4.4.2, 4.4.3) and lecturers (4.4.3). 
 
4.4.1. Going beyond the institution 
Unlike B_MM_EC, B_MM_LC did not join Blue as a faculty dean, nor was he headhunted. 
Instead, he applied for the post of director of Blue’s General Education and worked for a year 
before becoming LC’s dean in 2012. While he did not possess the same level of strategic 
understanding and management skills as B_MM_EC (B_TM), B_MM_LC was also convinced of 
Blue’s vision and held it as his own: 
                                                 
22 Turnitin is a plagiarism-checking software and service, see https://www.turnitin.com/  
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Blue was not doing anything grandiose; we just wanted to be a real university. I 
saw in it the values of a university as a university should be […] That said, when 
I joined, there were lots of things were in dire need of fixing, and I got straight 
to work. (B_MM_LC)  
Like B_MM_EC, he also had to make sense of his role as someone tasked with pushing Blue’s 
five component strategies forward, and to him driving the strategies in LC meant fixing its 
existing problems, as stated in the excerpt above.  
 
One of the first things B_MM_LC wanted to fix was plagiarism. The dean found plagiarism ‘a 
rampant issue in Vietnam [and] a disease’ and that little was done about it for a long time. 
Therefore, he ‘made it a point’ to combat all forms of cheating at Blue, particularly 
plagiarism, and the first step was to raise awareness of it and also to teach it properly. He 
also recounted that his awareness and objection to plagiarism was formed when he did a 
PhD in the US: 
My programme opened my eyes to the values of a university, like academic 
autonomy and integrity […] Until my PhD I had never really understood what 
plagiarism was and the significance of acknowledging prior research […] 
Fighting plagiarism has always been at the centre of my work. (B_MM_LC) 
The dean devised an initiative in the way of an activist students’ club whose mission was to 
run an advocacy movement for ‘a clean and honest education’. It was hoped that the 
movement would help produce honest graduates and in turn reduce corruption in the 
Vietnamese society in the long run (B_MM_LC). The rationale behind having the initiative led 
by students was that they would feel ‘true ownership’ and appreciate academic integrity, 
instead of having it imposed by ‘those with more power’ (ibid.). As a side note, the dean’s 
signature management style was that he was very close to and supportive of students 
(B_MM_LC; B_S1_LC; B_S3_LC). For instance, every week he invited a few students to have 
lunch with him (he paid for all) to get to know them and hear about recent happenings 
around campus. That said, the students’ club idea received strong support from top 
management, who were afterwards actively involved in planning its operations. The club was 
established and started operating in 2013, fully staffed by students with B_MM_LC as chair. It 
carried out its mission by organising exhibitions, talkshows, conferences and off-campus 
advocacy tours (e.g. to other universities and public parks), all themed around ethical issues 
in higher education. Thanks to continuing support from top management, it managed to 
hold ambitious events engaging not only Blue’s staff and students but also many people 
outside the university, including educators, publishers, businesses and celebrities. Their 
highest-profile event was a conference on academic integrity whose attendees were 
academic leaders from universities and colleges all over Vietnam. Unfortunately, none of the 
students participating in this study was part of the club, although they had heard of it and 
attended its events. They did not deem it relevant to their studies (B_S1_LC) and added that 





An advocacy movement, nonetheless, was of little help to detect and prevent plagiarism, and 
therefore the combat against this academic issue necessitated a more operational 
mechanism. In agreement with B_MM_LC, B_MM_EC deemed something had to be done 
about plagiarism, but his efforts were directed towards finding a plagiarism-checking 
software: ‘There is too much plagiarism in Vietnam, but we do not have a tool to stop it. I 
was looking for a software to scan plagiarised texts.’ He began by talking to the university 
librarian about the idea and discovered that Turnitin, a famous company in plagiarism-
checking software, had actually contacted Blue before to advertise their product. This led him 
to contact Turnitin to enquire whether their software could scan Vietnamese texts, the 
response to which was that he would be given a trial. The dean successfully tested the 
software in EC and later proposed to top management about purchasing it for Blue, which 
was quickly accepted since the request not only coincided with ongoing activities by 
B_MM_LC’s students’ club but also provided a tool to realise and consolidate the ongoing 
anti-plagiarism movement. The library was then responsible for training lecturers and 
students about plagiarism, citation and Turnitin usage. It was interesting to see the similarity 
between B_MM_EC’s Turnitin initiative and his research initiatives (4.3.1): They all started in 
EC but were meant for Blue and involved informal communication (with the librarian in this 
case). Unlike research, however, Turnitin was made compulsory for all faculties because anti-
plagiarism was more feasible and pressing for Blue’s teaching-centric environment (B_TM). In 
addition, while the research initiatives were aimed at lecturers (i.e. there were no plans for 
postgraduate research), only students’ works were scanned by Turnitin.  
 
The most special aspect of the Turnitin initiative was that its impact went far beyond Blue. 
Not only was Blue the first Vietnamese university to purchase a plagiarism-checking service, 
top management decided to disseminate this practice to the whole higher education sector. 
For a start, B_MM_EC managed to negotiate a discount with Turnitin by, on Blue’s behalf, 
offering to become their country agent. Concurrent to this, Blue invited representatives from 
the Ministry of Education and Training and a few universities for demonstration. Turnitin was 
well-received and adopted by the attending universities, and the Ministry even promised to 
recommend the software to other universities. Two weeks later a much larger demonstration, 
this time presented by Turnitin themselves, was held at Blue with the audience comprising 
major public universities and publishers, and in the end the software became one of, if not 
the most popular plagiarism checker in Vietnam. Thus, the Turnitin initiative clearly 
demonstrated the high level of support from Blue’s top management for strategic initiatives 
by deans, highlighting the latter’s strategic driving role.  
 
With that said, Turnitin brought about significant development in Blue’s teaching and 
learning, particularly assessment. From 2013, regulations on academic dishonestly (B_D) were 
updated to give more focus on plagiarism, and it was required that all major written pieces 
(mainly internship reports and the dissertation) be submitted by students to Turnitin and 
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then checked by lecturers, and that plagiarism had to stay below 20% – note this threshold 
as it will be often referred to onwards. All students and lecturers had to attend the library’s 
training, and lecturers were asked to remind students about plagiarism and provide 
guidance with Turnitin usage. More important than this workflow expansion, it was expected 
that students and lecturers would become aware of plagiarism and change their mindset 
away from ‘indiscriminately copy[ing] existing information’ (B_MM_EC). Interviews with the 
students, however, showed this educational goal was still far-fetched. 
 
4.4.2. Change in behaviours, not mindset 
One of the questions posed with Blue students in this study was ‘What comes to mind when 
you hear plagiarism?’, and their response was unanimously ‘Turnitin’, with B_S1_EC even 
referring to the software as among the three things she remembered the most about Blue. 
When asked why this was so, the participants again gave rather similar answers: 
Only we have it. A friend of mine from the University of Economics once 
borrowed my [Turnitin] account to check her works, but just for fun. They did 
not have it there. (B_S3_EC) 
No one did it before us. In other universities they copy one another or stuff from 
the internet like crazy, and in some cases you can buy high grades. Here 
lecturers’ corruption is none, and you have to write your own papers. (B_S1_LC) 
The software appeared to leave a lasting impact on students’ perception of their programme, 
but interestingly the reason was not its anti-plagiarism function but that it made Blue unique. 
Furthermore, none was aware of Turnitin as a strategic initiative, even though it was a major 
one for Blue and actually happened during their undergraduate years at the university. To 
them, Turnitin was ‘just there’ and was another aspect of their programmes to deal with 
(B_S2_LC). In fact, the students did not care about any strategic matters: ‘What do you mean 
by strategy? We are only students.’ (B_S3_EC), and as a side note only a few remembered 
academic integrity was a core value of Blue ‘from the VC’s speeches’ (B_S2_EC). Therefore, 
what they though about Turnitin and more generally plagiarism was simply informed by their 
use of the software and any ensuing feedback from lecturers about plagiarised texts in their 
papers; this will be evident below. 
 
While all found Turnitin a memorable part of their studies, their perception of its impact was 
mixed. On the one hand, some said Turnitin compelled them to improve their assignments: 
Turnitin is good because in other universities students take bits and pieces here 
and there and patch them into their own report; they do not even change the 
font! At Blue some reports are very professional-looking. (B_S1_EC) 
It makes you use your brain. You have to write your own papers, so you need to 




Since you are writing your own works, you feel responsible for making them 
better. (B_S3_LC) 
Improvements ranged from presentation to content, and in several cases students’ own 
learning and work ethics were also developed. The participants mentioned, however, that 
prior to Turnitin they had already been required by lecturers to pay attention to the quality 
of their assignments and understand what they had written, especially for the dissertation: 
‘Lecturers here are not the kind who tell students write anything to lengthen their papers’ 
(B_S4_EC). This implied what Turnitin really seemed to do was less helping students improve 
their assignments, as they suggested, but more helping them better themselves as learners.  
 
On the other hand, some complained: 
The software is very sensitive, too sensitive. You are often identified as 
plagiarising trivial things like ‘for this reason’, ‘solutions include’. (B_S3_EC) 
It is stupid. A lot of stuff picked up is unwarranted, you know, phrases you 
cannot avoid using or even Blue’s logo and motto! (B_S2_LC) 
The complaints were technical in nature and mostly about being unduly faulted by Turnitin. 
Similar complaints were found on Blue Confession, a Facebook community (see 3.5.8) created 
and managed by Blue students for Blue students; one such post read: 
I am very frustrated with the software Turnitin. Cannot understand why 
everything is marked plagiarised, why is ‘thank you sincerely’, ‘professional work 
environment’, ‘Blue’ plagiarism? (B_SM) 
Thus, the technical issue of Turnitin’s sensitivity appeared fairly common. Fortunately, it only 
caused ‘inconvenience’ (B_S3_LC) since lecturers had the discretion to remove inappropriate 
detections by Turnitin during marking, thereby reducing the plagiarised percentage below 
the 20% threshold. On the surface this was fair for students, but some lecturers could have 
abused their rights and removed accurate detections (this did happen, to be elaborated in 
4.4.3). That said, beyond inconvenience Turnitin’s sensitivity had the potential to negatively 
affect learning, as raised by a student: 
Sometimes I do not want to touch any literature and just write what I think. 
Once I have read a certain author I will be influenced and whatever I write will 
look like the original text. But this means I cannot go deep or wide with my 
assignments without getting strikes from Turnitin. (B_S2_LC) 
B_S2_LC faced a paradox in which the more she read and cited the literature, the more likely 
she would run into trouble with Turnitin. A few posts on Blue Confession echoed her 
sentiment, with one questioning how plagiarism could be avoided when the literature kept 
expanding (B_SM). B_S2_LC student added that she was afraid of ‘misrepresenting the 
original author’ if she paraphrased the source material too much. These findings indicated 
that some students lacked academic writing capabilities, particularly paraphrasing, which was 
not perceived a problem by itself but when combined with Turnitin’s sensitivity caused them 
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to shy away from the literature. This was clearly an unintended outcome that might not have 
been foreseen by B_MM_EC and top management. 
 
Be it praise or complaint, what students discussed was limited to behavioural change. That 
they hardly mentioned anything cognitive or attitudinal (e.g. how they understood and felt 
about plagiarism) begged the question whether the Turnitin initiative had achieved the 
intended change in mindset away from ‘indiscriminately copy[ing] existing information’ 
(B_MM_EC), as laid out by B_MM_EC and B_MM_LC. When explicitly asked what they were 
taught by Blue library about Turnitin and plagiarism, the students responded that they 
understood plagiarism as copying others’ ideas word-for-word without citing and that this 
was a ‘bad thing’ to do (B_S1_EC; B_S4_EC; B_S1_LC; B_S3_LC). Some, however, questioned 
the necessity of paraphrasing: 
We know that plagiarism is bad, but sometimes I cannot help wondering why 
certain stuff cannot be copied whole, like facts on a company’s website 
‘Established in 2001, company ABC is a leader in household goods’. 
Paraphrasing or citing this sentence does not feel necessary. (B_S2_EC) 
Paraphrasing is a waste of time. I cannot quite get why I have to think up 
another way to express the author’s ideas when I can spend my time 
progressing with my work, why can’t I just take the original text and cite the 
source? (B_S2_LC) 
Such misgivings demonstrated students’ discomfort and incomplete grasp of plagiarism and 
more generally academic writing. This issue was also found in interviews with lecturers, some 
of whom remarked that students’ understanding of plagiarism and observance greatly 
varied. The lecturers referred to cases where students used existing information, especially 
from the internet, in a ‘too liberal’ (B_L1_LC) manner with no citation, as if they had not 
considered such act plagiarism. It thus appeared that the Turnitin initiative could not achieve 
its goal of mindset change.  
 
During the member-checking interview with B_MM_EC at the end of this study, he gave a 
lengthy comment on findings concerning Turnitin and students’ limited mindset shift:  
It is not surprising really. None have been taught about plagiarism at school, 
neither have their lecturers been except those who did a degree at good 
universities abroad. The idea of plagiarism is still pretty alien in Vietnamese 
education, not just the higher education sector. You see people plagiarise all the 
time; a very common practice is quoting a statement without proper citation, 
usually the author’s name being mentioned and nothing else. You cannot easily 




What he said showed friction between the intended shift in students’ mindset and the larger 
social context where it was formed; similar remarks were actually made by lecturers (B_L3_EC; 
B_L2_LC). The dean added that a few training workshops by the library were not enough, and 
plagiarism had to be a focus throughout a programme. Interestingly, interviews with 
students and lecturers suggested the workshops themselves might have contributed to the 
limited attitudinal impact of this initiative: According to both students and lecturers, the 
workshops were to demonstrate the usage of Turnitin and how citation should be done, thus 
being mostly technical (B_L3_EC; B_L2_LC; B_S4_EC; B_S1_LC). In addition, the students 
recounted lecturers said little about plagiarism, neither did they provide feedback on 
plagiarised sentences if a paper did not cross the 20% threshold (B_S3_EC; B_S2_LC). It was 
possibly because of this emphasis on technicality within Blue, plus the low awareness of 
plagiarism in the larger Vietnamese context, that the initiative was limited in effect. More 
severely, anti-plagiarism at Blue turned into a counting exercise. 
 
4.4.3. Counting numbers, abuse and politics 
Although students felt the pressure of having to write their own sentences, they did so only 
to the extent that Turnitin detection was kept below 20%: 
I do pay attention so as not to plagiarise too much but might copy a sentence 
or two. If Turnitin says 20% or below I leave it at that. (B_S2_EC) 
When I don’t know how to paraphrase I just put a chunk in quotation marks 
and cite the source. I know my papers might have too much quotation, but my 
lecturers are usually okay with this. (B_S3_EC)   
I just write the way I like first. Then I look at what Turnitin says and change a 
few words23 here and there until the percentage is below 20%. (B_S2_LC)  
Thus, students’ motivation to avoid plagiarism was mainly extrinsic, driven by the 
consequence of penalty for crossing the threshold, as well as by utility because there was ‘no 
bonus for achieving 0%’ (B_S2_LC). Seemingly ‘nobody care[d]’ (B_S3_EC) about plagiarism if 
he/she still passed courses and complete a degree. In addition, the students’ unfamiliarity 
with paraphrasing and citation made them feel ‘writing properly [was] a chore’ (B_S4_EC), so 
sometimes they neglected citing short phrases as long as the detection result was below 
20%. In brief, students seemed to engage in a box ticking exercise around the 20% threshold. 
The fixation on this percentage was also present among lecturers, but in a more complicated 
manner. 
 
Before the Turnitin initiative, Blue lecturers had already been asked to check for plagiarism, 
and it was up to them to decide whether students had plagiarised. Leaving such task to 
lecturers’ discretion was problematic because understandably they could not know or 
                                                 
23 When students first submit they will see Turnitin result. They are permitted one re-submission to make 
necessary modificantions, but this time they can no longer see Turnitin result. 
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remember enough literature and media to assess every assignment. This was not to mention 
a number of lecturers were reportedly unfamiliar with plagiarism and citation in academic 
writing (B_MM_EC; B_MM_LC; B_L3_EC). This resulted in plagiarism being ignored in almost 
all assessment (B_MM_LC). The introduction of Turnitin turned the situation around, bringing 
plagiarism to the forefront of Blue’s teaching. That said, lecturers still played a major role in 
determining whether plagiarism was being committed. As mentioned in 4.4.2, they ensured 
that students were marked fairly by undoing inappropriate detections by Turnitin; however, 
this meant they also had the power to remove correct detections and in turn reduce the 
detection result to any number they saw fit. Such abuse did happen and was explicitly 
described by one lecturer: 
There is a group who do not care. They will let you off unless you plagiarise too 
blatantly, like copy another’s dissertation […] We can reduce the percentage 
even to 0% you know, and some really do cover up their students’ plagiarism, 
except when cross-marking is involved, which only takes place for the 
dissertation24. (B_L3_EC) 
 
She was then asked why this was the case considering Turnitin had been in place for three 
years (by the time of this study) with clear policies and regulations, and that Blue’s stance 
towards academic integrity was generally very strict. The participant attributed the problem 
to low awareness among lecturers: 
How many truly get plagiarism? To their mind cheating is looking over 
someone’s shoulder in the exam room or copying a classmate’s works, not 
taking stuff from a book or the internet. And how many cite properly 
themselves, let alone teach others to? (B_L3_EC) 
Her observation corroborated that of B_MM_EC (refer back to 4.4.2) and B_MM_LC, who 
complained that some lecturers ‘had serious misconceptions like it [was] fine if not useful for 
students to enrich their assignments by copying books and websites’. B_L3_EC added that 
regulations on plagiarism were not ‘strict and thorough’ enough as only major written pieces 
had to be scanned and in some programmes only the dissertation was. As a consequence, 
plagiarism was ‘obscure’ and Turnitin became ‘an afterthought and a mere tool’ in any 
assessment (B_L3_EC). A third cause for Turnitin abuse among lecturers was their 
dependence on student feedback: 
Again we have to remember what is the bread here: teaching. A lecturer 
maintains his bread with good students’ feedback. There are few [students] who 
manage below 20% and many who will always get caught by Turnitin however 
many times they revise. What are you supposed to do? Fail them and get 
terrible feedback? Plus students nowadays are devious; it will go viral ‘Oh this 
                                                 
24 Dissertations were marked by two examiners: the supervisor and another lecturer. Students then defended their 
dissertation in front of a panel consisting of three lecturers.  
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lecturer is very difficult, do not ask him for supervision or enrol in his classes’. 
Then the bosses will start questioning why you have no students (ibid.) 
Similar to the research initiatives in 4.3, it seemed the push against plagiarism faced two 
immense and intertwined obstacles, namely (a) Blue’s existing, teaching-oriented strategic 
patterns that made heavy use of student feedback and (b) lecturers’ livelihood which was 
dependent on that feedback. There is, however, even more risk here because in using 
Turnitin lecturers directly affected students, rather than only themselves as was the case with 
doing research. The excerpt above showed if lecturers maintained stringent standards they 
might find themselves at a deadend given how often students plagiarised and subsequently 
start a chain reaction that endangered their job security. This complication was taken yet a 
notch higher when a dissertation is marked: 
Of course as second marker I have to scan the paper independently. But what if 
Turnitin detection was too high? I cannot just fail the paper, especially not 
during defense, in front of the supervisor, other lecturers and students. Giving 
low grades for the content was enough to damage faces, imagine failing a 
dissertation, and for plagiarism! Do I get an award for it or intense animosity 
and retaliation against my supervisees? Usually I deduct grades a little for those 
who went above 20%, but I have to make up reasons related to the content. 
(B_L3_EC) 
Adherence to academic integrity could greatly strain relations with both students and 
colleagues, leading to the possibility of retaliation. It was also interesting to see how 
B_L3_EC avoided interpersonal rifts with supervisors/first markers when cross-
marking: She flexibly penalised plagiarism by pointing at the content, and the penalty 
was never to fail a dissertation. Figuratively speaking, she was treading a fine line 
between academic integrity and interpersonal harmony. What she said also indicated 
that the decision to remove correct detections, as mentioned earlier, could very well 
have been politically motivated.  
 
The issue of Turnitin abuse was raised with other lecturers, not all but only those who 
I had built good rapport with since it was a sensitive matter. They agreed such act 
was more likely than not among certain lecturers lacking in ‘teaching commitment 
and awareness of plagiarism’ (B_L2_EC), but at worst this was confined to a small 
group, and the situation was not as grim as what B_L3_EC described. For example, 
lecturers in B_L2_EC’s department did ‘take the time’ to read through Turnitin 
detections and made sure students were assessed fairly. B_L1_EC, in particular, 
‘trust[ed] everyone to have enough decency to tell their students to revise til the 
quality [was] acceptable’ (B_L1_LC had a similar answer). She was then asked about 
what was considered ‘acceptable’ as it was a rather qualitative word for the 20% 
threshold, and she explained that she would let a paper crossing 20% pass if each 
detection accounted for 1-2%, which was ‘small enough’ (ibid.) - again note the 
qualitative descriptor. As to dissertation marking, some lecturers admitted to often 
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seeing papers violate the 20% threshold, but there was ‘an unspoken rule’ (B_L2_EC) 
to deduct grades instead of failing those papers. Unlike B_L3_EC, however, B_L2_EC 
said the rule emerged out of necessity due to students’ weak academic capacity more 
than workplace politics. In the end, it appeared that the use of Turnitin at Blue left a 
lot of space for human decision, hence qualitative judgement and politics coming 
into play. Coupled with low awareness of plagiarism, this prevented the Turnitin 
initiative from achieving its goals of mindset change. 
 
Last but not least, I wish to point out that, unlike students, the lecturers were aware of 
Turnitin as a strategic initiative, but only to the extent that they knew when Blue 
bought the software. This was thanks to faculty meetings where the purchase was 
announced (B_L2_EC; B_L1_LC). Apart from this, their perception of Turnitin was 
informed solely by their experiences using it, as reported above. They were not 
communicated the rationale or backstory behind the initiative (ibid.), although they 
themselves acknowledged plagiarism as a problem for Vietnamese students. In 
addition, Turnitin was not something they paid attention to by itself since it was 
considered as ‘part of the job […] to get over with’ (B_L3_EC). 
 
4.5. Language 
‘Internationalisation is not Americanisation’ (B_TM) was a tenet in Blue’s 
internationalisation. However, this was not written into the corporate strategy; 
indeed, it was not documented anywhere, but rather communicated orally by the VC 
to deans, lecturers and students at Blue. As she explained, Blue was to be a multi-
cultural university where scholars and students from around the world would ‘feel no 
different than home’ (B_TM). Therefore, although the university drew a lot of 
inspiration from American universities, it should not be wholly modelled after them.  
 
A key issue in promoting multi-culturalism was language. While acknowledging 
English as the accepted international language, Blue believed there was much more 
to the word ‘international’ than the Anglophone and definitely than America (B_TM). 
Therefore, a truly international university should promote multi-lingualism (ibid.), and 
one way Blue accomplished this was to have students learn more than the English 
language. At Blue, students had to learn an additional language besides English, 
which could be French, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and attain a certificate in order to 
graduate. The certificate had to be equivalent to the B1 level of the Common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) – note this competence level 
as it will be referred to occasionally in this section. This requirement made Blue stand 
out among universities in Vietnam, many of which (including Red for example) 
required only English. In fact, since its inception Blue had emphasised command of 
foreign languages as a key learning outcome (ibid.). At the time of this study, 
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however, the requirement was applied only to students from the Language and 
Culture (LC) faculty; students in the other three faculties did not have to learn any 
foreign languages besides English.  
 
Multi-lingualism was also reflected in the interior design (B_TM, B_CV). The 
nameplates of offices and lecture halls were written in three languages, namely 
Vietnamese, English and French. In addition, quotes from famous Vietnamese and 
international personalities, which can be found around campus, were written in their 
original language and translated into English 
 
That said, this section will first focus on Blue’s foreign language requirement for LC 
students (4.5.1). Afterwards, I will briefly talk about the few students, both in and 
outside LC, who decided not to get any certificates at all and consequently forfeited 
their degrees (4.5.2). 
 
4.5.1. Learning Chinese: An easy way out 
Competence in foreign languages was cited as a selling point of Blue students by all LC 
students involved in this study. They said Blue students stood out in the job market often 
because of their command of at least a foreign language, and this is especially true for LC 
students, most of whom would work in hotels, restaurants or tour agencies where foreign 
language competence was a must: 
Foreign language is a strong aspect of Blue. For example, some modules are taught 
in English, and we have to write and defend our dissertation in English, plus you 
need English and another language to graduate. This is really modern and 
progressive for a Vietnamese university. (B_S1_LC) 
I have heard from alumni that employers recognise us for our language 
competence […] It is very difficult to get a job in the hospitality industry without 
knowing any foreign language. (B_S3_LC) 
This sentiment was shared by many other if not all participants, from the VC to other 
students. B_L3_LC, for instance, took pride in his students for their ‘dynamism and foreign 
language capability’, some of whom had secured jobs in multinational hotel chains in and 
outside Vietnam. Elsewhere, B_S1_EC gave an anecdote of being complimented by an 
employer for ‘having good English’ and noted that her case was not exceptional among Blue 
students. That said, none of the student knew Blue’s emphasis on multi-lingualism stemmed 
from the philosophy of internationalisation not being Americanisation, or its long history of 
emphasising foreign language competence as a learning outcome. To them, a certificate in a 
second foreign language was simply ‘a graduation requirement’ (B_S2_LC), and what they 
thought of multi-lingualism came from their experiences in trying to attain it in addition to 




Nonetheless, ‘foreign language’ seemed to be equated with English by the LC students (and 
also  EC ones for that matter). This was evidenced when they were asked specifically about 
being required to learn a second foreign language, to which the response was ambivalent: 
It is good to hold two certificates, [which] gives you an edge in your profile and job 
application, although you might not be able to communicate in both languages […] 
I think English is enough, you cannot be sure the [other] language you choose will 
be used at work. (B_S2_LC) 
I don’t find it effective having to learn two foreign languages. I mean, learning 
English is already hard, let alone another language. [Another foreign language] 
would be more feasible for those already good at English, but they are not many, 
you know how badly English is taught at schools25. (B_S3_LC) 
The excerpts suggested Blue’s language strategy brought students more symbolic than 
educational value, in the way of certificates to present to employers rather than 
communicative competence. One reason was the difficulty of learning two foreign languages 
in the span of a four-year undergraduate programme. Ideally, students only needed to focus 
on the second foreign language because English had been taught in schools, but this was 
not the case at least in their experiences because the latter was done poorly. Another, more 
utilitarian reason, was that any foreign language beyond English was not in demand widely 
enough to warrant the effort.  
 
Despite said perceived difficulty and low utility of a second foreign language, LC students 
could not opt for solely English as it would make them ineligible for graduation (there were 
students taking the drastic decision of not getting even an English certificate, see 4.5.2). 
However, there was an easy way out of this impasse, and the key partly lied in the foreign 
language requirement itself. As described earlier, the requirement was based on the CEFR; 
more specifically, LC students had to attain a certificate equivalent to CEFR-B1 in English and 
one language out of French, Chinese, Japanese and Korean. The problem was the CEFR-B1 
equivalent certificate in these four languages differed considerably in difficulty, with Chinese 
being reportedly easier and French harder than others (B_S2_LC; B_L2_LC), and this 
discrepancy was not accounted for and compensated by top management. As a result, many 
students would choose Chinese as their second foreign language: 
A lot of my friends and I chose Chinese. You only need to learn spelling and 
how to write in order to get the required certificate. It is easy and quick. [The 
equivalent certificate in] French is harder because you must be somewhat able 
to communicate. (B_S3_LC) 
 
                                                 
25 In Vietnam, English is taught from Grade 1. 
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Nevertheless, there were LC students who chose French. According to B_L4_LC, these 
students faced a significant issue of their own. Besides a CEFR-B1 certificate in French being 
more difficult, there was a lack of French courses at Blue. Thus, it was up to to students to 
find French courses outside Blue; some turned to B_L4_LC and asked for private classes since 
he had lived in French-speaking countries for over 10 years (B_L4_LC). This lack of stable 
structural support for foreign languages might have contributed to students choosing the 
‘easy’ ones; otherwise, they would have had to put a lot of effort into not only learning a 
language but finding courses on their own. 
 
Interestingly, LC students seemed passive about getting their language certificates. While the 
certificates were essential to programme completion and the students knew about this 
requirement in the beginning, they took little initiative in researching about the languages 
they could choose or finding language courses (B_S2_LC). Only when they were in the third 
year did they become more proactive, but by then they did not have enough time to take 
more difficult languages like French.  
  
4.5.2. Leaving without a language certificate  
Surprisingly, there were Blue students who decided not to attain a certificate, whether in a 
second foreign language (for LC students) or even in English (for students from other 
faculties). This meant they effectively forfeited their degrees and university graduate status. 
While such cases were rare, the fact they existed deserves attention in this study. Access to 
these students, however, was extremely difficult because they had all, in a sense, graduated 
from Blue – they were no longer studying or present on campus. In the end none could be 
contacted for interview. Therefore, what is reported hereafter was what peers, lecturers and 
deans said of them, which might not have wholly explained their drastic decisions. 
 
This phenomenon first appeared during a strategic meeting between top management and 
the faculty of Professional Training on curriculum transformation (B_CV). An issue raised 
there was the high percentage (more than two thirds) of students from this faculty who 
graduated later than the standard four-year duration of their programmes. The cause was 
the same in almost all cases: They had finished the required academic and vocational 
modules but not attained an English certificate in time, mostly due to tardiness or over-
commitment to existing employment26 or employment seeking. Another, closely related 
issue raised was a very small number of students who never submitted an English certificate 
and thereby forfeited their degrees. The dean explained that students from Professional 
Training were ‘extremely vocationally oriented’ (B_CV) and could find employment easily 
thanks to Blue’s reputation for the programmes in this faculty. She then added: 
                                                 
26 Some students from this faculty had already found employment by the final year, both part-time and full-time. 
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Some gave up outright, but some did after a few failed attempts to get a 
certificate. They saw no need; they already got themselves desirable jobs [The 
dean then gave a case study of a student who became a fashion designer 
without graduating] Blue is known for student employability; this is especially 
true for my faculty. Here our strength is our problem. (B_CV) 
The issues of late and non-submission of language certificates were also talked of in other 
strategic meetings with other faculties, albeit with less severity (B_CV). Subsequent interviews 
also confirmed the existence of late graduation or dropout due to language and 
employment: 
I have not seen anyone in my cohort drop out yet, but some are definitely 
behind with foreign languages. (B_S3_LC) 
Dropouts are very rare; I have only seen one myself, who had a family business. 
More common are those having to resit one or two courses or not handing in a 
language certificate in time. (B_L1_LC) 
 
Lateness or failure to submit foreign language certificates and its association with 
employment revealed a great deal about Blue students and the foreign language 
requirement. A considerable portion of Blue students, especially in Professional Training, 
prioritised employment over their degree. This in turn meant they saw university education 
as a means to employment, whether in the way of legitimisation (via a degree) or skill 
training. As a result, if desirable employment was secured, a negligent attitude towards their 
studies likely followed. However, this could not have wholly been the case because, as said 
by the dean of Professional Training, the students who had found their desired employment 
still completed all of their modules and attempted (but failed) to get certified in foreign 
languages. Therefore, there must have been a problem with the language requirement itself. 
For one, there was possibly a misfit between the requirement and Blue students, more so in 
Professional Training than other faculties. Misfit could be in terms of difficulty (e.g. a few 
Professional Training students repeatedly failed to get a certificate) or demand (e.g. LC 
students found little necessity of speaking another foreign language besides English). 
Alternatively, the problem could lie in the implementation of the requirement rather than the 
requirement itself. This was evidenced by lack of structural support: There was a shortage of 
courses for some languages like French (refer back to 4.5.1) and, as mentioned in the 
strategic meeting with Professional Training, English courses at Blue left ‘a lot of room for 
improvement’ (B_CV).  
 
4.6. Chapter conclusion: Non-leaders’ sensemaking, the ideal and the reality 
This chapter has presented the case study of Blue, starting with its institutional profile and 
unconventional internationalisation strategies, followed by a report of how three particular 
strategies: research, anti-plagiarism and language, were made sense of by its non-leaders. 




First, Blue did not have internationalisation as a dedicated component strategy, but rather its 
whole corporate strategy doubled as its internationalisation strategy (4.2.2). In the corporate 
strategy, Blue’s vision was to become a Vietnamese university recognised by all universities in 
the world; the vision was colloquially and frequently communicated by the VC to staff as ‘to 
became a normal university’. To this end, Blue believed it must embody the values (e.g. 
academic integrity) and functions (e.g. research) typical of a ‘normal’ university. Because the 
corporate strategy was the internationalisation strategy, these values and functions were also 
Blue’s approaches to internationalisation. This meant that the university’s internationalisation 
strategies were rather unconventional because, for example, conducting academic research 
was considered internationalisation. 
 
Second, the outcomes of Blue’s internationalisation strategies, as well as the strategies 
themselves, were heavily shaped by non-leaders’ sensemaking. For instance, both the deans 
of Economics and Commerce and Language and Culture devised and implemented initiatives 
that significantly changed Blue’s research and academic integrity. These initiatives were 
wholly the deans’ own, stemming from their past knowledge and experience in combination 
with their observation of Blue and Vietnamese HE, although it has to be acknowledge that 
the initiatives would not have been feasible without support from senior management. In 
another example, Blue lecturers’ concern for their own livelihood and familiarity with Blue 
teaching-heavy culture led them to interpret the deans’ initiatives in unfavourable ways, as 
most saw no point in doing research and considered the strict pursuit of anti-plagiarism 
unrealistic and risky. Thus, they created workarounds that would compromise the intended 
outcomes of the initiatives (e.g. subtracting marks instead of failing plagiarising papers) or 
even withdrew from the initiatives altogether (e.g. quitting Blue Research Seminars). Their 
actions then perpetuated into a common practice that steer internationalisation strategies in 
an undesired direction (4.4.3, also see 4.4.2). 
 
Third, Blue deans had remarkable decision-making power despite their middle management 
position. Both deans in this study were recruited as strategy drivers rather than 
administrators of their faculties, and thus enabled to have their own strategic initiatives or 
more generally to shape their own roles. Furthermore, they could expand the initiatives 
beyond the confines of their faculties (4.3.1) and even Blue itself (4.4.1). To shape their 
strategic roles, the deans had to make sense of Blue’s corporate and the conditions of their 
faculties to devise appropriate initiatives. They were assisted in this endeavour by the VC, 
who provided them with formal strategic information via documents and briefings (4.3.1).  
 
Fourth, Blue lecturers were heavily reliant on teaching and student feedback (4.3.4). Even as a 
university, Blue retained the teaching focus roots of its early days as a vocational school, in 
that remuneration and promotion still revolved around teaching, central of which was 
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student feedback. In terms of personnel, old staff were carried over, and those had been 
recruited since university status were solely tasked with teaching. Therefore, Blue lecturers’ 
greatest concerns were teaching quality and student satisfaction and by extension their 
livelihood, all of which shaped their sensemaking towards internationalisation strategies. It 
should also be emphasised that they were not interested in any strategic matters and made 
sense of internationalisation strategies through daily, mundane tasks they were assigned 
with.  
 
Fifth, Blue students were utilitarian, some extremely so. Their accounts about Turnitin and the 
foreign language requirement showed that while they put efforts to adapt to the demands of 
internationalisation strategies, they would do so in the most facile manner possible. This 
meant choosing the easiest option available (4.5.1) or finding work-arounds if not violating 
the rule (4.4.2). In rare circumstances, their rationality led them to abandon their degrees 
altogether (4.5.2). Like the lecturers, the students also made sense of internationalisation 
strategies through the tasks they had to fulfil on a daily basis; they showed a lack of interest 
and awareness of strategic matters. 
 
Lastly and overall, the case study of Blue, though centred on the micro level, reveals two 
strategic management issues at the meso level. On the one hand, there was a great gap 
between the goals of the strategies (the ideal) and the resources and capabilities of the 
university (the reality). For instance, very few staff were capable of doing research, plus 
existing remuneration and promotion structures were heavily oriented towards teaching 
(4.3.3, 4.3.4). Similarly, the Turnitin initiative was hindered by the unfamiliarity with plagiarism 
and academic writing among both students and lecturers (4.4.2). On the other hand, this gap 
could be considerably lessened with leadership and communication. B_MM_EC’s three 
research initiatives and his repeated communication of the role of research did create 
outcomes for the research strategy. For example, some lecturers were already contemplating 
doing a doctorate, and one in particular (B_L1_EC) established her own research group and 
invited others (4.3.2, 4.3.3). By contrast, the Turnitin initiative apparently lacked such 
leadership and communication. There was no leadership to energise staff and students, and 
the only communication provided was training workshops by the library, which focused on 
the technical usage of Turnitin rather than plagiarism and academic integrity as a whole 





CHAPTER 5: RED – ENGLISH AS THE CORE OF INTERNATIONALISATION 
This chapter presents the remaining case study of Red. The structure and reporting style are 
identical to Chapter 4, starting with the institutional profile of the university (5.1), followed by 
a report of how some of its internationalisation strategies were made sense of. The strategies 
are English as the medium of instruction (5.2), joint programmes (5.3) and international 
accreditation (5.4). I wish to note again that this study takes Blue and Red’s 
internationalisation strategies as given and provides no evaluation of the content. 
 
Red was a more straightforward case of strategic management where initiatives were mostly 
top-down with lecturers, students and even deans taking a passive role. Therefore, I believe 
presenting the empirical findings in order of Blue to Red will be more readable, because the 
readers can first focus on the more complex case of Blue and then, when reading the simpler 
case of Red, they can more easily spot cross-case patterns. 
 
To re-iterate Chapter 4, the findings reported below will include not only accounts explicitly 
about internationalisation but also those about matters pertaining to one’s role. This is 
because, as explained in 4.1.2, the participants’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies 
was embedded within sensemaking of their respectively roles. That is, they rarely paid 
attention to internationalisation as a sensemaking issue; instead, their concern was simply 
what they had to do in their roles like going to lectures (for students) or holding a laboratory 
session (for lecturers). However, it was through making sense of role responsibilities and 
experiences that they came to understand any internationalisation strategies that those 
responsibilities and experiences reflected. For instance, when Red students made sense of a 
new module they had just enrolled in, they are led to make sense of how well the lecturer of 
that module spoke English. This then shaped their perception of English as the medium of 
instruction, which was a central internationalisation strategy at Red.  
 
As a courtesy reminder, please refer back to 4.1.1 for a description of coding acronyms for 
the participants and other data sources. 
 
5.1. Institutional profile  
In 2001 the then Vietnamese Prime Minister announced a blueprint for national higher 
education, which stated: ‘Universities in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh must take a leading role in 
integrating with higher education worldwide […] connect with reputable foreign institutions 
to improve education quality’ (Vietnamese Government, 2001). In response, Vietnam 
National University Ho Chi Minh City (VNUHCM) planned to establish a new member 
university upon the premise that it would partner with foreign higher education institutions 
so that students and VNUHCM staff could enjoy international education at home and in turn 
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VNUHCM could benchmark itself against and learn from the world (R_D). Red was finally 
established after two years of planning, at the end of 2003. 
 
As a side note, there are two Vietnam National Universities, one in Saigon/Ho Chi Minh and 
another in Hanoi. Both are not universities per se but rather a federation of universities, 
united under a central management. The member universities are autonomous in the sense 
that they are legal entities in their own right, have their own management and thus can 
decide their own operations. However, they are accountable to the central management of 
their respective Vietnam National University, and certain decisions like opening joint 
programmes with foreign partners must be vetted centrally. In return, they enjoy greater 
freedom than other public universities because Vietnam National Universities report directly 
to Parliament while non-VNU public universities are each under a ministry (e.g. University of 
Medicine belongs to the Ministry of Health), which is then under the Government.  
 
Since inception, Red has fulfilled its expectations and set up partnerships with individuals and 
institutions around the world. It is also the first Vietnamese university to use English as the 
medium of instruction and the official administrative language – all forms and documents 
are translated into English. Another outstanding strategic aspect lies in recruitment: 
Academic posts are often given to those who have done a doctorate in an English speaking 
or Western country, like the US, UK, Australia, Germany. This is hoped to place the 
university’s research outputs in high impact journals, improve teaching quality and help it 
attain international accreditations.  
 
Red is now in its third strategic period from 2016 to 2020. This study, however, focuses on its 
second period from 2011 to 2015. 
 
5.1.1. Corporate strategy 
Red’s vision was 
By 2015 Red will have established the basic foundations of a research university. 
It will have a substantial academic body who are competent and committed; a 
strong administrative body who are committed and professional; students who 
perform well academically and career-wise; state-of-the-art governance and 
management adherent to international conventions; infrastructure that is 
modern, sufficient and uniform in quality for teaching and research; major 
research and technology transfer projects in science, engineering, technology, 
economy that are aligned with the development of Ho Chi Minh city and 
Vietnam. (R_D) 
And the mission was 
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Play a trailblazer role within VNUHCM, reaching regional and 
international standards in all areas, and create a positive spillover effect 
to assist other member universities in moving forward 
Provide high quality undergraduate and postgraduate teaching in 
engineering, economics, business and fields that are necessary to the 
development of the country 
Conduct academic and applied research and technology transfer with 
the industries and society 
Leverage our expertise to serve the community and industries 
(ibid.) 
 
The vision and mission were to be realised through 11 component strategies: 
Infrastructure, Human resources, Governance, Teaching, Research, International 
relations, Culture, Media and image, Finance, Accreditation, Students. Each component 
strategy contained a general aim and specific strategic objectives and actions. The 
corporate strategy is accompanied by an implementation plan laying out yearly key 
performance indicators for each component strategy. Interestingly, the 
implementation plan also contained a set of strategic objectives and actions for each 
component strategy, but these were different from those stated in the corporate 
strategy. The Pro-Vice Chancellor in internationalisation, who was an interviewee 
(R_TM), said this inconsistency between the two documents (corporate strategy and 
implementation plan) was due to them being written by different people, but both 
were based on discussions by top management and were checked by the Vice-
Chancellor (VC) before publishing. R_TM added that strategic matters were largely 
decided by the VC, so as long as he approved a document it would be published.  
 
5.1.2. Internationalisation strategies 
There was no dedicated internationalisation component strategy, but internationalisation 
was often mentioned in the 11 component strategies listed above. I managed to compile a 
list of eight internationalisation strategies from two documents, namely the coporate 
strategy and the accompanying action plan (R_D): 
1. Implement English as the medium of instruction (EMI) in all programmes 
2. Attain regional and international accreditations for all programmes 
3. Open joint programmes with reputable, accredited HEIs in developed countries 
4. Disseminate research internationally, in high-impact journals 
5. Develop international research partnerships, organise international conferences 
6. Recruit academic staff who were educated in good universities in developed countries 
7. Develop and maintain infrastructure to international standards 
8. Organise student exchanges 
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I cross-checked them with the Pro-Vice Chancellor in internationalisation (R_TM) and the 
head of External Relations Office (R_MM_ER), who added three: 
9. Design programmes based on those in developed countries, especially the US  
10. Recruit international students and staff 
11. Attain regional and international accreditations for management systems 
 
Among the 11 internationalisation strategies, strategy 1 (EMI) was stated as the most 
important, so much so that Red’s identity was tied to it: ‘We are the first Vietnamese 
university to wholly teach in English’ (R_TM). Nonetheless, Red had no official 
conceptualisation of internationalisation as Blue did. The internationalisation strategies were 
‘intuitive’ and ‘learned from other universities in Vietnam and abroad’ (ibid.).  
 
Campus visits and document analysis showed Red was very active in communicating and 
branding its internationalisation. Among the 11 strategies above, strategy 1 (EMI), 2 
(accreditations), 3 (joint programmes), 4 (research dissemination), 6 (recruitment of foreign-
trained staff) were consistently communicated to prospective staff and students (R_MM_ER). 
In fact, they were mentioned in all of the presentations and counselling sessions on Red’s 
open day, which I attended (R_CV). On top of this, the English language was consistently, 
though not solely, used in internal communication (e.g. emails) (R_MM_ER), official 
documents related to teaching and research (e.g. syllabi) and promotion materials (R_D), 
including posts on social media (R_SM). One striking instance of English use was also said 
open day (R_CV), where all materials and many presentations were in English or bilingual, 
and during the opening ceremony the VC greeted all guests and conducted a Q&A session 
in English. Red’s international image was further reinforced by the presence of foreigners, 
which I observed during many campus visits (R_CV). They comprised foreign students on 
exchange and occasionally representatives of partner higher education institutions that Red 
had joint programmes with (to add, all of the partners were invited to open days to promote 
themselves). Lastly, the word ‘international’ itself appeared in every promotion activity, 
materials and even in the Red’s name and logo. 
  
5.1.3. Organisational structure 




Figure 6. Red’s organisational structure 
 
 
As mentioned, Red was accountable to VNUHCM, the Director of which had the power to 
appoint Red’s VC, and this accountability extended to the political dimension through the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Committee27 at VNUHCM.  
 
Within Red, the VC oversaw all strategic and administrative decisions and also sat on the 
Academic council whose members included top management, heads of offices and functional 
departments, deans and senior academics. The council made decisions on teaching, research 
and the recruitment and professional development of academic staff. There were three Pro-
Vice Chancellors, each in charge of a distinct component strategy and the corresponding 
offices and functional departments. Daily administration was taken care of by the nine 
offices: Administration, Undergraduate, Postgraduate, Equipment, Finance, Student Activity, 
Research, External Relations, Youth Organisation28. Specialised, project-based tasks were 
handled by the six functional departments: Quality Assurance, Information Technology 
Service, Research and Technology Transfer, Sustainable Development in Education, Project 
Management, Technology and Entrepreneur Incubator. There were four faculties: Computer 
Science, Electrical Engineering, Biotechnology, Business School. The seven independent 
academic departments generally had no programmes of their own (few did) and instead 
                                                 
27 There is a VCP Committee at nearly every public organisation in Vietnam. One Committee can be thought of as 
the VCP’s branch in one organisation, acting as overseer of VCP activities and members in it. Sometimes the 
Committee also decides on strategic and operational matters. Red had a VCP Committee, which was accountable 
to the VCP Committee of VNUHCM. 
28 Youth Organisation is part of the VCP and mainly targets to teenagers and young adults. It has branches in all 
HEIs, and the branching is very often down to faculty level (i.e. each faculty has a Youth Organisation branch 
under the HEI one). 
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taught for multiple faculties; they included Construction Engineering, English, Mathematics, 
Industrial Engineering, Biomedical Engineering, Physics, Environmental Engineering. 
 
With the institutional profile of Red established, the following sections will report how three 
internationalisation strategies were made sense of by the deans, lecturers and students at 
Red: English as the medium of instruction (5.2), joint programmes (5.3) and accreditation 
(5.4). 
 
5.2. English as the medium of instruction: An ear from the top 
Red prided itself on being the first Vietnamese university to use English as the medium of 
instruction (EMI) for all programmes. In fact, EMI was the first thing mentioned by the Pro-
Vice Chancellor (R_TM) and head of External Relations Office (R_MM_ER) when talking about 
Red internationalisation during entry interviews. It had always been integral to Red’s identity 
and Teaching component strategy since founding. In the 2011-2015 strategic period, EMI 
was also considered one of Red’s inherent strengths in its SWOT analysis (R_D). A long-
standing lecturer, R_L2_BS recalled that over his seven years at Red he had seen students’ 
English ‘got better and better’ and this created the condition for updating existing modules 
and introducing new ones or even whole programmes. The overall teaching and learning 
quality and Red’s reputation, according to him, had improved significantly. 
 
The EMI strategy was implemented via lecturers’ contract (ability to teach in English was a 
requisite), teaching materials (all were in English), and of course all teaching and assessment. 
It was stated by R_MM_ER that if lecturers had been caught teaching in Vietnamese, they 
would have faced penalty. As shall be seen later in this section, this was easier said than 
done. 
 
One major part of the EMI strategy was the provision of courses in the English language. This 
was done to prepare students for learning academic modules in English, because the English 
competence of the majority was not enough for them to effectively engage in academic 
studies (R_MM_ER). Indeed, the dean of Computer Science (R_MM_CS), who was a participant, 
said he wished for better student intake in terms of English competence. In addition, the 
courses aimed to help them attain an international English certificate like IELTS or TOEFL. 
There were four courses in total: New students would first take two courses in general 
English and progressed to another two in academic English; all courses were handled by the 
Department of English. The English courses were mandatory but interestingly did not serve as 
pre-requisites for any academic modules, so students could enrol in the latter without having 
to pass any of the English courses. Students in joint programmes, however, followed a 
different roadmap with regards to English courses. They would take five courses in general 
English delivered by an external, private provider located on campus called langcen 
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(pseudonym) and then the aforementioned two academic English courses by the Department 
of English.  
 
This section will look at Red lecturers and students’ view of teaching and learning in English 
(5.2.1) and the issues surrounding the EMI strategy (5.2.2), before finally zooming in on a 
strategic change concerning langcen, initiated by students in joint programmes (5.2.3). 
 
5.2.1. English as a necessity for branding, employment and discipline  
EMI was received favourably by those on the frontline – lecturers and students. Students said 
learning in English was a major if not the top pull factor of Red and gave it an ‘international 
flair’ (R_S1_BS). Indeed, this international flair was also the reason they, as well as lecturers 
and deans, thought EMI was essential to Red’s identity and branding: 
To me EMI is a normal and necessary thing [for us] to become international. 
And it sets up apart from other Vietnamese universities […] benefits students, 
giving them an edge once they graduate. (R_MM1_BS)  
A university cannot just call itself international without using English. (R_L2_BS) 
Teaching and learning in English is the most special thing about Red and makes 
it an outstanding choice. (R_L2_BS) 
Some students, like R_S2_BS and R_S1_IE, even thought EMI meant English would be used for 
all communication rather than just teaching, when they first saw Red’s advertisement as high 
school students. This made them see Red as ‘extremely progressive’ (R_S1_IE), but of course 
post-enrolment they realised the mistake; nonetheless, they still regarded the university 
highly for its integration of English into teaching, and R_S2_BS in particular tried to speak 
English outside lectures as she believed Red was a good environment to practice the 
language. Lecturers, on the other hand, saw EMI as an opportunity to improve their own 
English, which might in turn help them publish (R_L1_CS), network or even develop an 
international career (R_L2_CS).  
 
Both lecturers and students also felt that even without EMI, they would have had to speak 
English anyway due to pressure from the larger professional and disciplinary contexts: 
Many want to work for multinational firms, so English is a must. I mean even 
local companies now require English; at the very least it is a bonus in your 
application. (R_S4_BS) 
Everything in our field is in English. Translating terms like object oriented 
programming into Vietnamese does not make sense, not to mention translation 




This demonstrated that Red’s EMI strategy was in line with social demands, either at the 
‘communicative or specialist’ level (R_S2_CS). Thus, the strategy was implemented without 
deliberate push: ‘Teaching in English is natural for us. No one questions it or tries to do 
otherwise.’ (R_MM1_BS). Interestingly, only interviewees from Computer Science (CS) referred 
to their field as a motivator for EMI, whereas those from Business School (BS) and Industrial 
Engineering (IE) did not; this suggested differences in perception across disciplines. 
 
5.2.2. Working around language barriers  
Further interviews revealed the implementation of EMI was not as bright as the sentiment for 
it. First, there was a lack of English competence among both students and lecturers 
(R_MM_CS), which hindered teaching effectiveness and created gaps in academic 
performance: 
We have a renown scholar here in the CS whose modules are super stimulating, 
but you cannot understand a thing he says in class because of his accent. The 
best you can do is read the slides. (R_S3_CS) 
My students grasp the subject matter; they can design algorithms and code, but 
they cannot express themselves in English or write assignments well. (R_L2_CS)   
Peers are bad at English. I can finish my exam in half time and most of them 
cannot even understand all the questions. (R_S1_IE) 
 
The solution, however, was nowhere to be found. For one, recruiting more English-
competent students was difficult because Red was located ‘far away from the city centre’ 
(R_MM_ER) and had a lot of competition from other major public universities, even within 
VNUHCM. The competitors were older, more famous, located more centrally and had 
themselves started offering programmes in English (R_TM; R_MM_CS). This was not to 
mention Vietnamese students as a whole were ill-equipped with English, because of ‘the low 
quality English teaching in schools’ (R_MM_CS) (recall that this low quality was mentioned by 
Blue students at in 4.5.1). Recruiting better lecturers was neither easy because there were 
reportedly not enough Vietnamese lecturers who could teach and publish in English (R_TM). 
On the matter of lecturers’ English competence, nearly every student was complaining about 
the pronunciation and accent of their lecturers; for example, R_S2_BS recalled one of her 
lecturers mispronouncing the company name Amazon. One exception was R_S4_CS, who 
showed more awareness and sympathy towards Red’s difficulty with lecturer recruitment: ‘I 
heard from the Academic Affairs Office that we were short on lecturers. That’s maybe why the 
bad ones are still here.’ He knew this thanks to his part-time job as an IT assistant, which 
afforded contact with many offices and functional departments where he overheard 
conversations about university-level issues. In other words, he was in the right place at the 
right time to gain access to formal strategic information. By comparison, other students 
made sense of lecturers’ English competence, and the whole EMI strategy for that matter, 
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solely through their experiences with their studies, which involved the daily lectures where 
they listened to lecturers and their peers speaking English. 
 
As a side note, lecturers and students were largely unaware of how the EMI strategy was 
implemented. For example, lecturers knew there were English courses to support students 
with their academic studies, but not how the courses were designed and delivered: ‘I don’t 
know what they teach [at the Department of English], so I cannot comment on whether they 
are doing a good job or not’ (R_L4_BS). They said the courses were not a matter of interest 
for them, and they were only concerned with whether students understood them and 
handed in ‘intelligible assignments or exam papers’ (R_L1_CS). Students, on the other hand, 
did not know how English was factored in during lecturer recruitment and performance 
evaluation. Amusingly, their concern was the reverse of the lecturers’, in that as long as the 
lecturers’ English was intelligible, everything would be fine (R_S1_IE). 
 
Lecturers and students had ‘workarounds’ (R_S2_IE) to cope with one another’s English 
competence and their own. On the students’ side, what had been taught in English in 
lectures would be repeated later on in Vietnamese in tutorials, a special kind of study 
arrangement at Red where senior, high-performing students were tasked with helping their 
juniors revise previous lectures, especially in preparation for exams and assignments. 
Tutorials were considered a ‘godsend’ (R_S1_BS) by the majority of students, and there were 
reportedly many who ‘only waited til tutorials to truly learn something’ (ibid.). The demand 
for tutorials was so great that students went onto Red Social, a Facebook community created 
by Red students (similar to Blue Confession, see 4.4.2), to look for or advertise private 
tutoring service, which was at times paid (R_SM). Three students in this study had used such 
service (R_S1_BS; R_S2_BS; R_S2_CS), but they said the reason was not only their inability to 
understand certain content in English, but the content itself was also difficult.  
 
On the lecturers’ side, workaround meant they sometimes had no choice but to switch to 
Vietnamese: 
For lectures I speak in English, but in laboratory sessions I show students how to 
work with computers in Vietnamese […] We lecturers have to think of education 
first, and although we try our best to get students to communicate in English, 
their disciplinary understanding is more important. (R_L1_CS) 
When lecturers see our bewildered face they switch to Vietnamese, more often 
than you think, but I heard that in BS they speak English more than us. 
(R_S1_IE) 
As can be seen from the excerpts, the lecturers’ teaching philosophy was to prioritise 
teaching effectiveness over EMI. Contrary to what R_MM_ER said earlier, no one was 
reportedly penalised for switching to Vietnamese, but R_L1_CS did note that language switch 
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should ‘sparingly’ occur and with reason, or a lecturer would likely to receive bad feedback 
from students, consequently creating a basis for penalty. The most telling finding, however, 
came from R_S2_IE; he studied some modules taught by the VC, who spoke ‘excellent 
English’, and recalled that even the VC had to switch to Vietnamese from time to time to 
ensure student’ comprehension.  
 
Thus, it appeared that the EMI strategy was not implemented as intended, in the sense that 
occasional compromises to the strategy had to be made in favour of learning and teaching 
effectiveness. R_MM_CS lamented about this ‘unwanted friction between [use of] English and 
[teaching of] content’, but he seemed to attribute the problem more to students: On the one 
hand, he understood it was simply ‘impossible’ to recruit enough students competent in 
English to make up a majority due to, as just stated above, competition from other 
universities and the rather weak English competence of Vietnamese students in general. On 
the other hand, however, he remarked that English competence for lecturers was not as 
important because ‘expertise must be core’ and an applicant would be recruited as long as 
he/she scored at least 7 on the IELTS29 and maintained ‘acceptable articulation’ (ibid.). What 
was acceptable articulation could definitely be a matter of date at Red because, as stated 
above, nearly every student was complaining about the pronunciation and accent of their 
lecturers. 
 
All these varying views of EMI, plus the fact that it was compromised occasionally, strongly 
suggested the strategy was too ambitious and did not fit Red’s resources and environment. 
Simply put, Red lecturers and students were yet capable of EMI, and there were not enough 
Vietnamese lecturers and students who were competent in English to recruit. As a 
consequence, workarounds had to be devised, whether in the form of formally organised 
tutorials, the coping behaviour of students in seeking private tutoring, or the practice of 
language switch by lecturers. Nevertheless, attitude towards EMI was positive, with the main 
complaint of students and lecturers’ English competence being accommodated by these 
workarounds.  
 
To joint students, however, there was one EMI-related issue that no workaround was 
available. 
 
5.2.3. Contestation, social media and leadership 
As described earlier, one key part of the EMI strategy was to provide English courses for 
students so that they could undertake academic studies in English. This provision was 
                                                 
29 The highest score for IELTS is 9, with 0.5 increments. According to statistics by Cambridge Assessment, the 




different for students of local programmes and joint programmes. While the former took 
four English courses by Red’s Department of English, the latter had to take five by an on-
campus, private language centre called langcen and then two by the Department of English. 
This arrangement was put in place one year before this study and had been removed by the 
time data collection commenced. 
 
Langcen’s five courses were ‘problematic in so many ways’ (R_S2_BS) that they affected joint 
students’ whole programmes. First, they would take several semesters to complete, and the 
lessons in each week amounted to 20 hours combined. This meant that joint students had to 
considerably postpone all academic studies and in turn their transfer to the partner 
institution (students typically studied two years at Red and two years abroad with a partner 
institution, see 5.3 for more details). To make matters worse, students could not skip any of 
langcen’s courses unless they had scored well on its placement test, and even then they still 
had to follow the intensive 20hr/week scheduling. Teaching quality was another problematic 
area, as vividly recounted by one joint student: 
My instructor who was a foreigner told us that our class was the first time he 
had taught English. […] The activities were pointless, can you imagine doing 
crosswords about animals or colouring objects at university! Each lesson was a 
drag, and we had to suffer this for hours every week. Langcen did not help 
anybody. (R_S3_BS) 
The overall sentiment towards langcen was that its courses bore no effect and the instructors 
and administrative staff were unprofessional. Some students even joked that the only point 
of langcen’s courses was ‘to make friends and chat in class’ (R_S1_BS). 
 
On top of the problematic scheduling and quality, langcen’s courses were accounted into the 
already very high tuition fee for joint programmes (compared to local ones). In addition, 
some students accused langcen of questionable financial practices due to it charging them 
separately for tuition and learning materials. All these factors were exacerbated by the 
Academic Affairs Office, who were dismissive of students’ complaints: ‘I asked if I could learn 
somewhere else because langcen was horrible, and an office staff scolded me for being lazy!’ 
(R_S2_BS).   
 
All of these factors resulted in widespread discontent: ‘We were angry and worried at the 
same time. Nobody wanted to study for more than four years’ (R_S1_BS), which students 
turned to Red Social to voice: 
This is extremely frustrating! Nobody wants to go to class. The Office of 
Academic Affairs know we are learning nothing and yet they still force 
attendance […] Langcen is doing an abysmal job preparing us for the IETLS, why 
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can’t we just stay home and learn? […] To future generations, you should try 
your best to get 6.5 IELTS before coming here to skip all this non-sense. (R_SM) 
I am deeply upset upon being noticed that I owed langcen 1mil VND in 
textbooks. That is not a small figure for us students. When we received the 
materials langcen never said anything about payment, nor were we offered not 
to accept them […] This is a scam! (ibid.) 
The first two courses at langcen were a big letdown; I met only bad instructors, 
bad in pedagogy and demeanour. The Office of Academic Affairs are not 
sympathetic at all; one admin was like scolding me when he saw I gave langcen 
negative feedback […] I wish the university would change how general English is 
handled because at this rate it might take three or four years to complete all the 
pre-sessional English. How can joint students transfer in time? (ibid.) 
A quick search using ‘langcen’ as keyword returned 11 such posts, each having in the 
proximity of 100 reactions30 (the last quote above gained 200 reactions). For comparison, the 
usual post on Red Social had only up to 10 reactions (R_SM), indicating the severity of the 
present issues with langcen. Among these posts, one stood out because it was both a 
complaint and rally:  
I am very angry, but I have heard that many have been turned away by the 
Office of Academic Affairs. I want to ask all of you joints out there if we can 
band up and appeal to the university about langcen? I think because we came 
individually they can easily dismiss us, let’s try doing it together. (R_SM) 
This post was commented on by the administrator of Red Social, who gave his/her support. 
This person also endorsed many complaint posts about langcen and even made one post 
calling for students to contact their faculties and the VC.  
 
Finally what was called an ‘uprising’ (R_S1_BS) happened. A petition was created and 
forwarded to the VC, who resolved the issue by allowing joint students to opt out of langcen 
if they signed an agreement to submit an IELTS or TOEFL certificate in time for transfer. 
Unfortunately, no data could be gathered on the specificities of what the VC did (e.g. 
whether a meeting was summoned and with whom). That said, the uprising was mentioned 
by all students, joint and local alike, as an example of Red’s uniqueness among public 
universities: ‘This is the only place you can find a VC who actually cares’ (R_S2_CS). In fact, in 
nearly every interview the VC was referred to as a frequent reader of Red Social and very 
attentive to students’ needs: 
The thing that I remember the most about Red is how the VC is very engaged 
with students. He often goes to the canteen at lunch time and ask stuff like ‘is 
the food to your liking?’. You see that roof shadowing the bus stop? He noticed 
                                                 
30 Readers of Facebook posts can use the reaction feature to express their attitude. 
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we were standing in the sun and commissioned it. And he reads and comments 
on Red Social31, so if you have a serious matter just post there. (R_S2_CS)  
I read Red Social from time to time because important matters are there. 
Students know it is an effective communication channel because the VC follows 
it closely. (R_L2_CS) 
 
The VC’s focus on students and his use of Red Social made this Facebook community a 
catalyst for change. He commented on two of the aforementioned 11 posts about langcen, 
telling the poster to contact him directly via email with details of the courses they were 
dissatisfied with so that he could ‘rectify them’ (R_SM). Scrolling through Red Social, it could 
easily be seen that the VC took care to comment on complaints by students, e.g. about exam 
scheduling or dealing with the offices. One particularly serious case that he got hold of was 
allegations of a lecturer harassing his students with the poster claiming to be a parent; 
he/she was invited by the VC to campus (ibid.). Thus, Red Social was found by students to be 
‘the best feedback method because it reach[ed] the ear from the top’ (R_S1_IE) and much 
‘preferable to the feedback forms’ handed out at the end of each course which would go to 
the Academic Affairs Office ‘for burial’ (R_S5_BS). In other words, thanks to the VC, Red Social 
was de facto communication channel even though not formally recognised as such. His 
leadership also drove a portion of staff to treat the page seriously and follow it, like R_S2_CS 
and R_MM_ER. 
 
The contestation further showed a great gap between the EMI strategy and what happened 
on the ground. What was intended (English courses for joint students) could not be realised 
by available resources (langcen), but in this case the misfit could not be accommodated by 
any workarounds. Perhaps more importantly, it also shed lights into the innerworkings of Red 
as an organisation. For one, the key structure to help students with academic matters – the 
Academic Affairs Office was not effective. Instead, Red Social, an online community for purely 
social purposes, became the place to turn to for not only academic but other matters. This, 
however, did not happen naturally but through the action of the VC, who interacted with 
students there and followed with interventions. Indeed, what students said highlighted the 
positive impact of his hands-on approach to strategic management and administration and 
the emphasis he placed on students, with langcen being just one among the many issues he 
intervened in.  
 
5.3. Joint programmes: Positions and perspectives 
                                                 
31 A feature of Red Social was that those who posted on it are kept anonymous, but those who commented on 




Besides EMI, joint programmes constituted a major internationalisation strategy for Red. The 
joint programme strategy was written into Red’s corporate strategy as follows:   
Open more joint programmes with leading foreign higher education institutions 
[and] actively seek accredited higher education institutions and sign 
MOU/MOA32 with  
(R_D) 
At the time of data collection there were 22 joint programmes, both undergraduate and 
postgraduate, which accounted for nearly half of Red’s portfolio. All of the joint programmes 
were between Red and a university in a Western country, including Australia, USA, the UK 
and Germany. I focused on joint undergraduate programmes because they were in the 
overwhelming majority at 19 out of 22, not to mention their number actually overtook that 
of local undergraduate programmes (15). Thus, joint undergraduate programmes were likely 
to produce richer data than their postgraduate counterparts.  
 
Undergraduate joint programmes came in three forms, namely 2:2, 3:1 and 4:0, which 
respectively meant that students had to do (a) two years at home and two years abroad, (b) 
three years at home and one year abroad or (c) the whole programme at home. During the 
home stage, joint students took courses that were pre-requisite for them to transfer to the 
abroad stage or, in the case of 4:0, to be eligible for final-year assignments and exams 
administered by the partner institution on Red’s campus. Nearly all of the pre-requisite 
courses actually belonged to local programmes, so interestingly joint students studied with, 
if not in the exact same way as local ones before the transfer. Another interesting feature of 
joint programmes was that assessment results for pre-requisite courses were not counted 
towards the degree. In other words, only courses taught by the partner institution in the 
transfer stage (for 2:2 and 3:1 programmes), or the results of final-year assignments and 
exams administered by the partner (for 4:0 programmes), determined what level of 
achievement students would graduate with. Accordingly, the degree would be issued by the 
partner; in the case of students in 4:0 programmes, this meant that they would get a Western 
degree for studying four years in Vietnam, with the same curriculum, facilities and lecturers 
as local students. Lastly, the entry requirements for joint programmes were generally lower 
than those for local ones.  
 
Joint programmes usually started with a foreign higher education institution contacting Red 
about a partnership. After initial negotiations and signing of an MOA, Red had to prepare a 
proposal to submit to VNUHCM and later defend it in order to open a programme with the 
partner. If passed, the programme would be allowed to recruit until the MOA expired, at 
which point Red extended the MOA and then prepared and defended a proposal for 
                                                 
32 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). These documents preceeded 
the opening of joint programmes between Red and a partner. 
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programme maintenance with VNUHCM. The paperwork for joint programmes was managed 
by Red’s External Relations Office (ER).  
 
5.3.1. Programme management: Centralisation and entanglements  
Given the presence of joint programmes, surprisingly little was mentioned about them by the 
academic managers of BS and CS. BS’ deputy dean (R_MM1_BS) and CS’ dean (R_MM_CS) 
said joint programmes had already been there before they got their post, so they kept ‘them 
where they should be’ and only intervened when something required attention, which ‘to 
best memory [had] not happened’ (R_MM_CS). They recommended asking ER or the 
Academic Affairs Office for more details because joint programmes were not within the remit 
of the faculties. The role of the faculties, and thus their own role as deans, was to provide 
information requested by ER for paperwork and to make sure joint students received all pre-
requisite courses. R_MM1_BS added that international partnerships in any form mostly came 
from top management or ER, who occasionally informed BS of opportunities and asked if 
they wanted to take them on. The deputy dean also talked of potential difficulty for faculties 
to open their own programmes, or more generally to have any strategic initiatives: 
Sometimes we come up with ideas benefitting everyone but possess no power to 
realise them, so we need help from the offices. Most are very helpful, but a few 
are, how to put it, unenthusiastic. Such instances make us reserved, and 
whenever we want to propose something we have to think whom it involves and 
how. 
But I know this is not wholly their fault, but rather they are chained down by too 
much governmental regulations. In Vietnam we have endless unreasonable red 
tapes. It entangles everyone from top to bottom. If you want to do good you 
often have to find a way around everything, not breaking, just going around. 
This takes a lot of effort, and not many think it’s worth it, nor have they enough 
resources to spare if they do. (R_MM1_BS) 
This lengthy account spoke volume about not only joint programmes but the 
governance at Red and the role of deans. More specifically, it showed how much 
faculty-originated initiatives like opening a programme could be hindered by a 
myriad of entanglements, including Red’s centralised governance structure, 
governmental regulations, human motivation and resource dependence. However, 
there was space to manoeuvre if one was ‘well familiar with laws and regulations and 
[knew] the right people to contact at the right time’ (ibid.); unfortunately, R_MM1_BS 
could not give specific examples as they were too sensitive. R_MM1_BS’ response also 
showed that Red deans’ role was to implement top-down strategies rather than 
devise the strategic directions of their faculties. This was confirmed by R_MM1_BS’ 
superior, the dean of BS (R_MM2_BS): ‘We almost entirely followed the direction of 
top management’. He said this in an email responding to my request for an interview, 
in which he refused the interview and hinted that any interviews about strategic 




Hearing much about centralisation, I decided to ask ER for an interview about joint 
programmes. Although the focus of this study was on academic faculties/departments rather 
than administrative offices like ER, it was likely in this instance that ER would offer insights 
into how the faculties worked. That said, the head of ER (R_MM_ER) granted me an interview. 
She first explained the ‘arduous’ process of setting up and maintaining joint programmes, 
from initial negotiations and MOA signing to preparing necessary documentations, 
defending each programme proposal in front of VNUHCM, and finally redoing everything 
every few years to maintain the programmes. More importantly, it was ER’s responsibility to 
spearhead all of these tasks. The faculties’ role was to provide information for paperwork and 
be present during defense. It was in this interview that I learned nearly all joint programmes 
had started with a foreign institution approaching Red rather than the other way round, 
which begged the question whether there had been one originating from Red, especially the 
faculties. The response was negative: 
Not that I know of since taking this position […] Even if the faculties had a 
strong connection that could result in a joint, any talks would still have to go 
through us and top management. (R_MM_ER) 
She then elaborated that ‘unlike Western universities, [Red’s] governance was central’, and 
therefore there was ‘little the faculties could decide by themselves’, which strongly 
corroborated what R_MM1_BS and R_MM2_BS said. She also recounted the many difficulties 
ER faced but that were invisible to the faculties, particularly a sudden change in the 
Vietnamese Higher education Law in 2015 that ‘brought about huge red tapes’; even she 
herself ‘could not have anticipated joint programmes were this complicated when [she] was 
still a lecturer’. In brief, her accounts showed that deans indeed had a minor role in joint 
programmes, with little decision-making power (e.g. to open one) and information (e.g. 
about the difficulties surrounding them).  
 
5.3.2. Insider and outsider 
Unlike the deans, students had much to say about joint programmes. Their responses 
generally fell into two camps, depending on whether they were studying in a joint 
programme – in this section, students in a joint programme will be marked with *. To begin 
with, there was consensus from both camps about the appeal of joint programmes for 
Vietnamese students: 
We want to study abroad but cannot afford four years’ worth of tuition and 
living. Joint programmes shave off at least two years’ expenses and in the end 
you still get a foreign degree. (R_S1_BS*) 
Red is like a bridge. Very few know how to go through British application or 
pass the SAT. Red lets you skip all that; you study in a Vietnamese high school, 
come here and then get into an American university, and for cheap. (R_S1_CS) 
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I would have flown abroad after high school, but my English was not good 
enough and I knew our Vietnamese high school diplomas would not qualify. 
Red gave me two years of getting used to studying in English. (R_S2_CS*) 
Joint programmes were clearly favoured by students to local ones. This strongly suggested 
that studying in the West (recall all joint programmes were with Western universities) was 
perceived as better than at home, which prompted me to probe for the reason. The students 
felt Western education ‘[was] better and more advanced’ (R_S2_CS*), and more importantly 
most of them observed a degree from the West ‘carr[ied] much more weight’ (R_S2_BS*) to 
Vietnamese employers who might not ‘pay attention to the programme or issuing institution, 
as long as it [was] from a developed country’ (R_S1_IE). A few referred to the opportunity to 
stay and work in the host country (R_S2_CS*). The last reason was cultural exposure or 
travelling experiences but the students said these were ‘minor’ (R_S2_BS*). This suggested 
the employability of a degree was the criterion by which students judged their university 
education, possibly more important than what they could learn or experience.  
 
Several students added joint programmes were also appealing because they provided an 
easy way to enter Red: 
Entry requirements are lower than for local programmes, so many put a joint as 
backup in case they fail a preferred local. If they cannot afford the tuition, they 
have to try hard on grades so that in the second or third year they can apply for 
a change to a local. (R_S2_CS*) 
Joint programmes are more expensive of course but so easier to enter; in fact, 
the requirements are on the level of a much weaker university. It is like buying 
your way into Red, and once you get in you can switch programmes with ease. 
(R_S2_IE) 
As to why some would go to such lengths and expenses, the students said Red was one of 
the best universities in Saigon and increasingly popular in recent years, and its graduates 
were more employable. The issue of intake quality was then raised. While the students 
agreed quality was affected, they found the compromise of entry requirements necessary for 
the sake of recruitment, because ‘there [were] few people rich and smart at the same time’ 
(R_S3_CS); R_S2_CS* added those applying for joint programmes simply had to know what 
they were ‘signing up for’ and set their expectations accordingly. Interestingly, joint students 
remarked that intake quality was not a big concern for them. Because they attended the 
same lectures as local peers during the home stage (refer back to the start of 5.3 for how 
joint programmes were configured), they could choose to work with high performers, most 
of whom were local students, during group projects, at the same time avoiding joint students 
who had got into Red by abusing the lower entry requirements of joint programmes. 
The thid and last point of convergence between local and joint students was that, like their 
deans, they were unaware of how joint programmes were set up or any formal information 
about specific joint programmes (e.g. how long a programme had been running). As was the 
141 
 
case for EMI, what the students knew and said about joint programmes came wholly from 
their experiences applying for and then being in one or, for local students, talking to their 
joint peers.  
 
When asked about the specifics, responses between local and joint students started to 
diverge. On the matter of local and joint students learning together, while local students 
were rather indifferent, saying ‘it [was] okay’ or they ‘[did] not think too much about it’ 
(R_S2_IE), joint students were quick to voice their mixed feelings: 
I am not saying that the courses are bad or anything; some are quite good in 
fact, but that we pay double or triple the tuition to receive the same education 
[as local students] does not feel right. (R_S1_BS*) 
It is great that we get to know so many people, but at the same time I wonder 
what is the difference between [local] programmes and ours. (R_S2_CS*) 
The sense of not getting the value they paid for was more prominent among students who 
did 3:1 and the most so 4:0 programmes. Moreover, while some partner institutions did 
require special pre-requisite courses not available to local students, these were few and 
some (e.g. basic chemistry and biology were compulsory for an American business 
programme) were questioned by the students in terms of necessity (R_S5_BS; R_S2_IE). The 
special courses might also present a problem in themselves, as one joint student recounted:  
I needed an advanced course in microeconomics, but [the Academic Affairs 
Office] cancelled it without notice, mostly likely because there were only two of 
us going to [the partner university] in 2017 […] Luckily we requested and got 
the course back. (R_S3_BS*) 
This ‘close call’ (R_S3_BS*) was met with strong reaction from her focus group who all agreed 
the cancellation was unacceptable negligence. Unfortunately, I could not follow up with the 
Academic Affairs Office about it. One local student expressed that he ‘could never imagine 
such a thing’ (R_S4_BS), to which one student of a British joint programme responded: 
Of course you cannot experience these things as an outsider. The Academic 
Affairs Office always scold and scare people in my programme about falling 
behind with IELTS certification whenever they see us. They say [the partner 
institution] got angry because our profiles were not up to par. (R_S2_BS*) 
 
This showed a clear gap in how much local students (outsiders) and joint ones (insiders) 
knew, even when both were in the same lecturers. The latter’s position afforded them unique 
situations, like encounters with the Academic Affairs Office, where they witnessed first hand 
the problems of joint programmes. That said, joint students were unanimous that they had 
never raised what they said above with their faculties, the offices or even the VC, either 
directly or on Red Social. This was surprising because every student interviewed extolled 
Red’s student service and that they could have a voice here unlike at other Vietnamese 
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universities, leading to the successful contestation described in 5.2.3. The students were 
asked why their attitude towards joint programmes was more passive than towards other 
matters, at least EMI. This was where insiders and outsiders converged again: 
It depends on which issue we are talking about. When it comes to our study we 
just want to pass courses and get the degree over with, so as long as we chug 
along just fine we will do nothing. (R_S3_BS*, seconded by other BS students) 
Langcen was so abysmal that many took action, but even then not everyone 
participated. Some, like me, were allowed to skip half of it, but if I had had to do 
the whole thing I would have surely protested because otherwise it would take 
five years for me to graduate. (R_S2_CS*) 
What you said applies for local students too. I think all of us care about 
graduating and making money rather than the design of our programme or 
whether a lecturer speaks intelligible English. (R_S1_IE) 
 
The excerpts above demonstrated an adaptive stance from which the students went about 
their studies. That is, they would first attempt to adapt to the situation at hand or resolve it 
before taking collective actions. The students said they avoided making things ‘a big deal’ 
(R_S2_BS*) as much as possible. Furthermore, joint programmes in general were ‘big things 
beyond [their] control’ (R_S4_CS*) and change would never come from a single complaint. 
Another reason for not taking collective action more often was cultural: ‘Maybe we have 
been conditioned since childhood that teachers are right and it is up to the students to do 
well.’ (R_S3_CS).  
 
The focus group with BS students led to a short but insightful discussion on Red’s rationale 
for opening joint programmes. As stated above, the students’ perception of joint 
programmes was informed by their experiences being in one; they had no knowledge of how 
they were set up or of specific programmes. Yet, this did not mean they had no opinion of 
the set-up of joint programmes. R_S2_BS*, a 4:0 student, was concerned with the fact the 
results of every course provided by Red were null in her degree; instead, only the 
assignments and exams issued by the partner university in the final year were accounted for, 
and the ‘irony’ was that they were marked at home by Red lecturers. She consequently found 
‘no motivation in doing [her] best’ with Red courses and remarked that it was ‘unfair for 
those who did’. Her sentiment was echoed by other BS joint students in the focus group and 
later by CS students in their respective focus group (R_S2_CS*; R_S4_CS*). The configurations 
around joint programmes made joint students feel their programmes were opened for more 
commercial than educational purposes: 
Last week we opened a brand new, marvelous campus in the city centre. The 
building was bought with my money no doubt. (R_S2_BS*) 
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There’s a lot to gain for both Red and foreign universities. Just look at how 
much we have to pay even when we are here studying in the same class with 
the same lecturer as locals, without grades. (R_S2_CS*)  
With regards to 4:0 programmes, some students found them ‘borderline selling and buying 
degrees’ (R_S2_BS*; R_S1_CS; R_S1_IE) but admitted that Vietnamese students and parents 
were complicit by ‘chasing an overseas degree to the end and nothing [was] more efficient 
than getting one without flying away’ (R_S1_IE). That said, nearly all students agreed the 
questionable set-up of joint programmes might be ‘worth it in the long run’ (R_S3_CS) due to 
the employability value of Western degrees and access to Western education, so they put up 
with the feeling that some joint programmes did not reflect their high tuition. In addition, 
the students said the programmes could not be adjusted anyway because they ‘[were] 
already there and decided by Red and the partners’ (R_S2_BS*). What was striking here was 
the students were seemingly trying to accommodate and rationalise the practices at Red and 
their own inaction. More specifically, recall in 5.2.3 they praised Red for its willingness to 
listen and change, here they described Red in a deterministic manner. However, such 
rationalisation was understandable considering they had explained they managed to adapt 
to the issues of joint programmes.  
 
Interestingly, a few students remarked my interview questions were critical and ‘if everyone 
were too strict, many joint programmes would not survive’ (R_S2_BS*). Two particular 
students, however, were critical of joint programmes: R_S1_IE said he wanted to go abroad 
but did not apply for any joint programmes because ‘the idea sound[ed] off’, and if he had 
had the money he would have chosen ‘better universities [than Red’s partners] and stud[ied] 
full-time overseas’. Somewhat similarly, R_S2_CS* did lots of reading and found only one 
‘decent British university’, the joint programme with which she applied for. Both preferred to 
keep their opinions to their own since ‘being critical could set [them] so apart that [they] 
would be called pretentious’ (R_S1_IE).  
 
5.3.3. A transparent area 
It would be reasonable to expect lecturers’ accounts of joint programmes to be rich because 
it was inevitable that they taught joint students, who shared the same lectures as local ones 
during the home stage. This turned out to not be the case as lecturers talked very little about 
the joint programme strategy. 
 
Most lecturers agreed joint programmes were a selling point for Red because they ‘satisfied 
a unique demand [that is] getting an international education without the associated costs’ 
(R_L3_BS) and in turn ‘diversified Red’s offerings to attract a wide range of students’ 
(R_L1_CS). Joint programmes were also a key element to Red’s international status because 
they helped create ‘links with the outside world [that] an international university must have’ 
(R_L4_BS). However, impact on academic staff was unclear (R_L4_BS), and many lecturers 
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could not even feel the presence of joint programmes, as figuratively expressed by R_L3_CS: 
‘To me, they are transparent. I know they are there, but I cannot see them.’ They referred to 
the configuration of their teaching responsibilities and joint programmes as reasons for such 
perceived transparency: 
Here we are assigned to teach courses, not programmes. The courses are shared 
by local and joint students. Sometimes a partner institution requires special pre-
requisite courses, but those are few. This is not to mention each faculty has a 
dedicated academic advisor for joint students. That person knows more than 
others. (R_L2_BS)  
Local and joint students are the treated the same when they are at Red. Without 
looking at the student number you cannot tell who is who in class […] There is 
no special way for teaching joint students; the content and delivery are exactly 
the same. (R_L2_CS)  
R_L3_CS, in particular, pointed to the ‘lack of communication from the partners’ and wished 
they had provided ‘feedback regarding teaching quality when receiving students’ so that Red 
lecturers could improve their modules. R_L2_CS likened Red lecturers to ‘outsourced workers’ 
as they were doing the work supposedly done by foreign institutions: ‘I am teaching so that 
students get a degree from an overseas university.’ His was somewhat echoed by other 
lecturers (R_L1_BS; R_L2_BS; R_L1_CS). Thus, the configurations around joint programmes put 
lecturers in a position where they were insiders yet outsiders, contributing but hardly 
perceiving.  
 
The unequal relation between Red and the partners was commented on by a few lecturers 
(R_L2_BS; R_L1_CS). They found it inevitable due to the lack of resources in Vietnamese public 
universities and the ‘sunken land’ (R_L1_CS) standing of Vietnamese higher education; these 
two factors forced Vietnamese universities to find financial solutions in lucrative joint 
programmes with foreign partners, against whom they had little leverage in negotiation and 
curriculum design (R_L2_BS; R_L1_CS). The lecturers were, however, optimistic that joint 
programmes ‘meant at least [Vietnamese] teaching was recognised’ (R_L2_BS) and might 
lead to academic cooperation down the road, but this would require ‘a push from the 
leaders’ (ibid.). 
 
As a last note, lecturers were not aware of the formal details concerning joint programmes. 
Therefore, they made sense of the programmes with their daily teaching experiences and, at 
a broader level, experiences of being an academic in Vietnamese higher education, as can be 
seen above.  
 
5.4. Accreditation: Environmental shock and disconnection 
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Besides opening joint programmes, Red also wanted to internationalise its own local 
programmes. One way to achieve this was to have them accredited by international bodies. 
Accreditation was also a means to enhance Red’s reputation, thus facilitating the 
establishment of new partnerships and through them new joint programmes: ‘One arrow 
hitting two birds. The VC gets international recognition and reputation while improving Red’s 
teaching quality’ (personal communication with a VNUHCM senior manager). Accreditation 
was therefore a key area in the corporate strategy: 
Improve teaching quality to approach regional standards (AUN) and 
international ones (ABET, AACSB)  
The objectives of the accreditation strategy are: 
• Complete and refine programmes, management systems and tools for 
quality assurances and accreditations  
• Raise awareness of quality assurances and accreditations for all staff 
and students 
• Promote internal quality assurance activities to ensure our programmes 
meet regional and international accreditation standards 
(R_D) 
At the time of data collection Red had conducted programme-level assessment by AUN-QA33 
and was looking towards institution-level assessment in addition to getting its engineering 
programmes accredited by ABET34.  
 
The accreditation strategy is headed by the Centre for Quality Assurance, a functional 
department, but only to the extent of institutional accreditation. Programme-level 
accreditation was delegated to the faculties. This section first focuses on the efforts of CS 
dean to get his faculty accredited by ABET (5.4.1), followed by the perception of CS lecturers 
towards accreditation in general (5.4.2). Section 5.4.3 will describe how the few students from 
BS and CS who were involved in accreditation work thought about accreditation. 
 
5.4.1. ‘Fighting with bare hands’ 
CS became the first faculty to have an undergraduate programme assessed by AUN-QA in 
2009, two years ahead of everyone else. The dean of CS (R_MM_CS) took great pride in this 
                                                 
33 ASEAN University Network (AUN), established in 1995, is an intergovernmental organisation in Southeast Asia 
whose mission is to foster cooperation among universities in the region and provide recommendations on higher 
education policies to ASEAN countries. One of its main activities is quality assessment, called AUN-QA. There are 
two levels of AUN-QA: institutional and programme-level, both of which involves self-reporting followed by a 
review visit. 
34 Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) is an American accrediting agency that assesses 
quality at either institutional or programme level. HEIs have to pay to be accredited in each of the four ABET 
categories: applied and natural science, computing, engineering, engineering technology. Accreditation involves 
self-report followed by a review visit. 
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and to further their ‘leading position in being recognised for quality’, he applied for ABET 
accreditation in 2016. Personally, he was a strong believer in such exercise: ‘Benchmarks are 
essential to know where we are internationally so we can reach better standards.’ CS’ 
application was not its own initiative but a part of an university-wide one devised by the VC; 
the VC’s intention was to have all of Red’s undergraduate engineering programmes 
accredited by ABET in 2019. Though enthusiastic, R_MM_CS admittedly could not foresee the 
learning curve and later on an environmental shock that put a halt to CS’ effort.  
 
It was the first time the dean and most of CS staff had encountered something like ABET 
accreditation. They were therefore ‘mentally unprepared’ for the workload required, but since 
‘everyone was okay with it’ (R_MM_CS) they decided to commit (as shall be seen in 5.4.2, 
‘being okay’ did not necessarily mean an engaged attitude). The challenge was greater for 
R_MM_CS because he had to coordinate and review all the works prepared for the ABET 
organisation: 
We were going in blind, like fighting with bare hands. We did AUN before but 
this is a different thing with different criteria and documentation requirements 
[…] It is difficult for me because I have to know what and who to assign work 
and judge the quality. (R_MM_CS) 
Central management could offer little guidance as ‘it [was] their first time [with ABET] also, 
everyone in the same boat’ (R_MM_CS). Faced with such a ‘daunting task’ (ibid.), the dean 
decided the best first step was to learn as much as possible. 
 
Red provided abundant information on training opportunities and encouraged the faculties 
to attend, including workshops by the ABET organisation or fieldtrips to one ABET-accredited 
university in Saigon. R_MM_CS actively made use of these, sending his staff or himself going 
to them, and then let everyone share what they had learned during faculty meetings. Red 
was also assigned a consultant by ABET – a Vietnamese American professor, thanks to whom 
the dean was able to adopt a ‘learn as you go’ (ibid.) approach where he sought iterative 
feedback on self-reports. On top of this, the dean turned to his own personal network for 
help: 
My close friend is a middle manager at [another university that had been 
ABET-accredited]. He showed me what they did over there, which is very 
illuminating. I sometimes asked for feedback and advice. I am lucky to have a 
forerunner as guide. (R_MM_CS) 
He considered this personal resource a ‘special advantage’ for CS which, combined with the 
more formal training, enabled him and CS staff to quickly grasp the innerworkings of ABET. 
Although progress was slow due to technical issues such as lack of data or time, CS was 




CS’ ABET aspiration, however, was put at risk by a new regulation on programme naming. At 
the time of data collection the faculty had two undergraduate programmes: a Bachelor in 
Computer Science and a Bachelor in Information Technology. The former was further broken 
down into two specialisations: Network Engineering or Hardware Engineering, which would 
be written onto the final degree. For instance, a student choosing the Network Engineering 
specialisation would graduate with a degree called Bachelor in Computer Science with 
Network Engineering. Both specialisations of the Bachelor in Computer Science were 
registered as two separate programmes for ABET accreditation. Complications arose when 
VNUHCM announced that specialisations should no longer be written onto a degree, which 
meant students taking either Network Engineering or Hardware Engineering would graduate 
with the same Bachelor in Computer Science degree. Because the degree no longer had the 
word ‘engineering’ on it, CS was disqualified from getting the ABET accreditation, which was 
for engineering programmes. The sudden setback came as a surprise to the faculty and 
particularly R_MM_CS, who had no choice but to withdraw his application.  
 
Nonetheless, the dean came up with a solution shortly afterwards: 
I will break the Computer Science programme up into two new ones with new 
names, with the word ‘engineering’ written in of course. The problem is I cannot 
just give any name to my liking; it has to be recognised by the Ministry of 
Education and Training35. For a start, there is no network engineering in their 
list, so I need to find something that is already there and that network 
engineering can fit in. (R_MM_CS) 
If the name change was successful, CS would get back on track to join the other faculties 
when ABET would visit Red to do on-site assessment. The dean added if there was no 
suitable name in the Ministry’s list, he would have to apply for Networking Engineering to be 
recognised and given a programme code, which he was trying to avoid: ‘We will miss this 
opportunity for accreditation. It takes two years for a new programme to be recognised, not 
to mention all the paperwork.’ (R_MM_CS). It appeared R_MM_CS was familiar with higher 
education legislation in Vietnam and drew on it to carry out the present strategic move. He 
also said he had not paid much attention to ‘such complicated things’ (ibid.) before the 
present regulation change. As of the time of writing, the dean is in dialogue with the top 
management over changing the name of CS’ Bachelor in Computer Science. 
 
Notably, R_MM_CS had never paid attention to accreditation until the ABET initiative. Indeed, 
he paid little attention to strategic matters in general and had little knowledge of the 
corporate strategy. He saw his own role as ‘to realise ideas from top management’ 
(R_MM_CS) and he trusted the latter would be the most suitable persons to handle anything 
                                                 
35 The Ministry of Education and Training compiles a list of recognised disciplines, each assigned a unique code. 
All programmes from Vietnamese universities (private and public) must be registered with an appropriate code. If 
an institution wants to open a programme in an unrecognised discipline, it has to apply for a new code and 
undergo a two-year trial period after which the Ministry decides if the programme and discipline are legitimate. 
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strategic. However, he believed that he still had a strong grasp of Red’s corporate strategy 
thanks to his years working at Red, first as a lecturer and then dean of CS: 
[I understand the corporate strategy] from meetings with the VC; you can 
connect his ideas and figure out the whole, and I think he has a very good 
strategy […] I used to be a lecturers for several years before this post, and just by 
working here I got a sense of how things were […] Through dean duties I have 
formed a better view of the environment here. (R_MM_CS)   
He added that while written, formal strategies were important, what was actually done and 
to be done on the ground ‘with the hand and heart’ mattered more (R_MM_CS). Thus, the 
dean had a very hands-on philosophy to management in that he would spring first into 
action to complete his duties and ‘work and play with [the staff] closely’, which he believed 
‘create[d] confidence in leadership and motivation.’ On top of this, when relaying top 
management’s decisions, he tried to rephrase and ‘translate [them] into what [needed] to be 
done’ while omitting what he deemed unnecessary. It can be seen above that R_MM_CS’ 
hands-on style shaped his role in the ABET initiative: Besides coordinating, he engaged with 
the work himself by going to training events, sharing what he had learned during faculty 
meetings, talking to the ABET consultant and his friend about CS’ preparations. 
 
5.4.2. Involved yet disconnected 
Though thoroughly involved in the process, CS lecturers appeared disconnected with the 
ABET initiative or rather accreditation as a whole. To begin with, it fell upon CS lecturers 
themselves to understand requirements from accrediting bodies like AUN-QA or ABET and 
then do all the work from gathering data to writing up reports for these bodies. In other 
words, they were heavily involved from start to finish. This was because CS (or Red for that 
matter) did not have an information system to gather, store and publish all of its information 
for accreditation, neither did it possess dedicated manpower for such task.  
 
Yet, the lecturers’ perception was one of uninvolvement. While most of the lecturers in this 
study agreed an accredited status was beneficial to CS and Red, ‘enhancing [CS and Red’s] 
reputation and image’ (R_L1_CS), they felt the impact on lecturers such as themselves was 
vague: 
The good thing is we have to be transparent, and this is one of the very few 
public universities where you can easily find syllabi, course descriptions, all in 
English. I have yet to see it change my teaching or research though. (R_L2_CS) 
The badges are more for marketing purposes, and that’s good for the whole 
university. It does not affect me except the extra workload. I still teach the same 
curriculum and the faculty runs the same way. (R_L3_CS) 
In addition, the labour associated with accreditation was not very meaningful in that it was 
‘just work for the university’ rather than something they were ‘invested in’ like a research 
149 
 
project (R_L3_CS). Such disconnect was also mentioned by CS dean, who implied that the 
lack of impact resulted from how accreditation was carried out: 
At the moment we are writing papers for accrediting bodies more than using 
the criteria to develop ourselves. Accreditation is like an award, not a guide. For 
me, what should be done instead is all the staff have to think ABET, speak ABET, 
write ABET so that the programmes we design are already ABET quality. 
(R_MM_CS) 
When asked, he said any accreditation-related work was counted as service36 and not a 
special task in itself. Moreover, there had not been any awareness-raising activity on quality 
assurances and accreditations for lecturers, as written in the corporate strategy. Thus, the 
lecturer’s feelings of disconnect likely stemmed from the perceived lack of impact and poor 
internal communication.  
 
Nonetheless, there was one interesting side effect brought by accreditation, particularly the 
ABET initiative. A requirement from both AUN-QA and ABET is that a higher education 
institution should have clear corporate strategies and that the strategies should be reflected 
in all aspects of its organisation. In order to prepare reports for accrediting bodies, therefore, 
CS lecturers had to find information and write about Red’s corporate strategy and then 
follow with an analysis of how a certain organisational aspect of CS (e.g. teaching, research, 
human resources) reflected and was supported by the strategy (R_L3_CS). In fact, they were 
provided with the formal corporate strategy whenever there was an accreditation round, the 
information from which was supplemented with ‘personal experiences […] gained from many 
years of working [at CS]’ (R_L2_CS). Thanks to the ABET initiative, CS lecturers became aware 
of Red’s corporate strategy and actually welcomed the insights:  
Reading the vision and mission I knew that I chose the right place to work. 
(R_L1_CS) 
It is good to know about our strategic directions though I do not have the need 
to. It feels good to know you are part of a community heading somewhere. 
(R_L3_CS) 
However, apart from this slight morale boost CS lecturers mentioned nothing else. They 
added what was written in the corporate strategy ‘bore no surprise’ because they had 
‘already witnessed it in reality’ (R_L2_CS), so reading formal strategic documents mostly 
served to confirm their observation. Furthermore, they said what was ‘spoken and done by 
top management’ mattered more to how they perceived Red, and they paid more attention 
to what the dean told them as it ‘was closer and more relevant’ (R_L1_CS). This showed a lack 
of interest in the formal corporate strategy, which if not for accreditation they would not 
have been in a position to know. 
                                                 




5.4.3. The chosen few 
The students in this study, both from BS and CS, were hardly aware of Red’s accreditation and 
unsurprisingly not involved in any accreditation activity. There were, however, two 
exceptions. The first was R_S1_BS, who volunteered to be a recruitment assistant. Her job 
involved helping organise open days and answer prospective students’ enquiries both during 
and outside open days. To this end, she was briefed about Red’s ‘sellling points’ (R_S1_BS) 
and required to memorise them. Some of the selling points she recalled during interview 
were actually part of the 11 internationalisation strategies presented at the start of this 
chapter (5.1), and among them was accreditation. However, the extent of her knowledge was 
the list of accreditations Red had achieved (e.g. AUN-QA). She did not know the details of 
these accreditations or how accreditation rounds were conducted.  
 
The other student was R_S1_CS, who was a member of the Youth Organisation branch in his 
faculty. His exact responsibilities were numerous and varied over time, but under the 
umbrella of (a) organising students’ events, (a) monitoring student societies and (c) 
implementing top management’s student policies at faculty-level. In addition, he sometimes 
assisted CS lecturers with conferences and participated in one-off duties for the faculty. One 
of these one-off duties was to sit for an interview with an accrediting body, thanks to which 
he knew what accreditation was and what role students played in an accreditation round. 
However, he could not remember the name of the accrediting body and did not know the 
procedures that CS had to follow when to attain an award from that body. He said that he 
was ‘just follow[ing] orders’ and was not interested in accreditation because it was not 
relevant to his regular responsibilities in Youth Organisation or his studies. 
 
The two students’ accounts of accreditation, while scant, were of value to this study. On the 
one hand, they indicated that Red students could gain access to strategic information that 
normally was beyond them if they were in certain organisational positions. This ties back to 
R_S4_CS in 5.2.2, who inadvertently overheard institutional matters that were reserved for 
managers when he worked part time as an IT assistant for administrative offices. On the 
other, they further showed that Red students were not concerned with or, for most, aware of 
strategic matters like internationalisation strategies, so what they knew of them 
(accreditation in this case) came from the tasks and experiences brought about by their role 
in the university. 
 
5.5. Chapter conclusion: Non-leaders’ sensemaking, centralisation, social media 
and vantage points 
This chapter has presented the second case study of Red by first detailing its institutional 
profile and 11 internationalisation strategies and them zooming in on three notable 
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strategies, namely EMI, joint programmes and accreditation. This section recaptures the six 
most significant findings of this case study. 
 
First, Red did not have a dedicated internationalisation component strategy. Its 11 
internationalisation strategies were integrated and scattered across the 11 component 
strategies (5.1.2). This is not to be confused with Blue’s approach in which every component 
strategy was an internationalisation strategy. Neither did Red have a clear conceptualisation 
of internationalisation like Blue, and its internationalisation strategies were instead based on 
observations of other universities in Vietnam and abroad. Among the 11 strategies, EMI was 
the most important; in fact, EMI was core to Red’s identity, and the HEI took pride in being 
‘the first Vietnamese university to wholly teach in English’ (R_TM). In fact, Red was very active 
in communicating and branding its international aspects. 
 
Second, even though the participants talked about their own experience at Red, their 
personal accounts illustrated how strategies were managed at the university. Decisions were 
made centrally by top management, particularly the VC, and the role of non-leaders was to 
execute those decisions, so they had little if any say in strategy making. However, the VC was 
also engaged with the frontline by paying attention to what students said on social media. 
By reading, commenting on posts on Red Social and following up with actions, he had 
empowered students to have strategic impact. The best example was the langcen debacle 
(5.2.3), where joint students’ complaints on social media were taken seriously and led to a 
significant change in how the EMI strategy was implemented for them. The role of 
institutional leadership and social media in empowering students was arguably the most 
interesting finding from Red. 
 
Third, despite centralisation and their lack of say in what internationalisation strategies were, 
Red non-leaders were able to shape the outcomes of the strategies in accordance with their 
sensemaking, and in rare cases they might induce strategic adjustments. For example, Red 
lecturers switched to Vietnamese when students showed confusion or in certain 
circumstances like laboratory sessions (R_L1_CS), even though officially it was required all 
teaching be done in English. Indeed, this practice characterised how the EMI strategy was de 
facto realised on the ground, evident by its mention by nearly all Red lecturers and students 
in this study. The language switch emerged out of lecturers’ observation that Red students 
were not competent enough in English for EMI; this is not to mention that, as suggested by 
students, the lecturers’ own English could be poor. Another example is how Red joint 
students’ sensemaking around langcen courses eventually led to the adjustment of the EMI 
strategy, as mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
 
Fourth, Red deans played a rather passive role with regards to internationalisation strategies. 
Their job was simply to keep business as usual and implement decisions from the top. As a 
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result, they felt no necessity to understand any strategies at all or to devise strategic 
initiatives; their focus was instead placed on the daily administrative tasks and occasional 
orders from the top. This did not mean, however, that no sensemaking of internationalisation 
strategies took place. Instead of reading strategic documents, Red deans made sense of 
internationalisation strategies by noticing any information coming their way when fulfilling 
their duties. For example, R_MM_CS made sense of the accreditation strategy via all the work 
to get his faculty accredited by ABET (5.4.1); he had had little if any knowledge of Red’s 
accreditation strategy until then. 
 
Fifth, the accounts of Red lecturers gave the impression of themselves as compliant 
frontliners of the university. However, they were also flexible and could compromise a 
strategy if the situation called for it (5.2.2). They were not concerned with strategic matters or 
involved in strategy making, so their understanding of Red’s internationalisation strategies 
came from the daily, mundane reality of teaching, doing research and the odd one-off 
duties. 
 
Lastly, Red students demonstrated that social media could be used as a tool for strategic 
change and that certain vantage points could provide them with normally inaccessible 
strategic information. On the one hand, the students used the facebook community Red 
Social as a venue for collective sensemaking and communication with the VC, who was a 
frequent reader of Red Social. It was Red Social that enabled the students to effect change at 
the university, a prime example of which was removing langcen courses as a requirement for 
joint students. On the other hand, it was possible for Red students to acquire formal strategic 
information, which was normally inaccessible to them, if they were placed in certain 
positions, such as working part-time with administrative offices or being involved in faculty 
activities (5.2.2, 5.4.3). Nonetheless, these students were few, and they showed little interest 
in the strategic information they had access to. Therefore, their sense of internationalisation 
strategies, as well as that of other Red students, instead came from the tasks and experiences 
of their roles. These tasks and experiences were often as simple as attending lectures and 
paying attention to what was taught, but could tell the students a lot about an 
internationalisation strategy. For instance, one could make sense of the effectiveness of the 





CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The last two chapters have respectively presented the case studies of Blue and Red. More 
specifically, their institutional profiles and internationalisation strategies were detailed, 
followed by empirical findings of how some of these strategies were made sense of by non-
leaders. In the end, the case studies have shown that the outcomes of Blue and Red’s 
internationalisation strategies, sometimes the strategies themselves, were shaped by the 
sensemaking of their deans, lecturers and students. However, it is difficult to discern the 
manner in which sensemaking was done by each non-leader group, which is necessary for 
answering my research question How are university internationalisation strategies made sense 
of by non-leaders? This is understandable since Chapter 4 and 5 focus on presenting 
coherent narratives around Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies and thus place the 
three non-leaders together, blurring the boundaries between them. Nonetheless, the data 
does suggest distinction to the sensemaking of deans, lecturers and students within and 
across cases (e.g. the sensemaking of Blue deans was different from that of Blue lecturers 
and Red deans). For these reasons, it is now necessary to tease out the sensemaking features 
of each non-leader group at Blue and Red. 
 
Drawing on the rich data in Chapter 4 and 5, Chapter 6 will compare how the 
internationalisation strategies of Blue and Red were made sense of by each group of non-
leaders across the two universities. Each section below compiles the accounts of one non-
leader group (deans, lecturers, students) from Blue and Red and lays them side by side so 
that cross-case themes and patterns in the group’s sensemaking may emerge. At the end of 
the chapter, I will highlight key differences between groups. The findings of Chapter 6 will be 
the direct basis for theoretical discussion and answering my research question in Chapter 7. 
This chapter, however, will not repeat in full the data from the previous two but instead sums 
it up in order to avoid needless repetition.  
 
On top of this, Chapter 6 will address in better depth the finding that most participants’ 
sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was embedded within sensemaking of their 
mundane role responsibilities, which was introduced in 4.1.2. In brief, internationalisation was 
rarely a conscious sensemaking subject for deans, lecturers and students from both Blue and 
Red. Instead, their concern was the tasks and experiences associated with their respective 
roles, through which they developed an understanding of any related internationalisation 
strategies. For example, Red students were more concerned with understanding their lectures 
than the EMI strategy, and yet it was through attending lecturers that they discovered EMI 
was beyond the capabilities of some lecturers and peers. While such embeddedness was 
noted in nearly every section of Chapter 4 and 5 (including the chapter conclusions), it will be 
treated with more attention in Chapter 6. To this end, Chapter 6 will pull in additional data 
that highlights (a) how the participants made sense of their roles and (b) how, through role 




With regards to said additional data, there are two points I wish to emphasise. First, this 
additional data only serves to enrich the empirical findings (and thus theoretical discussion 
later on) around the sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. It does not shift my focus 
from sensemaking of internationalisation strategies to sensemaking of role. Indeed, it has 
been a challenge to write about role sensemaking without placing it in the spotlight, but it is 
crucial to tackle this challenge in order to do the data full justice. Second, the new data 
pertains to and fleshes out what has already been reported; it does not introduce any issues 
not mentioned in Chapter 4 and 5. For example, Section 5.2.1 and 5.3.2 reported why Red 
students chose the university for its EMI and joint programmes. This meant that the students 
had already started making sense of Red’s internationalisation strategies before becoming a 
student. Section 6.4.4 of this chapter will add data to explore such early sensemaking.  
 
In brief, Chapter 6 serves a dual purpose: On the one hand, it presents the comparative 
analysis of Blue and Red so that a more useful empirical basis can be formed for discussion. 
On the other hand, it enriches this empirical basis by adding data about the embeddedness 
of internationalisation-strategy sensemaking within role sensemaking.  
 
Chapter 6 contains three sections, each corresponding to one university non-leader group 
from Blue and Red. The chapter starts with deans (6.1), followed by lecturers (6.2) and ends 
with students (6.3). 
 
6.1. Deans 
A comparison of Blue and Red deans’ accounts has revealed three key areas around which 
cross-case themes and patterns have emerged. The first is the impact of decision-making 
power (or lack of) on their internationalisation-strategy sensemaking and on how it is 
embedded in role sensemaking, which will be described in 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. The second is their 
ways of thinking about higher education and management, elaborated in 6.1.3. The third and 
last area is their utilisation of information and actions during sensemaking; this will be 
presented in 6.1.4. 
 
6.1.1. Proactiveness, agency and role 
Put together, the accounts from Blue and Red deans showed an immediate difference: Blue 
deans were markedly more proactive than their Red counterparts in making sense of 
internationalisation strategies, or more accurately all strategies. Both the Blue deans involved 
in this study, B_MM_EC from Economics and Commerce and B_MM_LC from Language and 
Culture, were proactive in making sense of Blue’s corporate strategy and the conditions of 
their faculties (4.3.1, 4.3.5, 4.4.1). B_MM_LC, for one, often ‘went down to lecture halls’ to see 
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if there were any issues and find a way to fix them, sometimes fixing an issue himself. This 
was not to mention his close relations with students as he invited them for lunch so that he 
could listen to what happened at the frontline. By contrast, Red deans leaned towards a more 
passive, reactionary way of sensemaking in which they took in strategic information as it 
appeared to them, rather than seeking it out. This was best evident by the explanation of 
R_MM_CS from Computer Science about how he had developed an understanding of Red’s 
corporate strategy: 
[I understand the corporate strategy] from meetings with the VC; you can 
connect his ideas and figure out the whole, and I think he has a very good 
strategy […] I used to be a lecturers for several years before this post, and just by 
working here I got a sense of how things were […] Through dean duties I have 
formed a better view of the environment here. (5.4.1) 
R_MM1_BS, deputy dean of Business School, had a similar answer, saying that he just needed 
to ‘pay attention to the surroundings’. 
 
On top of this, Blue deans possessed more agency to act upon their understanding of its 
internationalisation strategies. Both deans had their own strategic initiatives: B_MM_EC with 
his three research initiatives (Blue Research Seminar, the new research-lecturer contractual 
scheme and associated performance evaluation, 4.3.1) and the purchase of Turnitin (4.4.1), 
and B_MM_LC with the advocacy students’ club (4.4.1) plus conference trips (4.3.5). By 
contrast, it was very difficult for Red deans to make use of their understanding and devise 
similar initiatives (5.3.1), as expressed by R_MM1_BS and his superior, R_MM2_BS: 
Sometimes we come up with ideas benefitting everyone but possess no power to 
realise them, so we need help from the offices. Most are very helpful, but a few 
are, how to put it, unenthusiastic. Such instances make us reserved, and 
whenever we want to propose something we have to think whom it involves and 
how. (R_MM1_BS) 
We don’t have faculty strategy here. We almost entirely follow the directions of top 
management. (R_MM2_BS) 
 
These differences in sensemaking proactiveness and the agency the deans possessed could 
be attributed to, as R_MM2_BS said above, their organisational roles as a whole. Blue deans 
played more of a driving role in which they were enabled to put forward a strategic initiative 
and implement it, while administration was taken care of by deputy deans. By contrast, Red 
deans played more of a following role in which they were tasked with implementation of 
top-down orders and daily administration. As R_MM1_BS said, this was not to say they did 
not want to have their own initiatives, but when they did they were discouraged by lack of 
decision-making power and resource autonomy. The role difference was explicit in quotes by 
the deans themselves and others: 
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I hire deans to develop the faculties, not 
operate them. Operation is the 
responsibility of deputy deans […] 
B_MM_EC and B_MM_LC perfectly 
understood this. (B_TM) 
Unlike Western universities, our 
governance is central. There is little the 
faculties could decide by themselves 
without consulting the offices and 
getting approved by top management. 
(R_MM_ER) 
Administration is part of my duties, but 
the more important thing is to devise a 
path forward for the faculty. (B_MM_LC) 
We don’t have faculty strategy here. 
We almost entirely follow the 
directions of top management. 
(R_MM2_BS) 
 
6.1.2. Internationalisation-strategy sensemaking and role sensemaking 
The connection of the deans’ roles with their sensemaking proactiveness and agency also 
revealed how their internationalisation-strategy sensemaking was embedded in role 
sensemaking. This role-embeddedness was easily seen in the case of Red deans. As 
administrators and strategy implementers, they were on the receiving ends of tasks already 
well-defined by top management, and therefore their concern was to accomplish these tasks 
without any necessity to know the strategies behind them (R_MM_CS). Indeed, none in this 
study had read or heard of Red’s 11 internationalisation strategies (5.1.2), or the corporate 
strategy. However, they recognised all of the internationalisation strategies that I listed 
during interview, but as ‘existing areas of activity of the faculty’ to manage and oversaw 
rather than ‘a strategy’ (R_MM_CS). These so-called areas of activity became familiar to the 
deans through the daily reality on the job: ‘Just by working here I got a sense of how things 
were’ (ibid.), or more specifically through  
• ‘being guided by the predecessor’ (R_MM_CS) and learning on the job 
• managing internationalisation activities themselves, ‘pay[ing] attention to the 
surroundings [and] interven[ing] in time’ (R_MM1_BS)   
• having meetings with top management where they were discussed. For example, the 
accreditation strategy first caught R_MM_CS’ attention in a strategic meeting that 
discussed the VC’s intent to attain ABET accreditation, which involved CS.  
• teaching and doing research37 
This indicated that sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was embedded within Red 
deans’ sensemaking of their middle management role. Simply put, by focusing on their 
middle management responsibilities, Red deans also gained an understanding of 
internationalisation strategies, albeit in the form of activities rather than formal strategies. 
 
The role-embeddedness, however, was more complex with Blue deans. To begin with, their 
job was less about administration and top-down orders but more about the strategic 
development of their faculties: ‘I hire deans to develop the faculties, not operate them. 
                                                 
37 Deans at Red also had to teach and do research. 
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Operation is the responsibility of deputy deans.’ (B_TM). As strategy drivers, Blue deans 
therefore had to figure out what their role actually meant; that is, which component 
strategy(ies) (4.2.1) could be pushed in their faculties. To this end, they drew on various 
sources of information, including the whole corporate strategy (with particular focus on 
internationalisation strategies, for the purpose of this study), their personal and academic 
background, observation of faculty activities; this is not to mention each had his own beliefs 
of what higher education should be. The result was a role they set for themselves. For 
instance, before his appointment, B_MM_EC read the corporate strategy and had a short 
candidacy period when he ‘work[ed] with full responsibilities of a dean while getting to know 
the faculty’ (B_TM). He observed that while research was a strategic emphasis, it was ‘way 
beyond what the staff were capable of’ (ibid.). In addition, he himself was a strong believer in 
research and had had a professional ‘crisis’ (B_MM_EC) with it early in his career. Thus, the 
dean made it his goal to build research capacity for his staff, and to this end he came up with 
the three initiatives: Blue Research Seminar, the research-lecturer contractual scheme and 
new performance evaluation (5.3.1).  
 
In this way, Blue deans’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was not embedded 
and resulting from sensemaking of role, but overlapped and resulted in the latter. Simply put, 
Blue deans’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking was role sensemaking. Thus, the 
meaning they gave to internationalisation strategies shaped their future responsibilities as 
dean. The only caveat was that they had to choose internationalisation as the strategic area 
to push in their faculties, which was the case with both Blue deans in this study.  
 
Blue deans’ mode of sensemaking was marked by two features, distinct from that of Red 
deans’. First, to re-iterate 6.2.1, they were more proactive than Red deans since they sought 
out information rather than just being on the job and noticing what came their way. The 
second key difference was that while Red deans only recognised internationalisation 
strategies in the form of ‘areas of activity’ (R_MM_CS), Blue deans were formally aware of 
their internationalisation strategies, as well as of Blue’s corporate strategy. However, it should 
be noted that this formal awareness came about partly thanks to the efforts of Blue VC, who 
took care to provide her deans with formal strategic information via documents and 
briefings. Another point to note was Blue deans, like their Red counterparts, also looked to 
the reality on the ground to make sense of internationalisation strategies, in 
supplementation to formal strategic information. For instance, during his candidacy 
B_MM_EC noticed that despite research being written into the corporate strategy, there was 
a lack of research activity and capacity among EC staff. 
 
6.1.3. Beliefs about universities and management 
Another difference between the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of Blue and Red 
deans was their way of thinking about or framing internationalisation strategies (or schema 
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for short, in keeping with sensemaking theory). In the case of Blue deans, sensemaking was 
shaped by their beliefs about what a university should be, so they chose to drive the 
strategies that best reflected this perceived ideal. For B_MM_EC, research was essential to the 
identity of universities and university lecturers, so upon seeing the weak state of research in 
EC he decided his first office term should revolve around promoting research and building 
research capacity for staff (4.3.1). B_MM_LC also considered research important, but his 
priority was academic integrity, hence the establishment of a students’ club that advocated 
for education ethics (4.4.1). Moreover, these beliefs were in turn shaped by their previous 
experiences of higher education outside Vietnam, which they brought back and applied to 
Blue. B_MM_LC himself said his PhD in the US ‘opened [his] eyes to the values of a 
university’. This indicated the possibility of institutional influences at the macro, field level 
being imparted onto Blue deans’ schemas. As shall be seen below, there were strong signs of 
institutional forces, at both meso (organisational) and macro (field, societal) levels, in the way 
the Blue and Red deans, lecturers and students framed internationalisation strategies. This is 
a key issue to be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
By contrast, Red deans’ schemas about internationalisation strategies were, roughly speaking, 
much more practical. They hardly mentioned their beliefs about higher education, but  spoke 
at length about was their way of managing the implementation of internationalisation 
strategies in their faculties:  
Teaching in English is natural for us […] Usually there is nothing to do with it, 
but if on the odd occasion I see feedback about a lecturer speaking too much 
Vietnamese or too bad English, I might have to talk to that person. (R_MM1_BS) 
The first thing I did [with the ABET initiative] was to announce it in our next 
meeting and discuss how to tackle the job […] I got down to work with the 
brothers and sisters. (R_MM_CS) 
They did, however, state their support for Red’s choice of strategies, which they found was 
fitting for a university aspiring to be international like Red. This suggested that as an 
organisation Red had a certain degree of institutional influence over Red deans’ schemas:  
To me EMI is a normal and necessary thing [for us] to become international. 
And it sets up apart from other Vietnamese universities […] benefits students, 
giving them an edge once they graduate. (R_MM1_BS)  
With that said, it can be seen that personal management style, rather than beliefs about 
higher education, was the lens through which Red deans made sense of internationalisation 
strategies. This was rather understandable considering their internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking was embedded in role sensemaking, as demonstrated in the last section. I wish 
to note that Blue deans also framed internationalisation strategies within their management 
style when they tried to implement their own initiatives. For example, B_MM_EC preferred 
informal communication, which he used to convince various stakeholders of his research 
initiatives (4.3.2). He told EC staff stories of his own academic career, the early days of which 
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were marked with a ‘professional crisis’ where he was almost dismissed for lack of research. 
In addition, he had daily chat with another dean sitting across him in the office, during which 
he mentioned what he had done in EC; the latter eventually adopted his new contractual 
scheme and performance evaluation. 
 
As a side note, each dean in this study had a distinct management style:   
• B_MM_EC liked managing in an informal way. He relied on informal communication like 
story telling, small chat to convince other stakeholders of his ideas. He disliked having ‘to 
sit down and read something official’. 
• B_MM_LC stood out for his hands-on style and presence at the frontline. The dean ‘went 
down to lecture halls’ to see if there were any issues and find a way to fix them, 
sometimes fixing an issue himself. He also actively engaged in frontline activities, 
especially those that were part of his initiatives.  
• R_MM1_BS took more of a backseat (possibly because he was a deputy dean). He kept 
business ‘where [it] should be’ and only intervened when something required.   
• R_MM_CS led by example. He would spring first into action to complete his duties as a 
lecturer and dean, which he believed ‘create[d] confidence in leadership and motivation’. 
He also set clear deadlines and upheld them strictly.    
 
6.1.4. Information sources and frontline engagement 
Despite the above differences, there were two common features in Blue and Red deans’ 
sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. The first was the flexible use of various 
sources of information for sensemaking, including those that were external to the universities 
and yet essential to making sense of their internationalisation strategies. This flexibility was 
demonstrated by R_MM_CS when he had to get his faculty accredited by ABET (5.4.1). First 
time handling such a task, the dean decided to learn as much as he can by going to ABET 
workshops and asking his friend in another university, who had experienced ABET, for 
information and feedback on CS’ preparations. When CS’ efforts were suddenly halted by a 
new regulation on degree naming, he drew upon the list of recognised disciplines by the 
Ministry of Education and Training in an attempt to rename CS’ programmes to satisfy both 
said regulation and ABET’s requirements. A minor yet interesting quirk was that Blue and Red 
deans tended to attribute difficulties to extra-organisational facts like low aware of 
plagiarism in Vietnamese education (B_MM_EC, 4.4.2) or ineffective English teaching in 
schools (R_MM_CS, 5.2.2). 
 
Secondly, all of the deans engaged with the frontline and executed their own ideas. 
B_MM_EC himself organised the Blue Research Seminars and taught research methodology 
there, and he conducted and published a small research project with a few members of staff. 
B_MM_LC, by comparison, made a point of managing hands-on, and he was often present in 
activities around campus, especially those that were part of his initiatives. Also a hands-on 
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manager, R_MM_CS alternately attended ABET training workshops with his staff and shared 
what he learned later on during faculty meetings. R_MM1_BS would personally tend to 
students when they had problems requesting a semester off to go on exchange. Blue and 
Red deans gave a few reasons for engaging in frontline activities, such as to generate trust in 
leadership (R_MM_CS) and show staff that they were important and appreciated (B_MM_LC; 
R_MM1_BS). One reason shared by all of them was that the frontline provided the most 
accurate situation report and feedback on their ideas and more generally management style: 
I knew whether research was working 
by looking at participation in Blue 
Research Seminars. Not everyone there 
went on to do research, but I hoped they 
at least learned something. (B_MM_EC) 
I always observe and keep track so that 
I intervene in time if necessary. 
(R_MM1_BS) 
 
I went down to the lecture halls and 
found all sorts of equipment lacking, 
floor uncleaned. I took a broom and 
cleaned it myself […] The campus 
provides the most raw and real picture. 
(B_MM_LC) 
 
You should not be detached from your 
staff. If you work and play with them 
closely you will know their morale, 
difficulties, or if there is problems with 
the computers […] You also see if they 
are with you. (R_MM_CS) 
 
Besides feedback, the frontline could inspire new ideas, especially for strategy drivers. Here 
B_MM_EC and his Turnitin initiative (4.4.1) provide an excellent example because his decision 
to purchase Turnitin was not planned beforehand but rather inspired by a conversation with 
a librarian. He then tried the software in EC and the ensuing success provided feedback for 
him to introduce it to top management for an institution-wide implementation. The approval 
from top management and their decision to promote it to other higher education 
institutions in Vietnam were further feedback that motivated him to negotiate with Turnitin 
to become their country agent. 
 
6.1.5. Summary of deans’ sensemaking  
To sum up, Blue and Red deans had quite different sensemaking patterns depending on their 
role and management style, but there were also some similarities. As strategic drivers, Blue 
deans had to decide on a strategic area to push in their faculties (internationalisation in this 
study) and therefore were more proactive in seeking out information about specific 
strategies, both from briefings and strategic documents provided by top management or 
from observations of their faculties. What they made sense of internationalisation strategies 
then shaped what they would do as dean in the university. Red deans, by contrast, were 
strategic implementers whose role was to implement top-down orders and tend to daily 
administration. They were not concerned with strategic matters, including 
internationalisation, and only recognised them as specific areas of activity they were 
responsible for managing. However, it was through these activities that they developed an 
understanding of any related internationalisation strategies. Therefore, it can be argued that 
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Red deans’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was embedded within 
sensemaking of role, whereas Blue deans’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking was role 
sensemaking itself.  
 
In addition to role, individual management styles and beliefs about universities also shaped 
deans’ view of internationalisation strategies by providing a frame or schema. This schema, 
moreover, could be influenced by institutional forces at the meso or macro levels. 
Nonetheless, the deans were similarly actively engaged in frontline activities to execute their 
own ideas and gather feedback or to find inspirations. 
 
With all that said, the impact of Blue and Red deans’ sensemaking on the internationalisation 
strategies of their universities was clear. All deans heavily relied on their schema, in 
combination with any strategic information and resources available to them, to implement a 
strategy (Red deans) or develop it (Blue deans). Thus, the deans left their own impressions on 
the internationalisation of their universities. Take B_MM_EC and B_MM_LC for example, while 
both chose Blue’s research strategy to develop, the former created a new performance 
evaluation for lecturers, and the latter organised conference trips that doubled as vacation 
for lecturers. The two deans’ decisions stemmed from their schemas: B_MM_EC felt that 
research should be integral to a lecturer’s work and had familiarity with research-based 
performance evaluation in his previous institution. By comparison, B_MM_LC was an avid 
traveller and believed that lecturers must first be exposed to scholarship of their fields before 
learning about research. 
  
6.2. Lecturers 
Unlike deans’, the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of Blue and Red lecturers was 
more similar than not. Comparative analysis has revealed two main areas of similarities, 
within which individual differences might sometimes occur. First, the lecturers’ sensemaking 
of internationalisation strategies was clearly embedded in role sensemaking and therefore 
tied to their daily, mundane work of teaching and research; this will be the focus of Section 
6.2.1. Second, the meaning that Blue and Red lecturers attached to internationalisation 
strategies was shaped by their self interests but constrained by workplace politics and their 
mental image of their respective universities; Section 6.2.2 will look at this area. 
 
6.2.1. Work and internationalisation strategies  
Aggregated accounts from Blue and Red lecturers immediately pointed to a commonality: 
Their sensemaking of internationalisation strategies and indeed all strategic matters was tied 
their daily, mundane work. To start with, institutional strategic matters were not the lecturers’ 
concern, nor did they have much access to strategic information; the only exception was 
R_L2_BS, who was involved in strategy formulation at Red thanks to his seniority. A common 
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explanation given was that they felt no necessity or responsibility to engage with strategic 
matters, with other reasons being lack of authority over them or trust in top management: 
I think the VC’s vision is excellent and 
we all trust her leadership. On our 
side we do the best with teaching and 
research. (B_L1_EC) 
A few years ago I was invited to an 
institution-wide meeting between the 
executive and long-standing staff. 
They wanted input for the new 
corporate strategy […] Red was much 
younger back then, and the VC was 
newly appointed. (R_L2_BS)  
I never care about strategy or long 
term plan or direction. Why should I? 
It isn’t part of my job and I have no 
authority. (B_L3_EC) 
Strategy is a concern for the top. 
They have to decide where everyone 
is heading. We cannot do that. 
(R_L1_CS) 
I’m more engaged with the faculty 
than the university. We meet 
sometimes to discuss faculty matters, 
but not the university’s strategy. 
(B_L2_LC) 
Sometimes people complain about 
certain things like computers 
breaking down, but not many care 
about big things like strategy. 
(R_L2_CS) 
 
Instead, the lecturers were concerned with everyday teaching responsibilities (B_L1_LC), 
publication quotas (R_L4_BS), career development (R_L2_CS) and salary (B_L3_EC), so their 
sensemaking was directed at fulfilling their role within the universities and their own 
aspirations. Yet, thanks to these banal but essential aspects of their work they were able to 
engage in the Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies. For instance, Red lecturers daily 
engaged in its EMI strategy (5.2) when they delivered lectures in English. Each instance of 
engagement (e.g. one lecture) provided Blue and Red lecturers with evidence about relevant 
internationalisation strategies, and over time the evidence accumulated and enabled them to 
notice the patterns in how their universities operated with regards to these strategies. 
Continuing the last example, each lecture showed Red lecturers whether the students could 
learn in English or whether they themselves could comfortably teach in English. Moreover, 
each lecture with a different cohort would let them compare the English competence across 
intakes/cohorts and thus the effectiveness of recruitment each year. Over time, Red lecturers 
could evaluate if the EMI strategy worked or not, even when they did not consciously make 
sense of it – their sensemaking simply revolved around delivering lectures, which was part of 
their roles. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that Blue and Red lecturers’ sensemaking of internationalisation 
strategies was embedded in sensemaking of their roles. This made them remarkably similar 
to Red deans (see 6.1.2 above), who also made sense of internationalisation strategies 
through the mundane, daily reality of their job. One small difference, however, was that the 
lecturers’ understanding of internationalisation strategies emerged in a subtler, more gradual 
way than Red deans’. This was frequently suggested in the data:  
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It’s hard to say when you understand the institution. You just understand it after 
some time. (B_L2_EC) 
You just need to work to have a feel of this university, pick up information here 
and there when having a problem. (R_L3_CS) 
In comparison, Red deans said: 
[I understand the corporate strategy] from meetings with the VC; you can 
connect his ideas and figure out the whole, and I think he has a very good 
strategy […] I used to be a lecturers for several years before this post, and just by 
working here I got a sense of how things were […] Through dean duties I have 
formed a better view of the environment here. (R_MM_CS) 
[I understand the corporate strategy] through documents, meetings, 
announcements by top management […] You just need to pay attention to the 
surroundings […] I always observe and keep track. (R_MM1_BS) 
It can be seen that there were situations (e.g. meetings with the VC) where Red deans 
were made aware of internationalisation strategies. By contrast, Blue and Red 
lecturers did not pay attention to anything beyond their contractual duties (mostly 
teaching), and although strategic information was sometimes relayed to them by 
their deans, these instances were recalled as rare. Furthermore, any strategic 
information they received was probably fragmented; this was best evident by 
R_MM_CS, who said he only relayed information he deemed relevant to the staff or 
transformed this information into specific tasks first and then delegated them to the 
latter. Therefore, Blue and Red lecturers’ understanding of internationalisation 
strategies was almost entirely developed from the tasks and experiences they had on 
a daily basis, making it subtler and more gradual than that of Red deans. 
 
Interestingly, there was a particular opportunity, albeit under-utilised, for Red 
lecturers to gain a much more direct understanding of its internationalisation 
strategies. Many of Red lecturers in this study had been tasked with preparing 
documentations for accreditation bodies, for which they were provided with the 
corporate strategy, faculty-level reports and the curriculum of the programmes in 
their faculties. The lecturers recalled that accreditation was the first time they had 
looked at the corporate strategy and appreciated the opportunity to gain deeper 
insights into Red. A few even felt a morale boost upon seeing the alignment between 
the vision, mission and themselves (e.g. R_L1_CS). With all that said, they had not read 
too much into the corporate strategy and could remember little content apart from 
the vision, mission statement and the component strategy related to the subject-
matter of their reports. For example, R_L2_CS, who wrote about CS’ personnel for the 
ABET accreditation, said she only read the vision, mission and human resources 
strategy (one of the 11 component strategies, see 5.1.1). She added that she could 




6.2.2. Self-interests, institutional image and significant others   
While all Blue and Red lecturers made sense of internationalisation strategies through work, 
each drew upon his/her unique schemas and background knowledge. For instance, B_L1_EC 
held favourable views of her dean’s research initiatives since she considered research her 
passion and key to her academic identity. In contrast, B_L3_EC did not think highly of the 
initiatives because she saw little personal gain from research (refer back to 4.3.3 for her full 
rationale). Like B_L3_EC, B_L2_EC saw little utility in research at Blue, but she heard from an 
acquaintance that research could be made compulsory by the Ministry of Education and 
Training, so she had to do research to a certain extent. At Red, R_L2_CS thought teaching in 
English was inevitable, framing it in terms of a feature of his discipline: ‘Everything in 
computer science is in English.’ R_L1_BS, in comparison, did not cite his discipline (business 
administration) as a reason for using English, but simply said that English was necessary ‘in 
today’s world’. I wish to note that Blue and Red lecturers might frame one 
internationalisation strategy in multiple ways. Continuing the last example, R_L2_CS framed 
EMI not only within his disciplinary knowledge but also Red’s branding: ‘An international 
university must be able to speak English’. 
 
Nonetheless, there appeared to be two themes that ran across the schemas of all the 
lecturers in this study. First, they quite often framed internationalisation strategies within 
their self-interests, in the form of financial gain, promotion or professional development. A 
telling example is B_L1_EC: Although pursuing research out of passion, she acknowledged it 
was the security of her own livelihood that enabled her do so. She also stated that without 
‘carrot’ (incentives) research would always be at the margin of a lecturer’s job. Second, Blue 
and Red lecturers would try to act out their schemas and carry out any given task as they saw 
fit, especially when the task itself lacked formalisation or monitoring. For example, Blue 
lecturers framed Turnitin in terms of personal utility and Blue’s teaching culture, which placed 
heavy emphasis on student feedback. They thus found that being strict about the 20% 
threshold might result in failing a lot of papers and subsequently receiving bad feedback 
from students, which affected pay and promotion. As a consequence, they had to 
compromise the threshold and, in some reported cases, totally disregarded it or even 
removed correct detections by the software (4.4.3). Blue apparently did little to monitor the 
lecturers’ use of Turnitin.  
 
Some of Blue and Red lecturers’ schemas, however, were not utilitarian in nature or resulted 
in such negative outcomes for an internationalisation strategy. First, some schemas could 
enable the lecturers to reconcile a strategy with the situation on the ground, even when this 
meant deviating from the intended outcomes of said strategy. This was shown by Red 
lecturers switching to Vietnamese when their students showed confusion; although this was 
an unintended outcomes of the EMI strategy, it was deemed necessary by the lecturers to 
ensure teaching quality. Second, some schemas also motivated the lecturers to do more than 
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intended for a strategy. This was a unique finding from Blue, specifically from B_L1_EC (4.3.4). 
Her passion for research motivated her to do research independently with external funding, 
and this was even before B_MM_LC’s research initiatives. The initiatives only served to bolster 
her efforts by giving her a platform to bring research into Blue: She quickly applied for the 
new contractual scheme of research-lecturer, participated and presented in Blue Research 
Seminars and created her own research group, which was joined by other lecturers such as 
B_L2_EC. 
 
An interesting finding was that in several instances Blue and Red themselves became a frame 
for the lecturers’ sensemaking. For example, Blue’s ‘teaching culture’ was drawn upon by 
B_L2_EC, B_L3_EC to frame research. More specifically, B_L2_EC and B_L3_EC talked of their 
deans’ research initiatives and research more generally against the background of (a) the 
emphasis on student feedback, (b) the dependence of salary and promotion on teaching, 
and (c) the existing body of staff at Blue who had been recruited to teach and not research. 
At Red, the university’s branding as an international university was very often referred to as 
the background for the internationalisation strategies being discussed: 
A university cannot just call itself international without using English. (R_L2_BS) 
An international university must have links with the outside world. Joint and 
exchange programmes help us create those links. (R_L4_BS) 
Accreditations by international bodies let everyone know that Red is truly of 
international quality. (R_L2_CS)   
Though no explicit explanation was made by Red lecturers, the imprint of Red’s branding on 
their schemas appeared to have resulted from Red’s intensive corporate communication. My 
campus visits and document analysis clearly showed Red was very active in branding itself as 
being international (refer back to 5.1). Even a cursory look at Red’s branding would show the 
consistent presence of the word ‘international’, and indeed the word was in the university’s 
name and logo. The prevalent use of English during branding activities (e.g. the VC greeted 
prospective students in English during the open day) and presence of foreigners (e.g. Red’s 
partner HEIs were all present during the open day) also contributed. With that said, the table 




Table 14. Blue and Red lecturers’ schemas 
Blue Red 
Personal utility, specifically finance and professional 
development. For example, B_L3_EC and research. 
Blue’s teaching culture – i.e. the lecturer judged a 
strategy based on its fit with existing teaching-heavy 
remuneration and promotion structures. For example, 
B_L3_EC found respecting the Turnitin threshold risky 
to her student feedback.  
Passion For example, B_L1_EC and research 
 
Personal utility, specifically finance and professional 
development. For example, R_L3_CS and joint 
programmes (he complained about these 
programmes not benefitting lecturers). 
Educational effectiveness For example, R_L1_CS 
switched to Vietnamese during laboratory sessions. 
Red being international – i.e. the lecturer found the 
strategy a must to justify Red’s claim of being 
international. For example, R_L2_BS said a university 
cannot be international without English. 
Disciplinary feature – i.e. the lecturer found the task 
was a must in his/her field. For example, R_L2_CS said 
EMI was a must in computer science. 
 
Last but not least, Blue and Red lecturers’ sensemaking did not occur in a vacuum but within 
a social context where micro-politics complicated what meaning could be made. This was 
expressed candidly by B_L3_EC (4.4.3) as she explained her approach to marking with 
Turnitin. She did not fail the students whose graduation dissertations crossed the 20% 
plagiarism threshold for fear of (a) their retaliation via student feedback and (b) 
embarrassment to their supervisors followed by animosity. Politics was also mentioned by 
R_MM_CS, although he did not refer to any single internationalisation strategy: ‘When I 
started here as a lecturer, I was ambitious and driven to win. That quickly got me nowhere, 
so I had to learn who’s who and play by the rules.’ Politics was not widely talked about by the 
lecturers in this study, but when it was as in B_L3_EC and R_MM_CS’ accounts, it appeared a 
powerful force that shaped sensemaking.  
 
6.2.3. Summary of lecturers’ sensemaking  
In summary, unlike their deans, Blue and Red lecturers were quite similar in 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking. First, their internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking was deeply embedded within their role sensemaking. The lecturers were not 
concerned with or aware of any strategic matters, even in rare situations when they had to 
write about them (e.g. doing accreditation paperwork). Instead, their attention was centred 
on the mundane, immediate tasks of their job. However, by making sense of exactly these 
tasks the lecturers also developed an understanding of the internationalisation strategies 
that the tasks represented, and this happened subtly and gradually. Second, each lecturer 
had his/her own schemas, so two lecturers could arrive at different meanings for the same 
strategy, but in general Blue and Red lecturers took personal utility into consideration when 
making sense of any strategies. However, their schemas were also influenced by their mental 




Due to its role embeddedness, the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of Blue and Red 
lecturers had subtle but still significant impact on the universities’ internationalisation 
strategies. The data has shown that, by making sense of the mundane, immediate tasks of 
their job, the lecturers created small, concrete outcomes for internationalisation strategies. 
For example, Red lecturers was realising the EMI strategy when preparing a lecture in English. 
Moreover, the lecturers’ sensemaking collectively had the potential to produce common 
ways of accomplishing tasks that could steer a strategy in unintended directions. This 
happened when there was tension between the strategies and the lecturers’ personal 
interests (e.g. Blue lecturers and Turnitin), or between the strategies and the situation on the 
ground (e.g. Red lecturers and EMI). It is also worth noting that sensemaking could lead the 
lecturers to withdrawn from a task altogether (e.g. B_L3_EC withdrew from all research 
activity) or undertake an initiative beyond their responsibilities (e.g. B_L1_EC established a 
research group); such cases, nonetheless, were rare.  
 
6.3. Students 
As was the case with lecturers, Blue and Red students shared a lot of commonalities in their 
sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. First and foremost, students’ 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking was deeply embedded in role sensemaking and 
therefore inseparable from the routine organisational reality of their studies. This reality, 
however, existed not only in the physical but also digital world, where social media was 
extensively used for collective sensemaking. Section 6.3.1 will address the role-
embeddedness and role of social media in Blue and Red’s internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking. Nonetheless, a few students from Red showed that role-embeddedness did 
not necessarily mean they had to rely on the routine tasks and experiences of their studies, 
or social media, to make sense of internationalisation strategies. By chance or intent, these 
students found themselves in special positions that afforded them direct strategic 
information, which gave them a vantage point inaccessible to others; these students will be 
the focus of Section 6.3.2. Regardless of sources of information, all Blue and Red students in 
this study framed internationalisation in a self-interested manner, which will be elaborated in 
6.3.3. Finally, the students showed that they hard started to make sense of Blue and Red’s 
internationalisation strategies even before entering the universities; Section 6.3.4 will detail 
this early start. 
 
6.3.1. Studies, social media and internationalisation strategies  
At first glance, the accounts from Blue and Red students have already revealed their lack of 
interest in internationalisation as strategies: 
What do you mean by strategy? We 
are only students. (B_S3_EC) 
There’s no reason for us to know 
strategy or plan. We only need to 




Thanks to you I know a little bit more 
about Blue. I would never have 
guessed its [corporate strategy] was 
reflected so well in what we did. 
(B_S4_EC, post-interview comment) 
R_S2_CS and I are part of the Youth 
Organisation38. We work closely with 
institutional leaders to organise 
events for students, so sometimes we 
hear about plans. To be honest, I 
don’t think about them much, I just 
follow orders.  (R_S1_CS) 
I think most of us keep to our studies. 
Some protested the board conflict, so 
maybe they cared about Blue’s 
directions. (B_S1_LC) 
I don’t know anything about Red’s 
strategy. This is not a students’ 
matter. (R_S1_IE) 
 
The responses above clearly show that the students felt no necessity in being aware of 
strategic matters, even when they were involved in university-level activities like R_S1_CS. 
Instead, they perceived their role as simply involving going to lectures, passing exams and 
completing their programmes; simply put, studying was the only concern for them. However, 
it was the ordinary lectures and exams, as well as other activities in their programmes, that 
reflected the Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies; for example, every lecture at Red 
reflected its EMI strategy. Therefore, by carrying out tasks in order to progress into their 
programmes, the students were experiencing internationalisation strategies, even though as 
B_S4_EC said above they were unlikely to have realised the connection between the 
mundane and strategic dimensions of the tasks they fulfilled. Each instance of engagement 
(e.g. receiving Turnitin results for a paper, attending a lecture) provided evidence of related 
internationalisation strategies, which accumulated over time and subsequently allowed the 
students to draw an overall picture of those strategies. Take Red students in 4:0 joint 
programmes as an example (R_S1_BS, R_S2_BS, see 5.3.2), each module in their programmes 
and even each lecture informed them about the configurations of their 4:0 programmes and 
in turn the joint programme strategy. They saw that all aspects of their studies were identical 
to those of local students, and the only distinction from the latter appeared in the fourth 
(final) year when 4:0 students had to sit for exams administered by the partner university but 
yet marked by Red lecturers. Moreover, 4:0 students learned that only said exams counted 
towards the level of achievement written on their degrees. This wealth of evidence led them 
to perceive that 4:0 programmes were a glorified and more expensive version of local ones 
and opened in order to finance Red. At the same time, they found little motivation in 
studying because the results of all the modules they took were discounted.  
 
Therefore, it can be said that Blue and Red students’ internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking was embedded in their role-sensemaking and a by-product of the latter. 
Moreover, this sensemaking was done in a very subtle and gradual manner: 
                                                 
38 Refer back to 5.1.3 for a description of Youth Organisation and its relation to the Vietnamese Communist Party. 
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It takes about a year to know your way around. It’s hard to say how I came to 
understand Blue, but you just need to study and observe and listen. (B_S2_EC) 
I just do as people do, like when I first came here I heard about queueing, and I 
saw people queue, so I queued. After one or two years everything became an 
reflex and you just knew the university. (R_S2_CS) 
In this way, there was a remarkable similarity between the students and lecturers in this 
study, in that their sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was deeply embedded 
within role-sensemaking, and meaning emerged subtly and gradually.  
However, three important distinctions between students and lecturers’ sensemaking could 
be found in the data. The first was the extent of their engagement in strategic initiatives. 
Apart from teaching and research, many lecturers in this study had participated in at least 
one strategic initiative like Blue Research Seminar at Blue or ABET accreditation at Red. By 
contrast, only one student (R_S1_CS) was involved in an initiative (5.4.3): He had to sit for an 
interview with an accrediting body that CS applied for (the name of which he could not 
recall, to add). One reason was a reported lack of strategic initiatives for students (B_S3_EC; 
R_S3_CS), but even when there was one like the movement for academic integrity at Blue 
(4.3.1) or an accreditation round at Red (4.4.3), the number of participating students was low: 
There are so many events and extra-curricular activities happening all year 
around. I cannot keep track of them all. I think I have seen events related to 
academic integrity, but I was not part of it, nor was I interested. (B_S4_EC) 
Only a few students were invited for the interview, some in the Youth 
Organisation like myself. (R_S1_CS) 
 
Second, Blue and Red students were further away from managers, particularly deans, in the 
sense that they had fewer opportunities to meet managers in person or to sit in meetings 
with them. This distance, plus the students’ non-participation in strategic initiatives, meant 
that they had even less access to formal strategic information than the lecturers, so their 
understanding of internationalisation strategies heavily depended on the daily, mundane 
tasks and experiences of their studies. Interestingly, there were exceptions as few students in 
Red were in special positions that placed them in direct contact with managers (5.4.3), even 
Red’s Vice-Chancellor (5.2.2). As a result, they had better insights into Red’s strategies 
(including but not necessarily internationalisation); I will come back to this in the next 
section. 
 
The last but definitely not least distinction between the sensemaking of Blue and Red 
students and lecturers, and deans for that matter, was social media use. Like the lecturers, 
the students made sense of internationalisation strategies through experiences in the 
physical world, but unlike the lecturers, they also made sense of the strategies through posts 
and discussions in the digital world. All students in this study used social media, particularly 
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Facebook, on a daily basis and stayed connected with peers and lecturers well beyond the 
lecture hall and academic year. Furthermore, there were Facebook community pages39 for all 
students in each HEI (Blue Confession and Red Social), for students in a faculty, and even for a 
particular cohort or one single module. Most were created and managed by students, but a 
few were by lecturers. These Facebook community pages were major communication and 
information channels for all sorts of matters, especially those essential to fulfilling a student’s 
role like exam schedules: 
We get a lot of information via Facebook. We have pages for our cohort, pages 
for clubs on campus, pages for particular interests. You can find all sorts of stuff, 
like jobs, events, exam schedule. (B_S4_EC) 
If you want to update on current issues, check out Red Social. All the scandals 
are on there. The VC regularly reads and comments on posts […] Yes we have 
pages for Youth Organisation, cohorts and modules. People often post revision 
exercises online. (R_S1_BS) 
As a result, these pages also became venues of sensemaking of internationalisation 
strategies. For example, Blue students complained about Turnitin on Blue Confession:  
I am very frustrated with the software Turnitin. Cannot understand why 
everything is marked plagiarised, why is ‘thank you sincerely’, ‘professional work 
environment’, ‘Blue’ plagiarism? (B_SM) 
While the complaints did not lead to any actions (as far as the interviews indicated), they 
informed students who had yet submitted their papers about the potential inaccurate 
detections they might receive. A more notable example was the langcen debacle in Red 
(5.2.3). The university’s largest Facebook community page, Red Social, became the outlet for 
joint students to vent about the numerous problems of langcen and more importantly 
discussed how to proceed: 
I am very angry, but I have heard that many have been turned away by the 
Academic Affairs Office. I want to ask all of you joints out there if we can band 
up and appeal to the university about langcen? I think because we came 
individually they can easily dismiss us, let’s try doing it together. (R_SM) 
Collective sensemaking led them to file a formal complaint to the VC. This then brought 
about a strategic change, as langcen’s courses were no longer compulsory for joint students. 
It should be re-emphasised here that Red Social only had such impact because the VC 
himself frequented this page and took action based on students’ posts; with particular 
regards to langcen, he commented on two complaint posts and told the poster to contact 
him directly via email. Thus, for Red students social media was not only a sensemaking venue 
but a powerful sensegiving tool. 
 
                                                 
39 Refer back to 3.5.8 for a description of Facebook community pages. 
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6.3.2. Special access to strategic information   
One notable finding from Red was that a few students had special access to formal strategic 
information concerning not only internationalisation but other strategic areas, which was 
normally out of reach for all students. This was due to their special organisation positions 
within the university. One such position was being in programmes or modules where the 
lecturer held a management position. For instance, R_S2_CS and R_S4_CS had to take one 
with the deputy dean of CS, and R_S2_IE studied one module under the VC himself (5.2.2). 
These three students recalled occasionally hearing about institutional matters: ‘I remember in 
a lecture the VC told us about his intentions to build a new campus nearby’ (R_S2_IE). 
Another position was being in the Youth Organisation, as R_S1_CS and R_S2_CS were. Along 
with other Youth Organisation members, R_S1_CS and R_S2_CS worked closely with top 
management to ‘execute new directions and policies’ (R_S2_CS) on student activity; they 
often organised events for exchange students and assisted CS lecturers in holding 
international conferences, and R_S1_CS was once involved in accreditation work. Thanks to 
being in the Youth Organisation, R_S1_CS and R_S2_CS sometimes ‘hear[d] about plans’ 
(R_S1_CS). Yet another position was working as a recruitment assistant. As a recruitment 
assistant, R_S1_BS was required to learn the vision, mission statement and the ‘selling points’ 
of Red, some of which were in fact internationalisation strategies like EMI or accreditation. 
Lastly, any part-time job at Red that would place students in physical proximity with 
managers could also provide them with formal strategic information. For example, R_S3_CS, 
who was an IT assistant for the whole university, usually visited the offices and functional 
departments where he overheard about institutional matters like shortage of staff.   
 
Nonetheless, all the students cited above said they were not interested in strategic matters 
or put any thoughts into them: ‘We work closely with institutional leaders to organise events 
for students, so sometimes we hear about plans. To be honest, I don’t think about them 
much, I just follow orders.’ (R_S1_CS). This pointed back to their perception of their own role 
as unrelated to strategy (6.4.1) and further proved that students heavily relied on the 
mundane tasks and experiences of their studies to make sense of internationalisation 
strategies. 
 
6.3.3. Facile adaptation, fight and flight, and employability 
Blue and Red students’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies depended on not only 
their studies or social media but also their own schemas. Surprisingly, however, little 
variation was found between the students’ schemas, and between the way one student 
framed an internationalisation strategy and the way he/she framed another strategy. The 
data strongly suggested that Blue and Red students always took a passive and adaptive 
frame when making sense of any tasks of their studies, and thus the internationalisation 
strategies those tasks reflected. That is, they framed any given task as a demand that must 
be met and adapted to even when it proved problematic, and therefore they refrained from 
complaining or providing feedback to the universities. For example, many students at Red 
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coped with the modules they could not understand in English by seeking private tutoring in 
Vietnamese. This passive and adaptive schema was attributed, by both Blue and Red 
students, to the Vietnamese school culture:  
We have all been taught to conform in Vietnam. You know, the teacher is 
always right, so we adapt instead of raising our voice. (B_S2_LC) 
Maybe we have been conditioned since childhood that teachers are right and it 
is up to the students to do well. (R_S3_CS) 
Potentially, another antecedent of the students’ passive, adaptive schema was their special 
dependence on the universities. Assuming the students wanted to make progress and 
achieve a degree, it was understandable that they were pressured to observe the regulations 
and procedures laid out by Blue and Red regarding all aspects of their programmes. In 
addition, it would have been extremely costly for them, in both money and time, to change 
university if they had found Blue or Red’s teaching not to their liking, and the more they had 
progressed into their programmes the higher the cost became. This special dependence was 
mentioned by the VC of Blue and one Red student: 
I have always told staff that in order for their children to come here, parents 
have to sacrifice a lot, possibly their whole life savings. We have to remember 
students have a lot to lose and they are listening to our lectures, so we have to 
provide the best education. (B_TM) 
My programme is not exactly what I wanted, but I cannot just change 
everything after three years of study. That would waste too much money, time, 
effort. Perhaps once I get my degree, I will apply for short courses in [his field of 
choice]. (R_S1_CS) 
 
Three forms of adaptation were found in the data. For one, adaptation simply meant 
conforming to any requirements by Blue and Red. For example, Blue students in LC chose 
their second foreign language from the four Blue specified (4.5), or Red students had to get 
used to learning in English, which was novel for them. That said, the fact that many Blue 
students chose Chinese indicated there was more complexity to conformity; I will come back 
to this very shortly in the next paragraph. Second, the students could adapt by developing 
coping mechanisms. Coping was how Red students responded to EMI, as they paid for 
private tutoring in Vietnamese for the modules they had trouble with in English. The third 
form of adaptation was the most interesting, in that the students attempted to conform but 
in a way that compromised rules and regulations. This was best demonstrated by Blue 
students when avoiding detection by Turnitin; instead of proper paraphrasing, they put 
whole chunks of original text in quotation marks, or knowingly plagiarised and then changed 
a few words to keep detection down. Briefly put, the students simultaneously adapted to the 




Regardless of the form of adaptation Blue and Red students engaged in, it appeared that 
they would choose the easiest course of action. This explained why Blue students picked 
Chinese over French for their foreign language requirement, or why Red students paid for 
private Vietnamese tutoring instead of, for example, trying to self-study in English or 
improve their English competence to begin with. Therefore, it can be said that the students 
did not only frame internationalisation strategies as demands that must be adapted to, but 
adaptation had to be done in a facile way. This made the students’ schemas resemble those 
of lecturers in that they were highly self-interested.   
 
Nevertheless, there were situations where adaptation was not possible, and the students had 
to fight or flight. One instance was the English courses at langcen that Red joint students 
were required to take (5.2.3). In this scenario, adaptation was perceived as unacceptable due 
to the myriad of problems that langcen’s courses poses. As a result, they decided to fight this 
aspect of Red’s EMI strategy. Initially, they complained to the Academic Affairs Office, which 
was responsible for handling issues like langcen, but failed to achieve any results; on the 
contrary, they were scolded by officers. They then took to Red Social to share bad 
experiences with both langcen and Academic Affairs Office, as well as to discuss elevating the 
issue to the VC. Because they knew the VC frequented Red Social, it could be said that their 
intention was to inform him and request his actions on langcen. Another instance of 
adaptation being impossible was the language requirement at Blue (4.5.2). There were few 
students who chose not to get a certificate in English and/or a second foreign language, 
thereby forfeiting their degrees, because they had already got a desirable job and no longer 
found necessity in completing their programmes. In other words, they took flight from Blue’s 
language strategy. It should be acknowledged, however, that these students did attempt to 
obtain a language certificate before giving up. The decisions to fight or flight of Blue and Red 
students accentuated the self-interested nature their schemas. 
 
Apart from adaptation, Blue and Red students’ schemas were centred on another concern: 
employability. It can be seen throughout Chapter 4 and 6 that the students often framed a 
given internationalisation strategy according to its employment value. For example, Blue 
students in LC were not motivated to learn a second foreign language because they 
perceived that anything beyond English was not in high demand enough to warrant extra 
effort, more so considering they were already challenged by English (4.5.1). In a similar way, 
Red students chose joint programmes, even the problematic 4:0 ones (5.3.2), because they 
saw that employers in Vietnam preferred a Western degree to a local one. The most striking 
example about employability as a sensemaking frame was the reported drop-outs at Blue, 
who had found desired employment prior to graduation and consequently had little 
motivation to attain a foreign language certificate to complete their programmes (5.5.2). 
Employability was a quite curious type of schemas because it showed Blue and Red students 
were making sense of internationalisation strategies from the perspective of employers. In 




6.3.4. Starting early 
An interesting finding with both Blue and Red students was that they made sense of 
internationalisation strategies even before entering the universities. Months before 
application, the students in this study had sought information about Blue and Red, and other 
prospective universities for that matter. They did so via various means, including open days, 
exhibitions, seminars, acquaintances and social media. Indeed, a cursory browse of Blue 
Confession and Red Social yielded many posts by prospective students asking for 
information. The range of enquiry topics was extensive, pertaining to what they valued in a 
university education like teaching, extra-curricular, culture, and of course internationalisation 
was also among the topics: 
I want to apply to Blue next year as it is one of the best universities for 
tourism and hospitality. I heard that final year students can go on 
internships abroad. Can we stay and work afterwards? (B_SM)   
As you know there are two joint programmes in my faculty, each with a 
different partner institution. I looked up their ranking online and the choice was 
clear, [British institution name] was much better. I don’t know why people 
would choose the other. (R_S2_CS on how she chose her joint programme) 
 
This preliminary sensemaking provided the students with expectations of 
internationalisation strategies, which then had an impact on post-enrolment 
sensemaking. This was best evident by Red students. For example, when R_S2_BS saw 
Red’s advertisement that it was the first ‘Vietnamese public university to wholly use 
English’, she expected English to be used for all communication, within and outside 
the lecture, and this expectation was in fact shared by a few others like R_S3_BS and 
R_S1_IE (5.2.1). Post-enrolment, however, she discovered this was not true and 
English was used for teaching only. Nonetheless, she decided to speak English to 
some of her friends, among whom was R_S4_BS, because she wanted to practice the 
language. Despite unfavourable reaction from peers, she kept speaking English on 
campus and only stopped when she encountered a critical incident:   
Friends looked at us as if we had been crazy, but I didn’t care. One day we were 
outside a lift, and there was this lecturer who happened to go by; he heard us 
speaking in English and teased us, something like ‘What are you speaking 
English for?’. I felt embarrassed and upset and stopped speaking English outside 
lectures. (R_S2_BS) 
In another instance, when applying for one of Red’s 4:0 programmes, R_S1_BS and 
R_S2_BS had expected their programmes to be different from local ones (5.3.2). 
However, their experiences post-enrolment were to the contrary because they had to 
share the same modules, lectures and assessment with local students. The only 
difference was that they had to sit for exams administered by the partner university in 
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their last year. Furthermore, the results of these exams were the sole basis to 
determine the level of achievement they would graduate with, thus rendering the 
results of all their modules obsolete apart from proving eligibility for said exams. This 
violation of expectations was not received well by the 4:0 students, who found ‘no 
motivation in doing [their] best’ and remarked that it was ‘unfair for those who did’ 
(R_S2_BS).  
 
Blue and Red students’ pre-entry sensemaking problematised the role-
embeddedness of their internationalisation-strategy for two compounding reasons. 
First, pre-entry sensemaking happened when the students were yet to have a role in 
their future universities, so it cannot be said that pre-entry sensemaking was 
embedded in role sensemaking. On the contrary, pre-entry sensemaking actually 
shaped the students’ role later on. As shown above, it created expectations that led 
to certain behaviours and attitudes once the students had become enrolled – in other 
words, when they had a role in Blue and Red.  
 
While no explicit explanation was found in the data, it seemed the reason Blue and Red  
students engaged in substantial pre-entry sensemaking was the great stakes they had in 
their then future universities. Were they to make a mistake in choosing a suitable university, 
it would then be extremely costly in terms of money and time to change institution, and the 
cost would only increase the more progress they made into their programmes: 
I have always told staff that in order for their children to come here, parents 
have to sacrifice a lot, possibly their whole life savings. We have to remember 
students have a lot to lose and they are listening to our lectures, so we have to 
provide the best education. (B_TM) 
My programme is not exactly what I wanted, but I cannot just change 
everything after three years of study. That would waste too much money, time, 
effort. Perhaps once I get my degree, I will apply for short courses in [his field of 
choice]. (R_S1_CS) 
 
All this is not to say the lecturers and deans in this study had not done their 
homework prior to entering their universities. However, their pre-entry sensemaking 
was much more limited. With the exception of B_MM_EC, none of the lecturers or 
deans sought and/or had as much exposure to their universities as the students did, 
and what they knew was confined to job advertisements (e.g. B_L3_EC) and 
recommendations from acquaintances (e.g. R_L3_CS). Once again the data offered no 
clear explanation, but it seemed the lecturers and deans did not have as much stakes 
in their universities. For example, R_MM1_BS said that many lecturers in his faculty 
moonlighted (holding a part-time job) in the evening by teaching short courses in 




6.3.5. Summary of students’ sensemaking  
In summary, Blue and Red students’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies was 
clearly embedded within their role sensemaking. The students were not at all interested in 
strategic matters, and this included the few who happened to have access to formal strategic 
information. Instead, Blue and Red students focused on the tasks and experiences of their 
own studies, through which they were able to make sense of any internationalisation 
strategies those tasks and experiences reflected. Meaning then emerged gradually and 
subtly, even more so than was the case for the lecturers because the students had fewer 
opportunities to talk to managers or be involved in strategic initiatives; therefore, the 
students’ sensemaking almost completely depended on the daily, mundane tasks and 
experiences of their studies. Seldom, the students might be in special positions, such as the 
Youth Organisation, that afforded them access to strategic information; however, even then 
they had little interest in internationalisation as a strategic matter.  
 
The physical world was not the only place for sensemaking. One special finding with Blue 
and Red students was the prevalent use of social media as a venue for making sense of all 
aspects of their studies, including internationalisation. In Red, social media was also a tool for 
strategic change, thanks to the VC paying attention to it and more generally his focus on 
student satisfaction. 
 
All the students in this study approached internationalisation strategies with the same facile 
adaptation schema, which suggested that they were highly self-interested. Depending on the 
strategy and the students’ capability, adaptation could come in three forms, namely 
conformity, coping or compromise. Where adaptation was not possible, Blue and Red 
students could decide to fight and demand change to the strategy, or take flight from doing 
what the strategy required, even if this meant forfeiting their degrees. Another major 
element of the students’ schemas was employability, which was shaped by the institutional 
forces of the labour market. 
 
Last but not least, Blue and Red students started making sense of internationalisation 
strategies even before enrolling in the universities, because as highschool students they had 
to make a decision on where to study for their undergraduate. This pre-entry sensemaking 
generated expectations of the strategies, which had an impact on the students’ attitude and 
behaviour towards the strategies post-enrolment. Pre-entry sensemaking problematised the 
role-embeddedness of students’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking, because at this 
early stage the students had yet had a role in Blue or Red, and on the contrary, any meaning 




It can be seen that Blue and Red students’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking was 
characterised by features that set it apart from deans’ and lecturers’, namely social media use 
and pre-entry sensemaking. Accordingly, its impact on internationalisation strategies were 
special in some respects. First, the use of social media enhanced the students’ enactment of 
internationalisation strategies by providing a venue for them to collectively make sense of 
their studies, which might involve internationalisation elements. In rare circumstances, 
collective sensemaking on social media might even effect change, as was the case with 
langcen at Red. Second, the impact of Blue and Red students’ sensemaking on the 
universities’ internationalisation strategies was present prior to enrolment. This was because 
the students’ pre-entry sensemaking generated expectations of the strategies, which then 
primed their behaviour towards them.  
 
Nevertheless, the most defining feature of Blue and Red students’ internationalisation-
strategy sensemaking was its marked role-embeddedness. Therefore, most of the time its 
impact was subtle and could be found in the very mundane, routine tasks of the students’ 
studies. For example, Blue students helped realised the university’ multi-lingualism by 
making sense of which foreign language to undertake in addition to English. These 
outcomes, moreover, were mostly made in a way that fit the students’ facile adaptation 
schema, and over time such sensemaking might result in a common practice that shaped a 
strategy in unintended ways. For example, many Blue students chose Chinese as the second 
foreign language as it was the easiest to be certified in, which could render Blue’s intended 
multi-lingualism ineffective by reducing linguistic diversity.  
 
6.4. Chapter conclusion: Raw materials prepared 
Drawing on the data presented in Chapter 4 and 5, this chapter has compared the two case 
studies of Blue and Red to uncover the themes and patters in the internationalisation-
strategy sensemaking of each group of university non-leaders (deans, lecturers and 
students). Additional data has also been pulled in to flesh out existing data, with a view to 
providing more details about the groups (e.g. students’ use of social media). All this has 
helped reveal key sensemaking themes of each group and highlight the role-embeddedness 
of their sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, with few caveats (e.g. students’ pre-
entry sensemaking). More importantly, this chapter has prepared the empirical basis for 
discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
This concluding section will not summarise the sensemaking themes of deans, lecturers and 
students because it would take up too much space (please refer back to 6.1.5, 6.2.3 and 
6.3.5). What this section will do instead is to highlight four key differences between the three 




First, the role-embeddedness of internationalisation-strategy sensemaking can be 
problematised in certain circumstances. For most of the deans, lecturers and students in this 
study, they did not focus on internationalisation strategies as the subject of sensemaking, 
and their attention was instead directed at the tasks and experiences that were immediate to 
their respective roles (e.g. administration for Red deans, teaching and student feedback for 
Blue lecturers). Yet, it was through these that the participants developed an understanding of 
any related internationalisation strategies. The caveats emerged, however, from the accounts 
of Blue deans’ sensemaking and the students’ pre-entry sensemaking. These instances of 
sensemaking were not embedded in role sensemaking (6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.3.5). On the contrary, 
they helped shaped the one’s role. 
 
Second, be it role-embedded or non-role embedded sensemaking, deans, lecturers and 
students demonstrated significant differences in access to information, at both group and 
individual level. One example of group-level difference was between lecturers and students: 
Both had their internationalisation-strategy sensemaking deeply role-embedded, but the 
former occasionally gained access to strategic information via faculty meetings where 
announcements of institutional decisions were made, while the latter did not (6.3.1). An 
example of individial difference was how a few Red students possessed strategic information 
normally beyond students’ reach, thanks to their special organisational positions such as 
part-time work with administrative offices (6.3.2). 
 
Third, there were also clear distinctions between the schemas of each non-leader group. The 
deans framed internationalisation strategies in their beliefs about universities and/or 
management style. The lecturers, in comparison, made sense of internationalisation 
strategies against the background of their own personal interests, understanding of their 
universities and disciplinary features. Lastly, the students framed internationalisation 
strategies as demands that they had to adapt to, albeit in the most facile way possible; they 
also framed the strategies in terms of how much their employability could be enhanced. In 
addition, there were strong indications of institutional infuences at the meso (organisational) 
and macro (field, societal) in non-leaders’ schemas. 
 
Fourth, unique features were found in the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of each 
non-leader group. Blue and Red deans engaged heavily at the frontline to execute their own 
ideas and gather feedback; the frontline might even inspire new ideas. The lecturers’ 
sensemaking were unique for its political dimension, in that their relations with colleagues 
affected their view of internationalisation strategies. The students stood out for substantially 
making sense of internationalisation strategies before enrolment and use of social media as 




Finally, despite differences in sensemaking patterns, the non-leaders at Blue and Red showed 
that their sensemaking played a clear role in shaping the outcomes of internationalisation 
strategies and, in some cases, the strategies themselves. Differences in the non-leaders’ 
sensemaking, however, were meaningful with regards to what kind of impact each group had 




CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This chapter discusses the key issues of university non-leaders’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies which emerged from the comparative analyses in Chapter 6. In 
keeping with my focus on the praxis aspect of Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) research (refer back 
to 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3), the issues to be discussed revolve around the process and activity of 
sensemaking itself, more than the sensemaker or the tools and norms they employ – in SAP 
terms, practitioners and practices. This does not mean, however, that there is no discussion of 
practitioners or practices, because the sensemaking process cannot be understood without, 
at the very least, being contextualised with who is doing the sensemaking and what practices 
are used. Indeed, this study has shown that the characteristics of a practitioner, particularly 
organisational role, does affect sensemaking. Likewise, sensemaking practices cannot be 
discounted, like deans’ communication style and students’ use of social media. Thus, this 
chapter will also discuss sensemaking practitioners and practices precisely in order to 
comprehensively illuminate sensemaking praxis and also to do the data full justice.  
 
The issues will be discussed inductively. First, they will be framed and described using both 
cross-case themes and the theoretical building blocks afforded by sensemaking theory, 
including trigger, schema, cues and enactment, as detailed in Chapter 2 (see 2.2.3.1 to 2.2.3.7). 
Afterwards, relevant sensemaking literature will be drawn upon, especially the two 
substantial reviews by Maitlis and Christianson (2014) and Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015), in 
order to demonstrate the positioning of my findings in relation to previous research. 
References will also be made to the broader management and organisation studies literature 
where appropriate. 
 
Based on the issues discussed, I will draw the answer to the research question How are 
university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? and also look at the 
relevance of university non-leaders’ sensemaking to the strategic management of 
internationalisation. 
  
This chapter will then present how the framing of my research question and the findings 
have contributed to scholarship on higher education internationalisation, SAP and 
sensemaking. More specifically, an argument will first be made for the value of studying 
higher education internationalisation from the perspective of strategic management, 
specifically SAP, with sensemaking theory as the theoretical lens. Afterwards, I will talk about 
how this study has furthered the SAP movement in strategic management thanks to a 
combination of sensemaking theory and under-researched organisational members, 
especially frontliners (lecturers, students in this case). Lastly, an outline of the many 




There are two sections in this chapter. The first (7.1) builds up the answer to my research 
question by discussing the sensemaking of internationalisation strategies by university non-
leaders (deans, lecturers, students). The second (7.2) looks at the contributions to theory of 
this study.  
 
7.1. University non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies 
This discussion chapter now starts with how university internationalisation strategies are 
made sense of by non-leaders, which is central to answering the research question. More 
specifically, three areas of sensemaking issues will be explored with in this section. The first 
consists of issues that run across all three university non-leader groups studied (deans, 
lecturers and students), but manifest differently in each. These intergroup issues include role-
embedded sensemaking (7.1.1), cues sources and access (7.1.2), and schemas (7.1.3). While 
the issues are distinct in their own rights, they are all related to, if not stem from the features 
of each group’s organisational role. For instance, deans have much more access to sources of 
strategic information than students, because as part of their role they often have to receive 
and relay such information from top management to staff. Therefore, a discussion of 
intergroup issues must also examine the role features of deans, lecturers and students. As 
shall be seen later, such examination reveals two role archetypes, one of which can be further 
divided into two sub-types.  
 
The second area for discussion consists of issues that are specific to one university non-
leader group (7.1.4). They are communication and frontline engagement for deans (7.1.4.1), 
the political dimension of sensemaking for lecturers (7.1.4.2), and lastly for students, social 
media (7.1.4.3). One finding specific to students – the early start of their sensemaking, will be 
included in 7.1.1 because it is highly relevant to that section. Along with the intergroup 
issues above, these group-specific ones bring out the uniqueness in how each group makes 
sense of an internationalisation strategy and in turn explain why and how one group’s 
sensemaking is different from that of the next. 
 
The third area is the empowering role of university leaders, specifically top management, in 
non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies (7.1.5). Despite the focus of this 
study on the latter, the data shows that university leaders cannot be discounted, because 
they may involve non-leaders in strategic decision-making and thus provide them with great 
agency to make sense of internationalisation strategies and enact their meaning.  
 
With all key issues discussed, I will present the emerging answer to my research question in 
7.1.6 and then examine the relevance of university non-leaders’ sensemaking to the strategic 
management of internationalisation in 7.1.7. A table will also be provided in 7.1.6 to 
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summarise the theoretical findings from 7.1.1 to 7.1.5 and illustrate the similarities and 
differences in the internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of university non-leaders.  
 
7.1.1. Intergroup issue 1: Role-embedded sensemaking 
The central finding of this study, on both empirical and theoretical levels, is that in almost all 
cases non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies is embedded in 
sensemaking of the tasks and experiences of their role. To re-iterate previous three empirical 
chapters, the majority of deans, lecturers and students are hardly if ever concerned about 
how their university internationalises. Instead, their focus is directed at the immediate and 
mundane tasks they have to fulfil as part of their roles, plus any experiences that their roles 
bring. As a result, all sensemaking efforts are channelled into role-related matters. For 
example, a rank and file lecturer at Red would not be interested in how the EMI strategy was 
implemented, such as the English courses that aimed to help students learn academic 
modules in English. What this lecturer would be much more concerned about was making 
him/herself understood during lectures or marking assignments and giving feedback in 
English. Yet, exactly by making sense of the immediate and mundane reality of their roles, 
non-leaders come to understand the internationalisation strategies of the university. This is 
because some of the very tasks and experiences of their roles do contain internationalisation 
elements and therefore reflect, in part or full, relevant internationalisation strategies. 
Continuing the last example, every lecture at Red reflected its EMI strategy, so the lecturers 
could make sense of how well EMI was implemented (e.g. how articulate their students were) 
and whether there were problems with the strategy.  
 
In this way, the central and most notable finding about non-leaders’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies is its embeddedness in role sensemaking. That said, it is 
necessary to further unpack this role-embeddedness delineate its two constituent 
characteristics: implicitness and mundanity. As shall be seen shortly, these characteristics 
pose ontological challenges to current sensemaking research, which has always 
conceptualised sensemaking as an explicit process that only takes place during episodes of 
great uncertainty (Weick, 1995; Balogun & Johnson, 2005). 
 
On top of this, it is worth examining situations where internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking is not embedded in role sensemaking, which can also be of theoretical value. 
This will be discussed much further down. 
 
7.1.1.1. The implicit and mundane nature of role-embedded sensemaking 
Being embedded in role sensemaking means that internationalisation-strategy sensemaking 
is, first and foremost, implicit. As stated above, non-leaders’ lack of interest in 
internationalisation strategies does not mean a lack of sensemaking, but that 
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internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is embedded in role sensemaking. This study has 
found that, during role sensemaking, university non-leaders pay attention to cues that are 
essential to a task or experience at hand, but at the same time cues about the 
internationalisation strategy reflected in said task or experience are still taken in, interpreted 
and even at times remembered in exact details. This was evident by the participants’ vivid 
accounts about Blue and Red’s internationalisation strategies, reported in Chapter 4 and 5, 
even though they explicitly stated their lack of interest in them. It can be strongly argued, 
therefore, that the gathering and interpretation of cues about internationalisation strategies 
do not happen with intent or even consciously, but rather in an implicit manner. For example, 
Blue lecturers only paid attention to Turnitin usage as it was required during marking; 
however, they could still implicitly make sense of why the Turnitin initiative failed by noticing 
students’ low awareness of plagiarism and academic writing capability, or their own 
compromise due to dependence on student feedback and workplace politics. Even when no 
role sensemaking is necessary, internationalisation-strategy still implicitly occurs. One 
excellent example was how no sensemaking of joint programmes was necessary for Red 
lecturers, and yet the they could implicitly observe that joint programmes did very little to 
help Red improve its teaching due to lack of communication from the partner institutions 
about the quality of students transferring over and lack of joint teaching activity. With all that 
said, perhaps the best evidence for the implicitness of role-embedded internationalisation-
strategy sensemaking was the participants’ own description of it: 
Just by working here I got a sense of how things were […] Through dean duties I 
have formed a better view of the environment here. (R_MM_CS) 
It’s hard to say when you understand the university. You just understand it after 
some time. (B_L2_EC) 
It takes about a year to know your way around. It’s hard to say how I came to 
understand Blue, but you just need to study and observe and listen. (B_S2_EC) 
I have always had inklings about the stuff you asked, but never said it out like 
now. (R_L3_CS)  
 
The present finding about implicit sensemaking stands in great contrast to prior 
sensemaking research. Since Weick’s (1995) seminal work, sensemaking has been very often 
if not always conceptualised as explicit; that is, the sensemaker is conscious of what he/she is 
making sense of and the sensemaking process occurs with intent. This is likely because the 
subject of sensemaking is tangible, concrete and can be perceived with ease, and the trigger 
is strong and draws immediate attention. For example, Christianson et al. (2009) studied the 
collapse of a museum’s roof, or Dunbar and Garud (2009) looked at the shedding of foam 
during space shuttles’ flight. Even less critical sensemaking subjects in previous research are 
still clearly tangible, such as shifts in the industry (Ravasi & Schultz, 2006) or the restructuring 
of a firm (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). By contrast, the sensemaking subject in this study – 
internationalisation strategies are more intangible and abstract, because they are not an 
incident, person or object, but rather long-term plans and patterns (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & 
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Lampel, 2008) that are embedded in the tasks and experiences of one’s role. 
Internationalisation strategies are especially intangible for university non-leaders, who lack 
access to strategic information and have little motivation to gain it. Furthermore, the trigger 
for sensemaking is often subtle and might not command any attention, as it can be as simple 
as an internationalisation-related incident during the daily flow of tasks and experiences of a 
non-leader’s role. For example, Blue students’ sensemaking of Turnitin and plagiarism was 
triggered when they were first told they had to submit papers to Turnitin. I wish to note here 
that because internationalisation strategies are embedded in many tasks and experiences 
over time (e.g. Red’s EMI strategy was reflected in every lecture), there can be no single, one-
off trigger for the sensemaking of one strategy. Take Red’s EMI strategy as an example, every 
new lecturer, or more precisely listening to every new lecturer could be a trigger for students 
to make sense of how well EMI was done. I will come back to this issue of multiple triggers 
when discussing the second characteristic of embedded sensemaking – its mundane roots.  
 
With that said, the implicitness being discussed is important because it means that, as long 
as the sensemaking subject in embedded in the sensemaker’s role, he/she does not 
necessarily have to be conscious of the subject in order to make sense of it. Yet, it is this 
implicitness and the resulting tacit understanding of the organisation that guides behaviours, 
which in turn produce tangible, concrete outcome (intended or not) for any given strategies. 
For example, Red students’ implicit sensemaking of EMI informed them that they could 
switch to Vietnamese and expect a Vietnamese response from lecturers. Language switch 
was in fact a common practice at Red, and this was not the intended outcome of its EMI 
strategy.  
 
The second consequence of being role-embedded is that internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking is strongly tied to the mundane, routine organisational reality surrounding 
non-leaders. From the moment they enter the university to their departure, non-leaders are 
progressively faced with new and ambiguous tasks which they have to make sense of and 
which, for the purpose of this study, contain internationalisation elements. More importantly, 
although some of the tasks appear during episodes of great uncertainty, like when the dean 
of Red’s Computer Science (R_MM_CS) had to get the faculty accredited by ABET, most of 
them emerge from the mundane, routine organisational reality of the university. For 
example, apart from the ABET initiative, R_MM_CS became familiar with Red’s 
internationalisation strategies through daily administrative work. At Blue, students in 
Language and Culture had to naturally make sense of the language strategy and Turnitin 
during their studies, specifically towards fourth/final year when they were required to submit 
two foreign language certificates and have their papers scanned by Turnitin. Nevertheless, 
the best example for the mundanity in internationalisation-strategy sensemaking came from 
Red lecturers. Every new academic year they had to teach a new cohort and probably take on 
new modules or update existing ones. This presented them with new challenges and thus 
ambiguities to make sense of, but also enabled them to (implicitly) track the evolution of the 
EMI strategy because they could, say, assess if later cohorts were more comfortable learning 
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in English. R_S3_BS, in particular, noticed that over his seven years at Red the English 
competence of students ‘got better and better’.  
 
Findings about the mundane are yet another point of contrast with extant sensemaking 
research, in which the mundane is almost always side-lined in favour of episodes of great 
uncertainty as the settings for sensemaking. These episodes can be, as listed earlier, the 
collapse of a museum’s roof and ensuing reaction (Christianson et al., 2009) or the 
restructuring of a firm (Balogun & Johnson, 2005). In their extensive review, Maitlis and 
Christianson (2014) identify three types of such episodes, namely environmental jolts and 
organisational crises, threats to individual and organisational identity, and planned change 
intervention. All three episodes present the sensemaker with sharp disruptions to the status 
quo and demand their urgent response. In such situation, the moment of triggering is 
dramatic, and subsequent sensemaking is intensive until an episode is resolved. This study, 
by contrast, does not look at sensemaking of any particular episodes but rather of a strategic 
area of a university – internationalisation and from the particular perspective of non-leaders. 
It has found that in order to accomplish this sensemaking, non-leaders do rely on disruptive 
episodes (e.g. the ABET initiative at Red) but much more so on the mundane and routine 
tasks and experiences of their roles like operating the faculty, delivering a lecture or 
attending one. This is perhaps unsurprising because internationalisation strategies, both in 
the form of plans and activity patterns (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 2008), permeate and 
are reflected in the many tasks and experiences that non-leaders face on a day to day basis, 
which can be safely assumed to be greater in numbers than disruptive episodes in most 
organisations (it would be hard to imagine a university operating by disruptive episodes, 
compared to, e.g. a squad of soldiers in a warzone). It follows that the mundane does not 
trigger sensemaking in dramatic ways or lead to intensive, temporally delineated 
sensemaking. Instead, the trigger is subtle, as discussed earlier, and sensemaking happens 
perpetually as long as the sensemaker faces ambiguity with regards to a certain 
internationalisation strategy when fulfilling his/her non-leader role. For example, Blue 
lecturers in Economics and Commerce, especially those who wanted to do research, 
perpetually made sense of the state of research through tasks and experiences that research 
was embedded in, like performance evaluation, pay rise and promotion, research activities 
(e.g. Blue Research Seminar). Moreover, there can be no single trigger for sensemaking of an 
internationalisation strategy but multiple triggers, each attached to one task or experience 
that reflects said strategy. Continuing the last example, EC lecturers’ sensemaking of research 
was triggered by faculty meetings where B_MM_EC reminded them of the importance or 
research, annual performance evaluations or by Blue Research Seminars. Another example 
was that studying under every new lecturer could trigger Red students’ sensemaking of how 
well EMI was done and whether language switch was necessary with said lecturer.  
 
All this begs the question why university non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation 
strategies is of value when most of it is about the mundane and consequently the status quo, 
rather than disruptions. While disruptive episodes (e.g. the langcen debacle and ABET 
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initiative at Red) are undoubtedly useful for non-leaders to understand and function in the 
university, I would contend, as in Chapter 2, that the mundane should not be discounted as a 
setting and subject for sensemaking. First, ambiguities exist not only in disruptive episodes 
but also the mundane and routine. For example, it was ambiguous for Blue lecturers in EC 
whether research was worth pursuing and how to do it, and this ambiguity existed in and 
had to be made sense of through routine activities like Blue Research Seminars, registering 
for modules (of which the lecture schedule clashed with Blue Research Seminars), annual 
performance evaluation (that heavily favoured teaching), calculating pay (that would have 
been lost due to time spent on research instead of teaching). Second, while these 
ambiguities will not instantly make or break an organisation like those in a crisis, they must 
nonetheless be successfully made sense of in order for the university as an organisation, as 
well as individual non-leaders, to function. For example, if joint programme students at Red 
had not made sense of the requirements and procedure for transfer at any time during the 
home stage, all of the joint programmes would have been paralysed, because the students 
themselves would have missed the transfer. Third, sensemaking of the mundane and routine 
might provide a basis for sensemaking of disruptive episodes. Once instance of this was 
when Red joint students elevated the langcen issue to the VC to demand change, thus 
creating a disruptive episode. To achieve their goal, they referred to any understanding they 
had previously gathered from routinely attending langcen courses and dealing with langcen 
staff and the Academic Affairs Office. Another instance was when Red lecturers in CS used 
their knowledge of the faculty, gained from their day to day job, to write reports for ABET. 
For the above three reasons, it is rather unfortunate that the mundane has been a gap in 
existing sensemaking research, especially considering sensemaking of the mundane can 
inform that of disruptive episodes. Interestingly, the need to investigate the mundane was 
identified very early on by Gioia and Mehra (1996) in their review of Weick’s (1995) book and 
recently by Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015), but it seems very little has been done to address 
it. 
 
7.1.1.2. Non-role embedded sensemaking 
Nevertheless, this study has found two particular situations where non-leaders’ 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is not embedded in role sensemaking. One is 
when newly-recruited deans define their own roles, which involves analysing the university’s 
strategies, including internationalisation. The key notion here is ‘role definition’ because 
these deans are not just any deans but those who are recruited with no specific role except 
to take their faculties forward strategically, in alignment with the university’s corporate 
strategy. Briefly put, they can be called strategy drivers. Both Blue deans in this study were 
strategy drivers; in fact, as said by Blue VC herself, all deans at Blue were recruited or 
appointed to ‘develop faculties, not operate them [since] operation [was] the responsibility 
of deputy deans’. Therefore, the first thing that strategy-driver deans do and are enabled to 
is to make sense of the university’s component strategies and the conditions of their 
faculties in order to choose an appropriate strategy to drive and devise ways to accomplish 
this. The outcome of this sensemaking is none other than the role strategy-driver deans set 
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for themselves, mostly in the form of strategic initiatives to push the strategy they have 
chosen. For example, the dean of Blue’s EC (B_MM_EC) dedicated his first term to pushing 
research in the faculty, upon seeing that research was a component strategy and yet little 
research activity was found (to add, his personal belief in research should not be discounted). 
It can thus be argued that for these deans, internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is role 
sensemaking rather than being embedded in the latter. 
 
The other situation of non-role embedded sensemaking is when prospective students make 
sense of internationalisation strategies in order to make an application for entrance onto a 
programme. One special finding about students is that they start making sense of the HEI’s 
internationalisation strategies (as well as other strategies) when they have to decide where to 
apply for university. This is significant as it means that students’ internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking begins before they have a role in the university, so there is no role-associated 
tasks or experiences through which internationalisation strategies are understood. Indeed, 
this study has found that at this stage students ask explicit and direct questions about 
internationalisation strategies. For Blue and Red students, these questions included 
internship opportunities abroad, the difficulty of learning in English, joint programme tuition 
fee, the ranking of partner institutions. Perhaps more importantly, students’ pre-entry 
sensemaking of any strategies creates expectations that shape their post-entry behaviour 
and sensemaking of the same strategies. This was best exemplified by R_S2_BS, who 
misinterpreted Red’s advertisement of EMI as English being used not only for teaching but all 
communication (interestingly, to add, she was not the only student to think so). Although 
she discovered the mistake once enrolled, she still spoke English to her friends outside 
lectures as she believed Red was the appropriate place to do so. In this way, it can be argued 
that students’ pre-entry sensemaking is role defining in nature due to the behaviour and 
attitude-priming effects of the expectations it creates. Even without the expectations, the 
argument that pre-entry sensemaking is role defining might still stand for the simple reason 
that pre-entry sensemaking determines which programmes of the university students apply 
for and therefore their future place in the organisation.  
 
The above findings problematise and enrich the present discussion on role-embeddedness 
by demonstrating that not all non-leaders make sense of internationalisation strategies in a 
role-embedded manner, but their mode of sensemaking (role-embedded or non-role 
embedded) depends on the specific roles they have. This link will be explored in the next 
section.  
 
The findings about non-role embedded sensemaking also point to another theoretical issue 
in sensemaking research: sensemaking about the future. A common characteristic of 
strategic-driver deans and prospective students’ sensemaking of internationalisation 
strategies is its future orientation, which has been a point of debate in the sensemaking 
literature. The classic work of Weick (1995) conceptualises sensemaking as retrospective; that 
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is, sensemaking is only feasible if the subject of sensemaking has happened, or in the 
author’s own words: ‘How can I know what I think until I see what I say?’ (p.18). This 
emphasis on retrospection means that sensemaking about the future is done in future 
perfect tense, where the sensemaker imagines a future state and then makes sense of that 
hypothetical future as if he/she arrived at it (Gioia, Corley, & Fabbri, 2002; Gioia, 2006). More 
recent research, however, critiques this idea and argues that sensemaking of the future is 
prospective rather than retrospective (MacKay 2009; Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, 2010; Stigliani 
& Ravasi, 2012; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015); many of these authors question whether 
retrospective future sensemaking is possible under circumstances of great complexity and 
ambiguity or when the sensemaker’s own ‘expectations [and] aspirations about the future in 
unclear’ (Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012, p. 35). I would argue further that if future sensemaking is 
indeed retrospective, how can the sensemaker create the hypothetical desired future state to 
begin with (in enough detail, to add), if not through some form of prospective sensemaking? 
That said, proponents of prospective future sensemaking acknowledge that it has to be 
based on prior, retrospective sensemaking about the past and present (Gephart, Topal, & 
Zhang, 2010; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012). 
My study appears to support the prospective view, although the data is not conclusive. 
When defining what they would do to drive Blue’s internationalisation strategies, Blue deans 
were not envisioning a clear future state, from which meaning could be generated 
retrospectively. While there was no explicit evidence for this, the deans’ recollection of how 
they came up with initiatives strongly suggested so, for example: ‘There is too much 
plagiarism in Vietnam, but we do not have a tool to stop it. I was looking for a software to 
scan plagiarised texts.’ (B_MM_EC remembering his purchase of Turnitin). It can be seen that 
they started with a preliminary idea and desire and then acted upon it, without a clear future 
state in mind, and that this prospective sensemaking was based on assessment of the past 
and present (e.g. plagiarism in Vietnam and the lack of an anti-plagiarism tool at Blue). 
Similar prospection was found with Blue and Red students’ pre-entry sensemaking of the 
universities’ internationalisation strategies. The understanding they gained from, for example, 
open days and social media (i.e. retrospective sensemaking of past and present) helped them 
make the application decision and also created expectations of the tasks and experiences 
they would face post-entry. For example, several Red students expected English to be used 
both in and outside the lecture. It is difficult to describe these expectations as a future state 
that the students could look backwards from. Moreover, the students’ accounts of why and 
how they applied for Blue and Red made no mention of any future state they imagined 
themselves to be in post-entry, nor were they detailed enough to suggest its existence. 
 
7.1.1.3. Role archetypes and mode of sensemaking 
So far this chapter has discussed the two modes of non-leaders’ internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking, namely role-embedded and non-role embedded. However, it is not enough to 
examine the modes by themselves but against the formal role that each non-leader group is 
assigned with. Chapter 6 has shown that which mode a non-leader group engage in is 
dependent on the features of its assigned role; moreover, if one is to talk about role-
189 
 
embedded sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, there should be mention of the 
role through which university non-leaders experience internationalisation strategies. A 
discussion of the link between non-leaders’ roles and the two modes is therefore necessary 
in order to explore which mode is associated with which group and why. 
 
An examination of aggregated role features of all the deans, lecturers and students in this 
study reveals that they fall into two role archetypes: strategy driver and strategy recipient, 
which also correspond to their modes of internationalisation-strategy sensemaking. Strategy 
drivers, exemplified by Blue deans, are characterised by  
• agency and authority to act upon the university’s strategies via strategic initiatives (e.g. 
Blue Research Seminar) that might even alter existing structures (e.g. research-lecturer 
contractual scheme, Turnitin) 
• lack of task specificity. On the contrary, they have to devise their own tasks so as to drive 
strategies.  
In this study, only deans are found to be strategy drivers. These deans engage in the non-
role embedded mode when they make sense of internationalisation strategies, because they 
need to have an explicit understanding of them in order to define their role.  
 
By contrast, all other participants can be categorised as strategy recipients. These non-
leaders are the opposite of strategy in the sense that they have 
• little if any agency or authority to act upon the university’s strategies. It is very difficult 
for them to create strategic initiatives even if they want to (R_MM1_BS). 
• high task specificity. They are on the receiving end of tasks already well-defined by 
another party, such as top management or a programme coordinator (in the case of 
deans and students, respectively). These tasks can be implementation of a strategic 
initiative (deans) or simply daily administration (deans), marking (lecturers), attending 
lectures (students), all of which reflect certain strategies of the university. 
Strategy recipients therefore have little interest in strategic matters. Instead, their concern 
and thus sensemaking efforts are directed at the tasks they are specified to do. This means 
that role-embedded sensemaking is the default mode for strategy recipients’ sensemaking of 
internationalisation strategies.  
 
Strategy recipients can be further divided into two sub-types: strategy implementers, 
exemplified by Red deans, and strategy followers, exemplified by all Blue and Red lecturers 
and students. The difference between them is decision-making power. Strategy 
implementers, who in this study are only deans, directly receive strategy from top 
management in the form of strategic initiatives to execute (e.g. the ABET initiative at Red) or 
‘areas of activity’ (R_MM_CS) to manage or oversee. Although unable to decide what the 
initiatives and areas of activity are, they have control over what should be done about them, 
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including downward communication to strategy followers and setting specific tasks for the 
latter. Strategy followers, as the name suggests, follow orders and carry out said tasks to fulfil 
their role and at the same time realise strategies. They have the least decision power of all 
non-leader groups in this study, since all of their tasks are specified beforehand with little 
space for individual design. However, this study has found that strategy followers can induce 
strategic change (e.g. Red students and the langcen debacle) and thus alter the tasks, but this 
requires strong support from top management (see also 7.1.5). With all that said, both 
strategy implementers and followers in a university make sense of internationalisation 
strategies in a role-embedded manner since they are, in the end, strategy recipients. 
However, the present sub-division is necessary because there are nuances in their 
sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, especially with regards to cues and schemas, 
but this will be discussed later on in 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 respectively. 
 
Prospective students deserve special mention because they do not have a role and yet 
actively make sense of the university’s internationalisation strategies. This finding is 
significant in that non-leaders do not have to already be a member of the university to make 
sense of it, as long as they (a) have a stake in it and therefore motivation to make sense, and 
(b) in some ways will act upon the meaning made and alter the organisation (e.g. make an 
application) later on. My literature review did not yield any studies dealing with this kind of 
pre-organisation sensemakers and their prospective sensemaking, but my data is neither 
substantial enough to examine them indepth. Nonetheless, the data shows that these 
sensemakers do exist and are eventually impactful to the organisation. The present finding 
resonates with Sandberg and Tsoukas’ (2015) call for exploration of what they term second-
order sensemaking, which is sensemaking done by extra-organisational sensemakers, 
particularly ‘public inquiry reports’ (p. 23) into how intra-organisational sensemakers have 
made sense of a past crisis.  
 
Interestingly, moreover, the data shows that students conduct more pre-entry sensemaking 
than deans and lecturers. In fact, only after discovering students’ considerable pre-entry 
sensemaking did I go over deans and lecturers’ accounts to find similar sensemaking, which 
did come up (it would have been improbable for them to apply for a job blind) but the 
details were scant. One instance found was that B_L3_EC saw Blue’s ad on an employment 
website, which she found professional, and sent her application right after. A plausible 
explanation implied by the data is that students have much more stakes in their future 
university compared to deans and lecturers, so they are more inclined to engage in pre-entry 
sensemaking.  
 
As a whole, middle managers like deans and frontliners like lecturers and students are not 
novel to sensemaking research (although frontliners are for SAP and strategic management 
research, where this study is also positioned, but this will be discussed later in 7.2). However, 
previous sensemaking researchers have tended to investigate each group in isolation rather 
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than juxtaposing them. For example, Prior et al. (2018) study the sensemaking of ‘frontline 
employee’ (p. 79) in complex procurements, and Balogun and Johnson (2005) study changes 
in middle managers’ schemas over a restructuring initiative. While these studies generate 
great insights into the sensemaking of each group, they clearly do not show how and why 
one group’s sensemaking is different from another’s. It is also difficult to conduct cross-study 
analysis in order to tease out intergroup differences, because each study looks at a unique 
sensemaking subject (e.g. a procurement deal versus firm restructuring) in a unique 
organisation, not to mention the authors’ varied application of sensemaking theory.  
 
It is thus extremely difficult to relate my study to existing sensemaking research even in a 
contrasting manner as done in 7.1.1.1, because my study simultaneously examines the 
sensemaking of middle managers (deans) and two groups of frontliners (lecturers and 
students) about a single subject (internationalisation strategies). That said, it is clear from the 
data that university non-leader groups have distinct modes of sensemaking (role-embedded 
or non-role embedded) when making sense of their university’s internationalisation 
strategies, and that each mode is strongly tied to one of the two role archetypes: strategy 
driver and strategy recipient. As shall be seen below, the two modes of sensemaking are only 
one intergroup difference; Section 7.1.2 to 7.1.5 will examine other differences.  
 
7.1.1.4. Answering the research question: The first step 
Up to this point the discussion has provided an initial answer to my research question How 
are university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? In brief, 
internationalisation strategies can be made sense in two different modes: role-embedded 
and non-role embedded, which respectively correspond to the two formal roles that 
university non-leaders can be assigned with: strategy recipient and strategy driver. When 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is embedded in role sensemaking, it occurs 
implicitly and in the context of the mundane, routine organisational reality that non-leaders 
experience when fulfilling their roles. When it is not, it can take on a role-defining and 
prospective nature.  
 
7.1.2. Intergroup issue 2: Cue sources and access  
While role-embeddedness is my central finding about how university internationalisation 
strategies are made sense of by non-leaders, the data shows complexities and nuances 
beyond whether non-leaders’ sensemaking is role-embedded or non-role embedded. This 
section and the next (7.1.3) will discuss two such complexities, starting with cues (Weick, 
1995; Maitlis, 2005) or more precisely the sources which non-leaders extract cues from.  
 
The data shows that cues are not extracted from an indistinct, singular environment as often 
described by sensemaking scholars (Weick, 1995; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), but from 
192 
 
distinct sources that are characterised by the type of cues or information they provide. In this 
way, the sources that one sensemaker can uniquely access will differentiate his/her 
sensemaking from another’s. This section will discuss two cue sources that university non-
leaders utilise to make sense of internationalisation strategies, and how non-leaders’ 
different roles grant them varying access to these sources.  
 
7.1.2.1. Sources of cues 
Each non-leader group in this study had access to distinct sources of cues, which 
unsurprisingly provided them with different cues about internationalisation strategies. For 
instance, Blue deans possessed strategic documents and were formally aware of what Blue 
internationalisation strategies were. Blue lecturers and students, in comparison, were 
knowledgeable of how the strategies were actually done at the frontline thanks to the daily, 
mundane lectures or extra-curricular activities they participated in. The cues sources found in 
the data are numerous, but when aggregated they reveal a categorical pattern according to 
the content of the cues they provide:  
• One type of sources provides cues about internationalisation strategies themselves, e.g. 
strategic documents, announcement of a strategic initiative. Henceforth this will be called 
source-strat. 
• Another provides cues about the realisation or manifestation of the strategies in tasks 
and experiences, e.g. a lecture, a programme, interaction with other university members 
(non-leaders and leaders alike). The second source will be called source-tne (short form 
for tasks and experiences). 
• The last type provides cues about matters that are unrelated to the strategies but 
beneficial to making sense of them, e.g. personal connections, scholarship in one’s own 
discipline, national law. The last source will now be called source-other. 
Apart from content, these types of cue sources differ in purpose. The data shows that 
source-strat and source-tne are central to making sense of internationalisation strategies, 
whereas source-other is brought in for justification or rationalisation of the success or failure 
of the strategies. For instance, the limited success of Turnitin at Blue was attributed to low 
awareness of plagiarism among Vietnamese students and lecturers. In certain situations, 
however, source-other can be greatly conducive to internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking, such as when R_MM_CS was able to make progress with the ABET initiative 
thanks to his personal contact in another university, which had attained ABET. That said, 
there is not enough data to discuss when source-other can be of such usefulness, but it is 
seemingly so when it involves personal connections to knowledgeable others, as was the 
case for R_MM_CS and also B_MM_EC, who invited his friend (also a renown academic) to 
present at one Blue Research Seminar. Therefore, this section will mostly focus on source-




A closer look at source-strat and source-tne reveals differences not only in content but also 
in their location and how cues can be extracted from them. Source-strat is more likely to be 
found in management spaces (e.g. deans’ office, meeting room) and cues are extracted by 
cognitive, discursive means (e.g. reading and discussing a document). By contrast, source-tne 
is common at the frontline where the university’s strategies are transformed into concrete 
activities, and the cues are more experienced and lived than thought or talked of. This 
distinction has important implications. First, in order to comprehensively make sense of 
internationalisation strategies, a non-leader must either be present in both management 
spaces and at the frontline, or be provided with cues that he/she lacks. However, the 
provision of missing cues can be problematic for source-tne. Because cues from it are mostly 
gathered in an experiential manner, they cannot be easily provided as-is to another person 
but have to be first transformed into narratives, and since their experiencing is likely to vary 
among individuals, there can be many narratives of the same source-tne cues (see also 
Weick, 2005 about distributed sensemaking). The second implication, therefore, is that any 
recipients of source-tne might need to gather and synthesise multiple narratives to 
approximate as accurately as possible the original cues. This was exactly what B_MM_LC did 
when he hosted weekly lunches with students to catch up on the frontline of his faculty. 
Having access to both source-strat and source-tne has indeed been found to help strategy 
drivers like B_MM_LC. For example, his colleague B_MM_EC decided to pursue research for 
his first term after seeing the lack of research and research capacity among staff (source-tne) 
despite research being a component strategy (source-strat). B_MM_LC himself attached great 
value to source-tne and made a point of staying close to the frontline where he could 
discover issues and fix them.  
 
With source-strat and source-tne established, it is now necessary to examine their access by 
non-leaders in various formal roles to understand how, apart from modes of sensemaking, 
different university non-leader groups made sense of the same strategy differently.   
 
7.1.2.2. Role archetypes and access to cue sources 
The access to source-strat and source-tne is dependent on which role archetypes and sub-
types non-leaders are assigned with in the university (refer back to 7.1.1.3 for role 
descriptions). It follows that one cue source is also more associated with either role-
embedded or non-role embedded mode of sensemaking.  
 
To start with, the data shows source-strat is best accessed by strategy drivers, followed by 
strategy implementers. Strategy drivers need and are granted access to source-strat so that 
they can choose which internationalisation strategies to drive and at the same time define 
what they will do in the university. Strategy implementers, by comparison, do not find 
source-strat necessary because their tasks are already well-defined and therefore are their 
primary concern, but they have access to source-strat anyway in the form of strategic 
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meetings with top management, which is part of the role. More importantly, the data 
suggests that the source-strat accessed by strategy implementers is significantly more ad-
hoc than that by strategy drivers. B_MM_EC and B_MM_LC, both being strategy drivers, were 
carefully briefed about and/or provided with Blue’s corporate strategy before they started 
their post. By contrast, the source-strat of R_MM1_BS and R_MM_CS was mainly meetings 
with Red top management, and each meeting often addressed only one internationalisation 
strategy or even one aspect of a strategy (e.g. a meeting may focus on opening joint 
programmes with a new partner institution). It was thus up to Red deans to link the ad-hoc 
information they had gained to establish whole strategies, as said by R_MM_CS: ‘You can 
connect [the VC’s] ideas and figure out the whole [strategy]’. As a consequence, the resulting 
strategic knowledge of Red deans was unlikely to be as comprehensive as that of Blue deans. 
Lastly, source-strat can be accessed by strategy followers, but this requires them to be in 
special organisational positions that afford them access. For example, one student in Red 
(R_S2_IE) studied under the VC and heard his plans for a new campus, or two others 
(R_S1_CS; R_S2_CS) were members of the Youth Organisation and thus worked closely with 
top management, from whom they gained strategic information. Alternatively, strategy 
followers can access source-strat when assigned special tasks that involves formal knowledge 
of internationalisation strategies. This was evident by Red lecturers in CS when they had to 
write reports for ABET. To fulfil this task they needed to analyse CS’ teaching, research and 
operations in relation to Red’s corporate strategy, which they were provided with. That said, 
the data indicates strategy followers do not pay attention to cues from source-strat, 
perceiving them as unnecessary.  
 
Given the strongest link with strategy drivers, source-strat corresponds to the non-role 
embedded mode of internationalisation-strategy sensemaking. It enables non-leaders to 
make sense of internationalisation strategies explicitly and in their own rights, rather than 
implicitly through tasks and experiences.   
 
Source-tne is best accessed by strategy followers, followed by strategy implementers and 
drivers. Stationed at the frontline, strategy followers are constantly gathering cues about 
internationalisation strategies through internationalisation-related tasks and experiences. 
Though not at the frontline, strategy implementers similarly relied on cues extracted from 
the tasks and experiences that deal with internationalisation, which in their case consist of 
daily administration and the occasional strategic initiatives (e.g. the ABET initiative). As to 
strategy drivers, they need source-tne to supplement source-strat during role definition; that 
is, they need to grasp how internationalisation strategies are being realised on the ground in 
order to devise appropriate initiatives. Source-tne is also necessary when they implement 
their own initiatives as it provides feedback on their ideas and more generally management 
style: ‘The campus provides the most raw and real picture.’ (B_MM_LC). The way strategy 
drivers access source-tne, however, is not the same as strategy followers or implementers: It 
tends to be second-hand. The data shows strategy drivers often have to rely on managerial 
observation or accounts from strategy followers, who have first-hand access to source-tne, 
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because it would be difficult if not impossible for strategy drivers to be at the frontline all the 
time and experientially gather cues from it. This is especially so at the beginning of their 
post, when strategy drivers are yet able to engage substantially with the frontline. For 
example, B_MM_LC could not experience what he called ‘rampant’ plagiarism but only 
observed it, simply because he was not a student writing a paper or lecturer marking one. In 
a similar way, B_MM_EC did not have first-hand information of Turnitin making contact with 
Blue to offer a trial, but instead was told about the offer by a librarian. Strategy drivers can 
better access first-hand source-tne when carrying out their own initiatives (e.g. B_MM_EC 
organised and ran Blue Research Seminars himself). Even then, I would argue that they might 
still need source-tne from strategy followers’ perspective to see how the latter receive the 
initiatives. For example, B_MM_EC did not receive any feedback about Turnitin until I told 
him my findings in a member-checking interview. He could have possibly adjusted the 
implementation of Turnitin by, say, making sure the library focused more on plagiarism 
instead of just Turnitin usage. 
 
It can be seen that source-tne corresponds more to the role-embedded mode of 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking, most often found with strategy followers. This 
type of cue source does not let non-leaders make sense of internationalisation strategies 
themselves, but it shows how the strategies are realised and reflected in the daily, mundane 
tasks and experiences at the frontline. 
 
The idea that there can be multiple types of cues and cue sources has been examined, albeit 
implicitly, in several studies about the practices for conducting sensemaking and 
sensegiving, from which it can be inferred that cues can physically exist as language 
(Nicholson & Anderson, 2005; Sonenshein, 2010; Cornelissen, 2012), sociomateriality (Kaplan, 
2011; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012) or physio-psychological stimulation (Cunliffe & Coupland, 
2012; Liu & Maitlis, 2014). A close reading, however reveals very little discussion related to 
cues beyond their physical nature. For example, while it can be inferred from Sonenshein’s 
study (2010) that cues exist as language, specifically managerial narratives, the author does 
not discuss why certain cues were included or excluded in these narratives. In my literature 
survey, there are only two sensemaking studies with an explicit focus on cues: One is by 
Gacasan et al. (2016) (see also Gacasan & Wiggins, 2017), which looks at construction project 
managers’ use of cues during critical incidents. The researchers found three types of cues, 
including feedback, context cues and tacit knowledge. The other study is by Svensson and 
Hallgren (2018), who examined Swedish emergency call operators’ reaction to verbal and 
non-verbal cues. Their findings reveal that incongruence between verbal and non-verbal 
cues lead the operators to pay more attention to the latter. It is therefore very interesting to 
see that, though a core concept (Weick, 1995), cues have rarely been a focus for analysis by 
sensemaking scholars. Most of the time, cues are compressed and reduced to being an 
indistinct, singular ingredient taken from an indistinct, singular environment for meaning 
making. A good example is Balogun’s study on middle management’s sensemaking of 
strategic change (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Rouleau & Balogun, 2011). A lot of cues and cue 
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sources can be teased out from their findings and actually fit my classification of source-strat 
and source-tne; these are, to name a few, communication exercises like videos, vision 
workshops (source-strat), being placed in new positions and working for longer hours 
(source-tne), experiencing ‘defense of turf’ during daily work (one cue from source-tne). 
However, no analysis is provided by the authors themselves of the cues or cue sources, such 
as why videos were chosen as a source or how middle managers gathered cues during the 
change.  
 
Like Gacasan et al. (2016) and Svensson and Hallgren (2018), my study has treated cues in 
more depth than previous research. My findings demonstrate that cues are not readily taken 
from an indistinct, singular ‘environment’ as often found in extant sensemaking writings (e.g. 
Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 67). On the contrary, they come from different sources, which 
can at least be distinguished based on the content they provide about the subject of 
sensemaking (e.g. internationalisation strategies) or on the location of origin. More 
importantly, it is such distinction that enables an examination of how non-leader groups 
each access and utilise cue sources, which has the potential to explain differences in the 
conduct of sensemaking and the resulting meanings across groups of university non-leaders.    
 
The above discussion about cue sources and access also expands my findings about 
intergroup sensemaking differences, introduced in 7.1.1.3, by adding access to cue sources 
as another role-based differentiating element (besides modes of sensemaking) between the 
sensemaking of university non-leaders.   
 
7.1.2.3. Answering the research question: The second step 
The discussion around cue sources and access has greatly helped develop the answer to my 
research question. It demonstrates that university internationalisation strategies are made 
sense of not only in two different modes: role-embedded and non-role embedded, but also 
with two types of cue sources: source-strat and source-tne. Source-strat, like strategic 
meetings, provides cues about internationalisation strategies themselves and can be found in 
management spaces. Cues are extracted from source-strat in a cognitive and discursive 
manner (e.g. reading, discussing). In comparison, source-tne, like a lecture, provides cues 
about the realisation or manifestation of the strategies in tasks and experiences and is 
common at the frontline. Cues are extracted from source-tne experientially; in other words, 
the sensemaker experiences internationalisation rather than reading about it. 
 
7.1.3. Intergroup issue 3: Schemas 
The third and last intergroup sensemaking issue is schemas, or cognitive frames (Labianca, 
Gray, & Brass, 2000; Bingham & Kahl, 2013). The data shows that each of non-leaders’ role 
archetypes and sub-types is associated with a kind of framing of internationalisation 
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strategies. For instance, strategy drivers frame the strategies within their beliefs about what 
universities should be; this was evident by B_MM_EC, who believed that research was 
essential to the identity of a university and thus chose research as the component strategy to 
drive in EC. This schema is not present in any other roles. In addition, it has been found that 
(a) there are meso and macro-level institutional influences in the content of non-leaders’ 
schemas, and (b) schemas can predict how strategy followers will act in general and by 
extension what outcomes they create for a strategy. This section will focus on university non-
leaders’ schemas, in relation with role archetypes, institutions and enactment trajectory.  
 
7.1.3.1. Role archetypes and schema 
Despite individual differences, university non-leaders in each role archetype and sub-type 
appear to share a unique theme in the content of their schemas. Strategy drivers make sense 
of internationalisation strategies according to their own prescription about universities. For 
example, B_MM_EC considered research the core of any universities, while B_MM_LC greatly 
cared about academic integrity, particularly the fight against the plagiarism ‘disease’. In 
comparison, strategy implementers’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies, or more 
accurately of the administrative tasks and occasional initiatives that reflect the strategies 
(role-embedded sensemaking), is framed by their beliefs about the best approach to 
managing these tasks and initiatives. For instance, R_MM_CS made a point of leading by 
example; he would spring first into action and engage in the very tasks and initiatives he had 
to manage (e.g. he attended ABET workshops like everyone else). Lastly, the schemas of 
strategy followers are very diverse, but most of them have a utilitarian nature. Both Blue and 
Red lecturers perceived internationalisation-related tasks and experiences (role-embedded 
sensemaking) in terms of financial, professional or personal gain. The students, on the other 
hand, always tried to find the most facile way to complete their tasks. 
 
Nonetheless, the data offers no clear explanation for these role-schema associations (the 
links are clearer between roles, modes of sensemaking and cues). It can only be inferred, 
through examining the features of each role archetype and sub-type, that non-leaders utilise 
the above schemas because they best assist them in fulfilling their roles. Take strategy 
drivers as an example, the strategic agency and low task specificity of their role mean they 
are faced with great ambiguity, especially at the start of their post when they have to decide 
on which component strategy to drive in their faculties. The logical first step for strategy 
drivers then is to make sense of the university’s corporate strategy and component 
strategies, and this entails processing a large amount of cues from numerous sources, both 
source-strat and source-tne. Therefore, they need a schema that can help them assess which 
cues and in turn which strategies should be focused on, and because they are driving 
strategies for a university, it can be strongly argued that the schema content has to enable 
them to assess which strategies are most necessary for universities and not other 
organisations. This problem, understandably, touches on strategy drivers’ beliefs about what 




The utilitarian schemas of strategy followers, in particular, appear to echo the principal-agent 
problem (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 2006). Strategy followers can be considered 
agents of internationalisation strategies, whose interests (in this study) are not exactly 
aligned with those of the principals of the strategies (top management and strategy driver 
deans). According to the principal-agent problem, strategy followers will be more likely than 
not to act in their interests, which creates deviant or null outcomes for the strategic intents 
of top management and strategy driver deans. Thus, the principals can combat this problem 
by installing incentivising (Yang, 1991) or deterrent mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1989b), both of 
which were notably missing with the strategic initiatives at Blue. Indeed, B_L1_EC figuratively 
said that without ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ no lecturers would want to do research, while B_L3_EC 
complained: ‘Do I get an award for [observing the 20% threshold] or intense animosity and 
retaliation against my supervisees?’. 
 
The role-based variation in schema content among groups once again expands my findings 
about intergroup sensemaking differences (7.1.1.3) by adding schema as a differentiating 
factor between university non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies.  
  
7.1.3.2. Institutions and schema content 
One notable finding of this study is the clear presence of institutions in the content of 
university non-leaders’ schemas. Here institutions are understood as the ‘material practices’ 
and ‘cultural symbols [like] assumptions, values, beliefs’ (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 
2012, p. 2) that shape how individuals and organisations make meaning and act (i.e. 
sensemaking). Most of the participants were more or less affected by such practices and 
symbols. For example, B_MM_LC’s beliefs about what universities should be were influenced 
by his exposure to American universities during his PhD: ‘My programme opened my eyes to 
the values of a university’. Elsewhere, every Red lecturer found EMI a must for Red to claim 
itself an international university, because the English language is ‘the international language’; 
in addition, those in Computer Science cited that English is the language of their field. Lastly, 
nearly all students attributed their adaptation schemas to prior schooling, where they had 
been taught to conform, and some Red students considered employers’ bias towards 
Western degrees a motivation to pursue a joint programme, even one involving no time 
abroad or teaching by the partner institution. These instances show that the schema content 
is not only tied to non-leaders’ role archetypes and sub-types, but also shaped by 
institutions at the meso (organisational) and macro (extra-organisational, field, societal) 
levels. As can be seen from the aforementioned examples, strategy drivers’ framing of 
universities can be shaped by institutional forces relating to the ideal university, in this case 
modelled after a well-known system (e.g. American universities). Strategy followers’ schemas 
can be shaped by societal expectations of their behaviours (e.g. students must conform), the 
labour market (e.g. a Western degree is better) or the features of their professional field (e.g. 
English is the language of computer science), or by the image of the organisation they are 
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members of (e.g. Red must have a certain strategy because of its claim of being 
international).  
 
Beyond the existence of institutions in university non-leaders’ schemas, the data does not 
say much about the mechanisms for these influences to become ingrained. There are only 
three mechanisms evidenced, but without much substance: One is students’ prior schooling, 
which was cited by almost all Blue and Red students as the origin of their adaptation 
schemas: ‘We have all been taught to conform in Vietnam. You know, the teacher is always 
right’ (B_S2_LC). The other is remuneration and promotion structure, mentioned by Blue 
lecturers in Economics and Commerce when describing the ‘teaching culture’ at Blue 
(B_L2_EC); this culture was their frame for making sense of research (they paid attention to 
the lack of incentives for research) and Turnitin (they were concerned with receiving bad 
student feedback, which would affect pay and promotion, for failing a paper crossing the 
20% Turnitin threshold). The last one is corporate communication. Red was very active in 
communicating and branding its international elements (5.1.2), and this international brand 
was often referred to by Red lecturers as the background and reason of being for certain 
internationalisation strategies.  
 
In a conceptual paper, Weber and Glynn (2006) propose that institutions have three effects 
on sensemaking: priming, editing and triggering. According to the authors, institutions of a 
certain context can prime the sensemaker by limiting the schemas to be used, in accordance 
with the ‘appropriate institutional norm’ of that context (p. 1648). Alternatively, institutions 
can retrospectively and indirectly edit the meaning of past actions; that is, they shape the 
expectations by other people of the sensemaker’s own actions, and if these expectations are 
violated, the sensemaker will receive negative feedback that compels him/her to reassess 
that past actions giving rise to the feedback. Lastly, institutions themselves might trigger and 
become the focus for sensemaking. Based on Weber and Glynn’s framework, it can be seen 
that the institutional influences found in this study all have a priming effect on sensemaking 
because they dictate the content of university non-leaders’ schemas. With all that said, the 
authors offer little discussion on the mechanisms for institutions to affect schemas. Apart 
from Weber and Glynn’s (2006) paper, not much has been done into institutions by 
sensemaking scholars (another notable study is by Schultz & Wehmeier, 2010), and indeed 
institutions have long been identified a gap in sensemaking theory (Magala, 1997; Weick, 
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Consequently, there is little 
empirical evidence of institutional influences on sensemaking, and sensemaking theory as a 
whole has been critiqued as ‘subjectivistic’ (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015, p. 20) or ‘hyper-
agentic’ (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 98) for positioning the power to interpret the world 
and enact meaning within the sensemaker, without much consideration of constraints posed 




7.1.3.3. Strategy followers’ schema-task congruence and enactment of task 
outcomes 
The distinction between sensemaking and interpretation is that the former involves both 
meaning making, like interpretation, and the actions that enact meaning (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014). Of all the role archetypes and sub-types of university non-leaders, 
strategy follower presents perhaps the most compelling subject for examining enactment. 
Because strategy followers directly and constantly carry out tasks that realise 
internationalisation strategies, the meaning they make of tasks and how they enact that 
meaning made will create the most concrete, tangible outcomes for internationalisation 
strategies. For instance, while B_MM_EC helped push Blue’s research strategy by devising his 
three initiatives, it was the actions of his staff that determined whether and what outcomes 
were achieved by attending Blue Research Seminar, opting in for the research-lecturer 
contract and most importantly learning and doing research. However, the dean himself also 
carried out his own initiatives by teaching in Blue Research Seminars and evaluating the 
performance of research lecturers. Another example is that Red’s joint programme strategy 
would never have been realised without students enrolling in joint programmes and 
qualifying in time for the transfer stage, and in order to do so they had to make sense of 
joint programmes. In this way, I would argue that large-scale analyses of strategy followers’ 
enactment of task outcomes might help predict strategic outcomes. This section, however, 
only examines strategy followers’ enactment on a small scale of individual tasks. 
 
The most outstanding finding about strategy followers’ enactment is that it corresponds 
strongly to the congruence between their schemas and the task specifications, of which there 
can be four scenarios. First, the data shows that enacted outcomes are in line with the 
specifications of a task if the cues around that task (mostly coming from source-tne, to add) 
fit strategy followers’ schemas. Second, when congruence is not found, strategy followers 
enact outcomes that both fulfil a task and are compatible with their schemas. Such 
outcomes, however, are likely to deviate from and compromise said task. Third and fourth, 
where compromise is not even feasible, strategy followers withdraw from the task (flight) or 
attempt to change it (fight). As found in this study, if change attempt is successful, a whole 
strategy can be altered; this was evident when Red joint students fought langcen’s courses, 
which led to the VC making all these courses optional, thus altering how the EMI strategy 
was implemented for joint students. Both flight and fight are understandably deviant, 
unintended outcomes of a task. Table 14 on the next page provides illustrative evidence of 









Congruence seeking  Flight  Fight  
Sensemaker 
and task 
Blue students and getting CEFR-
B1 certified in a second foreign 
language 
Red lecturers in Computer Science 
and teaching in English 
Blue students and getting CEFR-B1 
certified in English and/or a second 
foreign language 
Red joint students and English 
courses at langcen 
Schemas 
applied 
Facile adaptation  
 
• Disciplinary feature (English is the 
language of computer science) 
• Institutional feature (English is key 
to Red’s identity) 
• Educational effectiveness 
• Facile adaptation  
• A university education is a means 
to employment 
Facile adaptation  
 
Cues about task 
There are four languages to 
choose from: Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean and French. Chinese is 
the easiest to get a CEFR-B1 
certification. 
Students’ command of English is not 
good enough to learn wholly in 
English. This presents a dilemma: 
Switching to Vietnamese violates 
disciplinary feature and institutional 
feature (and regulation). Continuing 
to teach in English is not effective. 
• Repeated failures to get certified 
in English and/or a second foreign 
language 
• Desirable employment found 
without a degree or Blue’s 
mandated language certificate 
• Taking all langcen courses would 
delay the transfer severely and as 
a consequence prolong the 
programme unnecessarily 
• Low teaching quality and 
questionable financial practices 
• Langcen courses were compulsory 






Switch to Vietnamese only when 
necessary, e.g. students show 
confusion 
Action reinforced by further cues: 
• No objection from students to 
lecturers switching to Vietnamese 
if done sparingly 
• No reported penalty for language 
switch  
Give up getting a language 
certificate, even when this means 
forfeiting graduation 
Demand langcen courses to become 




B_L1_EC quickly opted into the 
research-lecturer contractual 
scheme after its introduction. 
She also actively attended Blue 
Research Seminars and had her 
own research group. Her 
passion for research (schema) 
was congruent with the push for 
research by her dean (cues). 
Red students had to pay for private 
tutoring in Vietnamese to cope with 
modules they could not learn in 
English, meaning adaptation 
(schema) was not possible given 
their own English competence of 




It can be seen from the table that all four scenarios of schema-task congruence are 
underpinned by tensions between what strategy followers are supposed to do and their 
schemas. Therefore, by enacting an organisational reality that fits their schemas, strategy 
followers are reducing these tensions between action and thoughts. This echoes the very 
popular cognitive dissonance theory (Hinojosa et al. 2017; McGrath, 2017), which states that 
when people are confronted with conflict or dissonance between cognition and attitude 
(what they think and feel) and behaviour (what they do), they try to reduce dissonance by 
inter alia altering their cognition and attitude or behaviour. In the three non-congruence 
scenarios presented, strategy followers are confronted with a dissonance between the way 
they think and feel, represented by their schemas, and what they are doing, represented by 
the task they are engaging in (and gathering cues from). Even when task-schema congruence 
is found, strategy followers might still face a hypothetical dissonance if they have multiple 
courses of action to choose from and some (e.g. learning French instead of Chinese). Thus, 
according to cognitive dissonance theory, it is easy to see why strategy followers enact task 
outcomes in line with their schemas. However, it is interesting that the reverse – altering 
schemas to fit task is not found in this study, considering schema change exists in the 
sensemaking literature (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004), though not originating from 
cognitive dissonance. One plausible explanation is that, at least in this study, schema 
alteration does not serve the interests of university strategy followers as much as task 
outcome alteration, because their schemas are already often self-interested, as discussed 
earlier in 7.1.3.1. Indeed, the cognitive dissonance literature seem to suggest that people 
change whichever is in their best interests. For instance, Ashforth et al. (2007) demonstrate 
that employees in stigmatised professions change their attitudes to make work feel more 
favourable. By contrast, in their review Hinojosa et al. (2017) find that fund managers or 
journalists change their behaviour to suit CEOs who have ‘ingratiated’ (p.187) them.  
 
The enactment of task outcomes based on self-interested schemas is very likely to result in 
deviant and unintended outcomes (as shown by Table 14), unless there is alignment between 
the interests of strategy followers and strategists (e.g. top management, strategy driver 
deans). This ties back to the principal-agent problem mentioned in 7.1.3.1. However, it is 
possible for deviant outcomes to actually benefit the university, such as Red lecturers’ 
language switch without which students would have had little comprehension of the subject 
matter being taught.  
 
Nonetheless, there was one single instance in this study where schema-task tension was not 
found: B_L1_EC and the three research initiatives. The initiatives were not only congruent 
with her schema (research being a passion) but in fact productively resonant with it. More 
specifically, the initiatives created structures for B_L1_EC to engage in research, in the form of 
venue (Blue Research Seminar) and research-based remuneration and promotion (the new 
research-lecturer contractual scheme and associated performance evaluation). This was not 
to mention her dean was a strong believer in research and persistent in communicating its 
importance. B_L1_EC was thus able to enact extra outcomes for the three initiatives: She took 
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advantage of all three to bring her existing research activity outside Blue into the university 
and on top of this created her own research group with participation from other lecturers. 
B_L1_EC’s schema-task congruence and highly constructive enactment reflect the well-
documented organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) phenomenon in organisation and 
psychology research (see Podsakoff et al., 2014; Ocampo et al., 2018; Organ, 2018 for an 
overview). OCB is defined as a group of behaviours that are discretionary and beyond one’s 
duties and that promote the effecting functioning of the organisation (Organ, 1988; Organ, 
1997). These behaviours are numerous and OCB writers have created their own elaborated 
and often overlapping categorisation (e.g. Organ, 1988; Podsakoff et al., 2000). For the 
purpose of this study, however, B_L1_EC’s enactment best corresponds to what is called 
change-related OCB (Dewett & Denisi, 2007), which includes ‘improvement-related’ (p. 246) 
behaviours or personal initiatives that move an organisation forward. Moreover, the 
congruence between her passion-for-research schema and the research initiatives mirrors 
what has been found in OCB research as perceived fit and identification with the 
organisation (Ocampo et al., 2018), which is an antecedent of OCB. The research-lecturer 
contractual scheme itself and B_MM_EC’s enthusiastic push for research also reflect two 
other antecedents, HR practices and transformational leadership (ibid.). Thus, OCB theory 
offers valuable insights into situations of schema-task congruence where there is little 
tension and the enacted task outcomes are more than intended.  
 
The schemas of frontliners like university strategy followers’ and their link to enactment, as 
discussed above, is yet to be examined in extant sensemaking research. Although schema 
has received considerable attention in the literature, it is rather confined to the context of 
strategic change, where it is one of if not the central construct. Sensemaking researchers 
have been interested in top management’s attempts to shape other stakeholders’ schemas in 
favour of a change (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Sonenshein, 2010; Ma & Seidl, 2017), as well as 
change recipients’ adjustment of their schemas (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; Balogun & Johnson, 
2005). In particular, Mantere et al. (2012) undertook an interesting study into the success of 
top management to shape recipients’ schemas around a merger, and their struggle later on 
to reverse the schemas when the merger was cancelled. Another sensemaking area where 
schema is an important construct is managerial decision-making (Sleegers et al., 2009; Winch 
& Maytorena, 2009; Hahn et al., 2014). My study, in comparison, investigates schema from an 
opposite and novel perspective: frontliners making sense of mundane, routine tasks (also 
refer back to 7.1.1.1). Incorporating cognitive dissonance and agency theory, it shows how 
tension can arise out of incongruence between the largely self-interested schemas of 
frontliners, specifically university strategy followers, and the actions they supposedly take to 
fulfil a given task. Indeed, tension may arise even when there is congruence, albeit 
hypothetically. University strategy followers thus try to reduce this tension by constructing 
and enacting outcomes that both fulfil the task and fit their schemas, which are likely deviant 
from the intent of strategists. Conversely, my study has also found that without this tension 
and given structural support and leadership, university strategy followers may engage in 
change-related OCB (Dewett and Denisi, 2007), enacting extra outcomes for tasks. 
205 
 
7.1.3.4. Answering the research question: The third step 
Findings about schemas yet again expands the answer to my research question How are 
university internationalisation strategies made sense of by non-leaders? That is, 
internationalisation strategies are made sense of with the schemas that best serve each non-
leader group’s formal role. Strategy drivers devise their strategic initiatives against their view 
of what universities are and should be. Strategy implementers are more pragmatic and frame 
internationalisation strategies within their beliefs about management; this is because 
internationalisation strategies to them are specific administrative tasks or top-down 
initiatives that they have to carry out. Strategy followers have diverse schemas, but most are 
utilitarian; they judge internationalisation strategies in terms of benefits to their livelihood 
and professional development (for lecturers) or employability (for students). Indeed, schemas 
provide a powerful tool to explain strategy followers’ actions towards internationalisation-
related tasks. Nonetheless, the schemas of all university non-leaders similarly contain 
institutional influences that constrain their sensemaking. 
 
7.1.4. Group-specific issues 
So far this chapter has discussed three sensemaking issues that run across all university non-
leader groups but manifest differently in each group: role-embeddedness, cue sources and 
access, and schemas. The discussion around each issue has substantially addressed the 
research question by illustrating how deans, lecturers and students make sense of 
internationalisation strategies with different modes of sensemaking, cue sources and 
schemas, depending on their role archetypes and sub-types. Nonetheless, the data shows 
there are other sensemaking issues that are specific to deans, lecturers or students and that 
may or may not also relate to their role archetypes and sub-types. It is necessary, therefore, 
to discuss these issues in order to exhaust the data and in turn generate a more 
comprehensive answer to the research question and explore additional contributions to 
sensemaking theory. This section discusses sensemaking issues unique to deans (7.1.4.1), 
lecturers (7.1.4.2) and students (7.1.4.3).  
   
7.1.4.1. Deans’ frontline engagement 
The unique feature of deans’ sensemaking is their hands-on engagement with the frontline. 
All the deans in this study executed the very tasks that they laid out for strategy followers, in 
order to implement their own strategic initiatives or top-down ones. This is likely because, as 
the data reveals, there are clear benefits to frontline engagement for both deans of strategy 
driver and implementer role. First, it enables them to enact their own ideas. B_MM_EC 
organised Blue Research Seminars himself and taught research methodology for the first half 
of each session. R_MM_CS, by comparison, not only coordinated work for the ABET initiative 
but also attended training workshops with his staff. Second, it provides feedback for their 
ideas and more generally management style. B_MM_EC assessed the effectiveness of his 
push for research by observing participation in Blue Research Seminars, while R_MM_CS said 
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working and playing ‘closely’ with staff enabled him to understand their ‘morale’ and see if 
they were ‘with [him]’. Third, it provides them with source-tne, albeit second-hand. B_MM_LC 
valued being at the frontline because the campus ‘the most raw and real picture’ of 
strategies, so much that he hosted weekly lunches with students to listen to situations on the 
ground. Finally, frontline engagement may inspire new ideas, especially for strategy driver 
deans. B_MM_EC’s purchase of Turnitin was inspired by his conversation with a librarian 
about preventing plagiarism, from which he learned Turnitin had contacted Blue before and 
offered a trial. 
 
Deans’ frontline engagement can be conceptualised as an umbrella term for any enactment 
that involves hands-on execution of their own ideas via frontline tasks (see also studies on 
management by walking around, e.g. Tucker & Singer, 2015). Enactment by middle managers 
like university deans is obscure in the sensemaking literature. The only studies that arguably 
deal with it are those about communication and sensegiving (Rouleau, 2005; Rouleau & 
Balogun, 2011; Sharma & Good, 2013), because with communication middle managers can 
indirectly enact their preferred meaning by ‘selling’ it (Rouleau, 2005) to others (mostly 
frontliners) and instil actions. For example, one middle manager in Rouleau (2005) enacted 
his clothing company’s turn to the mass market by presenting a new mass-market oriented 
collection to fashion journalists, who would write about it for the public. Frontline 
engagement as found in this study, however, differs from communication in that middle 
managers realise the very meaning they want to sell, rather than selling it. This means they 
have direct control over the outcomes and can quickly gain feedback for their ideas, as well 
as gather first-hand any cues for further sensemaking. In this way, it strongly appears that 
frontline engagement is closer than communication to the original conceptualisation of 
enactment by Weick (1995; Weick et al., 2005), which states that the sensemaker takes 
actions that alters the surrounding environment and generates cues for sensemaking. 
 
7.1.4.2. The political dimension of lecturers’ sensemaking 
One outstanding issue of lecturers’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is the influence 
of workplace micro-politics. Although the data does not say much about this issue, any 
available accounts are candid. Workplace politics were consistently referred to B_L3_EC as 
great constraints on her sensemaking. More specifically, she (and reportedly many 
colleagues) kept attending Blue Research Seminars out of respect for B_MM_EC as ‘he was a 
good dean and scholar’, even though she had to give up teaching hours to do so, which was 
detrimental to her income. As to Turnitin, potential animosity and retaliation from other 
lecturers was part of the reason she did not observe the 20% threshold when marking their 
students’ dissertations. Similarly, B_L2_EC briefly mentioned ‘an unspoken rule’ in her 
department with regards to not failing papers crossing the threshold. On top of this, B_L3_EC 
said that even her own students held political power over her because they could tell others 
not to ‘ask [her] for supervision or enrol in [her] classes’, which might then cause her head of 
department to question her performance. From B_L3_EC’s accounts, it can be seen that a 
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lecturer’s sensemaking of internationalisation strategies is affected by perceived power 
dynamics with every other university non-leader group in this study. Such power dynamics 
often result in tension between what lecturers want to do (e.g. stop attending Blue Research 
Seminars) or think that they should do (e.g. failing plagiarising students) and what they have 
to do to cater to significant others; in other words, politics may cause cognitive dissonance 
(see 7.1.3.3). The resolution of this dissonance, as shown by the data, is very likely to result in 
compromised outcomes for an internationalisation strategy. 
 
The micro-politics of sensemaking have become increasingly more abundant in the 
literature. In the main, previous research has explored the contestation of meaning and 
narratives (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008; Vaara & Tienari, 2011); a few studies have 
also dealt with top and middle managers’ political actions during sensemaking and 
sensegiving (Hope, 2010; Filstad, 2014) or how perception of power shapes sensemaking 
(Frieder, Ma, & Hochwarter, 2016; Whittle et al., 2016). Power perception is precisely what 
affected B_L3_EC’s sensemaking of Turnitin. She avoided upsetting colleagues and students 
due to their perceived power over her. Similar to Frieder et al. (2016) and Whittle et al. 
(2016), power perception in her case is prospective; that is, she did not enact certain 
meanings in anticipation of negative political consequences, rather than because of previous 
negative political feedback. Apart from power perception, her sensemaking was influenced 
by another political factor: respect for her dean, B_MM_EC. While yet to be investigated by 
sensemaking scholars, respect for leaders40 has been found in the broader management 
literature as a desirable factor that enhances employees’ receptiveness, performance, well-
being and job satisfaction (Wolfram et al., 2007; Graf, Quaquebeke, & Dick, 2011; Decker & 
Quaquebeke, 2015; Clarke & Mahadi, 2017). In B_L3_EC’s case, however, it did make her 
receptive to Blue Research Seminars, but at the same time caused tension with her 
sensemaking of research. Nonetheless, politics and power are an under-researched topic in 
the sensemaking literature (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015), despite being a long-standing topic 
in organisation studies and management (Gandz & Murray, 1980; Drory & Romm, 1988). 
Since Weick’s seminal founding work (1995) until his own review ten years later (Weick et al., 
2005), sensemaking research was found to be politically ‘naïve’ (p. 418), and although 
gaining traction in the 2010s (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014), politics is still a topic that 
deserves more attention (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). This paucity of research into politics in 
sensemaking ties back to the general issue of sensemaking being ‘subjectivistic’ (p. 20) or 
‘hyper-agentic’ (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014, p. 98), mentioned earlier 7.1.3.2.  
 
7.1.4.3. Social media use by students  
The last group-specific sensemaking issue is students’ use of social media. This study has 
found that social media is ubiquitous among students as a sensemaking venue, where cues 
                                                 
40 The word ‘leader’ in this single instance is in its generic sense as someone who leads, rather than governors or 
corporate-level managers of universities (vice-chancellors, pro-vice-chancellors), as has been used throughout 
this study in the phrase ‘non-leaders’. 
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can be shared and gathered, and is extensively used in internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking both pre and post-entry. All Blue and Red students in this study looked up their 
universities on social media, and indeed a cursory browse of Blue Confession and Red Social 
returned many posts by prospective students asking for information about international 
matters. Post-entry, the students joined various social media communities, ranging from 
those for all students in Blue and Red (Blue Confession, Red Social) to those created for their 
specific cohorts or one single module, where they could share and discuss their experiences 
of internationalisation (e.g. trouble with Turnitin’s sensitivity, the teaching quality of langcen). 
By contrast, social media was rarely mentioned during dean and lecturer interviews, except 
by some Red lecturers (e.g. R_L2_CS) who said they read Red Social because the VC made it a 
place for students to voice their concerns (the role of top management in non-leaders’ 
sensemaking will be discussed later). The respective prominence and absence of social media 
among students and other university non-leader groups can best be explained by 
demographic traits. The students in this study were all born into what is called Generation Z, 
whose lifestyle is strongly attached to technology, the Internet and social media (Mintel, 
2018). On the other hand, the lecturers and deans belonged to Generation X or were early 
Millennials, who relied less on those (ibid.). This finding is significant because it establishes a 
link between the demographics of the sensemaker and his/her sensemaking. However, there 
is not enough data to discuss this in fuller depth. 
 
With that said, Blue and Red students’ accounts suggest that the two most prominent 
features of social media as a sensemaking tool are its inclusivity and scalability. Social media 
connects students from different organisational positions (e.g. faculties, cohorts, 
programmes) and enables them to communicate with other university stakeholder groups, 
non-leaders as well as leaders, and even people outside the university like prospective 
students. Moreover, communication via social media is easily scalable, so one post by any 
students can reach hundreds of others. For example, one post on Red Social about langcen 
received 200 reactions41 and 30 comments. Thus, social media greatly facilitates collective 
sensemaking.  
 
There is little prior research into sensemaking with social media. Only recently, a few notable 
attempts have been done into the role of social media as a sensemaking tool during an 
organisational crisis (Gruber et al., 2015), revolution (Oh et al., 2015) or extreme event like 
terrorist attack or plane crash (Steiglitz et al., 2018). These studies all show that social media 
can mobilise a large number of sensemakers, internal and external to the organisation, and 
provide them with a means to share a great amount of cues in ‘real-time’ (Gruber et al., 2015, 
p. 163), thus corroborating my findings. However, Steiglitz et al. (2018) warn that cues and 
meaning on social media can be manipulated to spread false information. Another study by 
Ryden et al. (2015) looks at how social media itself is made sense of as a business tool by 
                                                 
41 Facebook has a reaction feature that enables readers of a post to express their attitude (e.g. happy, angry, sad). 
In addition, readers can comment on the post. 
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senior managers or business owners in retail and service businesses. The students in this 
study appeared to have been familiar with social media use well before enrolment, evident 
by their use of it to look up Blue and Red for their university application. 
  
7.1.4.4. Answering the research question: The fourth step 
The findings presented in 7.1.4 has added complexity to the answer to my research question, 
in that there are sensemaking issues specific to deans, lecturers or students. To start with, 
both strategy driver and implementer deans engage heavily with the frontline in order to 
enact their own ideas and gain feedback, or to gather the valuable source-tne and find 
inspiration. On the other hand, lecturers’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies 
stands out for its political dimension, which includes perceived power dynamics with 
colleagues and students, as well as respect for superiors. Lastly, social media is extensively 
used by students as a venue for making sense of internationalisation strategies. 
 
7.1.5. University leaders’ empowering role and the final step to answering the 
research question 
Even though this study focuses on university non-leaders, the data shows that leaders (top 
management in this case) cannot be discounted, because both Blue and Red VC played a key 
role in the sensemaking of Blue deans and Red students, respectively. The VC of Blue made a 
point of communicating the corporate strategy to new deans and, with B_MM_EC, she herself 
took charge of his recruitment and provided him with a candidacy period to get to know EC. 
More importantly, she viewed deans as strategy drivers rather than implementers or daily 
administrators, thus giving them the freedom to shape their own roles and at the same time 
their faculties. Indeed, she even helped broaden the scope of their initiatives beyond faculty 
boundaries (B_MM_EC’s three research initiatives) and Blue itself (Turnitin). By comparison, 
Red VC was very attentive to student feedback and needs. It was reported that he often 
visited the canteen to ask students if they were enjoying the food and that he commissioned 
a roof for the bus stop after noticing students were standing in the sun. That said, the 
participant students remembered him the most for giving them a voice. He was a frequent 
reader and poster of Red Social, the largest social media community for Red students, and 
had on many occasions resolved issues posted on it. One such issue was the English courses 
at langcen, which he resolved by commenting on the numerous posts about langcen and 
telling the posters to contact him directly by email. Thanks to the VC, the students knew that 
they could fight to change a task if adaptation were not feasible. 
 
The similarity between the two VCs was their empowering of non-leaders. Empowerment in 
this study is understood in the simple sense of enabling non-leaders to have ‘a greater say’ 
(Labianca et al., 2000, p. 236). Blue VC empowered her deans to strategically drive their 
faculties, with spillover effects on the whole university and even the Vietnamese higher 
210 
 
education sector. By comparison, Red VC empowered his students to be his informants and 
change agents. The impact of empowerment on these non-leaders’ sensemaking was also 
clear. Blue deans had the freedom to devise initiatives for internationalisation strategies and 
enact them, while Red students could take collective action upon their interpretation of a 
task when adaption proved impossible. The empowerment of corporate non-leaders like 
middle management and employees is a very common and long-standing topic in 
management research (e.g. Walton, 1985; Denham, Ackers, & Travers, 1997; Joffe & Glynn, 
2001; Raelin & Cataldo, 2011), not to mention its association with another very common 
topic – transformational leadership (Sharma & Kirkman, 2015; Banks et al., 2016; Arnold, 
2017). In general, empowerment has been found to have positive effects on middle 
managers, enabling them to become facilitators of organisational change (Raelin & Cataldo, 
2011), as well as on employees, improving satisfaction, commitment, creativity and 
performance (Sharma & Kirkman, 2015). With regards to university students, empowerment 
has also been supported for its potential to transform teaching and learning and to develop 
strategies (Dunne & Zandstra, 2011). Despite said wealth of empowerment research, there is 
a paucity of studies into the role of empowerment in sensemaking. The only two that I have 
found are Labianca et al. (2000) and Nketia (2016); the former examines employees’ schema 
inertia as a barrier to their empowerment as co-designers of an organisational change, and 
the latter examines how employees’ involvement in strategy making increases their 
sensemaking activity, which then leads to more commitment to strategies. The findings of 
this study, by comparison, demonstrate that empowered university non-leaders can take 
advantage of their schemas and cue sources to drive or change internationalisation 
strategies. 
 
The empowerment of university non-leaders by leaders, and its clear impact on non-leaders’ 
sensemaking of internationalisation strategies mark the last component and thus final step 
to answering the research question. 
 
7.1.6. Summary of theoretical findings and answering the research question 
This chapter has hitherto discussed the seven issues of university non-leaders’ sensemaking 
of internationalisation strategies that have emerged from the data. These issues are either 
found with all non-leader groups but manifest differently in each (role-embedded 
sensemaking, access to cue sources, schema content) or unique to one group (frontline 
engagement, politics, social media). The involvement of university leaders has also been 
explored. More specifically, Section 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 have examined how different role 
features, aggregating into role archetypes and sub-types, lead university non-leaders to 
engage in two modes of sensemaking (role-embedded and non-role embedded), with 
varying access to two sources of cues (source-strat and source-tne) and the application of 
distinct cognitive frames that might also contain institutional influences. Thereafter, Section 
7.1.4 has looked at deans’ engagement with the frontline to enact their own ideas and gain 
feedback or to find inspirations, lecturers’ consideration of workplace politics in their 
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behaviours towards an internationalisation strategy, and finally students’ use of social media 
as a sensemaking and sensegiving venue. Lastly, Section 7.1.5 has discussed the way 
university leaders empower non-leaders and therefore enable them to capitalise on their 
schemas and cue sources to more directly shape internationalisation strategies.  
 
All of the theoretical findings from this study are summarised in Table 15 on next page: 
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Table 15. Summary of theoretical findings 




• agency and authority to act upon 
the university’s strategies via 
strategic initiatives that might alter 
existing structures 
• low task specificity 
Strategy recipient – implementer: 
• little if any agency or authority to 
act upon the university’s strategies 
• high task specificity 
• some decision making power over 
specification of tasks 
• access to top management  
Strategy recipient – follower: 
• little if any agency or authority to 
act upon the university’s strategies 
• high task specificity 
• little if any decision making power 
over specification of tasks 
 
Strategy recipient – follower: 
• little if any agency or authority to 
act upon the university’s strategies 
• high task specificity 
• little if any decision making power 




Non-role embedded:  
• internationalisation strategies are 
the focus for sensemaking. 
• internationalisation strategies are 
made sense of in their own rights 
and explicitly, rather than implicitly 
through tasks and experiences. 
• internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking can be used to 
define one’s role. 
Role-embedded: 
• internationalisation strategies are 
not the focus for sensemaking. 
• role-related tasks and experiences 
are the focus of sensemaking, 
through which internationalisation 
strategies are implicitly and 
unintentionally made sense of. 
• most of these tasks and 
experiences occur in the mundane, 
routine organisational reality 
around non-leaders, rather than in 
disruptive episodes. 
Role-embedded: 
• internationalisation strategies are 
not the focus for sensemaking. 
• role-related tasks and experiences 
are the focus of sensemaking, 
through which internationalisation 
strategies are implicitly and 
unintentionally made sense of. 
• most of these tasks and 
experiences occur in the mundane, 
routine organisational reality 
around non-leaders, rather than in 
disruptive episodes. 
Role-embedded: 
• internationalisation strategies are 
not the focus for sensemaking. 
• role-related tasks and experiences 
are the focus of sensemaking, 
through which internationalisation 
strategies are implicitly and 
unintentionally made sense of. 
• most of these tasks and 
experiences occur in the mundane, 
routine organisational reality 




Sources of cues 
Source-strat: 
• provides cues internationalisation 
strategies themselves  
• commonly found in management 
spaces 
• cues are extracted and transmitted 








• provides cues about how 
internationalisation strategies are 
realised or manifest in tasks and 
experiences  
• commonly found at the frontline 
• cues are extracted experientially 
and cannot be transmitted as-is to 
another sensemaker. 
Source-strat (ad-hoc access): 
• provides cues internationalisation 
strategies themselves  
• commonly found in management 
spaces 
• cues are extracted and transmitted 








• provides cues about how 
internationalisation strategies are 
realised or manifest in tasks and 
experiences  
• commonly found at the frontline 
• cues are extracted experientially 
and cannot be transmitted as-is to 
another sensemaker. 
Source-tne: 
• provides cues about how 
internationalisation strategies are 
realised or manifest in tasks and 
experiences  
• commonly found at the frontline 
• cues are extracted experientially 
and cannot be transmitted as-is to 
another sensemaker. 
 




• provides cues about how 
internationalisation strategies are 
realised or manifest in tasks and 
experiences  
• commonly found at the frontline 
• cues are extracted experientially 
and cannot be transmitted as-is to 
another sensemaker. 
 




• Have to consider what universities 
are and should be in order to 
devise strategic initiatives 
• Possibly affected by institutions 
• Beliefs about management shape 
implementation of strategies.  
• Possibly affected by institutions 
• Mostly utilitarian 
• Efforts to reduce schema-task 
tension has great impact on 
enacted task outcomes. 
• Possibly affected by institutions 
• Mostly utilitarian 
• Efforts to reduce schema-task 
tension has great impact on 
enacted task outcomes. 
• Possibly affected by institutions 
Unique 
features 
Heavy engagement with the frontline to enact 
own ideas, gather feedback, gather source-tne, or 
find inspiration 
Workplace politics as strong sensemaking 
constraints  
Use of social media as an inclusive and scalable 
sensemaking venue  
University 
leaders’ role 
Empowering deans to become strategy drivers, 
thus enabling them to utilise their schemas and 
cue sources to devise initiatives 
None found Empowering students to become change agents, 
thus enabling them to enact change based on 
their interpretation of a strategy 
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More importantly, the theoretical findings around each issue have constituted part of the 
answer to my research question How are university internationalisation strategies made sense 
of by non-leaders? By weaving all these findings, the full answer to my research question can 
be stated as follows: 
Depending on the features of their formal roles, university non-leaders make 
sense of internationalisation strategies in either role-embedded or non-role 
embedded mode, drawing on their varying access to source-strat and source-
tne and interpreting cues with the schemas that best serve their roles and that 
might contain meso and macro institutional influences. Schemas are 
particularly powerful in explaining the actions of strategy followers towards 
internationalisation strategies, which are most often framed within their self-
interests. 
The sensemaking of each non-leader group is also characterised by unique 
features. Deans engage with the frontline to enact and gain feedback for their 
own ideas or to find inspirations. Lecturers’ sensemaking is constrained by 
perceived power dynamics with colleagues, students and deans, which shape 
which meaning can be made and enacted. Students stand out for their pre-
entry sensemaking and use of social media as an inclusive and scalable 
sensemaking and sensegiving venue. 
Last but not least, non-leaders may fully utilise their own schemas and cue 
sources to create strategic development or change if they are empowered by 
university leaders.  
I wish to acknowledge that the answer does not capture all the nuances and 
complexities shown by the data. For example, it does not say which role features, 
reflected in archetypes and sub-types, correspond to which mode of sensemaking, 
nor does it mention the potential resonance between strategy followers’ schemas and 
their tasks, which leads to organisational citizenship behaviours. Nonetheless, the 
answer highlights the key findings of this study in a brief and, I would argue, 
memorable manner, thus offering a balance between comprehensiveness and 
economy. All that being said, with the answer established it is now necessary to 
examine the relevance of non-leaders’ sensemaking to the strategic management of 
internationalisation. 
 
7.1.7. Non-leaders’ sensemaking and the strategic management of 
internationalisation strategies 
All the sensemaking issues discussed in this chapter bear relevance to the strategic 
management of university internationalisation strategies. This is because, as evidenced by 
Blue and Red, the outcomes of internationalisation strategies, and sometimes the strategies 
themselves, depend on the sensemaking of non-leaders, which involves different modes of 
sensemaking, cue access, schemas and group-specific features like frontline engagement, 
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workplace politics and social media. Based on the findings around the key issues of non-
leaders’ sensemaking (tabled in 7.1.6), four arguments can be made for the strategic 
management of internationalisation. 
 
First, the strategic management of internationalisation is not only about formulating and 
implementing the right strategy, but also about tailoring the mundane, routine tasks of non-
leaders’ roles. The majority of non-leaders in this study are formally assigned with a strategy 
recipient role (7.1.1.3) and accordingly make sense of internationalisation strategies in a role-
embedded manner (7.1.1.1). This means non-leaders’ experiences with the routine tasks of 
their roles, especially concerning internationalisation, become cues that inform not only the 
accomplishment of those tasks but also the meaning of internationalisation strategies said 
tasks represent (7.1.2). As a consequence, whether internationalisation strategies are realised 
as intended will depend on whether non-leaders’ tasks provide them with experiences that 
are conducive to the accomplishment of the tasks as specified by the institution. Moreover, 
non-leaders filter their experiences with an often self-interested schema (7.1.3.3) and 
subsequently make value judgement of tasks and, implicitly, the underlying strategies. This 
leads to the principal-agent problem (ibid.) if the tasks and strategies are perceived by non-
leaders as irrelevant to their interests. For these reasons, in order for internationalisation 
strategies to be realised, the daily tasks of non-leaders should be shaped in a way that 
provides experiences conducive to the accomplishment of the tasks as specified, while being 
aligned with non-leaders interests as much as possible. How this can be done in practice, 
however, is beyond the goal of the present study. That said, my empirical data does provide 
a few signposts, to name a few: 
• The tasks are accompanied by clear communication as to their purpose and execution 
(4.4.2).  
• The tasks are underpinned by clear incentives and support mechanisms (4.3.3, 4.3.4). 
• The tasks do not clash with the culture of the institution (4.3.3, 4.4.3) or its resources 
(5.2.2).   
 
Second, the strategic management of internationalisation can be enhanced by leveraging 
non-leaders’ sensemaking. As shown by the data, non-leaders in each role archetype and 
sub-type can utilise their sensemaking to overcome challenges in realising a strategy or even 
stimulate strategy development and adjustment: 
• Strategy driver deans can combine their past experience and knowledge of the 
institution, gained from both source-strat and source-tne (7.1.2), in order to devise 
initiatives that push a strategy forward. This was exemplified by B_MM_EC, who drove 
Blue’s research strategy (4.3.1). Once an initiative is created, strategy driver deans may 
then engage with the frontline (7.1.4.1) and make sense of the tasks they themselves 
have set (as part of the initiative) for strategy followers. 
• Somewhat similarly, strategy implementer deans can weave their own experience and 
personal resources with knowledge of the institution, gained largely from source-tne, in 
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order to implement a challenging top-down strategic initiative. A clear example was 
R_MM_CS, who had to achieve ABET accreditation for his faculty (5.4.1).  
• In the case of strategy followers like lecturers and students, sensemaking may enable 
them to reconcile conflicting cues and reach a compromise or coping measure so that a 
task can be accomplished. An example of compromise was found with Blue lecturers and 
their workarounds for Turnitin (4.4.3), while one of coping was found with Red students, 
who sought and offered private tutoring in Vietnamese so as to cope with learning in 
English (5.2.2). It is worth noting that although compromises facilitate the execution of a 
strategy, they are likely to create unintended outcomes and in the long run may produce 
a common practice that replaces said strategy as the de facto strategy (see 2.2.1 for the 
concept of emergent strategy). 
• Students’ sensemaking, in particular, can inform strategists about the state of 
internationalisation strategies at the grassroots level, which can be used for strategy 
adjustment. This unique function of students’ sensemaking exists thanks to the 
ubiquitous use of social media as a venue for collective sensemaking, which inadvertently 
makes social media a substantial source of cues about internationalisation strategies for 
not only strategists but anyone who can access it. An excellent example was Red students 
in joint programmes, who through social media effected a change in how the EMI 
strategy was implemented for them (5.2.3).  
The data suggests that one way to leverage non-leaders’ sensemaking is for strategists to 
empower them (7.1.5). Empowerment can range from giving non-leaders a voice, as Red VC 
did with students, to providing them with strategic decision-making power, as Blue VC did 
with her deans. In addition, strategists need to get involved with non-leaders and take 
concrete action to support them. 
 
Third, non-leaders’ sensemaking is the medium through which institutional forces and micro-
politics affect the strategic management of internationalisation. This study has found that 
institutional forces at both the meso (organisational) and macro (field, societal) levels shape 
the schemas of university non-leaders and therefore the meaning of internationalisation 
strategies as well as its enactment (7.1.3.2). In this way, non-leaders’ sensemaking, more 
specifically their schemas, become the medium through which the meso and macro contexts 
are imparted upon enacted strategies. Apart from institutions, micro-politics also shape 
enacted strategies through non-leaders’ sensemaking. As discussed in 7.1.4.2, power 
dynamics between non-leaders may cause tension between what they want to do and, in the 
presence of significant others, what they have to do. Micro-politics, therefore, has the 
potential to prevent certain strategic outcomes by nudging non-leaders to enact certain 
meanings and forgo others.    
 
Finally, the strategic management of internationalisation is not restricted to the physical 
confines of a university. On the one hand, prospective non-leaders (e.g. high school 
students) have already started making sense of a university’s internationalisation strategies 
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prior to becoming organisational members (7.1.1.2, 7.1.1.3). Their pre-entry sensemaking 
generates expectations that prime behaviour towards tasks upon entry, thus having the 
potential to influence the outcomes of internationalisation strategies. On the other hand, 
non-leaders’ sensemaking may take place in the digital world via social media. As discussed 
in 7.1.4.3, social media is a special venue for collective sensemaking due to its inclusivity and 
scalability; simply put, both university members and non-members can interact on social 
media, and there is little spatial or temporal constraints to their interaction. As a 
consequence, any discussions on social media might have far-reaching implications for the 
strategic management of internationalisation, one such implication being collective actions 
(e.g. Red joint students and langcen).  
 
In brief, an examination of university non-leaders’ sensemaking offers important insights into 
the strategic management of internationalisation. More specifically, my findings have shown 
that managing internationalisation strategies is mostly about shaping the mundane tasks 
that non-leaders engage in on a daily basis, in a way that orients non-leaders’ sensemaking 
towards intended outcomes. In addition, non-leaders’ sensemaking can be leveraged to 
enhance the effectiveness of internationalisation strategies; if non-leaders receive conflicting 
cues, however, their sensemaking might also lead to compromises that steer the strategies in 
unwanted directions. Non-leaders’ sensemaking is also the medium through which 
institutions and micro-politics affect internationalisation strategies. Finally, a sensemaking 
lens reveals that, even beyond the physical confines of the university, prospective non-
leaders and the digital world (particularly social media) might shape internationalisation 
strategies.  
 
Now that I have established the answer to my research question and its relevance to the 
strategic management of university internationalisation, the rest of this chapter will outline 
how the present study has contributed to theory. 
 
7.2. Contributions to theory 
This section will examine how the framing of my research question and subsequent findings 
contribute to scholarship on higher education internationalisation, SAP and sensemaking, in 
which this study is firmly theoretically grounded. To start with, Section 7.2.1 will demonstrate 
that important insights into higher education internationalisation can be gained by studying 
it from a strategic management angle – specifically SAP, with sensemaking theory as the 
theoretical lens. The following Section 7.2.2 will show how this study helps advance the SAP 
movement in strategic management thanks to a combination of sensemaking theory and 
under-researched organisational members, especially frontliners (lecturers and students in 
this case). Finally in 7.2.3, an outline will be provided of the various contributions to 
sensemaking theory that have directly resulted from the discussion of the seven issues of 
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university non-leaders’ sensemaking in 7.1. All of the contributions present clear implications 
for future research and practice, but these will be deferred to the concluding chapter. 
 
7.2.1. The strategic management of higher education internationalisation 
The present study helps fill an important gap in the literature: the strategic management of 
higher education internationalisation. As stated in Chapter 2, internationalisation has long 
been considered a strategic matter for higher education (Rudzki, 1995; Kehm & Teichler, 
2007; Warwick, 2014) due to its economic, academic and sociocultural significance (Knight, 
1997; de Wit, 2002). This strategic emphasis on internationalisation can also be seen in 
practice since internationalisation is often included as a component strategy or even part of 
the corporate vision and mission of many universities all over the world, including those in 
countries that are not higher education hubs like Vietnam (refer back to 2.1.2). Nonetheless, 
as stated in 2.1.3, my review of the literature on higher education internationalisation 
indicates that internationalisation as university strategies has been treated superficially, with 
the word ‘strategy’ being invoked to either as a recommendation that internationalisation 
should be planned and long-term (Knight, 2008a; de Wit, 2011) or as reference to empirical 
internationalisation strategies of particular higher education institutions (Taylor, 2004; 
Knight, 2008b; Ho, Lin, & Yang, 2015). Even studies that adopt a strategic management 
perspective engage little with the rich theoretical resources afforded by the vast field of 
strategic management (Elkin, Farnsworth, & Templer, 2008; Jiang & Carpenter, 2013) or use 
them as the central lens (Warwick, 2014). The few that examine internationalisation strategies 
with theoretical depth include two conceptual papers by Davies (1992) and Rudzki (1995; see 
also Al-Youssef, 2010), one study into the choice and implementation of internationalisation 
strategies by Adel, Zeinhom, and Mahrous (2018) in Egypt, and very recently one mixed-
method study into impact factors for internationalisation strategies in Germany (Bremer, 
2018). Despite their little relevance to my research question and in one case theoretical 
shortcomings (Adel, Zeinhom, & Mahrous, 2018) (again refer back to 2.1.3), these four 
studies are valuable explorations of higher education internationalisation from a strategic 
management perspective. In the end, however, the small number of such works and their 
relative similarity in focus (on strategies themselves and strategic factors) means that there is 
a lot of ground to be gained in understanding internationalisation strategies. 
 
My study makes, therefore, a timely addition to the higher education internationalisation 
literature. Not only does it approach internationalisation from a strategic management angle, 
it employs a novel and coherent theoretical framework based on SAP and sensemaking 
theory and moreover applies the framework to study university actors who are not 
traditionally associated with strategy work, namely deans, lecturers and students. All of this is 
reflected in the research question How are university internationalisation strategies made 
sense of by non-leaders? This way of framing the research problem and the subsequent 
findings have generated important insights into higher education internationalisation. That 
is, internationalisation is not simply a matter of planning the right strategies or capturing 
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opportunities into strategies, as proposed by Rudzki (1995) and Poole (2001), but it is also 
shaped by the way non-leaders make sense of those strategies. Most of the time, non-
leaders’ internationalisation-strategy sensemaking is characterised by its role-
embeddedness; that is, it is unintentional, implicit and embedded within the sensemaking of 
the daily, mundane tasks of their assigned formal roles. As a result, whether and to what 
extent a university can achieve the economic, academic or sociocultural goals of its 
internationalisation (Knight, 1997; de Wit, 2002) will depend on the experiences non-leaders 
encounter in their daily organisational life when fulfilling their roles. In addition, such role-
embedded sensemaking is affected by a myriad of factors, which in this study include role 
features, sources of information, cognitive frames, meso and macro institutions, frontline 
engagement, politics, social media and empowerment. An examination of these factors 
offers even further insights into higher education internationalisation (specifically with 
regards to how it can be strategically managed), which have been detailed in 7.1.7. All of my 
findings about university non-leaders’ sensemaking and its relevance to the strategic 
management of internationalisation mark my contribution to higher education 
internationalisation research and at the same time demonstrate the value of a strategic 
management perspective, particularly SAP, combined with sensemaking theory in studying 
the topic. 
  
7.2.2. Sensemaking theory and frontliners in SAP  
Another contribution of the present study is advancing the SAP movement in strategic 
management, with regards to the use of sensemaking theory and coverage of frontliners. On 
the one hand, a key character of SAP research is its ‘theoretical pluralism’ (Golsorkhi et al. 
2015b, p. 12) whereby it draws upon a lot of theories, both in sociology (Orlikowski, 2000; 
Gomez & Bouty, 2011) and management and organisation studies (Ambrosini, Bowman, & 
Burton-Taylor, 2007; Salvato, 2009) to elucidate the praxis, practitioners and practices of 
strategising (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). Among the many theoretical lens found and/or 
advocated for in SAP (see Golsorkhi et al. 2015a), Weick’s (1995) sensemaking has received a 
lot of attention due to its suitability and usefulness in studying matters of interest to SAP 
researchers, such as strategic cognition (Kaplan, 2008) or the reception of strategic change 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005). However, from their extensive review, Cornelissen and Schildt 
(2015) find that sensemaking in SAP has mostly been used in a ‘perfunctory manner’ (p. 345) 
in that, instead of a theoretical lens, it is a ‘shorthand or label’ (p. 350) for empirical instances 
of thinking and talking (e.g. Rouleau, 2005;  Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013; Kwon, Clarke, & 
Wodak, 2014), which are then explained using other theories. As a consequence, the diverse 
concepts and models in the sensemaking literature remain under-utilised in SAP. Moving 
beyond this, as Cornelissen and Schildt (2015) strongly suggest, would lead to better 
theoretical claims and explanations of the subject matter. My study precisely responds to this 
call with the adoption of sensemaking as the theoretical framework to address the research 
question, which is also framed around sensemaking. In Chapter 2, I have specified and 
defined the key sensemaking concepts that guided my data collection and analysis; more 
importantly, I have also stated my orientation towards the cognitive aspect of sensemaking 
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and addressed how the social aspect was factored in. Clarity in one’s appropriation of 
sensemaking theory has been emphasised in both the SAP (Cornelissen & Schildt, 2015) and 
sensemaking literature (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). That said, sensemaking theory has 
indeed enabled me to investigate how strategy is done, specifically how internationalisation 
strategies are interpreted and acted on by university non-leaders. For instance, Section 
7.1.3.3 discussed how unintended outcomes might result from the incongruence between 
lecturers and students’ schemas and the internationalisation-related tasks they have to carry 
out. 
 
On the other hand, due to its focus on the doing of strategy, SAP has explored and given 
voice to those who do not conventionally decide strategies but are instrumental in their 
implementation, like middle managers (Balogun & Johnson, 2005), frontliners (Balogun, Best, 
& Le, 2015) or consultants (Nordqvist & Melin, 2008). However, it appears that middle 
managers have received overwhelmingly more coverage than the others, particularly 
frontliners. In my survey of the literature, there is only one study into frontliners (Balogun, 
Best, & Le, 2015), compared to an easily found set of four about middle managers (Balogun 
& Johnson, 2005; Rouleau, 2005; Sillince & Mueller, 2007; Mantere, 2008). Some studies do 
cover both but without dedicated treatment of either (Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Faure et al., 
2010; Erkama & Vaara, 2010), because their focus is not on the two groups but rather on 
issues that happen to involve both, such as communication (Faure et al., 2010) or 
participation in strategy making (Mantere & Vaara, 2008). As a side note, top managers or 
those with strategic decision-making power are also more prominent than frontliners in the 
SAP literature (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002; Mueller et al., 2013; Liu & Maitlis, 2014). Thus, 
frontliners constitute a gap in SAP. For this reason, the present study is of value to SAP for its 
exploration of university lecturers and students, who are essentially frontliners. It has clearly 
demonstrated the impact of their utilitarian schemas as well as unique sensemaking praxis 
and practices on strategies; for instance, lecturers might reject or withdraw from a strategic 
initiative that brings them little perceived benefits and clashes with their view of the 
university (Blue lecturers and the three research initiatives). Students, by comparison, can 
leverage social media and empowerment to create strategic change (Red students and 
langcen courses).  
 
In fact, my investigation into lecturers and students has inadvertently revealed three issues of 
frontline strategising that possibly prove important to SAP: institutional influences, politics 
and social media. First, this study has found that institutions, at both the meso 
(organisational) and macro (field, societal) levels, affect the attitudes of all frontliners, leading 
them towards acceptance, usually uncritical, or rejection of strategies (refer back to 7.1.3.2). 
For example, Red lecturers in Computer Science found EMI a must because they perceived 
English as the core feature of the field. The role of institutions in strategising is still a 
‘nascent’ (Smets, Greenwood, & Lounsbury, 2015, p. 283) topic in SAP research, and it 
appears the intersection of institutions and SAP has primarily been conceptual (Suddaby, 
Seidl, & Le, 2013; Smets, Greenwood, & Lounsbury, 2015). Nonetheless, SAP scholars (ibid.) 
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have pointed out the compatibility and complementarity between institutional research and 
SAP, in that their combination can shed lights on the interaction and mutual influence 
between structures, especially at the macro level, and strategising actions at the micro level. 
My findings, therefore, substantiate this argument and additionally show that meso-level 
institutions do play a role in micro-level praxis. 
 
Second, workplace micro-politics emerge from lecturer data as a constraint on the courses of 
action that frontliners can take with a given strategy. This was candidly evident when a Blue 
lecturer in Economics and Commerce (B_L3_EC) spoke about her and a few others’ reluctant 
attendance at Blue Research Seminars out of their respect for the dean, or about her anxiety 
of retaliation from other lecturers if she had failed their students for crossing the 20% 
Turnitin threshold. Unlike institutions, politics and power have been addressed more widely 
in both conceptual (Fenton & Langley, 2011; Clegg & Kornberger, 2015) and empirical SAP 
works (Kaplan, 2008; Mueller et al., 2013; Hardy & Thomas, 2014). However, it seems most 
extant research is centred on the impact of politics and power, very often in the form of 
competing discourses, on strategy making (Kaplan, 2008; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; Hardy & 
Thomas, 2014; Brorstrom, 2017), or on the diffusion, legitimisation and resistance of newly 
made strategies (Laine & Vaara, 2007; Erkama & Vaara, 2010). While my findings also deal 
with politics and power, they revolve around (a) the perception of power (refer back to 
7.1.4.2) rather than competing discourses and (b) the mundane, routine actions that create 
outcomes for strategies rather than strategy making or diffusion. In this way, my study 
contributes to the discussions about politics and power in SAP by exploring a new form of 
political influence (perceived power) and a new area of praxis shaped by politics (mundane, 
routine activity). 
 
Lastly, the findings from students highlight social media as a powerful practice, or tool for 
strategising. As discussed in 7.1.4.3, the inclusiveness and scalability of social media enable 
frontliners like students to share information with a large audience that comprises not only 
other frontliners but also decision makers and even external stakeholders. This information 
can then be used by decision makers as feedback or by frontliners themselves to take 
collective action, as Red VC and students did respectively; there is of course a caveat in that 
the former have to be present on social media. The impact of social media on strategy work 
and social media itself as a strategy have been noticed in recent years, notably by 
researchers in communication (Benthaus, Risius, & Beck, 2016), information systems 
(Senadheera, Warren, & Leitch, 2017) and organisational knowledge (Archer-Brown & 
Kietzmann, 2018; Neeley & Leonardi, 2018). However, social media is still an obscure topic in 
SAP research with only brief mentions in Whittington’s (2014) conceptual paper and one 
empirical study by Neeley and Leonardi (2018), who find that non-work related interaction 
on social media initially enhances work-related knowledge sharing but then hinders it. As a 
consequence, apart from the insights by Neeley and Leonardi (2018) it is unknown how 
social media, presumably as a practice, can play a role in strategising praxis, or how social 
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media itself is used as a practice in strategising. My findings about students’ use of social 
media are therefore a chance yet timely contribution to the SAP literature.     
 
To sum up, it is clear that the use of sensemaking theory and explicit focus on frontliners can 
help to advance the SAP movement. Here the combination of both has produced 
considerable insights into the doing and accomplishment or non-accomplishment of 
strategies. A close look at frontliners, in particular, further reveals valuable issues like 
institutions, politics and social media. All of this constitutes my contribution to the SAP 
literature. 
 
7.2.3. The ontology, core concepts and new directions of sensemaking theory  
The final area of contribution of this study is to sensemaking theory. It can be seen 
throughout Section 7.1 that the seven sensemaking issues emerging from the data are 
under-researched if not contrary to extant sensemaking ideas. For example, there is little 
sensemaking research into institutions (7.1.3.2), and existing theorisation posits sensemaking 
as an explicit and episodic process rather than an implicit and mundane one (7.1.1.1). It has 
therefore been a great challenge for me to discuss my findings in relation to the 
sensemaking literature. More importantly, this means that the very findings presented in 7.1 
together form my contribution to sensemaking theory, and some of them can even be 
considered grounds for debate (e.g. implicit sensemaking). Hereunder I will provide a brief 
outline and summary of these findings and associated contributions to sensemaking theory: 
• First, my findings are a departure from the current view of the sensemaking process, 
which posits that it is triggered by and explicitly conducted during episodes of great 
uncertainty and disruptions (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005; Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014). The data shows that sensemaking can also occur continually and 
implicitly in the mundane, routine organisational reality around the sensemaker, not to 
mention the knowledge gained from the mundane can inform sensemaking of crisis-like 
episodes (7.1.1.1).  
• Second, my study sheds lights on the sensemaking differences of different organisational 
groups, specifically middle managers versus frontliners, in this case being university 
deans versus lecturers and students, respectively. Although middle managers and 
frontliners’ sensemaking have both been addressed in prior research (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2005; Prior, Keranen, & Koskela, 2018), they were isolated from one another. 
Moreover, it is extremely difficult to comparatively synthesise these studies and tease out 
intergroup differences due to variations in the use of sensemaking theory, research 
contexts and the sensemaking subject. My study, by contrast, simultaneously covers 
middle managers (deans) and frontliners (lecturers and students) and focuses on one 
sensemaking subject (internationalisation strategies) in one context (Vietnamese 
universities). This approach has enabled the mapping of differences in their role features 
(7.1.1.3) with two modes of sensemaking (7.1.1.3), varying access to two distinct cue 
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sources (7.1.2.2) and certain schemas (7.1.3.1). On top of this, the uniqueness of 
university deans, lecturers and students’ sensemaking has also been revealed (7.1.4). 
• Third, by borrowing from agency theory, cognitive dissonance and organisational 
citizenship behaviour (OCB), my study has explored the often self-interested nature of 
frontliners’ schemas and its impact on their actions (7.1.3.3). Previous investigations into 
schemas have been rather confined to the context of strategic change, where top 
management attempt to shape other stakeholders’ framing of a change (Bean & 
Hamilton, 2006; Sonenshein, 2010; Ma & Seidl, 2017) and where change recipients like 
middle managers and employees try to adjust their schemas (Bean & Hamilton, 2006; 
Balogun & Johnson, 2005). Alternatively, the role of schemas in managerial decision-
making has also received attention (Sleegers et al., 2009; Winch & Maytorena, 2009; 
Hahn et al., 2014). As a consequence, little is known about frontliners’ schemas when 
making sense of mundane, routine tasks, which is a gap that the present study fills. 
• Fourth, my findings about the presence of institutional forces (7.1.3.2) and politics 
(7.1.4.2) in university non-leaders’ sensemaking help address the critique of sense making 
theory as ‘subjectivistic’ (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015, p. 20) or ‘hyper-agentic’ (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014, p. 98).  
• Fifth, the findings about deans’ frontline engagement as a form of middle managers’ 
enactment (7.1.4.1) add to the scarce research on middle managers’ enactment, which 
has only dealt with communication and sensegiving. 
• Sixth, this study explores social media as an inclusive and scalable sensemaking tool that 
might lead to strategic change (7.1.4.3). Social media as a whole is a very recent topic in 
sensemaking research, with a few studies into its role during an organisational crisis 
(Gruber et al., 2015), revolution (Oh et al., 2015) or extreme event like terrorist attack or 
plane crash (Steiglitz et al., 2018). 
• The seventh and final contribution of this study to sensemaking theory is the role of 
empowerment (by corporate leaders) in non-leaders’ sensemaking. The data shows that 
when empowered, non-leaders can take advantage of their schemas and cue sources to 
drive or change internationalisation strategies (7.1.5). Despite its popularity in the 
broader management literature, empowerment seems largely absent in sensemaking 
works.  
 
7.3. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has applied sensemaking theory to discussing the key themes from the case 
studies, thus generating theoretical findings that help answer the research question How are 
university internationalisatoin strategies made sense of by non-leaders? More specifically, the 
discussion has revealed seven key issues: 
• The first three issues are present across all university non-leader groups (deans, lecturers, 
students) but manifest differently in each, depending on their role features. They are 
modes of sensemaking (role-embedded and non-role embedded), access to cue sources 
(source-strat and source-tne), and schema content.  
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• The next three issues are unique to each non-leader group: frontline engagement for 
deans, politics for lecturers and social media for students. 
• The last issue relates to non-leaders’ empowerment by university leaders, which enable 
the former to directly shape internationalisation strategies via their sensemaking. 
 
The findings around the seven sensemaking issues above constitute the answer to my 
research question, which was stated in 7.1.6, and bear relevance to the strategic 
management of university internationalisation, which were outlined in 7.1.7. With the 
findings, my study has made contributions to three separate literatures: higher education 
internationalisation, SAP and sensemaking. First, the study addresses the paucity and 
theoretical shortcomings of extant higher education internationalisation research that takes a 
strategic management perspective. Second, the study helps further the SAP movement in 
strategic management by extensively adopting sensemaking as a theoretical lens and 
exploring the strategising of frontliners, specifically university lecturers and students. Lastly, 
my findings expand sensemaking in various ways, which were listed in 7.2.3, and contribute 




CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
This study has applied the Strategy-as-Practice (SAP) approach and sensemaking theory to 
studying how university internationalisation strategies are interpreted and realised by 
university non-leaders. In so doing, it has contributed to knowledge on the strategic 
management of higher education internationalisation, as well as helped further the SAP 
movement in strategic management research and contributed to sensemaking theory. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarise the key points of the thesis (8.1), outline the 
practical implications for managing university internationalisation strategies (8.2), and finally 
discuss the limitations of my study (8.3) and venues for future research into higher education 
internationalisation as strategies (8.4). 
 
8.1. Research summary  
This study has been conducted to solve one question How are university internationalisation 
strategies made sense of by non-leaders? The study has emerged out of my interests in the 
managerial dimension of internationalisation, specifically the reception and realisation of 
internationalisation strategies by non-leaders like deans, lecturers and students. More 
importantly, it is a response to the lack of research into higher education internationalisation 
from a strategic management perspective, which is a gap that exists even though 
internationalisation has long been considered a strategic issue for many universities due to 
its economic, sociocultural and academic benefits. The motivation and rationale behind this 
study was explained in detail in Chapter 1 and 2. 
 
To address the research question, my study has engaged substantially with the theoretical 
resources afforded by the strategic management and organisation studies literatures. In 
particular, the SAP approach in strategy research and sensemaking theory have been 
incorporated into my theoretical framework. As SAP research, this study follows the tripartite 
framework of praxis, practitioners and practices (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009), with emphasis 
on the sensemaking praxis (or flow of sensemaking activity) of deans, lecturers and students. 
Furthermore, this sensemaking praxis is placed within the structural influences at the meso 
(organisational) and macro (field, societal) levels. The praxis has then been examined from a 
cognitive perspective of sensemaking theory rather than a social one; that is, my study 
investigates how university non-leaders’ sensemaking is accomplished via the application of 
schemas or cognitive frames to selecting and interpreting cues from their surroundings, 
instead of via the discursive practices that one party uses to influence another’s meaning-
making. An indepth discussion of the SAP approach and sensemaking theory, as well as the 




Methodologically, the study has adopted a qualitative, comparative case study design. The 
design choice is pragmatic in the sense that it is entirely driven by the demands for depth of 
the research question and theoretical framework, and not by any ontological and 
epistemological commitments (which I do not hold). With that said, the design involves two 
Vietnamese universities, coded Blue and Red, that had explicit internationalisation strategies 
and were active in internationalising. The Vietnamese context has been chosen for its 
relevance, having a long history of internationalisation, relative novelty in the higher 
education internationalisation literature and practicality to myself as a researcher since I am a 
Vietnamese and have a personal network who could have helped with case selection and 
access. From the two cases, data has been collected utilising multiple methods, including 
semi-structured individual interview and focus group, document analysis, quasi-ethnographic 
campus visit and, added upon suggestions by the participants, social media analysis. In each 
university, the participants recruited for interview consisted of a top manager, an officer in 
internationalisation (none found for Blue), and deans, lecturers and students from two 
faculties. All data was then analysed through four stages: holistic exploration, single-case 
thick description, cross-case comparison, and finally theorisation. Despite careful planning, 
complications with access to Blue and Red caused significant changes and delays to 
participant recruitment and data collection. Chapter 3 described and explained the rationale 
for my methodological choices; it also recaptured the complications I encountered with Blue 
and Red and the subsequent impact on participant recruitment and data collection at the 
two universities. 
 
The case studies of Blue and Red have provided rich empirical evidence of 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking by deans, lecturers and students. In so doing, they 
demonstrate that the strategic management of internationalisation depends as much on 
non-leaders’ sensemaking as on having the right strategy. It is impossible, however, to 
summarise the cases here due to space constraints, so I will only highlight what is most 
notable about each. On the one hand, Blue has shown that deans’ sensemaking may result in 
innovative initiatives that can push internationalisation strategies forward, if they are 
empowered to become strategic drivers. However, such initiatives can be received 
unfavourably and thus resisted by lecturers and students because they violate the latter’s 
personal utility, which is tied to the status quo. Red, by comparison, has demonstrated the 
potential of social media as a device for student-led strategic change because it enables 
students to engage in collective sensemaking, which might then lead to bottom-up 
sensegiving towards top management. The necessary condition, however, is that top 
management have to utilise social media as a source of information and make their presence 
known on social media. The case studies of Blue and Red, including the institutional profiles 
of both universities, were respectively presented in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
The case studies of Blue and Red have then been compared to tease out the sensemaking 
patterns of each non-leader group, which provided the direct basis for discussion. The 
ensuing discussion has examined the key sensemaking issues emerging from the 
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comparative analysis; some of the issues are applicable to all non-leader groups (intergroup 
issues), while others are unique to one (intragroup issues). The intergroup issues include 
university non-leaders’ modes of sensemaking, access to cue sources and the content of 
their schemas, all of which are tied to the features of their formal organisational roles. The 
intragroup issues are deans’ frontline engagement, the impact of micro-politics on lecturers’ 
sensemaking and students’ pre-entry sensemaking and use of social media. In addition to 
these six issues, the empowerment of non-leaders’ sensemaking by institutional leaders has 
been examined. Chapter 6 presented cross-case themes and patterns in the 
internationalisation-strategy sensemaking of deans, lecturers and students from Blue and 
Red. The findings in Chapter 6 then provided the basis for discussion in Chapter 7, resulting 
in the theoretical findings above. 
 
The findings in Chapter 7 have constituted the answer to my research question How are 
university internationalisation strategies are made sense of by non-leaders? 
Depending on role features, university non-leaders make sense of 
internationalisation strategies in either role-embedded or non-role embedded 
mode, drawing on their varying access to source-strat and source-tne and 
interpreting cues with the schemas that best serve their roles and that might 
contain meso and macro institutional influences. Schemas are particularly 
powerful in explaining the actions of strategy followers towards 
internationalisation strategies, which are most often framed within their self-
interests. 
The sensemaking of each non-leader group is also characterised by unique 
features. Deans engage with the frontline to enact and gain feedback for their 
own ideas or to find inspirations. Lecturers’ sensemaking is constrained by 
perceived power dynamics with colleagues, students and deans, which shape 
which meaning can be made and enacted. Students stand out for their use of 
social media as an inclusive and scalable sensemaking and sensegiving venue. 
Last but not least, non-leaders may fully utilise their own schemas and cue 
sources to create strategic development or change if they are empowered by 
university leaders. 
More importantly, the findings bear strong relevance to the strategic management of 
internationalisation. They have shown the importance of shaping non-leaders’ routine tasks 
in a way that orients their sensemaking towards intended strategic outcomes, and of 
leveraging their sensemaking to enhance the effectiveness of internationalisation strategies. 
They have also revealed that non-leaders’ sensemaking can be a medium through which 
institutional forces and micro-politics affect internationalisation strategies. Lastly, my findings 
draw attention to the potential impact of sensemaking that takes place beyond the physical 
confines of a university. The answer to my research question, a summary of theoretical 
findings and the relevance of my findings to the strategic management of 
internationalisation are also found in Chapter 7. 
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With my research question answered, my contributions to theory finally emerged, specifically 
to three literatures: higher education internationalisation, SAP and sensemaking. First, this 
study has explored the strategic management of higher education internationalisation, which 
is a gap in extant higher education internationalisation research. In so doing, important 
insights were gained into the strategic management of university internationalisation. 
Second, this study has helped further the SAP movement in strategic management by 
demonstrating how sensemaking theory can be extensively adopted as a theoretical lens to 
investigate strategising, rather than as a mere label for empirical instances of thinking 
(2.2.3.6, 2.2.3.7). Moreover, my study has explored the strategising of frontliners (specifically 
lecturers and students), who are under-researched in SAP. Third and lastly, my theoretical 
findings have shed more lights on core concepts in sensemaking theory and contributed to 
existing debates on the locus and nature of the sensemaking process. A detailed outline of 
my contributions to theory can be found in the second half of Chapter 7. 
  
8.2. Practical implications 
Although academic in nature, the present study does pose practical implications for 
university leaders, especially top managers, and deans in managing internationalisation 
strategies. The implications are both drawn from the theoretical findings (Chapter 7) and 
directly indicated by empirical evidence (Chapter 4 and 5). Overall, all implications underline 
the necessity of paying attention to non-leaders’ meaning and creating the conditions where 
their sensemaking can contribute to strategic management. With that said, the practical 
implications are as follows: 
• Deans can be empowered to become strategic drivers (7.1.1.2, 7.1.5), in which case the 
university can take full advantage of their previous experiences (e.g. B_MM_EC was a 
professor in a multi-nationally funded HEI in Thailand), personal connections (e.g. one of 
R_MM_CS’ friends was a dean in a major public university) and managerial skills (e.g. 
B_MM_LC’s attention to details) in order to develop internationalisation strategies. This 
may require, however, top management to carefully vet prospective deans to ensure that 
their beliefs about higher education (e.g. B_MM_LC’s insistence on student-led initiatives) 
are aligned with the university’s corporate strategy and internationalisation strategies. 
Moreover, prospective deans can be given a trial period, as B_MM_EC was (4.3.1), so that 
they can make sense of available resources and capabilities and socialise with staff, which 
helps them make informed strategic decisions. 
• Dean empowerment does not solely mean giving them decision-making power. Top 
managers might also need to actively support them. For example, B_TM attended a 
meeting between B_MM_EC and Human Resources and gave her vocal support for the 
former’s research-lecturer contractual scheme (4.3.1). Apart from active support, top 
managers can arrange working space in a way that fosters communication of ideas. The 
lack of office space at Blue was a blessing in disguise because, while having to share the 
same room, deans had the chance to discuss what they did in their faculties. This enabled 
B_MM_EC to disseminate his initiatives to other faculties (4.3.2). 
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• Deans or more generally progenitors of strategies and strategic initiatives would be well-
advised to engage with the frontline (7.1.4.1). All the deans involved in this study, 
especially R_MM_CS, showed that frontline engagement brought four clear benefits: It 
enabled them to enact their ideas, provided feedback on said ideas and management 
style, provided information of the frontline and finally inspired new ideas. 
• Lecturers and students can also be empowered to have strategic impact, at the very least 
by having their voices heard (7.1.5). A distinct characteristic of lecturers and students’ 
sensemaking is that it relies almost completely on their daily, mundane experiences on 
the frontline, which provide them with immediate, tangible cues on the effectiveness (or 
lack of) of internationalisation strategies (7.1.1). Moreover, these cues often elude those 
higher in the decision-making hierarchy (7.1.2), who are unlikely to engage in the daily 
tasks where strategies are realised. Therefore, it can be beneficial for decision-makers to 
listen to lecturers and students (or other frontliners for that matter) in order to gather 
cues they lack access to. The langcen problem at Red was solved precisely because the 
Vice-Chancellor listened to joint students’ complaints and acted upon it (5.2.3). 
• However, lecturers and students’ voices can only be heard if there is an effective 
communication channel in place. The data offers two such channels: One is social media 
(7.1.4.3). The advantage of social media is its inclusivity, connecting different people from 
various organisational positions and even outside the university, as well as scalability, 
facilitating a large number of people to communicate at the same time. The other 
channel is physical social gathering. This was undertaken by B_MM_LC, who invited 
students to have lunch with him every week and asked them about recent happenings 
(4.4.1). Nonetheless, the data also implies that decision-makers need to take actions 
upon the cues gathered, because otherwise frontliners are not motivated to share 
information. This was what happened with student feedback at Red (5.2.3), which 
students did not believe was taken seriously as they saw little effect resulting from it. 
• Apart from empowerment, the daily, mundane tasks of lecturers and students (and of 
deans for that matter) should be shaped in a way that orients them towards intended 
strategic outcomes (7.1.7). This is because lecturers and students interpret and realise 
internationalisation strategies through the very tasks they encounter on a daily basis as 
part of their assigned roles. 
• Strategic initiatives should be accompanied by incentivising and deterrent mechanisms, 
as well as effective communication. The purpose is to align the university’s interests with 
those of frontliners, which are often utilitarian (7.1.3.3). This is especially true if the 
initiatives disrupt the status quo (e.g. B_MM_EC’s research initiatives disrupted Blue’s 
teaching culture) or make demands that are beyond frontliners’ capacity (e.g. Blue 
students were unfamiliar with academic writing and plagiarism). B_L1_EC used the 
metaphors of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ (4.3.3) to explain the limited success of research at Blue, 
and all the Blue students recalled that the training workshops on Turnitin were very 
technical with little explanation of plagiarism or academic writing (4.4.2, 4.4.3). 
• Attention should be paid to sensemaking constraints such as institutional and (perceived) 
political forces because they can either facilitate or hinder the implementation of 
strategies (7.1.3.2). For example, all Computer Science lecturers and students at Red 
welcomed English as the medium of instruction because English was the language of 
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their discipline (5.2.1). On the other hand, power perception was part of the reason 
B_L3_EC avoided penalising Blue students for plagiarising, consequently compromising 
the Turnitin initiative.  
• Care should be taken when communicating about internationalisation strategies to 
prospective university members (e.g. high school students who might apply). The data 
has shown that one’s sensemaking about a university’s internationalisation strategies can 
start even before his/her entry. This pre-entry sensemaking primes post-entry behaviours 
and therefore has the potential to affect the outcomes of the strategies (7.1.7). For 
example, prior to enrolment at Red,  R_S2_BS had had the impression (of Red’s 
advertisement) that English was used both in and outside lectures, and this motivated her 
to speak English with her friends all the time on campus (5.2.1, 6.3.4). Although she was 
an isolated case, it can be speculated that if many students had acted similarly42 they 
could have created a positively unintended outcome for Red’s EMI strategy. 
• Last but not least, attention should be paid to monitoring social media. Due to its 
inclusivity and scalability, social media greatly facilitates collective sensemaking, which 
makes social media a vast source of information and a springboard for collective actions 
(7.1.4.3). A prime example is the langcen debacle at Red (5.2.3), where social media use 
by students effected change to how the EMI strategy was implemented for joint students.  
 
8.3. Limitations 
The present study exhibits many limitations in the framing of its research question, 
theoretical framework and methodological choices. These limitations originate from either 
the compromises I had to make for feasibility reasons or the conscious decisions to take the 
study in a certain direction and not another. Hereunder an outline of the limitations is 
provided: 
• The research question only covers three groups of non-leaders, namely deans, lecturers 
and students. Based on my use of the term ‘university non-leaders’ (see 1.3), at least 
three other groups are missing: administrative staff (e.g. faculty secretaries, recruitment 
officers), support staff (e.g. cashiers, caterers), functional managers (e.g. head of 
marketing).  
• My application of the SAP approach focuses on the sensemaking praxis of non-leaders 
rather than non-leaders themselves as practitioners or their practices. Therefore, findings 
about the characteristics of my participants (e.g. role features, academic background) and 
about their sensemaking tools, procedures and routines (e.g. social media) have only 
played a supporting role to elaborate on findings about their sensemaking praxis. 
• This study adopts sensemaking theory from a cognitive rather than social perspective. 
Therefore, it remains to be seen how intersubjective meaning (Maitlis & Christianson, 
2014) of internationalisation strategies is made within and between groups of non-
leaders, or what discursive practices are used by which group. 
                                                 
42 This was a possibility considering R_S1_BS and R_S1_IE had the same impression of Red’s advertisement as 
R_S2_BS, in that they thought English was used for all activities. 
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• The methodological design is small scale and involves only two Vietnamese universities 
in the city of Saigon, which also means that my study is limited to internationalisation at 
home (Knight, 2004). Moreover, I focus only on faculties that are active in 
internationalisation. Consequently, little is know about the internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking of non-leaders in other universities in Vietnam and beyond, or in passive 
faculties. 
• The sensemaking of my participants was captured with interview, making the data 
retrospective in nature. Thus, it is not known how internationalisation-strategy 
sensemaking unfolds in realtime. 
 
8.4. Recommendations 
Based on the limitations above, four recommendations can be made for future research on 
university non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies. The recommendations 
are distinct but not mutually exclusive, so researchers could choose to explore one or several 
at the same time. 
• The breadth of evidence should be increased. This involves investigating universities that 
are outside Saigon or Vietnam, or universities that engage in internationalisation abroad 
(Knight, 2004) like those with branch campuses. Moreover, non-leaders from faculties 
that are passive in internationalisation can be included, not least because their 
sensemaking could be the cause of such passiveness. 
• The theoretical framework can also be expanded. Future research can choose to focus on 
non-leaders’ traits and/or the tools, procedures and routines they use to make sense of 
internationalisation strategies; these foci correspond to the elements of practitioner and 
practices in Jarzabkowski and Spee’s (2009) tripartite framework. Moreover, a social 
perspective of sensemaking theory can be adopted instead of the cognitive one.  
• In terms of methodology, methods that capture sensemaking in realtime can be 
deployed. Some examples are observation, whether non-participant or participant, 
shadowing or even participatory data collection, where participants can record their own 
sensemaking. Indeed, the use of such methods has been called for in extant sensemaking 
literature (Maitlis & Christianson, 2004, p. 106). 
• Finally, other groups of non-leaders like administrative and support staff, or functional 
managers should be explored. I would suggest that these non-leaders can be further 
divided into two groups to facilitate focus: One comprises those directly responsible for 
internationalisation, such as recruitment officers, immigration counsellors, human 
resources officers. The other includes those who play a more indirect role in 
internationalisation, such as faculty secretaries, information system managers, marketing 
and design officers. 
 
8.5. Final remarks: A research agenda 
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This study has been a long and rewarding journey for myself as a researcher. Thanks to the 
study, not only have I explored a matter of personal interest and academic significance – the 
(strategic) management of university internationalisation, but I have actually had a few 
opportunities to apply what had been learned to higher education in my home country of 
Vietnam. For instance, after her dismissal, the VC of Blue set up a consultancy agency for 
schools and universities, and she invited me to work on some of her projects. One notable 
project was to assist a newly-established private university in middle Vietnam in planning 
their first strategic period. 
 
Nonetheless, there remains much scope for investigation with regards to how universities 
plan and execute internationalisation. At the very least, the recommendations outlined in the 
last section can be addressed so that a more comprehensive and robust understanding of 
non-leaders’ sensemaking of internationalisation strategies can be gained. Alternatively, a 
move beyond non-leaders and sensemaking theory might also prove valuable for both 
theory and practice. For example, a combination of top management and the resource-based 
view (Regner, 2015) may result in questions around the decision-making processes of top 
management when allocating resources for different international activities (e.g. student 
recruitment versus research partnerships). In this way, although this study has come to an 
end, it has opened a wide research agenda for me.
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APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM 
Dear participant, 
I would like to ask for your consent to participate in the research project ‘Grounding 
Internationalisation: The role of university non-leaders in an internationalisation strategy’. 
The study is conducted as part of my PhD programme at the University of Bath, UK. 
Your identity and responses will be kept confidential and will not be used for any purpose 
except that of my own research. More importantly, you have the right to 1. voice your 
concerns about my data collection should you feel uncomfortable, 2. refuse to respond to 
questions or tasks you think are intrusive, 3. withdraw from the study at any time without 
penalty, in which case I will no longer retain the data and return everything to you. Details of 
your acquaintances and institution may be incorporated into the study but all identifying 
traces will be removed; however, you can negotiate with me which details to be included or 
not. 
Data collection will be conducted via interview. I have enclosed the information sheet of the 
interview procedure in this letter. Please note that you can ask me for clarification, but I 
cannot give a full explanation to avoid data contamination. Towards the end of this study, 
you will receive the data and my analysis for revision of any misrepresentation of yourself, 
your acquaintances or institution.  
Please also note that this study may be published but any information that identifies you, 
your acquaintances or institution will not be used unless stated otherwise by you. 
I would be very grateful if you could participate in my research. 
Should you have any enquiry about the study, please feel free to contact me in person, via 
my phone number, email blt25@bath.ac.uk, or Facebook.  
Please tick as appropriate 
 I would like to participate in this research project 
 I would not like to participate in this research project 
 
Please write your full name and sign 
Participant’s name: 
     
Participant’s signature: 




     
Researcher’s signature: 




APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
ENTRY INTERVIEW 
Focus Data Questions Possible probes 
Internationalisation 
strategies as enacted  
Data A 1. What does your university do to internationalise? Could 
you describe what is international about the university? 
You have often mentioned this international 
aspect/activity. Could you elaborate on it? Why 
is it important to the university? 
Elaboration of formally 
stated internationalisation 
strategies* 
Data A 2. I saw this interesting internationalisation strategy 
mentioned in your corporate strategy. Could you elaborate 
on it? 
Why did you choose this strategy? 





Data C 3. From what you said, it seems this strategy is very 
important. Could you tell me how it is implemented?  
4. What are the challenges in implementation? 
5. What is the role of deans, lecturers and students in 
implementing this strategy? 
6. From your observation, how is the strategy received 
among deans, lecturers and students? 
Why is it a challenge? 
What happens if deans/lecturers/students do 
not complete this task? 
In your opinion, why do 
deans/lecturers/students feel that way about 
this strategy? 
Faculty identification for 
Data collection Stage 2 
 7. Which faculties would you recommend I investigate? 
 
What should I keep in mind when approaching 
the faculty? 
What is the faculty known for in terms of 
internationalisation? 





Focus Data Questions Possible probes 
Academic and managerial 
background 
Data D 1. What is your role as dean?  
2. Please describe your management style. 
3. Could you tell me a bit about your academic and 
managerial background?  
 
What made you come to this university? 
Can you talk a bit more about this 
responsibility? 
How does your previous academic and/or 




strategies (free answer) 
Data C 
 
4. Could you describe the international aspects and activities 
in your faculty? 
5. What do you think about them? 
6. How do you manage them? 
7. In your opinion, what is an international university? 









8. Are you aware of the university’s internationalisation or 
corporate strategy? (show the corporate strategy document) 
I am going to list the internationalisation strategies as 
formally stated, and would like to have your comment on 
each. Do you have it in the faculty and what do you think 
about it? 
Why do you think so about this strategy? 
How is this strategy implemented in the 
faculty? 
How do you manage the implementation? 
 
** using data gathered from document analysis of the corporate strategy and the entry interview 
LECTURER INTERVIEW  
Focus Data Questions Possible probes 
Academic background Data D 1. Please describe your responsibilities as a lecturer here. 
2. Could you tell me a bit about your academic background?  






strategies (free answer) 
Data C 
 
3. Could you describe the international aspects and activities 
in your faculty? 
4. Which international activities have you taken part in? What 
do you think about them? 
5. In your opinion, what is an international university? 









6. Are you aware of the university’s internationalisation or 
corporate strategy? (show the corporate strategy document) 
I am going to list the internationalisation strategies as 
formally stated, and would like to have your comment on 
each. Have you engaged in any activities related to them? 
What do you think about those activities? 
Why do you think so about this strategy? 
 
** using data gathered from document analysis of the corporate strategy and the entry interview 
STUDENT INTERVIEW 
Focus Data Questions Possible probes 
Academic background Data D 1. Can you introduce yourself? What do you study here? What made you apply for this university? 
Sensemaking of 
internationalisation 
strategies (free answer) 
Data C 
 
2. Could you describe the international aspects and activities 
in your faculty? 
3. Which international activities have you taken part in? What 
do you think about them? 
4. In your opinion, what is an international university? 










5. Are you aware of the university’s internationalisation or 
corporate strategy? (show the corporate strategy document) 
I am going to list the internationalisation strategies as 
formally stated, and would like to have your comment on 
each. Have you engaged in any activities related to them? 
What do you think about those activities? 
Why do you think so about this strategy? 
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